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THE JOURNAL c*

OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE

AND

MENTAL PATHOLOGY.

EDITED BY

FORBES WINSLOW, M.D., D.C.L. OXON.

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LONDON:

JOHN CHURCHILL, NEW BURLINGTON STREET.

MDCCCLIX.

LONDON :
SAVILL AND EDWARDS, PRINTERS, CHANDOS STREET,
COVENT GARDEN.

APR 17 1925

THE JOURNAL
OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE
AND
MENTAL PATHOLOGY.

JANUARY 1, 1859.

ART. I.—LITERARY FOOLS.—BLUET D'ARBÈRES.*

FOOL is a technical as well as a conventional word. In its conventional signification it is familiarly known and widely and freely used; in its technical signification it expresses a form of mental disorder, which has been aptly considered by Feuchtersleben as in some measure the prototype of other forms; but the affinity which exists between the conventional and technical meanings of the word is invariably more or less conspicuous even in the freest usage to which it is put in the affairs of common life.

The most marked characteristic of the fool, in the technical sense of the term, is a peculiar abnormal mobility of thought and emotion, which parallels in the mind the erratic and ludicrous movements that are observed in the muscles in choreatic affections—as, for example, in St. Vitus's Dance. In whatever manner the intellectual faculties and the emotions are called into play there is found a preponderance of their automatic manifestations. This is co-existent with, and it is indeed significant of a weakened volitional power, and a deficiency of co-ordination in the mental faculties. The thoughts, imperfectly controlled by the will, hasten along as in the consistent-inconsistency of dreaming, and they are reflected in the voluble tongue and restless actions; while the emotions rapidly succeed each other, joy alternating with grief, anger with fear, upon the most trifling incitements.

In the slighter, connate forms of the disease the abnormal mobility of thought is shown in the eccentric and fantastic associations of the ideas which throng the mind. Every thought and sensation excites an anomalous sequence of ideas, which commonly present actions and events in a ludicrous light. This species

* “Études Bio-Bibliographiques sur les Fous Littéraires.” Par Octave Delepierre.—(*Privately printed.*)

of folly is quite consistent with considerable powers of perception and observation; but it is never dissociated with those general indications of weakened intellectual power which are summed up in the expressive word *foolishness*. It was for this rarer form of folly that the Court fools of the middle-ages were chiefly distinguished; and the fantastic nimbleness of fancy which characterizes it have been fixed indelibly in language, by Shakspeare, in the characters of the Fool in "King Lear," the Clown in "Twelfth Night, or What You Will," and Touchstone, in "All's Well that Ends Well."

In the more highly-developed forms of folly disconnected ideas course in rapid succession through the mind, crowding one upon the other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and the emotions change with, and as rapidly as, the conceptions. Hence, in fools of this class, a general craziness of thought is observed, an overwhelming, senseless loquacity, and a motiveless bustling activity. They are forgetful, volatile, inconsiderate, and incapable of reasoning; and their passions are easily excited, readily calmed, and rarely terminate in violence.

There are many modifications of folly, and it is connected by insensible gradations with idiocy on the one hand and mania on the other. Hallucinations are present in nearly every form of the disease, and delusions are probably of more frequent occurrence than is commonly supposed.

The technical, rather than the conventional meaning of the term, is most applicable to the word "fool" as it is used in the Essay which forms the subject of this article. Bluet d'Arbères, to an account of whose life and writings the Essay is devoted, was a fool of some little note in his day. The most marked phase of his folly was exhibited in certain strange literary productions, the chief value of which, at the present time, arises from the curious psychological study they afford, and from the little flecks of light they cast upon the social economy of France and Savoy during the five last lustres of the sixteenth, and first lustre of the seventeenth centuries. The records of Bluet d'Arbères' acts and doings have been disinterred and reduced into a reasonable compass by M. Delepierre, with a delightful pseudo-serious unction; and bibliographer, historian, and psychologist, will dwell with rapture upon the daintily-set gem of literature which he has presented to them.

This, with a few additions, is M. Delepierre's story:—In the year of Grace, 1566, there was born, of poor parents, in the village of Arbères, near Divonne, in the territory of Gex, Switzerland, one Bernard de Bluet. As a lad he tended flocks, and very early in life he believed that Providence destined him to play an important part in the world. He tells us himself, in his curious autobiography,

that the village of his birth was situated in the lowlands, and that towards the sun-setting there were grand ranges of mountains where rocks and sweet-smelling herbs alone could be seen; and that towards the sun-rising there were but swamps. He tells us also that he remembered all that he had done and said even from the cradle. When an infant he was held in the arms by one of the great men of the village, and as soon as he could walk he began to climb upon the great coffers of the peasants, and sing in a loud voice to the Lord. It was a custom of the peasants who had sown millet to place images of Christ in the fields, in order to scare the birds. These images Bluet was in the habit of stealing from the great desire that he had to know God. When he began to tend sheep a wolf attacked them, but he cried to God and the ravenous beast fled. Even a companion who had played him a foul trick, while he slept, was constrained to confess the fault, and forthwith the offender died. These events happened in the first lustre of Bluet's life.

So great was the influence of his childish prayers, that, so long as he had charge of sheep, they were safe from the wolf, but if his father took charge of them they were at once attacked. Moreover, he recounts, that being cold in the month of March, he prayed that the clouds which hid the face of the sun might be removed, and God in answer to his prayer dispersed them. His mind was filled with the desire to become a preacher from the respect in which learned men were held, and from a wish (in a great measure prompted by vanity) to teach his companions, and he prayed constantly to God that he might have knowledge and science. The gifts and graces of David and Moses made a great impression upon his childish mind; but, alas! there steals out of his account, at every turn, the painful fact that his solitary musings and vague desires were determined in no small degree from his being scouted and laughed at by children of his own age for his simplicity and foolishness.

Before the termination of his second lustre his father wished him to take charge of a herd of cows. To this Bluet objected, as he conceived that the cow was not so worthy a beast as a sheep, that being the most worthy of all animals except the dove. Compelled, however, by necessity he began to tend kine, and he naively tells us that he found it a less devotional duty than that of tending sheep, as the cows were never attacked by the wolf, and hence there was not so great an inducement to devotion. His mind, therefore, being less pre-occupied by holy thoughts, he was persecuted by his feelings to love unchastely the peasant girls. He was an enemy to all other vices, but he found that this was the most pleasant vice.

Before his twelfth year he prophesied that the country about

Geneva would become the seat of war; and he told his companions that, when he became a great man, they would see him in the suite of princes, and afterwards of kings, and if it pleased God he should wear habits like unto theirs, satin and velvet, tricked out with gold.

In the midst of vague childish dreams he longed with impatience to distinguish himself by some warlike exploit. He made cuirasses of the bark of trees, morions of pumpkins, sabres, arquebuses, and pistols of wood, &c., with which he proposed to arm his companions, and to conduct them to some prince who might desire to have their services; and with the profits obtained by the sale of baskets at Geneva he bought taffeta, from which he made ensigns of war. When these preparations were completed, he communicated his project to those of his comrades whom he placed most confidence in. He afterwards distributed the arms to them, and conferred upon each of them a title of nobility, and declared himself to be their chief, without asking their consent. The boys and girls of the village fanned Bluet's notions by adopting them and paying court to him; but he tells us that when he first made known his great preparations and high ambition, his parents took their stand near him, and weeping exclaimed, "that he did them shame, and they had rather have nourished a pig than him." But he told them that they dishonoured him, and that he would be an honour to them, and heap them with favours, whilst he would be disgraced by them.

Believing that it was beneath him to gain a livelihood by the work of his hands, he fled from home (when he was about twelve years of age, according to his own story). One of the principal inhabitants of Rumilly received him, from charity, into his house, and as he stated that it was his intention to marry, this was made a plea to decide him in selecting an occupation which would give him an opportunity of bringing up a family when he might have one.

He then undertook the trade of wheelwright, and he was employed for some time in mounting cannon, at the Fort of the Annonciade, in Savoy. As soon, however, as he had obtained a little money, he dressed himself in carnation-coloured garments, placed a feather in his cap, and with a sword at his side and poniard in his girdle, he hastened to his native village to show himself, thus accoutred, to his poor comrades. The compliments they lavished upon him, on account of his brilliant equipment, still further unsettled his brain; he assured them of his protection, and believing that he had become an important personage, he dubbed himself *Superintendent of Artillery-mounters of the Castle of the Annonciade*.

While at Rumilly he was occasionally admitted to the tables of the gentry, and he enacted there the character of Fool, although

he attributes his admission to an acknowledgment of his genius and talents.

He quitted Rumilly when sixteen years of age, and offered his services to the governor of the citadel of Montmélian, who consented to give him employment. His vanity exposed him in this city to many misadventures, which he recounts very naïvely, but always having care to give them a creditable aspect in so far as he was concerned. Angered, however, by the tricks which his comrades made him the victim of, he left Montmélian, and after having wandered some time in the neighbourhood of Chambéry, leading a very austere life, in order to reduce his temperament, he set out again for Arbères, and announced himself there as a prophet sent from God to convert the Philistines, as he termed the Protestants. Bluet had been born and baptised a Protestant, but whilst living at Rumilly he had embraced the Romanist doctrines. The announcement of his prophetic mission at Arbères not having produced the effect he intended, he shook the dust from his feet, and, in 1597, sought the Duke of Savoy, at Chambéry. This prince (who is named King David by Bluet in his writings), being amused at his extravagances, clothed him in his livery, and assigned him a maintenance. In the suite of this Prince, Bluet travelled through Piedmont, and saw Alessandria, Asti, and Turin, where he passed several years, serving as a butt for the pleasantries of the courtiers. They had persuaded him without difficulty that all the demoiselles of Turin contended for the happiness of pleasing him; but he had given the preference to the mistress of the Duke of Savoy, and he carried publicly her colours. One day, when he was upon his knees before this lady, the duke caused him to be seized by four lackeys, and tossed in a blanket, like the unfortunate squire of Don Quixote. This discourteous treatment displeased him, and he demanded his *congé*, which he obtained without difficulty. He went into France to see the great Emperor Theodosius (as he termed Henri Quatre), who, however, did nothing for him.

When thirty-four years of age, Bluet began to publish his lucubrations, in the form of small pamphlets or fly-sheets, of which upwards of one hundred are known to bibliographers. These sheets contain a curious collection of fantastic and incoherent visions and dreams, devotional exercises, and many particulars of Bluet's life. Religious delusions form the most notable characteristics of the different writings, and much lasciviousness of thought is found in them; but a certain degree of shrewdness crops out here and there.

In the title to his collected works Bluet writes:—

"The INTITULATION and collection of all the works of Bernard de Bluet D'Arbères, Count by Permission, Chevalier of the XIII. Con-

federated Swiss Cantons: the said Count by Permission gives you to understand that he knows not, neither has he ever known, how to read, or to write, except by the inspiration of God, and the guidance of Angels, and for the goodness and mercy of God. And the whole shall be dedicated to the high and puissant Henry of Bourbon, King of France and of Navarre, great Emperor Theodosius, chiefest son of the Church, Monarch of the Gauls, the first of the world, by the grace, goodness, and mercy of God.

This is to make declaration of the books which have been printed in his name, which have had their fulfilment, reserving three of all my works, until it pleaseth God to call me. And there shall be given, concerning all my works bound in one, declarations to all the governors and great lords of the earth who are my friends, and it (sic) shall be dated the day and the time that they shall have received and printed them, and shall be taken for a testimony to declare the truth of the visions which have not yet had their fulfilment, and to declare the truth of those which shall have fulfilment if it please God. May, 1600, in 12°."

Equally curious and significant of mental disorder is the title which heads his Book of Orisons. It runs thus:—

"ORISONS, which have been given to Bernard de Bluet d'Arbères, Count by Permission, by the inflammation and inspiration of the Holy Ghost and of the Angels: they were not given to him when he frequented the world, but when he frequented the catacombs (testes des mortes) at Meing, near Chambery, which is the most ancient church of Savoy, and the solitary places, and not for his good deeds, but according to the grace and goodness and mercy of the holy court celestial."

The amusing character of Bluet's egotism is well shown in one of his visions:—

"It appeared to me," he writes, "that I was transported to the house of a great lady, one of my friends. I was dressed in an antique habit, and carried a *palle de feu* in my hand. There was a table covered with vessels of silver-gilt. . . Three Capuchins who had resplendent (*reflambante*) faces said to the company that they had come to see me. I spoke to them, the tears distilling from their eyes, and they said to me, 'You have the very highest obligation from the Great God on high; there never was, and there never will be, a Pope able to do this which you have done. Your books will reign even to the end of the world; you will be regarded as a wonder in the future, which you are not now; show us your works.' I showed them. When they had (seen) them, they commenced to sing in a loud voice, 'Glory be given to the great God Eternal, and blessings be upon your actions and your works.' I said to them, 'This is nothing in comparison to that which I shall do in the future, if it please God. I am about to remove all the difficulties of all the divisions, including Turkey, &c.'"

In Paris Bluet led the life of a literary vagabond, barely subsisting and meanly clad, standing at the doors of the great to

present his books in hope of receiving a handsome gift in return, and spending such money as he did obtain mainly in printing his sheets. At length he died; and in the manner of his death the Fool became enabled. The plague broke out in Paris in 1603, and ravaged the city for several years, at the acme of the outbreak the deaths numbering two thousand every day. About the year 1606, Bluet conceived that it was his duty to intercede with God by prayer and fasting, and to offer up his life as an expiatory sacrifice for the plague-stricken city. He retired to the cemetery of St. Etienne, and there, amidst the tombs, rapt in devotion, he fasted; and on the fifteenth day he died, happy in the thought that his death would stay the pestilence.

Such is an outline of the life and character of Bluet d'Arbères. The peculiarities which distinguished his folly differed little from childhood to the grave. The childish personal vanity which he exhibited in the first two lustres of his life clung to him until death, deepening merely as he advanced in life into a more absorbing egotism. His vanity prompted the most fantastic phases of his love-dreams and amorous delusions; but these were mainly induced by an ungovernable lasciviousness of thought which manifested itself first in childhood. That eccentric fashion in which his vanity showed itself when a child, by the mode in which he attached names of nobility to himself and comrades, was exhibited also at every period of life in the divers titles he from time to time assumed; and somewhat akin to this grotesque fancy was the passion he displayed to attach symbolical names or titles to those persons of dignity with whom he was thrown into contact. The childish longing for religious distinction which he indulged in while tending his flocks formed the substratum of those notions of inspiration which dominated the major part of his life and acts, and which culminated in the delusion which ended his days.

Bluet d'Arbères was not the solitary fool of his time. A contemporary writer ranks him among a number of madmen who, in the epoch preceding the civil wars in France, wandered from city to city. These men, bearded and having dishevelled hair, filthy and half-naked, recounted to all they met in the market-places and public resorts the "fantasies of their black frenzy," from the morning until the setting of the sun.

The religious notions which were dominant in the delusions of Bluet d'Arbères were but the reflex of the sole absorbing general feeling of the days in which he lived. The year in which he first saw the light is seared with the scheme which was concerted between Catherine of Medicis and Philip of Spain for the total extermination of the Protestants by fire and sword. Bluet d'Arbères lived through the wars which tore up France and the

Low Countries with the horrible mitraille of religious discord ; and the enthusiastic, unrestrained nature of the religious opinions held in those days are shown in his delusions and writings. He was sufficiently shrewd to see the folly of the struggles between Huguenot and Catholic, and in his 21st Book he writes :—

“There are the preachers of both religions : the most part of their preaching is to incite the professors of the one religion to cut the throats of those of the other. The Protestant preacher preaches that the poor papists make a God of paste and a silver goblet : they are idolaters. The Catholic preachers say that the Calvinists are dogs who eat flesh at all times. The Count by Permission gives you to understand on the part of God that it is not well to retail all these words. . . . that of thirty thousand who go to the church there is not one who does his duty.”

Bluet d'Arbères was from birth a fool, and as such his contemporaries held him ; but his works have been the cause of foolishness, in the conventional sense of the term, in others. Writings exist of men who have thought that they have discovered in this poor fool's works marks of true inspiration, or of the occult analysis which would lead to the discovery of the philosopher's stone. The faith which Bluet d'Arbères reposed in his inspiration, and the prophetic character of his visions and dreams, was doubtless indulged also by several individuals in his own time, as it will probably be by some in ours. The divinely-prophetic power of the madman is no new belief, and Ennemoser, in his work on “ Magic,” not long ago published in an English guise, by Mr. Howitt, quotes two instances of the prophetic power of fools. One example will suffice :—

“Claus, the fool, at Weimar suddenly entered the privy council, and exclaimed, ‘There you are all, consulting about very weighty things, no doubt ; but no one considers how the fire in Coburg is to be extinguished.’” It was afterwards discovered that a fire had been raging at the very time in Coburg.”*

We fear that M. Delepierre will have his eyes upon M. Ennemoser and his writings.

Literary fools are of no specific age and date. It would perhaps not be difficult, even in these days, to lay hands on works from which the freshness is scarcely worn off, but which have a marked similitude to Bluet d'Arbères' writings. M. Delepierre quotes many instances of literary fools in past centuries, and he wickedly hints that Kant and Hegel (if the anecdotes told of them are to be believed) are not so widely separated from the class of which Bluet d'Arbères will become in future a representative, that they may escape altogether outside its bound-

* “The History of Magic.” By Joseph Ennemoser. Translated from the German by William Howitt. Bohn. Vol. I. p. 80.

daries. M. Delepiere, however, promises in due time to furnish us with essays on the whole of the distinguished literary fools and eccentrics of history, and we shall wait with impatience for the second part of that series of which Bluet d'Arbères forms so fascinating an introduction.

ART. II.—ON PUERPERAL INSANITY.

WE have selected the comprehensive title of "Puerperal Insanity," as the heading to some observations on unsoundness of mind especially attached to the puerperal state, in preference to that of puerperal *mania*, which, although much more frequently used, is certainly imperfect; inasmuch as mania is only one of the various forms assumed by the intellectual disorder, which so frequently supervenes during this period. In the outset we would state that the period to which we here allude as the "puerperal," extends, in our plan, from the moment of conception to about a fortnight after the cessation of lactation; or, in the absence of this latter function, to about two months or ten weeks after delivery. And this period admits of a natural division into three minor ones, during which the mental disorder is characterized by phenomena and reactions sufficiently marked—viz., (1) the period of pregnancy; (2) that of delivery and six weeks succeeding; and (3) that of lactation and a week or ten days subsequently. During each of these sub-periods mental disorder may supervene, due to the physiological and quasi-pathological condition; and may assume the forms of mania, melancholia, hallucinations, illusions, and partial delirium (or monomania). These forms are generally admitted by writers; we venture to add to them *acute dementia*—an illustration of which we shall give from our own note-book, in due course. Dementia, in a chronic form, has been allowed by some authors to form a certain proportion of the cases.

In attempting to give a view, as comprehensive as our limits will permit, of the present state of our knowledge of this difficult section of morbid psychology, we propose in some measure to follow the plan of M. Marcé, a recent French writer on this subject, whose contributions have been for some years appearing from time to time in the Continental journals; and who has now collected them, with additions, into one compendious treatise.* We shall avail ourselves largely of his valuable collection of data,

* *Traité de la Folie des Femmes Enceintes, des nouvelles accouchées, et des nourrices; et considérations medico-legales qui se rattachent à ce sujet.* Par le Dr. L. V. Marcé. Paris, 1858.

and add such observations from other sources as may seem desirable for further illustration.

M. Esquirol remarks (in 1819) that although much had been written concerning the diseases to which women recently confined were liable, and the consequences of the supposed *metastasis* of the lacteal secretion, yet very little had been said on the subject of the *mental* maladies which make their appearance after delivery, or during lactation; and in a brief memoir he treats upon the frequency, the causes, the nature, and the treatment, of these affections. For long after this, however, writers passed hastily over the subject, only enumerating the puerperal state as one frequent cause of mental unsoundness. We have before us one systematic work on insanity, of no very ancient date, in which the whole of this branch of our science is passed over in seven or eight lines.

And yet it would appear that puerperal insanity was well worthy of separate study, whether from the frequency of its occurrence, the gravity of its character, its clearly-marked etiological relations, its amenability to treatment, or lastly, its important legal bearings.

There are many reasons why it is difficult to determine with any approach to accuracy the absolute number, or the relative proportions, of these diseases to the number of persons confined. In private obstetric practice such cases are not generally made known; the friends of the sufferer naturally wish it to be kept secret; and the medical attendant in the majority of cases has no interest in keeping the statistics of his practice with any accuracy. It would appear that in institutions devoted to lying-in women, there would be no difficulty in arriving at some definite conclusions; but here the case is even worse, for instead of having no data, we get incorrect ones—from this cause, that in such places, the women generally only remain about a fortnight after delivery; whereas insanity may occur a month or six weeks after this period; and, where the child is suckled, it may occur at any period during lactation. Hence arises the discrepancy of the accounts, and the generally small stated proportions of such cases to the whole number of deliveries. Dr. Reid stated in this journal, in 1848, that out of 3500 women confined at the General Lying-in Hospital in Westminster, where the patients remained three weeks after delivery, only nine were attacked with insanity. At Queen Charlotte's Lying-in Hospital, in 2000 cases there were 11 of insanity; this greater proportion was considered due to the greater number of unmarried females admitted here. In two other collections of cases we meet with 950 in which no instance of insanity, and 1888 in which only one occurred, which was very soon cured.

When we inquire into the proportion which puerperal insanity bears to the other forms, we are enabled to arrive at some definite results. M. Esquirol states, in the memoir before mentioned, that at the Salpêtrière from one-twelfth to one-tenth of the females there received are affected with puerperal insanity. In 1119 women there were 92 such cases; in 1812 and 1813 there were 60 in 600 cases. In private practice the proportion is still larger, the same authority giving the numbers are 21 in 144 cases. At Bethlehem, during five years, there were 111 cases of puerperal insanity out of the entire number of 899 women admitted. Other statistics are as follows—the periods of admission not specified:—

	Entire Number of Females admitted.			Cases of Puerperal Insanity.		
Hanwell	708	79
Reported by Dr. Macdonald	691	49
By M. Parchappe	596	33
By M. Lellier	97	11
By Dr. Webster	282	17
By Dr. Kirkbride	2752	116
By M. Mitivié	242	9

Summing up these, and many other details, we find that about one-twelfth part of the women who are received as insane into asylums, are so in consequence of the puerperal condition, or as a sequel to it.

It is next proper to inquire at what period of the puerperal state these cases occur. Bearing in mind the division into sub-periods above noticed, we find that by far the greater number of cases occur in the second, or that immediately after delivery, and in the next six weeks. In the 92 cases mentioned by Esquirol, 54 occurred in this period, and 38 during lactation. In a report from Hanwell, in this journal, in 1848, 48 cases were mentioned, of which 4 occurred in the first period (pregnancy), 26 in the second, and 13 in the third, or suckling period. Dr. Macdonald found, in 66 cases, 4 in the first period, 44 in the second, and 18 in the third. M. Marcé, in 79 cases, found 18 developed during pregnancy, 41 after confinement, and 20 during lactation. M. Marcé has collected 310 cases from various authors, which are thus distributed:—

Developed during pregnancy	27
After confinement	180
During lactation	103

Total 310

In forming a judgment upon these statistics it must not be forgotten that the absolute number of women confined is much larger than that of those who suckle. The influence of lacta-

tion, therefore, is not fully shown by such relative proportions as the above.

After these preliminary considerations we shall proceed to offer some observations upon these cases of insanity in chronological order; and first upon those occurring during pregnancy. During 30 or 35 years of female life, the uterus and its functions exercise a most powerful and important influence, not only over the animal economy, but also over the moral and intellectual nature. This influence is very specially marked during pregnancy, when the entire nervous system frequently acquires an excessive mobility and sensitiveness to all impressions—evidenced by vomitings, syncopes, cramps, and vertigo; *occasionally* partial paralysis, deafness, amaurosis, chorea, epilepsy, and hysterical crisis. The moral nature indicates its subjection to the same influence by an unwonted excitement of the faculties, or more frequently by a tendency to extreme depression and discouragement. This is in many cases purely psychical, but not in all. In *primiparæ* especially, there are many physical causes—such as the important changes in life, residence, occupations, &c.; in these, also, pregnancy is not always a happy event; but, even amongst those who have every cause for rejoicing, the same depression will often occur, and one fixed idea will often take possession of the mind. There is a strong conviction of a fatal termination, or there is a fear of some deformity in the child, &c. At the same time the digestive functions are disordered, the respiration and circulation are troubled, sleep is broken and disturbed, and there is a tendency to fainting. On the other hand, some naturally melancholic women present a strange excitement and gaiety during this period. The singular tastes and propensities manifested at such times are too familiar to require notice; but some of the recorded cases are sufficiently curious to merit quotation. Vandermonde (quoted by M. Marcé) relates the case of a woman who became hydrophobic during the first four months of each of her eleven pregnancies. Soon after conception she began to drink very little, and by-and-bye the horror of fluids was so great, that she could neither drink herself, nor could she bear others to drink in her presence. To cross a running stream was almost impossible to her. M. Cazeux relates the case of a young lady, *primipara*, who, during her pregnancy, felt the most unconquerable aversion to her husband, whom at other times she most tenderly loved; and of another, who took so decided an antipathy to her home, that she had to go into the country to be confined, in spite of all the efforts of her reason.

All these peculiarities are not insanity; they are moreover marked by one favourable characteristic—viz., that they, for the most part, diminish or disappear as pregnancy advances, and *very rarely* last after delivery, or pass into insanity at that

period. M. Marcé states that out of 79 cases of disturbed intellect during labour, he only found six who had exhibited any well-marked peculiarities during pregnancy. This furnishes an excellent index for treatment. To correct by the mildest means any marked somatic disorder, to prescribe moderate exercise, and a careful moral hygiene, are the principal points to be kept in view—always remembering that, in a short time, nature will in all probability effect its cure, if not too officiously interfered with, or disturbed by so-called remedies too potent for the occasion.

But these intellectual disturbances may pass into veritable insanity; and between the one form and the other there are innumerable gradations, of which it is often difficult to say to which category they belong. M. Marcé has some remarks on this point, which are valuable:—

“There is one point which has struck us, and which, we believe, may aid the physician in his diagnosis; it is, that the tendency to sadness, and all the modifications of character and intelligence with which we meet at the outset of pregnancy, become, in general, less and less marked as this advances, and especially after passing the third month. Now, we observe exactly the contrary in the facts of true mental alienation. Setting aside those cases, where conception gives immediately the signal for the outbreak of insanity, this does not generally appear until after the third month—more frequently the sixth or seventh; and it does not in general disappear during pregnancy at all.”

Two observations, by the same writer, are worthy of notice, in reference to the *causes* of the insanity of pregnant women; the first is that, after *heritage*, moral influences of a painful character are amongst the most frequent causes—such as circumstances requiring a concealment (were it possible) of the pregnancy. The second is, that this form of insanity is not so frequent amongst primiparæ as amongst those who have had two or three children. At the same time he states that the number of his own observations is too small to make this a well-ascertained conclusion.

A previous attack seems to predispose to a recurrence. Sometimes the attacks occur with alternate pregnancies; some are only observed with male children; and many other varieties are noticeable. The precise time of the outbreak is variable; sometimes it is truly and strictly *sympathetic*;* the appearance of the mental disorder is synchronous with conception, and its disappearance with delivery. At other (and more frequent) times the

* The word “*sympathetic*,” as here made use of, requires a little definition, being intended to imply something more specific than its usual significance. We call one affection *sympathetic* with another, when it is strictly coincident with it as to commencement and termination; when the two appear clearly to stand in the relation of cause and effect; and *sublatâ causâ, tollitur effectus*. Thus, a lady ex-

sympathy is imperfect, and the disorder appears from the third to the seventh month.

The form assumed by the mental disorder is in the majority of cases *melancholy*, with tendency, it may be, to suicide, with or without hallucinations. In other cases the form is maniacal. It may be stated here that whatever is the special type of insanity of puerperal women, occurring at any period, whether mania, melancholia, partial delusions, or dementia, these differ in no respect from the corresponding form occurring in the non-puerperal condition. Dr. Gooch remarks, that "if a physician was taken into the chamber of a patient, whose mind had become deranged from lying-in or nursing, he could not tell, from the mere condition of the mind, that the disease had originated in these causes." M. Marcé says also: "Disons seulement que rien dans les symptômes, la marche et la physionomie de ces deux maladies (mania and melancholia) chez la femme enceinte, ne permet de la distinguer des maladies de même nature observées dans des conditions ordinaires de santé." Dr. Macdonald,* however, considers that there is one sign which attaches especially to puerperal insanity:—"In the acute form of the mania which succeeds parturition we observe an intensity of mental excitement, an excessive incoherence, a degree of fever, and, above all, a disposition to mingle obscene words with the broken sentences—things which are rarely noted under other circumstances. It is true that in mania modest women use words which in health are never permitted to issue from their lips; but, in puerperal insanity, this is so common an occurrence, and is done in so gross a manner, that it early struck me as being characteristic." Dr. Campbell also remarks, that the patient, "though remarkably devout when sane, now launches out into such a torrent of obscene language, that one would be astonished that respectable females could have become familiar with such expressions." These peculiarities belong more especially to the form of mania which succeeds confinement.

The prognosis of these cases of true derangement is very uncertain. It is unfortunately not the case that they terminate per se at each menstrual period violent pains in the face and neck; a fibrous tumour of the uterus is detected and removed, and the neuralgia disappears entirely. Esquirol attended a young lady who became deranged on a suppression of the menses, and was restored immediately they began to flow again. Guislain relates the case of a girl who had prolapsus of the uterus, and who was affected with the most profound sadness, with tendency to suicide, whenever the neck of the uterus presented itself at the opening of the vagina. Such cases as these are illustrations of what we call complete *sympathy*: those in which the mental affection lasts much beyond the organic disease, or physical cause, or where it ceases whilst such causes are still in operation, are examples of *imperfect sympathy*. Cases of the former class are much more favourable as to prognosis and indications of treatment than the latter.

* "Journal of Psychological Medicine," No. 3, p. 534-5.

with delivery in more than about one-third of the number. In M. Marcé's 19 cases 7 terminated at this period, or near it; but 4 of these cases were purely *sympathetic*—that is, had begun at the period of conception; such as these may generally be expected to terminate thus favourably. It is rare that an attack of insanity begins and ends within one pregnancy. M. Esquirol relates one case, and Madame Boivin another; besides these, M. Marcé has not met with any.* In the majority of cases the labour seems to exert little influence upon the march of the disorder; some cases remain permanently incurable; others continue for months and even years, without much change, and then gradually subside. The termination by death is not frequent. This fact is of much practical importance, as throwing discredit upon the plan that has been occasionally adopted, of attempting to cut short the mental affection, by inducing premature labour. This can only be expected to succeed when the affection is of that strictly sympathetic nature above noticed. The treatment must be conducted on principles precisely similar to those which guide us in analogous cases, uncomplicated by pregnancy; being careful to avoid energetic measures. Indeed, in many cases, it must be almost entirely expectant; comprising such precautions as are necessary for the safety of the life of mother and child.

During labour a transitory delirium occasionally supervenes, which, although not frequent, it is important to notice from its legal relations. At the latter period of labour, when the pain becomes most intolerable, some women become so excited as to lay violent hands upon the child, if possible—to attempt suicide—and to view with hatred the husband and child to whom they are most tenderly attached. Osiander delivered of twins a woman, whom two strong men could scarcely prevent from throwing herself out of the window. He also relates the case of a plethoric woman at Strasbourg, who, in the midst of the most violent pains, demanded that she should be cut open, and herself obtained a knife to attempt it. Another instance, by the same writer, would appear to have something incredible in it. It is that of a negress, who, being seized with delirium during a long and painful labour, cut open her body, extracted the infant, and recovered! We shall have occasion to return to this subject, should our limits permit us to speak of the judicial relations of pregnancy and parturition: we now pass on to notice the insanity of the recently-confined and of nurses; and first concerning its etiology.

The earliest notice of this is found in Hippocrates, who announces in the 40th Aphorism of the 4th section, that "a congestion of blood in the mammæ announces insanity." Some

* Since writing the above, we have met with a few instances, mentioned by various authors.

writers have quoted cases in support of this opinion. Van Rossum relates that M. Pieters saw a woman yielding blood instead of milk; the fourth day she became maniacal, and died the seventh. Planchou relates a similar phenomenon;—on the fourth day of the flow of blood, loquacity supervened, and a maniacal delirium followed which lasted till death, a month afterwards. But cases of this kind are few in number; and others of a totally opposite significance abound, in which blood flowed from the breast, without any evil consequences; and also in which insanity appeared without any such symptoms. It would not tend to any valuable practical result to enter minutely into the ancient theories of the causes of the mental disorders of puerperal women. They are all founded upon the hypothesis, that after labour, the milk escapes by the breasts and by the lochial discharge, and that when from any cause this secretion is turned from its natural direction it affects the brain, either by being deposited upon or within it, or by making the blood impure. Thus, even for such men as Sydenham, Levret, and Van Swieten, the suppression of the milk or of the lochiæ is an essential condition for the development of the mental disorder. What are the facts which bear upon this view?—

Examining the reports of such cases as occurred during the six weeks succeeding labour, *in those who did not suckle*, we find that a considerable proportion did not occur until after the first month—that is, until a period when the lochial discharge has naturally subsided. Amongst those which occurred earlier we find eleven illustrative cases. In one, the suppression of the discharge coincided with the outbreak of the delirium; in two the suppression was subsequent to it. In seven the lochiæ continued to flow three weeks or a month, being at most slightly diminished at the period of the appearance of the mental disturbance. Lastly, in one case, the patient had attacks of insanity after repeated confinements, and in some the lochiæ stopped, and in others continued to flow. M. Marcé, commenting on these facts, proposes to reverse the usual verdict, and to say that “puerperal insanity in some cases suspends the lochial secretion, by reason of the general perturbation of the system which it induces; but more frequently exerts no influence upon it.”

If we examine also the phenomena attendant upon the secretion of milk, in reference to the development of the psychical disturbance, we shall find that the relation is equally undefined. Sometimes the insanity breaks out at the very time when the secretion of milk commences, and at other times at the period of weaning; moreover, in many cases, the secretion continues unaffected during the whole course of the most marked derangement. We may conclude, therefore, that the proximate cause of puer-

peral insanity is not to be found in the suppression of milk, or of the lochiæ.

In rejecting this theory we naturally wish to fall back upon some other; and we attribute the development of puerperal insanity to the reactions between a system predisposed to such derangements, and the normal physiological conditions which are found after confinement: just as in constitutions predisposed to tetanus, or nervous delirium, these will be developed after the slightest accidents or operations. The pains of labour, the lively emotions which often accompany it, and the large suppurating surface which results after the expulsion of the fœtus, will bear a very close comparison with the course and results of a serious surgical operation. After a time, also, temporary secretions are established, which, both at their commencement and their termination, necessarily induce serious changes both in the circulating and nervous systems. Dr. Gooch's opinion on this subject is worthy of much attention:—

“The cause of puerperal mania is that peculiar state of the sexual system which occurs after delivery.”

He afterwards explained and commented upon this as follows:—

“What I meant was this: the sexual system in women is a set of organs which are in action only during half the natural life of the individual; and even during this half they are in action only at intervals. During these intervals of action they diffuse an unusual excitement throughout the nervous system—witness the hysteric affections of puberty, the nervous susceptibility which occurs during every menstrual period, the nervous affections of breeding, and the nervous susceptibility of lying-in women. I do not mean that these appearances are to be observed in every instance of puberty, menstruation, pregnancy, and childbirth; but that they occur sufficiently often to show that these states are liable to produce those conditions of the nervous system. . . . Dr. Marshall Hall thinks that the susceptibility of the puerperal state is to be explained by mere exhaustion; and does not at all depend on the influence of anything specific in the condition of the several organs at that time; but would an equal or a greater degree of exhaustion at *any* time occasion the disease? This is a question of fact, that I should answer in the negative. I have seen patients who have been deranged in childbed, and who had recovered, at a future period much more exhausted by illness, and much more agitated in mind, without the slightest appearance of mental derangement.”

Having a condition of body at least as well prepared for delirium as it would be after a serious operation; and a state of mind in general much more so; we cannot feel any surprise at derangement supervening on certain occasions, especially when the *predisposing causes* are powerful.

At the head of these, as is the case in all mental affections, we

may place hereditary influence. M. Esquirol states the proportion of those thus liable, to those attacked, at about 2 in 5. Dr. Gooch says: "A very large proportion occurred in patients in whose families disordered minds had already appeared." Dr. Burrows says that out of 80 women, who became delirious after labour, above half had an hereditary predisposition to insanity. The following are other statistics:—

	No. of cases of puerperal insanity.		No. of cases of hereditary predisposition.
By Dr. Helfft, of Berlin	131	—	51
„ M. Weill, of Stephansfeld	30	—	14
„ M. Marcé	56	—	24

No doubt these proportions would require considerable increase, as there are great numbers of cases where no history can be got; there are also numbers which are allied to families where great nervous excitability prevails, perhaps not amounting to alienation, but liable to be developed into that under any favourable conditions.

Anæmia, whether primitive or consecutive to repeated pregnancies or hæmorrhages, is a powerful predisposing cause of mental alienation. Its symptoms are here, as in ordinary cases, paleness of skin and of mucous membrane, small pulse, weakness of the digestive functions, emaciation, and weakness of the muscular system; the *bruit de souffle* is likewise heard if the anæmia passes certain limits.

Authors differ as to the effect of repeated pregnancies upon the production of mental alienation; it has generally been considered that the liability is greater in the first pregnancy. M. Marcé disputes this, however, and finds amongst 57 patients only 14 primiparæ; and amongst the 43 remaining cases 13 had been confined five, six, and even nine times. This he explains by the greater debility produced by repeated confinements.

The influence of age is sufficiently marked: the further removed is the patient from the most favourable age for childbearing, 20 to 30, the greater is the liability to mental disturbance, judging from the statistics. These are of rather too complicated a nature to be made clear in a brief statement.

A previous attack appears strongly to predispose to a recurrence of the mental disorder; or an attack of insanity in the non-puerperal state has very much the same influence. It appears also, according to some authorities, that the attacks in successive confinements do not increase in intensity—the patient often recovers from the later ones more readily than from the earlier. Esquirol relates the case of one woman who was attacked by puerperal insanity ten times; and on the last occasion recovered in a few weeks. Dr. Ramsbotham considers that the chances of

a patient becoming insane after a subsequent confinement, who has been so in one, are very small, "Although (he adds) as the former attack proves that a predisposition then existed, and may still be operating, that very circumstance would strongly impress us with the *possibility* of a recurrence, and would induce us sedulously to avoid every exciting cause, and to use the utmost degree of care for its prevention, not only in the next, but all the following labours." Dr. Gooch appears to hold the same opinion; he says—"I have attended many patients who came to town to be confined, because they had been deranged after their former lying-in in the country, and, excepting Case No. I., not one of these patients had a return of their disease." Dr. Montgomery relates a case of a lady who became insane after eight successive confinements; and several others in a less marked degree illustrative of the same position. Our opinion is that one attack strongly predisposes to another; and that, if the instances of successive attacks are not so numerous as might be expected, it is because the care and pains alluded to by Dr. Ramsbotham are not without their result in preventing them. In some few cases it has been observed that the *sex* of the infant acted as a predisposing cause—women having got over the confinement of a girl with safety, after repeatedly having suffered when the child was a male.

Of the occasional or exciting causes of puerperal insanity we are not well informed. It does not appear that difficult labours exercise much influence in the majority of cases; nor are many of the recorded cases connected with extreme hæmorrhage. We cannot speak definitely as to the relation which it bears to eclampsia; Merriman, Gooch, Esquirol, Frias, Selade, Billod, and Dr. Reid, each relate one instance of such apparent dependence.

In this Journal, for the year 1850, Dr. Webster relates some cases in which he attributes to chloroform the production of the mental disorder; Dr. Simpson relates facts having a very opposed significance. The question is one of very great importance, but one which must be decided by prolonged experience.

Moral emotions will, no doubt, exercise a strong influence upon the development of mental alienation; the cases in which the affection is distinctly traceable to these are certainly not very numerous; but the number would be very much augmented had we full histories of each case. In women who do not nurse, the first menstruation has a strong influence upon the development of this affection: in 60 cases mentioned by M. Marcé eleven became insane exactly at this period. It is worthy of notice also that, amongst those who do nurse, a not inconsiderable number begin to be insane about the same time—i.e., the sixth week. Out of 22 cases six were of this nature. It is scarcely necessary to

point out the practical bearing of this observation; nor how necessary at such a period is the most careful physical and moral hygiene. Errors in diet, exposure to cold,* imprudences of various kinds, inflammation and suppuration of the mammæ—all these have been observed to act as exciting causes. We have ourselves observed one case which in the outset was clearly dependent upon a sudden pleurisy. In this, as in other diseases, however, etiology is an obscure science; for the most part the affection will not be due to any one cause, but to the action of many upon a constitution enfeebled or otherwise predisposed.

These general observations apply to the insanity of the newly-confined, and to that of nurses indiscriminately; it will now be convenient, following the plan of M. Marcé, to separate the two forms, and make some remarks upon each.

The forms of mental unsoundness enumerated by this author as occurring shortly after confinement are mania, melancholy, partial lesions of the intelligence, hallucinations, intellectual and instinctive monomania, and “a special variety of mental enfeeblement, which seems to be caused by excessive losses of blood, and is easily cured by appropriate treatment.” These forms of alienation are not equally frequent; amongst M. Esquirol's 92 cases 49 were mania, 35 melancholy, and 8 chronic dementia. In the 44 related by M. Marcé 29 were mania, 10 melancholy, 5 partial lesions, and 2, cases of temporary intellectual enfeeblement. It is worthy of notice that in the insanity of nurses the proportions between mania and melancholy are much more equal than those here noticed.

In the form of puerperal insanity now under notice, the cases almost all begin at one of two periods; either in the first eight or ten days after confinement, or towards the fifth or six week. M. Marcé remarks that in his 44 cases, 38 commenced in the first ten days, and 11 about the sixth week. We do not find in other authors the same precision of classification.†

* M. Esquirol lays great stress upon cold as an exciting cause. He says:—
‘Le refroidissement, l'impression du froid, de quelque manière qu'ils aient lieu, sont de tous les écarts les plus à redouter; l'exposition à l'air frais, l'application de l'eau froide, soit que l'accouchée s'expose à des courants d'air froid, ou qu'elle marche en plein air, soit que l'accouchée ou la nourrice plonge ses membres dans l'eau froide, la coupe des cheveux, l'abus des médicaments chauds, en supprimant les lochies, provoquent la folie. Chez nos 92 aliénées, quatorze fois l'aliénation mentale a été provoquée par des causes physiques, et dans ces quatorze cas, dix fois l'impression du froid a causé la maladie.’

† M. Esquirol's 92 cases commenced as follows:—

16	became delirious from the 1st to the 4th day.
21	” ” 5th ” 15th ”
17	” ” 16th ” 60th ”
19	” ” 60th day to the 12th month.
19	” after forced or voluntary weaning.

These 92 cases include both forms of puerperal insanity—that of the newly-confined, and that of nurses.

It is not necessary to enter minutely into the phenomena of puerperal *mania*, so familiar to all of extensive obstetric experience. The outbreak may be quite abrupt, as in the case related by Dr. Reid, where the patient having fallen asleep in good health, awoke suddenly, crying out that her child was dead, and became maniacal from that moment. In the great majority of cases, however, the accession is gradual; the first change noticed is often in the eye, which assumes an expression easily recognisable, but difficult of description. The countenance is restless, anxious, and troubled; sometimes flushed and sometimes unnaturally pale. There is great excitement of the special senses; slight sounds distress the ear, light affects the eyes; there are often hallucinations. The temper changes completely, and family affection is apparently changed into the bitterest hatred; and this is particularly observed as regards the child, which the mother often attempts to destroy. Then succeeds or accompanies these symptoms the outbreak of violent delirium, with the characteristics before mentioned. At the commencement there is not always fever, and if the pulse be accelerated, it is often from the violence of the excitement alone; but after a time it becomes very rapid (especially in those cases which will be fatal); the head is sometimes hotter than usual, although the general temperature is not much raised; there is almost complete insomnia; the tongue is foul, the urine scanty, the bowels often constipated; the breath is offensive, and the skin emits an unpleasant odour. The condition of the milk and the lochiæ has been before noticed. These signs of constitutional disturbance, in the majority of favourable cases, subside long before the mental disorder.

It is of much importance to inquire whether during pregnancy or labour there are any symptoms which may lead us to apprehend insanity afterwards, and so enable us to take every precaution to guard against it. Esquirol states that it is sometimes announced by sinister presentiments even during pregnancy; but such presentiments are so frequent, and are in so small a proportion of cases followed by any evil consequences, that we cannot found much upon them. Dr. Burrows has some important remarks on this point:—

“Puerperal delirium consequent on labour is sometimes predicted, though not absolutely developed during gestation. If, while pregnant, there be frequent hysterical affections, preternatural sensibility, unaccountable exuberance or depression of spirits, morbid aptitude to exaggerate every trivial occurrence, and attach to it great importance, suspicion, irritability, or febrile excitation; or, what is still more indicative, a soporose state, with very quick pulse—then the supervention of delirium on labour may be dreaded.”

Dr. Ramsbotham adds to this, that “if a great loss of memory be present, such a result is eminently foreboded.”

The characteristics of puerperal mania are so well marked, that it is scarcely likely to be confounded with any other disease. From the low muttering delirium of fever, the history will sufficiently distinguish it, as well as its own peculiar characters. From phrenitis it is sometimes not so easy; and cases will occasionally occur where the affection seems to partake of both characters. The delirium of phrenitis is preceded by headache, fever, tinnitus aurium, and flushed cheeks; the pulse is quick and sharp; all these are generally wanting in mania. In the former, the eyes are injected; not usually in the latter. The inflammatory fever of phrenitis has a character almost altogether wanting in mania. It is of the highest importance to distinguish between the two affections; since the active depletory measures required for phrenitis would be ruinous in mania.

Puerperal mania terminates by recovery, by incurability, or by death; the first appears to be much the most frequent; the last is rare. "It used to be the prevalent opinion (says Dr. Ramsbotham) that puerperal mania *never* resulted in a fatal termination. Even the late Dr. Baillie, observant as he was of disease, and well-informed upon the morbid conditions of the body in all their forms, when consulted about a case of this kind, remarked, 'that the question was not whether the patient was to recover, because of that he had no doubt, but how long the disease was to last!'—she died within a week after this opinion was uttered. Of Esquirol's 92 cases, 6 died, 1 after six months, 1 after a year, 2 after eighteen months, 1 after three years, and 1 after five years after delivery. These statistics, however, as well as those of Dr. Webster and Dr. Burrows, include not mania only, but all the forms of puerperal insanity.* In 24 cases of mania, M. Marcé enumerates 16 recoveries, 2 incurables, 2 in which after one year there was no amendment, and 4 cases of death; 1 in twenty-six days, 1 in nineteen, 1 in sixteen, and 1 in seven days. Almost all deaths in this disease result from a complication with, or transition into, *acute delirium*, the *délire aigu* of French writers. Where the insanity has been developed during the first fifteen days after confinement, it may be thus complicated from the first, but it may also occur after the mental affection has lasted many weeks. M. Marcé's sketch of this affection is graphic:—

"The agitation augments from day to day, the tongue becomes dry, the digestive functions are impeded; the pulse becomes rapid, more than 120 per minute; the face is flushed, the head hot, and the eye haggard; the skin is covered with a viscous sweat; the patient is a prey to incessant hallucinations, and exhausts herself by violent agitation and

* As this is the case with all the statistics yet published on the subject, we shall recur to the various terminations of puerperal insanity, after reviewing the different varieties.

an incessant loquacity; she is no longer conscious of anything that is present; under the influence of her delirious ideas, or even of a veritable hydrophobia, she rejects all aliments, especially drink, and spits almost perpetually. M. Baillarger has remarked the expectoration of large yellowish *crachats*, which are unaccompanied by cough, or by any pulmonary symptoms."

Then follows a quasi-typhoid state, with fetid breath, and still incessant spitting; the urine and fæces are passed involuntarily; insomnia is constant, and the powers are speedily exhausted—the termination being often accelerated by diarrhoea. The signs of amendment are, that the pulse becomes somewhat slower, and has more volume; the tongue moistens, the agitation is a little calmed, and the patient returns either to reason, or to the normal condition of the previous insanity. But when once the condition above described is fully developed, there is but very slight hope of any amendment; the prognosis is most grave. With regard to the prognosis of puerperal mania in general, the quickness of the pulse is the most serious sign—not that quickness which is brought on merely by agitation, and is transitory, but a continuous permanent acceleration, which does not subside even during moments of calm. The acute delirium would seem to be merely the maniacal agitation, carried to its extreme limits; and the constitutional disturbance is merely a consequence. It is of importance to recognise the beginning of this acute delirium; and *fever* is the distinctive sign between it and the ordinary maniacal agitation. Meningitis offers striking relations occasionally to this acute delirium; but in this we meet early with partial paralyses, contractions, or strabismus; the head is thrown backward, there is subsultus, coma, and resolution of the muscular fibres. Those patients who do not die of this affection are generally carried off either by diarrhoea, or by some pulmonary disease, if the insanity terminates fatally.

The pathology of puerperal insanity is as obscure as that of mental affections generally; morbid changes are found occasionally after death, of various kinds, but none that are constant or special; and it must always be remembered that *death* has taken place, for which some physical cause must exist, which is not necessarily connected with the psychical disorder. Esquirol has examined the bodies of patients who have died of puerperal insanity, in which there was no morbid change to be detected. Others have found thickening, or eburnation of the skull, induration, or softening of the brain, opacity and adhesions of the membranes, purulent or serous deposits, &c. &c. In one of our own patients the most careful examination failed to detect any morbid condition. Dr. Gooch relates a case which was exactly similar. As a general rule, in those cases which are fatal,

whether by reason of acute delirium, or of some intercurrent malady, the lesions found in the brain are insignificant, and altogether insufficient to furnish a plausible account of the phenomena. Those which have been complicated by meningitis or cerebritis will present the usual morbid appearances; but to the disease itself there is no special morbid anatomy attached. We quote M. Marcé's conclusions on this point in full:—

"I do not wish to conceal the little importance which I attach to the results of pathological anatomy in this disease: the details which I have given are the latest data of science, but I am convinced that in a short time another order of ideas will arise concerning the researches necessary to be made, in order to *try* to ascertain the organic cause of the three or four elementary and distinct forms which constitute mental alienation. What is it that we now study when we examine the bodies of maniacs, monomaniacs, or melancholics? The more or less intense colour of the white or grey matter, the abundance of the sub-arachnoid fluid, the state of the membranes, the consistence and general aspect of the cerebral pulp; and the examination is made by means of *approximative appreciations purely personal*, without exact means of verification. But these incompletely interrogated elements constitute but a small part of the diseased organ. The state of the nerve-tubes, of the intermediate substance, the induration or ramollissement of the organ, the quantity of water which it contains, the state of the chemical elements which enter into its composition; these are all points which we should examine by the most rigorous methods which science affords; and, so long as so complex and extensive a labour is unperformed, no one has a right to say that we are ignorant (qy? *must be ignorant*) of the intimate nature and cause of insanity. *The immaterial soul cannot be diseased*; the brain then is responsible for the intellectual disturbance. Moreover, when I see forms of delirium so clearly characterised as mania, monomania, and melancholy, in their typical forms, I cannot believe that one and the same elementary lesion presides over alienations so distinct, and I am disposed to admit something special in each case."

The *treatment* is that of mania, in the non-puerperal state. As a general rule bleeding is utterly inadmissible, unless there are such inflammatory complications as would render it necessary, were there no mental aberration. The heat of head, so often observed, indicates the propriety of the application of ice to the shaved head; and blisters are often of very great service. The extremities are often cold, and must be stimulated by hot water, or mustard, and the usual obvious methods. The stomach and alimentary canal must be regulated, if necessary, by emetics and purgatives; and, after this, opium is of the greatest utility. Dr. Gooch advises hyoscyamus, and camphor, and is generally of opinion that narcotics are the most valuable remedies in this disease. The intellect is often obviously clearer from the rest obtained by their use. In the chronic stage stimulants and

tonics are often required ; and ammonia is amongst the most useful. Dr. Pritchard mentions oil of turpentine, in drachm doses, three times a day, as one of the best stimulants, when the stomach will bear it. The diet must be farinaceous, with a good allowance of milk, so long as the febrile symptoms prohibit animal food ; in the chronic stage it must be of a free and generous order, including a certain amount of wine, or malt liquor. The rules as to isolation must be as strictly observed in this form of mania as under ordinary conditions. If it cannot be accomplished perfectly at home, it must be by removal to an asylum, as soon as the special circumstances of the case admit of it. The general management is that of ordinary mania.

Such is an outline of our ordinary English practice ; some other methods have obtained reputation on the Continent, which we may briefly sketch, as they appear to have been attended with success. Tartarized antimony has been recommended by Dr. Weisener, as reducing the energy of the nervous system, without affecting the general strength so seriously as depletory measures. Dr. Elsoener relates a case, in which the patient was attacked with mania five days after delivery ; he gave tartarized antimony at first in fractional doses, and ultimately to the amount of six or eight grains in the day, applying cold to the head at the same time ; the cure was completed in twelve days. There might, however, be practical difficulties in carrying out this plan.

Prolonged tepid baths, for two or three hours, or more, are stated to have produced the happiest results in these cases, on the authority of M. Brierre de Boismont. It will be remembered that, some time ago, we gave a sketch of M. Pinel's method of treating delirium tremens—in which prolonged warm baths, for five, eight, ten, or even twenty-four hours, with constant cold effusion to the head, formed the principal feature, with or without the exhibition of opium. In the cases now under consideration it is necessary to bear in mind that the peculiar state of the patient will not bear so prolonged an exhausting process ; and the time must be limited to two or three hours at the utmost.

M. Esquirol had great faith in injections of milk and sugar, three times a day, the diet being at the same time rigorously attended to. Camphor has at times been resorted to as an almost exclusive treatment, given both by the mouth and in injection. M. Marcé gives two or three cases where recovery was rapid under this plan ; but he does not attach much value to it, nor yet to æther, which has occasionally been employed in drachm doses.

M. Baillarger has strongly recommended "milk diet" as a curative measure—alone, or combined with baths, purgatives, or narcotics. In giving two or three pints of milk daily the thirst

is allayed, and a good deal of nutriment obtained, which is not exciting. This may be tolerated for a considerable time; but if it should begin to purge, it must be relinquished, as it is rare that the toleration of it is re-established. According to the special circumstances of each case, a selection, or combination of these methods of treatment, will be desirable. It is, perhaps, scarcely necessary to add, that if the delirium be anything more than transitory, all idea of suckling must be relinquished, as not only would it injure the mother, but the safety of the child would be materially compromised.

The *melancholia* of the recently-confined is less grave, at least so far as life is concerned, than *mania*; it is also less frequent at this period by more than one-half. Its history is very similar to that of melancholy in general, and its symptoms the same. The period of its outbreak is the same as that of the affection already noticed. It begins by signs of depression from the first, which may be mistaken for obstinacy or sulkiness; or it may commence by a degree of excitement almost maniacal, and only assume its special form afterwards. Hallucinations of the ear, the eye, and of taste, are very frequent; and there is often a suicidal propensity; very commonly, also, the child is the object of extreme dislike, and attempts are made to destroy it. M. Marcé says that in these cases he has repeatedly noticed an almost complete *analgesia*; the patient appeared insensible to pricking or any irritation. Hysterical convulsions, and a cataleptic state, have also been observed accompanying this affection. Almost all the patients present the symptoms of *anæmia* (as above described), with *bruit de soufflet* in the heart and large vessels.

The prognosis is not very grave, the greater number recover by far; the duration is from one month to six, or perhaps longer. The treatment is that of melancholia in general, modified in accordance with the special requirements of the condition. The principal indication to be kept in view is that the constitution is almost to *remake*. Iron and other tonics are of great service when the proper period arrives; at a proper interval after confinement the cold affusion may be used daily with advantage; in short, all means which will raise the powers of life. When this is accomplished, opium and other narcotics are as useful in this form as in mania, to allay excitement, and procure rest.

We have no particular observations to make upon the partial derangements of intellect in the newly-confined; they differ in no respect from those met with in the non-puerperal condition. They chiefly consist of hallucinations, impulses, religious scruples, and sometimes partial losses of memory. Some of these latter are worthy of passing notice. Capuron relates, that

a young lady, after a painful confinement, experienced a severe emotion, which brought on syncope, lasting three days. On recovery she remembered nothing of having been confined; and this amnesia lasted some months. Louyer-Villermay relates a similar case: A young lady, after long disagreements and controversies with her family, married a man to whom she was much attached: after her first confinement an accident happened, accompanied by long weakness, on her recovery from which she had lost all memory of the time that had elapsed since her marriage, although she remembered exactly all the details of her previous life. Her marriage itself was forgotten, and she repulsed with every appearance of fear her husband and her child. Since then she has never been able to recal the memory of this portion of her life.

A species of chronic dementia is an occasional, but not frequent, form of puerperal insanity; sometimes it merely depends on debility, and is relieved by appropriate tonic treatment; but it is generally more grave in its significance.

In the early part of this paper we have alluded to acute dementia as occasionally occurring after confinement. It is mentioned by some writers, but we have nowhere seen any detailed description of it. A case which occurred to us, some months ago, seemed to be of this nature, and is certainly worthy of record. The patient was a woman of about 26 years of age, in her third confinement, apparently of healthy constitution. There had been nothing in the two former labours, nor in the nursing which followed, to account for the subsequent phenomena. On this occasion, all went on well for seven or eight days, when a peculiarity of manner, more than a derangement of health, awoke the anxiety of the friends. There was a little headache, and some occasional flushing of the face; the tongue was white, rather *creamy* in appearance, but there was no thirst. The milk flowed freely, and the lochiae were natural; the sleep was not much affected. The peculiarity of manner was this: when spoken to, she appeared to understand perfectly, and to have an idea of the answer in her own mind, but on trying to express it, two or three words were uttered, and the rest were lost. Thus, on being asked if she had much pain in the head, she would say, "No, not in my ——" and then, after a pause, she would add, "I know very —— if I could only ——." When the attendants tried to explain, she would stop them, and make another attempt; and, on again failing, she would put her hand to her head, and appear trying to remember, and the face would flush with the effort. She was quite conscious that she forgot words, and seemed a little annoyed at it; but generally the expression of the face was calm, and even happy. The pulse was not above 75, and soft. But by degrees the power of compre-

hension diminished, and the faculty of speech was lost: there was more fever, and the patient became unconscious. The friends described something like convulsive movements of one arm; a quasi-typhoid state supervened, and on the eighth day from the commencement of the attack she died. A very careful post-mortem examination, 86 hours after death, failed to reveal any morbid change. The brain and its membranes might have passed for an entirely healthy specimen. The other organs were in the normal puerperal conditions, without evidence of inflammation, or any other morbid action. We are unable to offer any theory as to the pathology of this case.

The insanity which supervenes upon the state of lactation is closely allied to that of parturient women. The puerperal state proper is supposed to end with the flow of the lochia; but lactation maintains a condition which has been not inaptly termed a "prolonged puerperal state." "In virtue of the lacteal secretion the woman is so far removed from her physiological state; she is more nervous, more impressionable, and more accessible to morbid influences, which she would easily have resisted at another time" (Marcé). The mental alienation of nurses may be naturally divided into two classes; (1) those which appear within the first six weeks after labour; and (2) those which do not appear until after six, eight, twelve, or more months of suckling, or immediately after weaning. The cases of the first class are too closely allied to those already noticed to require any detailed examination. If insanity does not appear in the first six weeks, it is very rare to meet with it before the sixth month: out of 22 cases, M. Marcé states that he has only once seen it appear at any intermediate period; this was in the third month. An etiological deduction of some value may be drawn from this fact—viz., that as the great majority of these cases appear only after prolonged lactation, the cause is to be sought in the anæmia and debility produced by this; and it may be inferred that this cause is the most powerful, after heritage, and the other *general* causes of mental alienation.

In all cases of extreme debility or exhaustion, nervous accidents are to be expected in some form—palpitations, vertigo, weakness of sight, or the other senses, neuralgic pains, partial paralysis, contractions—all these, with the constitutional symptoms of imperfect nutrition, are met with in nurses in whom a too prolonged lactation has induced an anæmic condition. It is quite natural to expect, therefore, that in those who are so predisposed, by the operation of the influences before described, alienation should supervene.

But if the weakness produced by lactation be so powerful a predisposing cause of insanity, how does it happen that this so

frequently comes on a few days after weaning? On a first glance we should suppose that the cessation of so abundant a secretion ought to tend to strengthen the economy; and it has sometimes certainly the effect of checking mental disturbance. M. Marcé relates the case of a woman who had five attacks of delirium after five successive labours; yet three times she tried to suckle her children. "When she suckled she was in a state of maniacal agitation, which came on a few days after labour, lasted during the whole lactation, and regularly ceased eight or ten days after weaning. When she did not suckle, the delirium ceased a few days after the milk fever." Such facts as these are not frequent, and authors justly attribute a dangerous influence to the period of weaning. But weaning is not *always* justly chargeable with the effects attributed to it: it may be that a patient has evinced nervous symptoms of various kinds, and weaning has been ordered; the insanity appears, but it was probably pending before, and the weaning has simply not checked it. From whatever cause, however, or combination of causes, it may be, a considerable proportion of cases of puerperal insanity do arise at this period. Out of 38 cases of this nature, related by Esquirol, 19 occurred just after weaning; and in 22, related by M. Marcé, six were at this period. "Enfeebled women, it appears, may nurse for a great number of months, and only fall ill at the moment when lactation is suspended; for even an exhausted organism habituates itself during some time to losses which enervate and weaken it in a regular daily manner. We see it daily in individuals subject to hæmorrhoidal discharge, or a purulent secretion from an issue; if these are suppressed suddenly they produce in the economy a reaction as dangerous in proportion as the subject is inclined to nervous accidents. One of our patients, Madame X—, had an accession of insanity after each of her confinements. When she suckled, the accession was deferred until the time of weaning, when it broke out in full force" (Marcé). But there is still another condition, and one which has a different etiological significance. The suppression of an abundant secretion may determine a state of *plethora*, to which the insanity may be due; and it is of importance to recognise this fact, and the cases which illustrate it, as the treatment will require to be essentially different.

As in the insanity of parturient women, so these cases may commence abruptly, evidently the sequel to some exciting physical or moral cause; or they may come on gradually, in which case, almost invariably, the disorder of the physical health will precede the outbreak of the mental disturbance. The precursory symptoms are those of anæmia, already mentioned; and they are of the utmost importance to mark, inasmuch as well-

directed care in this prodromic period may avert the threatened aberration.

The older authors were accustomed to attribute all these mental disorders in nurses to suppression of the milk. When the delirium is very intense it does sometimes happen that the secretion ceases; but this is not frequent. In 40 cases, Dr. Maconald only noted six in which this was the case; and M. Marcé states, that in all his cases of insanity consequent upon lactation, he has not met with one in which the secretion did not continue, often requiring special means to prevent the distention of the breasts.

It is worthy of observation, that the cases of mania and melancholia are nearly of equal frequency amongst nurses, although the causes operating in their production are chiefly depressing. There is nothing distinctive in any of the forms which insanity assumes during lactation to require special mention, after what has been said before. The prognosis is not very grave. M. Marcé enumerates 26 cases, of which 20 were cured, 1 uncured, 8 were lost sight of, and 2 dead. Of the 20 cures, 6 took place in the first five weeks, 5 from ten weeks to three months after the commencement, 2 in four months, 1 in seven months, 1 in eight months, 6 in from ten months to two years. Of the 8 who were lost sight of, 2 were notably improved, and 1 seemed to threaten dementia. The 2 who died were both melancholic; one died of phthisis; the other refused all nourishment, and so perished.

The general outline of the treatment is the same as that prescribed before for the insanity of parturient women. If the disease can be taken when the physical disorders are giving evidence of what is impending, much may be done by careful and gradual weaning, and by a strict physical and moral hygiene, to prevent the outbreak. In any case the child must be weaned, were it only for the obvious reason that it is in danger whilst in the care of an insane mother. When the secretion is stopped, we must have recourse to a decided tonic treatment—iron, quinine, cold affusions, change of air and scene, moderate exercise, and generous diet. In that class of cases which depend upon phethora, of course this treatment is inapplicable; in its place, mild evacuants, even stronger ones, may be necessary occasionally. In all other particulars the treatment must be conducted on the general principles laid down for insanity, in its ordinary forms; and what has been said before concerning isolation is here equally applicable.

The history of puerperal insanity cannot be made complete without a few illustrative cases, two or three of which we shall abstract and condense as far as possible—selecting them from sources which will be most likely to be new to most of our

readers. A very instructive and interesting case is related by M. Legrand du Saulle, in the *Annales Medico-Psychologiques*, for April, 1857, in which the patient had two attacks, one of mania, and the other of melancholy; both yielded to treatment, but the patient finally succumbed to hæmoptysis and rapid phthisis.

Marguerite B—— was brought up by poor parents, in the country, in excellent principles, and had the rudiments of a moderate education; her conduct was always irreproachable. She always enjoyed good health, and menstruation was developed, and continued normally. She married happily when eighteen years old. In the three first years of her marriage she had two children, both of whom she nursed, at intervals of one year. When pregnant for the third time, her habits, tastes, and manners underwent a sudden change; she indulged in gay and obscene conversation, forgot the sentiment of modesty, sought the society of men, and when her husband remonstrated, she overwhelmed him with reproaches, and even blows. In trying to escape from the house, one night, she fell from the window, and abortion, with enormous hæmorrhage, followed. The fœtus was about five months old. After this, during her recovery, she surprised every one by her calmness, and her perfect return to her original character. But scarcely was she convalescent, when a violent mania broke forth, and on May 28th, 1849, she was removed, by order of the authorities, to the asylum of the Côte-d'Or, almost in a state of acute delirium. Under treatment by baths daily, and purgatives twice a-week, the excitement rapidly subsided, and in forty-eight days she went home perfectly well, and was as before, an excellent manager, and a quiet, staid mother of her family. She again became pregnant, without any mental affection supervening; she was confined of a little girl, whom she suckled eleven months. Scarcely had she weaned the child, when she fell into a state of emaciation; she lost her natural affections, and very soon was plunged into a state of utter depression and inertia, which necessitated her entry into the asylum again, on the 27th of March, 1851, twenty-two months after she had gone out. "At our first visit, we found Marguerite before a window, immovable and mute, with fixed eye and open mouth, without consciousness of time, place, or persons; she seemed in a sort of ecstasy, and living in an imaginary world. The sensation of hunger was not strong enough to rouse her; she did not touch anything that was given to her, and had to be fed like an infant; in a word, she was in a state of melancholy, with stupor." She had prescribed a generous diet, and tonic medicines, with alkaline and sulphureous baths. In about twenty days some amendment was perceived; her eyes seemed

to recognise, even with pleasure, some objects; and at different times she even articulated intelligible words; she paid some regard to propriety, which had before been quite neglected. On the 20th of April she had a blister applied to the arm; she spoke a few reasonable words, and then broke into a long and loud laugh. April 25th: "It seems that Marguerite is awakening as from a frightful dream, and that she is endeavouring to gather together her ideas—to retrace her thoughts. She appears unquiet, *chagrin*, frightened; she looks at us with terror, and hesitates to answer." On the 1st of May she seemed to be well; on being asked what she had thought about during the long period of her immobility, she replied, "Oh, I don't know; I had always before my eyes my little child, which my husband was cooking in a vessel of boiling water. And then I heard it cry; but I was as if dead. I would have taken it off the fire, but could not, my hands and feet were so bound." There were also hallucinations of another kind. She had seen her niece taking her first communion, and, on going out of the church, a gendarme took her away to prison, where she had died. May 10th: The improvement was progressive; she still answered slowly, but rationally; her physical health was excellent. On the 25th, "we promised her that she should go home in a few days; but, on the 1st of June, on going to inform her that her discharge was made out, we found her spitting blood in large quantities." The remainder of the case is but the history of a rapid phthisis, with perpetual hæmoptysis. She died on the 2nd of July.

Autopsy, thirty hours after death:—The body appeared anæmic. The vessels of the brain were empty; the cerebral pulp was firm; its consistence was greater than natural, as if macerated in alcohol. In the chest the pleural cavities contained about ten ounces of fluid; the left lung was full of tubercle, with an enormous cavity at the apex; the right lung was less diseased. The heart was small, flaccid, and empty; the liver was hypertrophied. All the other organs were healthy; but the uterus was large, and its lining was of a vinous redness. M. du Saule comments upon this phthisis as follows:—

"In the case which now occupies us, did the phthisis precede the melancholy; was it developed during the last period of lactation; or were the phthisis and the melancholy entirely mutually connected? This last opinion is ours; and we believe that the phthisis had existed and was developed in a latent state, whilst the resources of art were directed against another enemy. Our practical conclusion is, that it is very dangerous for a woman who has once been deranged, to suckle her child. Should she do so, at the period of weaning, she ought to be confided to the care of an experienced physician, who will insist

upon all precautions which may prevent the return of the mental malady And as phthisis pulmonalis is a disease which appears so frequently as a sequel to prolonged lactation, and also frequently accompanies melancholia, and is developed very insidiously, it is important carefully to examine, by percussion and auscultation, all patients brought under our notice in these conditions."

We subjoin a very brief sketch of a few of the recorded cases of insanity in pregnant women. M. Baillarger relates one, of a young unmarried woman, who in the third month of her pregnancy became melancholic, apparently as the sequel to a fright, her general state having been one of depression previously. She had hallucinations, chiefly of the ear, and obstinately refused food; she had to be fed with a stomach-pump. Her mental condition gradually improved as pregnancy advanced. She went home to be confined, and shortly afterwards recovered completely. The child was healthy and strong. The same writer gives the details of another case, in which the delirium, dating from the third month, assumed the ecstatic form. She had hallucinations of both eye and ear. She recovered almost completely in about sixteen days; but, from another emotion, she had a relapse six weeks afterwards, which continued in a more or less severe form until her confinement, after which her recovery advanced rapidly, and was perfect. Both these were cases of seduction, and the moral causes appeared well marked.

Madame C——, aged 39, evinced maniacal symptoms from the period of her conception; the pregnancy advanced naturally, but the patient was always delirious. The labour was natural, and she was a little calmer after it, for a time; but the mental derangement continued incurable. She died eight years afterwards of chronic enteritis.

Dr. Reid relates an instance of melancholia, dating from conception, with continual desire to destroy the child. The mental condition became worse after delivery.

In Dr. Seymour's work on *Mental Derangement* a case is mentioned of melancholia, occurring in the fourth month of pregnancy, which was aggravated after delivery, but recovered about twelve months afterwards. M. Morel gives the history of a case, the termination of which was more serious than these. It is that of a young, hysterical, married woman, who had successive pregnancies, which aggravated the nervous state. Acute mania supervened in the seventh month of her third pregnancy; abortion took place, and the mania persisted, terminating in dementia and general paralysis.

These cases sufficiently indicate, as was before stated, that there is no constancy in the effect to be expected of labour upon the mental condition. Sometimes it is the signal for its cessa-

tion, sometimes for its aggravation ; at other times it has no effect whatever.

We extract the next case, of puerperal mania proper, from M. Marcé's collection. Helen Lorig, aged 42, entered the La Charité, May 13, 1855. Her mother had had nine children ; the first six confinements had been attended by no evil consequences ; but after the last three she had attacks of delirium, lasting some months. H. L. was confined on the 5th of May, and gave birth to a dead child ; all went on well until the 10th, when, after some moral emotion, the lochia were suppressed ; and it was remarked that there was no evidence of lacteal secretion. There was no fever ; but the ideas were slightly incoherent. On the next day the delirium became furious, and continued so till the 13th, when she was brought to the hospital. The transition produced a calmness, with which she herself was astonished. On the 14th she could answer questions for a little time, but soon began to wander again. She feared poison, and had hallucinations of the eye and ear ; there was insomnia, headache, thirst, a rather dry tongue ; the pulse was 100 ; the patient perspired freely, and the skin presented a miliaary redness, with sudamina. There was a little pain on pressure over the region of the uterus. The delirium persisted, and on the 17th became almost acute: pulse 110—tr. opii, gtt. xxv. with musk, 10 grs. The same condition, and the same treatment, continued till the 21st, when there was more tranquillity, and a desire for food ; the pulse was much reduced. On the 28th the pulse was 72, the uterus not painful ; the patient could give a rational account of herself, and her past state, but still rambled off into other matters. On the 6th of June the delirium and hallucinations had all ceased. On the 15th she was still very weak, but rational, and left the hospital cured at the end of the month.

Our next case is from M. Esquirol :—S. J., æt. 40, entered the Salpêtrière, April 22nd, 1812. Her stature is large, her face studded with pimples, her eyes and hair brown, her skin white ; she is tolerably stout. History : at 12 years, headache, nasal hæmorrhage. 13 years ; first appearances of the menses, cessation of the nasal hæmorrhages ; since then, regular, but scanty menstruation. 18 years ; a dear friend was guillotined, and she had an attack of trembling, followed by rambling, for some days. 26 years ; J. married, and became the mother of three children, which she suckled. 30 years ; she was confined of a fourth child, suckled it, and weaned it without precaution. Two days afterwards she was attacked with general delirium, with predominance of religious ideas. She was taken to the hospital, and left it perfectly well after four months. 36 years ; a new accession, caused by the absence of her husband ; she was again

received into the hospital, and was there thirteen months; she left again cured. 39 years; her fifth confinement; seven months suckling; the day after weaning, delirium, with imaginary fears, broke out; she was brought into a *maison de santé* with a general eruption over the body, which, after some time, was limited to the face; twenty months after this she was received at the Salpêtrière. She was sad, melancholy and despairing, and had religious terrors. On the 24th of May there was a discharge of matter from the left ear; since then she became more reasonable; she eats and sleeps well. During the month of June baths and blisters to the arms were continued; she went out in perfect health and reason on the 11th of August, 1812. All her attacks had been preluded by sadness, *ennui*, and inaptitude for her ordinary occupations; by degrees her head became confused; and during the accession she always felt her head hot and embarrassed.

M. Esquirol's cases are so instructive, from the careful manner in which the histories are traced, that we extract further. D. S. D., æt. 41, entered the Salpêtrière, June 19th, 1812. Middle stature, brown hair, blue eyes, white skin, mobile physiognomy, moderate stoutness. This woman has an uncle and aunt insane. She had a fall when 9 years old, and wounded her forehead; the cicatrix is still visible. At 14 years she suffered from psora. 16 years; headache, followed by appearance of the menses, few and irregular. 26 years; D. married—from that time the menses were more abundant, with leucorrhœa; more headache. At 27 years, she had many domestic troubles during her first pregnancy. 38 years; her husband, having an operation performed without her knowledge, she was alarmed; her mind began to wander, and she became furious. She was treated at Charenton; the accession lasted five months, and the intellect remained somewhat enfeebled. She was again confined at 35 years. At 37 years, three days after her third confinement, she experienced a slight vexation, after which occurred delirium and fury. Her insanity this time lasted six months. At 41 years; domestic troubles, and slight vexations, followed by new accession of fury, lasting a few days. Received at the Salpêtrière, she was calm, but not rational. August 12th; she talks much and long, relates everything that she has heard, seen or known; but with much incoherence. She has long intervals of reason. In October, she was calm, and worked; but was occasionally incoherent. In December there was the same condition. The attack terminated in dementia.

These cases, and many others which to quote would swell our paper to too great length, illustrate many important points as to the etiology of this form of insanity; and also as to the tendency to recurrence under certain conditions when the proclivity has

once been developed. We must refrain from further illustration, as there are yet some important questions connected with pregnancy and labour to pass in review; and first, concerning the terminations of puerperal insanity in general—a subject which we deferred from the earlier part of the paper. We have stated that of M. Esquirol's 92 cases, 55 recovered their reason, and six died, leaving 31 incurables. Dr. Haslam reports 50 recoveries amongst 85 cases; and Dr. Burrows cured 35 out of 57. Dr. Macdonald states that 80 per cent. of his cases recovered. Dr. Brierre de Boismont says, that cases of puerperal insanity (excluding melancholia) have recovered under his care in about a week on an average—a statement which is vaguely worded, and which is open to some misunderstanding. Dr. Gooch (quoted by Dr. Pritchard) has observed that such records as these throw but little light upon the real proportion of recoveries, and present a prospect unnecessarily gloomy and discouraging; inasmuch as the “records of hospitals contain chiefly accounts of cases which have been admitted because they had been unusually permanent, having already disappointed the hope, which is generally entertained and acted upon, of relief by private care; the cases of short duration, which last only a few days or weeks, and which form a large proportion, are totally overlooked or omitted in the inspection of hospital reports.” Dr. Gooch further adds—“Of the many patients about whom I have been consulted, I know only two who are now, after many years, disordered in mind; and of these one had already been so before her marriage Mania is more dangerous to life, melancholy to reason.” It is extremely difficult to form an idea of the *average* duration of these cases, as will be understood from the remarks above. With regard to the prolonged cases, it is very generally received, that most of the recoveries take place within six months. In M. Esquirol's 92 cases, 55 were cured, and the recoveries took place as follows:—

4 took place in the 1st month.		
7	”	2nd ”
6	”	3rd ”
7	”	4th ”
5	”	5th ”
9	”	6th ”
15	”	in the months following.
2	”	after 2 years.

Thus it appears that 38 out of 55, or more than two-thirds of the cures, were completed within six months from the outbreak of the mental alienation. M. Esquirol had but six deaths in the 92 cases, and none of them were fatal before the sixth month; but this must be judged by the same considerations as above stated—

viz., that the cases received at the Salpêtrière were such as had passed the period generally most fatal, as will be further seen by a reference to the details already given of M. Marcé's fatal cases of mania, where all (but one) died within twenty-six days. Esquirol's fatal cases were, one after six months; one after one year; two after eighteen months; one after three years, and one after five years. Dr. Burrows' table gives 10 deaths in 57 patients, a proportion which, under ordinary circumstances, probably gives too high an average, as M. Esquirol's gives one perhaps too low.

What influence does pregnancy exert upon previously-existing mental alienation? On this question authorities differ much. M. Guislain writes as follows:—"As to the utility of conception and gestation in disorders of the intellect, opinions are much divided. I know well that these acts do not always produce the happy results that we might expect; and that delivery itself has often been the determining cause of insanity. It is, however, a truth which we ought not to doubt, that lactation almost always produces a favourable change in the moral nature of the insane." MM. Dubois and Desormeaux give this opinion:—"Mania and dementia are often favourably influenced by pregnancy; but we can only hope for a complete and durable amendment in such cases as have depended upon lesions of menstruation, or other affections of the uterus. Apart from this, pregnancy is probably unfavourable; not in itself, but by reason of the weakness induced by confinement." As in all cases connected with mental alienation so in this, M. Esquirol's opinion is of much weight:—"Pregnancy, parturition, lactation, are *sometimes* the means of which nature takes advantage to terminate attacks of alienation. I believe these terminations rare. I have seen pregnancy and parturition make the patient calmer, without affecting the delirium. I have known also a lady who became insane during five consecutive pregnancies, and each time was cured by confinement. Notwithstanding these instances, and many others cited by authors, I regard as exceptions the cases of insanity cured by marriage, pregnancy, and labour; so often have I seen the mental affection persist and even become aggravated under such circumstances. Let any one visit the Salpêtrière and he will find more than 100 insane women, although they have been married and had children." A valuable collection of cases is thus summed up by M. Buchez:—"In twenty-two observations of the influence of the uterus or mammæ upon the brain affected with mental alienation, including pregnancy, labour, lactation, and weaning, *not one* has presented any diminution of the delirium; all have provoked or augmented it." M. Marcé gives a short collection of cases, from which it results that in all, at the period of pregnancy, the mental

affection assumed a more serious aspect, and gave cause for suspicions of incurability.

In general, the pregnancy of the insane proceeds without any peculiarities; but there is one circumstance connected with the labour which is not only curious, but important to bear in mind. Parturition is often unattended by any signs of suffering, and, in many cases, the dropping of the child upon the floor, or its cry under the bed-clothes, have been the first announcement that labour had been in progress. Such was the case in two cases noticed by M. Lannurien and M. Mitivié. A young lady attended by M. Esquirol was delivered without appearing aware of it, and also without any of the attendants knowing. Many cases of similar import are related by M. Marcé, who considers that painless labour is the rule in confirmed cases of insanity. And thus it appears that the analgesia, which is so frequent an accompaniment of mental derangement, may extend to the internal organs. Nor is this an isolated fact in the history of insanity; it is borne out by the phenomena of phthisis, pneumonia, pleurisy, and other diseases, occurring in such a state, which frequently, or even generally, occur without the usual constitutional or physical signs. It results from this that the insane, near the period of their confinement, require to be watched and guarded with especial care.

The children born of insane mothers are naturally submitted to the most unfavourable influences, and can but rarely escape the hereditary taint—here in tenfold force. Those born of mothers who have become insane during their pregnancy are not unfrequently still-born; M. Marcé states that of 11 such cases five were still-born. Those born of mothers insane before their pregnancy are not found to be dead in so large a proportion of cases. The intellectual condition of those who survive and grow up is generally most lamentable; they remain imbecile, or at least of a very limited intelligence. There are, however, instances in which the child has betrayed no trace of its disordered source. Catherine, the daughter of Jeanne la Folle, was born during her mother's insanity, and afterwards became Queen of Portugal, and presented no indications of unsound mind. M. Marcé has collected a few cases in which similar immunity was manifested; some from his own note-book, and two from those of MM. Calmeil and Bailarger; but these must be looked upon as only exceptional: the future of a child born under such inauspicious circumstances must be the subject of apprehension of the very gravest character.

We intended to have appended some observations upon the legal responsibility of pregnant women; but the subject is one of too much importance, and too much contested, to be entered upon in the brief limits which are still at our disposal.

ART. III.—PSYCHOLOGY OF KANT.*

BY PROFESSOR HOPFUS.

(Continued from vol. xi. p. 521.)

WE now proceed, from the Categories, to further developments. Our philosopher next gives us what he terms the *deduction* of the categories, meaning their derivation from their transcendental (*a priori*) source in the understanding itself, which applies them to the objects of our senses, since these objects constitute the *matter*, the categories the *forms* of our knowledge. For knowledge is possible only on two conditions—*intuition*, by which the object is given merely as bare phenomenon, that is, something presented to sense—and *conception*, by which it is thought. Kant is too chary of examples. But here he says: "A savage sees a house in the distance, but he knows not its use; he has the same object before him as another man has who knows it as a place to dwell in; but, in form, there is a difference; to the savage there is only intuition (*Anschaung*), to the other intuition and conception (*Begriff*), at the same time."† Now, the diversity of representations which are given in intuition (which is sensuous) are simply a mode in which we are passively affected: but the act by which this diversity is brought to unity in any case, does not come from our senses; nor is it included in the *pure* form of intuition—either space or time. In all cases of the union of different elements, whether they are given in our sensuous or in our thinking nature, there is an act of the understanding which we term a synthesis. All combination implies both diversity and unity. Sensible things furnish us with intuitions or sensuous representations:‡ understanding collects and unites them by its syntheses, and thus gives rise to empirical conceptions. In all our knowledge, sense and understanding must concur to produce the result.

In thus collecting into one diverse representations, the understanding, which is the faculty of cognition (knowledge,) must have the aid of imagination, memory, and consciousness. Reproductive imagination is required, because the putting together, mentally, of a diversity of sensible representations is an affair which must take place by successive steps: imagination must be always ideally reproducing, at each step, the parts which are successively put together, or they would be lost to us, and the picture would be imperfect. But such a reproduction involves the memory of what has already presented itself to our

* Immanuel Kant's sämtliche Werke, (Rosenkranz,) Leipzig.

† Logik: Einleitung, V.

‡ *Vorstellungen*; presentations would here be a better word, though not usual.

senses. Again, memory implies the conviction of consciousness that the successive representations which present themselves in us are always identical. Thus every synthesis which the understanding makes when it thinks the objects of sense, is effected by the joint agency of imagination, memory, and consciousness—faculties which Kant regards as subservient to it.

The whole discussion on the “transcendental deduction” of the categories, or the legitimacy of their origin in the spontaneous activity of the understanding, and of their application to phenomena, is sufficiently obscure, although this portion of the *Kritik* was almost entirely recast in the second edition. It is closely interwoven with Kant’s theory of consciousness—no longer now, as before, regarded as attaching to sensuous intuition, but as developed in the acts of the understanding—the faculty of thought. His speculations on consciousness are involved in considerable difficulty; and the changes he made, in different editions, on this subject, indicate something like a want of reliance on his own statements.

Here we must remind the reader that we have already glanced at our author’s doctrine of *internal sense*—that is, of the intuition of self and our internal state, of which the *form* is time, since all that passes within us must take place in time. We have seen that he has identified this internal sense of self and its states, with consciousness (*Bewusstseyn*); and he says that, by means of it, the phenomenal reality of myself and of my internal state are clear to me. In the Transcendental Æsthetic, he described the consciousness of oneself, or “apperception,” as the simple representation of the *ego*;* and he adds, that the subject (mind) intuits or views itself according to the manner in which it is internally affected, or as it appears, not as it is—that is, the mind is presented to itself phenomenally only, like any phenomenon of external sense. Hence this sort of consciousness is an affair of sense, and not of understanding; we are as passive in it as we are when a sound salutes our ears, or the sun dazzles our eyes.

In his doctrine of the understanding, however, Kant presents to us a very different view of consciousness. It is now an affair of thought, not of sense. The terms, indeed, in which these two aspects of the subject are expressed (*Bewusstseyn*—*Apperception*) are used in reference to both, which tends to perplexity rather than to clearness;† but when he wishes to *distinguish* the con-

* Das Bewusstseyn seiner selbst (Apperception) ist die einfache Vorstellung des Ich, etc., *Vid. Kritik* (Rosenkranz), *Supplem.* XI. This whole passage contains the main development of Kant’s theory of consciousness as identified with the internal sense.

† Perhaps some light may be thrown on this obscure portion of the *Kritik*, by a reference to the two different views which have been entertained respecting con-

sciousness of thought from the consciousness of sense, he names the former *apperception*, the latter *internal sense*. We give a very few brief quotations :

"The *I think* (Ich denke) must accompany all my representations, or else they would be in relation to me nothing. Representation given previously to all thought is called intuition. All the diversity of intuition has a necessary relation to the *I think*, in the subject (mind) in which this diversity is found. But this representation, *I think*, is an act of spontaneity; that is, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it pure apperception. It is a self-consciousness to which all my representations belong, and in which I unite them.* I am conscious of a necessary *a priori* synthesis of my representations, which is called the original synthetical unity of apperception. In systems of psychology, the internal sense is commonly held to be one with this faculty of apperception; while we, on the contrary, carefully distinguish them."

"How the *ego* which thinks is distinct from the *ego* which intuits (views) itself, and is yet one and the same with it, as the same subject—how I as *thinking* intelligence know myself as an object *thought*, in intuition, like other phenomena—not as I am in myself, and as considered by the understanding, but merely as I appear?—is a question neither more nor less difficult than the question, How can I be an object to myself?—how can I be an object of my intuition and inward perceptions? Such, however, is the fact."

"As regards internal intuition, we know our own subject (mind) as phenomenon, and not as it is in itself. On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of manifold representations, consequently in the synthetical unity of apperception, I am conscious to myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only *that I am*. This representation is a thought, not an intuition."

"I do not see why so much difficulty should be found in admitting that our internal sense is affected by ourselves; every act of attention exemplifies it. . . . The *I think* expresses the act of determining my own existence; but the *mode* in which it is determined is not given in this spontaneous act; my existence remains determinable in a purely sensuous manner, as the existence of any other phenomenon."†

sciousness among English writers. Some hold that consciousness is that power of inward self-survey, by which we make the conception of *self* and our internal states an object of attention and thought. Others say, that the having any sensation or thought, or being in any state whatever, however passively, is consciousness; and these would not allow that the term should be restricted to the peculiar state in which we are when we are making the idea of self and our internal modifications a special object of attention. Perhaps the two views admit of being somewhat harmonized, but our sphere forbids our entering on this subject. Possibly Kant intended both a general and a special consciousness: he evidently saw no contradiction in his theory, as given under the head of sense, and as given here under the head of understanding, though he was quite alive to the mystery of the fact that the mind *can* and *does* direct itself to an observation of its acts and states, as its own.

* Wolf says (*Metaphys.*, cap. iii. § 194.) "Die Verbindung der Vorstellung mit dem Bewusstseyn heisst *denken*."

† Kritik der r. Vernunft: *Deduction der reinen Verstandes-begriffe*. Ausg. 2.

It is evident from these statements and others that might be quoted, that Kant held with *two* principles in consciousness, which were always found co-existing. This union of both has perhaps saved him from wholly contradicting himself on this subject.* The internal sense, the instrument of psychological observation, is not the same thing as the faculty of pure apperception. It is in the same relation to this latter as external sense is. The *ego* as a thinking subject is to be distinguished from the *ego* as an *object* of intuition and thought. Self-consciousness, or mere intuition, is not yet knowledge of self: this knowledge is the product of the operation of the understanding on the data of internal sense. Kant strenuously maintains that "the '*I think*' is, in all acts of consciousness, one and the same;" and that, unaccompanied by it, no representation whatever, and therefore not the simple representation of the *ego*, "can exist for me." He inquired into the contents of consciousness, and aimed to show what there is in it that is sensuous and empirical, as belonging merely to the internal sense, and what there is *à priori* and belonging to the understanding. The internal sense contains no synthesis; therefore the diversity of representations or intuitions which present themselves in it would have no meaning, unless to this diversity there were superadded a certain unity. The synthetic process which reduces to unity the various matter furnished by intuitions, both pure and empirical, is a spontaneous operation of the understanding; and this unity has its principle in the unity of consciousness—that is, in the pure apperception "*I think*." The diversity of representations to the mind produce only "empirical apperceptions:" the unity comes from the synthetic power of pure or primitive apperception, or the self-consciousness which attends all thought, and is its proper seat. Kant sometimes terms this principle of unity in which all representations belong to one identical *ego*, the transcendental unity of apperception, as being the principle of all knowledge, and therefore of the categories—it is indeed the highest principle of the understanding itself. It is primitive and absolute, the basis of all the activity of the understanding, a condition of all knowledge and of all intuition.

But from this subjective unity of consciousness by means of which everything is referred to the *ego*, we are to distinguish that *objective* unity by means of which the variety of intuition is referred to an object. The act of understanding by which the latter unity is effected is the judgment. Objective knowledge is therefore subjected to the primitive elements of judgment—that is, to the categories. These, though only simple forms of thought, have an objective validity in their application to phenomena, which

* M. Cousin, however, maintains that the two views are in absolute contradiction, and wonders that no critic of Kant has ever pointed this out. *Léçons sur Kant*, 6.

these forms determine. Our experience of all nature becomes possible only by means of these categories, for that experience must be in accordance with them. As the *à priori* conditions of experience, they are not derived from nature—they constitute its laws. The phenomena of nature have reality, therefore, only in relation to our sensuous faculties: their laws only exist for our faculty of thought. We know nothing of things in themselves or their laws. The laws of phenomena are all that we know, and these are the laws of thought. Nature is nothing but the systematic aggregate of phenomena, such as we conceive them in virtue of the laws of our faculties of sense and understanding.

2. The Analytic of Principles (*Analytik der Grundsätze*) next follows. It is to be a guide to the faculty of judgment in applying to phenomena the categories, which are the necessary conditions of *à priori* principles, as will appear; for understanding includes both conception and judgment; which latter faculty brings particular cases under some general rule or form.

The *schematism* of the pure conceptions of the understanding (categories) is the first point to be noticed under this "transcendental doctrine of judgment." When an object is brought under a conception, the representation must be homogeneous with the conception. The empirical conception we form of a *plate* is homogeneous with the pure geometrical conception of a circle; for the roundness which is *thought* in the latter, is *intuited* (seen) in the former. But the pure conceptions of the understanding are not at all homogeneous with sensuous intuitions, and can never be discovered in them. How then can phenomena be brought under the categories? Take, as an instance, the second of the categories of relation,* which is *causality*. This is not an object of sense. We do not see causes: we only think them. We simply see changes and successions of phenomena—that is, we see objects in different circumstances. How then are we entitled to unite the pure conceptions of the understanding with these intuitions of sense? There must be, says Kant, some third thing, some medium, homogeneous with the special category and with the particular object which is to be subsumed under it. This medium must be both sensuous and intellectual.

This medium is *time*. It is the "transcendental schema;"† for it is the form or condition under which all the objects of sense must present themselves to us. They all appear in time; and all conception and thought must also go on in time. Time is the common form both of external and internal sense. It is therefore the uniting bond of both; and its transcendental determi-

* See the Table of the Categories in our Number for July, 1858.

† Aristotle uses this term (*σχημα*) for the figures of the syllogism.—*Analyt. Prior.* Lib. i. cap. 6.

nations, as we shall presently see, render possible the *schematism* which enables us to fit on, as it were, the categories to the corresponding phenomena. Many of our readers perhaps would see little difficulty in saying of a certain object that it was a unity (one,) or of another that it was a totality (whole) of parts, and the like. "Common sense" would be sufficient here, as usual. Kant, however, speaks almost with awe of this schematism as a sort of mystery, "an act hidden in the depths of the human soul." It is, at all events, an ingenious subtilty, founded on a true view of time as the background of all sense and thought, whatever may be its merits in detail. Of course it is, as usual, loaded with technicalities.

A schema is not an image. Five dots form an image of the number five. But we can only *think* number in general: we cannot make an image of anything that is not special. Number in general is the *schema* of the conception of any particular number of which an image may be formed. So also no image can be made of a triangle in general. It is a schema of the understanding, which contains under it all the species of this figure, of the several conceptions of which images may be formed. Such images come from the empirical power of productive imagination. The schemata of sensuous conceptions, as figures in space (triangle), arise from the pure imagination *à priori*, which renders the images possible; but the schema of a pure conception of the understanding (category) is, of course, not the schema of an image: it is simply the pure synthesis expressed in the category conformably to a general rule. It is a transcendental product of imagination determining our internal sense according to the conditions of time, in respect to phenomena, in harmony with the unity of consciousness. The transcendental schemata of the categories, and the sub-schemata of the sub-categories are as follows:

The schema of *Quantity*, as a pure conception of the understanding, is *number*, which comprises the successive addition of unities of the same kind in a *series of time*; so that number is the synthesis of all the variety of our homogeneous intuition in general. This view applies equally to unity, plurality, and totality: for unity as applied to an object means that it is taken one time, plurality more than one time, and totality a unity of times.

The schema of *Quality* marks the content of time, or *existence in time*. Reality as a pure conception corresponds to our sensations and the phenomena which occasion them. Every sensation has a degree by which it fills time, more or less, until it vanishes into negation. We may see a brilliant light: here is something in time, or which fills time, a reality. The sensation may

diminish, the light becoming fainter and fainter : here is limitation, or a transition from time filled to time empty ; and when the light has vanished we have a negation of the reality, or non-being in time.

The schema of Relation has reference to order or *arrangement in time*. Subsistence has for its schema permanence in time, or reality considered as the substratum which remains while all else changes. Time passes not, says Kant, it does not change. Hence what is unchangeable in objects corresponds to time ; and permanence in time is the most general conception of substance, which is the unchangeable in existence. Causality, again, points to priority and succession in time, so far as this is subjected to a certain rule. Community or reciprocity, which is the mutual causality of substances, or the interagency of correlates, has for its schema the co-existence or contemporaneousness of their reciprocal determinations, according to a rule.

The general schema of Modality is the *mode of connexion or non-connexion with time*. Possibility involves such an accordance with the general conditions of time, as that a thing is conceivable. A thing is always possible to us when it is conformable to the conditions of any one time ; but two contradictory propositions exhibit what cannot belong to the same thing at the same time. Existence* is schematized by the contemplation of anything as being in a certain determined time. The schema of necessity is exemplified in the being of the object in all time.

As we have from the beginning added our own illustrations where it seemed desirable, we will here give the above theory in a Table, which Kant has not done. It will already have been noticed that the schematism closely follows the order of the categories.

SCHEMATISM OF THE CATEGORIES.

- | | |
|---|--------------------------------|
| 1. Quantity, (series in time.) | 2. Quality, (content or matter |
| Unity, (one time.) | of time.) |
| Plurality, (more than one.) | Reality, (time filled.) |
| Totality, (unity of times.) | Negation, (empty time.) |
| | Limitation, (transition |
| | from former to latter.) |
| 3. Relation, (arrangement in time.) | |
| Subsistence and inherence, (co-existence with time.) | |
| Cause and effect, (succession in time.) | |
| Reciprocity of action, (contemporaneousness of mutual influence.) | |

* The term here used is *Wirklichkeit*, reality. In the list of Categories, both in the Kritik and in the Prolegomena, *Daseyn* is the word for this second sub-category under Modality, and *Realität* for the first sub-category of Quality. Kant, in using this latter term, in his Schematism, makes it synonymous with *Sachheit*, matter of fact. It is evident, however, that he attached no importance to these verbal variations. Existence is a matter of fact, both in distinction from a mere negation, and a mere possibility.

4. **Modality**, (mode of connexion or non-connexion with time.)
 Possibility and impossibility, (conceivableness of being in some time or not.)
 Existence and non-existence, (being in a certain time or not.)
 Necessity and contingency, (inconceivableness of not being at all times, and the reverse.)

Such, then, is the "schematism" of the understanding. Agreeably to his twofold view of consciousness, Kant says it is "simply the unity of the varieties of intuition in the internal sense, amounting indirectly to the unity of apperception, as a function which corresponds to the internal sense as a receptivity." He adds that as the categories merely serve to subject phenomena to these forms of synthesis, they are only capable of empirical use, though they are themselves *à priori*, being derived from the mind itself, and not from experience. Thus the categories are limited by sense; for the schema, in any case, is properly the phenomenon, or the sensuous conception of an object in harmony with the category. Number is phenomenal quantity, sensation is phenomenal reality, and the like. The categories, without schemata, are mere empty functions of the understanding, they derive their significance as well as their restriction from sense.

2. In immediate connexion with the above schematism, arise what our philosopher terms *the system of all principles of the pure understanding*. Having shown the general conditions under which the categories are applicable to our sensuous experience, so as to enter into synthetic judgments (propositions), he next proposes to exhibit systematically these judgments—namely, those which the understanding produces *à priori*, ultimate principles not being derived from any higher or more general truths. These principles are nothing more than rules for the objective use of the categories.

As these principles are synthetical, and not analytical, Kant here adverts to the distinction with which he set out. The judgment (proposition) *body is extended* is analytical, the predicate being already contained in the subject. *Body is not extended*, would therefore be a logical contradiction—it would be saying that something extended is not extended. The "principle of contradiction," therefore, is the sufficient test of the truth of all analytical judgments. But of synthetic judgments this principle is not a test, it is only a *sine quâ non*. *Every event has a cause*, is a synthetic judgment; for the conception "cause" (the predicate) is not contained in the conception "event" (the subject). It is also *à priori*, for it is not an induction from experience, but is a universal and necessary truth. No doubt its predicate does not contradict its subject; so far well, but this says nothing to its validity. Kant says, again, that there must be a medium in

which alone the synthesis of subject and predicate can unite—it is that in which all our representations are contained—namely, the internal sense, and its form *a priori*, *time*. The synthesis depends on the imagination; their synthetical unity in the proposition (judgment) on the unity of consciousness. This appears to mean that such truths—those which can neither be proved nor denied—have their seat and their self-evidence in the inmost convictions of our consciousness. We believe such propositions just because we cannot help believing them.

The *principles* which we have now to detail relate, severally, under the categories, to the following heads, which are given in Kant's usual peculiar and technical style :

1. QUANTITY.	2. QUALITY.
Axioms of Intuition.	Anticipations of Perception.
3. RELATION.	4. MODALITY.
Analogies of Experience.	Postulates of Empirical Thought.

1. *Axioms of Intuition*—that is, the laws or ways in which objects can be presented to us, have for their principle, that *all phenomena are extensive quantities*; they have magnitude in space, or are conceived of as having continuity in time: for space and time are the conditions *a priori* of all intuition. All phenomena are in them, and can only be received into our empirical consciousness (that is, we can only have an actual experience of the things around us) by means of a successive synthesis, whereby is generated the representation to us of a determined space or time, more or less, the parts rendering possible and preceding the whole. A line, for example, however short, must be drawn in thought, part after part, if it is to be represented to our mind. So also of time, short or long—we think of its successive progression. On this successive synthesis depends the generation of geometrical figures. Geometry furnishes examples of certain axioms of intuition; as *between two points only one straight line is possible*, and *two straight lines cannot inclose a space*. Here, of course, we have to do with extensive quantities—that is, magnitudes. It is evident that the sub-categories of quantity, which are unity, plurality, and totality, have always to do with phenomena as presented in space, or numbered in time—that is, they all express magnitudes conceived of as measurable, and therefore to be called “extensive.”

2. *Anticipations* of Perception*.—By this expression Kant means our previous knowledge of a certain general characteristic of our sensations. He does not here allude to the universal *a priori*

* Kant says the *προληψις* of Epicurus suggested to him this term.

conditions of space and time as necessary to our perception of phenomena. What to us appears real in these phenomena corresponds to the sensations they produce in us. Hence the principle of the *à priori* knowledge or anticipation referred to is, that *all phenomena, as represented by our sensations, must have intensive quantity, or must present themselves as of a certain degree of reality.* Perception he defines as "empirical consciousness, or a consciousness containing an element of sensation." We refer our own sensuous affections to some external object; and in so doing we ascribe to it degree, or *intensive quantity*, a degree of effect on sense. Kant uses the term "*intensive quantity*" for a quantity which is "apprehended as a unity only, or in which plurality can be represented only by gradual approximation to negation = 0." For our perception of external things takes place through sensation, which has no extensive quantity. There is in it no successive synthesis from part to part till we reach the whole as in measurable magnitudes. Our sensations are wholly subjective; they are our own feelings, though they represent qualities of body. Their only quantity is the degree of their intensity, and hence we call them intensive magnitudes. They may vary from any degree, by diminution, till they vanish. A sensation has no parts, and exists only the moment we feel it. If it diminishes or increases, it becomes, as it were, so many varieties of sensation, perhaps of inappreciable succession—but still, in fact, so many intermediate sensations between the highest degree and zero. There is not here one continuous quantity, as in extensive magnitude, but only a concatenation of many possible degrees ascending or descending, each of which is less different from another than the sensation in its original degree is from zero. A rainbow affects our eyes, say, in its most vivid state; it becomes fainter and fainter till it vanishes. A body feels hot to our touch, it gradually feels less hot, and at last we have no sensation of heat from it. Though our sensations do not admit of linear admeasurement, like extensive magnitudes, yet numbers may be used to determine *à priori* certain intensive phenomena. Thus, the light of the sun must be anticipated to produce a sensation—say "200,000 times" stronger than that of the moon. Heat, again, is measured by the thermometer. On account of quantity and quality being thus determinable, Kant regards the synthesis belonging to these categories as mathematical or *constitutive*. He terms the third and fourth principles, to which we now proceed, *regulative*, as they only concern, as we shall see, the relations of existing phenomena—not the very phenomena themselves in their magnitudes or degrees.

3. The general principle of the *Analogies of Experience* is that *experience is only possible through a necessary connexion of our*

perceptions ; in other words, we must have in our minds a fixed synthesis of phenomena, in order to have an experimental knowledge of them. Experience is a synthesis of our perceptions, which is not contained in our perceptions themselves. I see the wood-man's axe fall : I afterwards hear the sound of the blow. Here are two perceptions, one from sight, one from hearing. My experience teaches me to connect them as cause and effect ; but the perceptions themselves do not contain this synthesis or conjunction as involving a necessary bond between the phenomena. In Kantian phrase, we have here a synthesis which contains the "unity of the diversity of these perceptions, in our consciousness." The two events only present themselves as empirically related in time, but with no sense of necessity. Experience, however, is only possible by means of the necessary connexion which the mind itself gives to its perceptions. Kant expresses the general principle also thus :—All phenomena stand, *à priori*, under rules of the determination of their relationship to each other in time.

The three modes of time, says our author, are *permanence, succession, and co-existence* ; corresponding, in the categories of *Relation*, to substance and accident, cause and effect, and reciprocity between agent and patient. Hence the three modes give the three analogies of experience—that is, the three laws for determining all the relations of phenomena in time, laws prior to experience and rendering it possible.

(1) The first analogy of experience is the principle of the *permanence of substance*. In all the changes of phenomena, the substance or object changes not : its quantity remains the same ; the changeable is only the mode in which the permanent exists. The substratum or substance corresponds with time in general, which changes not ; the accidents alone change in time. Substances are the basis of all the time-determinations which phenomena present to us. Accordingly, the permanence of substance is a necessary condition under which alone phenomena as things or objects are determinable in a possible experience.

(2) The second analogy of experience is the principle of the *succession of time, according to the law of causality* ; that is, all changes take place according to this law of the conjunction of cause and effect. One phenomenon as effect succeeds another as cause—thunder succeeds lightning. We unite the two perceptions, not by the senses, but by the synthetic faculty of imagination, which determines the relation of the phenomena in our internal sense in regard to time. What is further required is, that the order of the phenomena should be determined, that is, which must precede, and which follow. This relationship between them is a pure conception of the understanding by which cause determines effect as consequence. It follows that experience is

only possible in so far as we submit phenomena to this law of causality. True it is that, in our apprehension of any phenomenon, the parts always follow each other, though they do not so succeed each other in the object. I see a house: in this apprehension, I may begin anywhere, at the roof or at the foundation. In this empirical intuition, I may apprehend the manifold by going from left to right, or the reverse. But the parts do not so follow each other in the object; there is no determinate objective order in this case; nor is any particular order thought as necessary in this synthesis of mere apprehension. Not so where an event B succeeds its antecedent A, as when the explosion of the cannon succeeds the flash. I here derive the subjective order of my apprehension from the objective succession of the phenomena; and thus my apprehension proceeds according to a rule. It is, therefore, justly supposed that every event is preceded by something which causes it, that is which it follows according to a rule; and in this condition experience is possible. This principle of causality is not a mere induction; if so, it would be wanting in universality and necessity. Why do we find this conception of cause in our actual experience, but because it is *à priori* in the understanding? No doubt it was first elicited on occasion of our empirical perceptions; but this conception once gained, we yield to it as the *à priori* condition of the synthetic unity of certain phenomena in time, and as the condition of all our experience of actual causes and effects. The principle of the succession of effect to cause still holds, even where the effects are apparently simultaneous with the cause. The relation remains, even where no time perceptible to us has elapsed; for had not A existed, B would not have arisen.

(8) The third analogy of experience is the *principle of co-existence according to the laws of reciprocal agency*. All substances, so far as they can be perceived in space as co-existing, are in mutual connexion with each other. Our mind views the changes of state which substances undergo, as having their causes in other substances; so that nothing exists in a state of isolation, but there is a mutual intercommunion among objects, and the active forces which render matter what it is are always in a reciprocal action among themselves. Things co-exist when the perceptions we have of them can be taken in any order; when, for instance, we can go from A through B, C, D, to E, or retrograde from E to A, or proceed in any other way. Now this, as we have seen, we cannot do in the case of cause and effect, which necessitates a certain succession: we can only place A before B, we cannot reverse the order in causation. But on the other hand, I can look first at the earth, then at the moon, then at a star, or I can look at them in any order as I please. Hence the earth, the

moon, the star, are contemporaneous. I am entitled to say so, simply because my perceptions of these objects can thus follow each other reciprocally, in any order. The synthesis of the imagination would only go from one of these objects to another, but would not show their co-existence. A conception of the understanding, or the category of reciprocal sequence, is necessary to justify us in representing co-existence as phenomenally objective. Hence the co-existence of substances in space can only be cognised under the pre-condition of their reciprocal action; and this is, therefore, the condition of our experience of things. It is only by observing that the order of our synthesis of the objects is arbitrary and indifferent, that we can say they co-exist in one and the same time. Kant says it is evident, in our experience, that it is only the continuous influences in all parts of space that can lead our senses from object to object: the light which plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies effects a mediating reciprocity between them and us, which shows their co-existence with ourselves. It is the relation of reciprocal causality, or of a certain interagency, which alone renders possible our experience of the simultaneous existence of things. Only thus—by this community, can objects produce in us a system of corresponding perceptions, and a real whole.

Such are the three "dynamical" relations which involve all others. Objects must be related to each other as *inherent* one in the other, or as *consequential* to each other, or as *combined* into a whole; and the three analogies of experience determine things according to the three modes of time—*duration*, *succession*, and *simultaneousness*.

4. *The Postulates of Empirical Thinking.* The general principle here is, that everything which can be known in our experience, must be known under a certain modification of the connexion between the subject and the predicate of the proposition in which we state our knowledge of it. Either A may be B (possibly); or A is B (the fact exists); or A must be B (necessarily). The categories and judgments of modality do not add anything to our conception of things; they only show how that conception is related to our faculty of knowledge. The postulates of our empirical thought are nothing more than explanations of possibility, actual existence, and necessity, as applied to our experience of things.

(1) Of these postulates, the first relates to possibility; and here the principle is: *that alone which agrees with the formal conditions of experience (intuition and conception) is possible.* The meaning is that for any event or object to be thought as possible to occur or exist, it must not violate the laws either of sense or understanding. Logical possibility merely demands

consistency in our conceptions: thus that a triangle should have four angles involves a logical contradiction. But Kant here refers to a possibility that is real, or in things. The conception of a figure made up of two straight lines implies a synthesis that is void; as it can refer to no object, not admitting of being constructed in space. It belongs not, therefore, to experience. So the conception of a body constantly present in a portion of space without occupying it, equally disagrees with the conditions and determinations of space. Now these latter apply to all possible things, because they contain *à priori* the form of our experience of objects in general. Such conceptions, therefore, as the above have no objective reality; that is, they cannot be realized in experience—they are opposed to its known conditions.

(2) The second postulate is that, *in order for anything to be real, or actually existing, it must cohere with the material conditions of experience (perception, and therefore sensation)*. In other words, what has actually affected our senses is not merely possible but really exists. Perception by conscious sensation is here required, according to the analogies of experience. From the mere conception of a thing, however complete, and however accordant with the conditions of a possible experience, we can never conclude that it exists. If this conception of it precedes the perception, all we can say is, that it is possible; but when our perception of a thing presents *matter* to the conception of it, we have the true mark of its reality. Our personal knowledge of the existence of things, therefore, reaches as far as our perceptions, and what may be immediately inferred from them according to the laws of experience, extend. Sometimes we know the existence of a thing comparatively *à priori*, and mediately; that is, when it attaches itself to certain perceptions according to the analogies of experience; so that we can reason from a thing which we do perceive to the thing we do not perceive. Thus we know the existence of a magnetic matter in bodies, by the actual perception of the attracted iron filings, though we cannot perceive the matter itself.

(3) The third postulate is as follows: *that exists necessarily, the coherence of which with the real is determined according to universal conditions of experience*. The necessity here spoken of is not mere formal and logical necessity, as when one conception must imply another; it relates to necessity of existence, which can only be known in connexion with an object of perception; and the only existence thus conditioned is that of effects from given causes, as when A being given in perception, B follows in conformity with the laws of causality. Hence the mark of necessity is to be found only in that law of a possible experience, that everything which happens is determined *à priori* by its

cause. We therefore only know the necessity of those effects in nature the causes of which are given to us ; so that this necessity only regards the relations of things according to the dynamical law of causality. Nature could not exist, unless all that happens were subjected to a hypothetical necessity ; that is, every effect must happen if the cause be present. Hence " nothing happens by blind chance," and " there is no such thing as fate," are *a priori* laws of nature, meaning that all is conditioned by causation. This principle forbids any gaps or breaks in the series of phenomena (*in mundo non datur hiatus*), and any leaps in nature (*non datur saltus*) ; for there must be a continuity in all causes and effects ; and no void can be admitted as a part of empirical synthesis.

It may be added that while Kant, as we have seen, terms the axioms of intuition and the anticipations of perception mathematical or constitutive, because they relate to Quantity and Quality, which are extensive and intensive magnitudes—he calls the analogies of experience, and the postulates of empirical thought *dynamical* or regulative ; because, since they concern the Relation and Modality of objects, they bear, not on the nature of objects, but on the principles which affect their existence.

Kant concludes the above systematic representation of " all the synthetical principles of the pure understanding," by reminding us that all which he has set forth shows that the categories, in themselves, are not cognitions (knowledge), but merely *forms* of thought for making knowledge from given intuitions (sensuous representations) of objects. Our external senses, alone, can exhibit the conceptions of understanding in objective reality. If we say " all contingent existence has a cause," this only tells us that, without this relationship to cause, we do not at all comprehend the existence of the contingent. We could never know the existence of such a thing through the understanding and *a priori*. The question is not, how may things exist in themselves, but how *must* they exist if we are to *know* them ? The categories only furnish us with laws of the possibility of experience, and of our knowledge of objects as given in our empirical intuition. The final result of the whole is, that all principles of the pure understanding are nothing more than principles *a priori* of the possibility of experience ; that all synthetical principles *a priori* relate and apply to experience alone ; and that their very possibility rests entirely on this relationship.

Kant's systematic application of the twelve categories to " principles" here ends. As a kind of appendix to the second postulate, he adds some paragraphs by way of refuting Material Idealism, which pronounces the existence of external objects either doubtful or untrue. Descartes said there was nothing absolutely unques-

tionable but the one empirical assertion: *I am*. Berkeley denied the possibility of all material existence. Kant calls this "dogmatic idealism." His own theory—that we know phenomena only, though real things exist—he terms "critical idealism," as being the result of the criticism of reason. Yet, by his making space and time to be simply psychological, and not independent of our sensuous faculty, his realism is irreconcilable with the idealism which characterizes so strongly his whole system. Space and time, he says, are only in us; they do not belong at all to things themselves, we only place phenomena in them. They are only "receptivities" (capacities) of our faculty of sense. This vital inconsistency was not only seen by the Wolfian school; Fichte a disciple of Kant saw it, and started from this point to his own egoistic idealism. Whatever may be thought of Kant's arguments in favour of realism, against Berkeley or Descartes, they are out of all harmony with his idealism of space and time. He strangely says, however, that if space and time were not wholly and alone in us, the external world would be a nonentity! On the contrary, can anything be plainer than that if, as Kant admits is the case, things really exist externally to us, and are not, as Berkeley said, merely our ideas and feelings—then space and time must be something more than mere forms of our sensuous faculty, otherwise the very existence of objects in themselves must depend on our own existence. If the material world really exists, it must exist in space and time: if not, the material world is but an illusion.

Our philosopher further argues that Descartes' principle of the certainty of our own personal existence from consciousness, proves the existence of phenomena in space, which involve something permanent as the cause of our perceptions. Our internal experience is only possible under the previous admission of external experience. My internal experience (consciousness) only gives me representations, but these changeable representations which are presented to me imply of necessity something permanent. Now this permanent must be something without me, and not a mere representation. Nothing permanent corresponds to our notion of body except *matter*. Therefore my existence in time can only be determined (made known) to me by the existence of something out of me; and the material world exists. "The consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of things without me." It is now generally admitted, with Kant, that the agency of external objects is the means by which all our faculties are excited to action. This is obvious with regard to our senses; and if we had no senses, how could any of our other powers have, at the outset, materials to work on? Thought itself must be first elicited by sense. A human being

without all sensation could not know even his own existence, under the present order of things. The *me* and the *non-me*, the subjective and the objective, are therefore inseparably correlated in all our knowledge. There is a question, however, whether the term "consciousness" (*Bewusstseyn*) ought to be indiscriminately applied to our knowledge of ourselves and our knowledge of nature, as Kant has done.*

This discussion of Kant on material idealism is not free from obscurity, on account of his leaving the reader to discover how far he is speaking of external phenomenal realities, in distinction from Berkeley's idealism, and how far of "*noumena*" or things in themselves. His succeeding remarks entitled, "*The Ground of the Distinction of all Objects into Phenomena and Noumena*," may throw further light both on the realistic and the idealistic side of his system. The understanding, says our philosopher, can never make any use of its *à priori* conceptions and principles but what relates immediately to our sensuous experience of phenomena: it cannot make a transcendental use of them—that is, it cannot apply the categories and "principles" to things considered in themselves. Why have mathematical conceptions significance? Take the example: "between two points there can be only one straight line." This principle and its representation are generated in the mind wholly *à priori*; but it would mean nothing if we were not able to exhibit it empirically to sense. An abstract conception must be made sensuous—that is, an object must correspond with it in intuition, else the conception is void of meaning: and so throughout the entire domain of the understanding. Quantity is only explained by means of some adopted unit of sense, and we everywhere find such empirical illustrations necessary. In a word, no conception will have a corresponding object, if we take away sensuous intuition—the only intuition we possess.† Thought itself is only the act of referring a given intuition to an object; and, beyond the sphere of passible experience, no category and no synthetic *à priori* principle can apply.

Now as nothing but phenomena are presented to us in sense; that is, nothing but things as they appear to us—to these *phenomena*, alone, can the understanding apply the categories and the principles derived from them. Other possible things, which are not objects of our senses but are merely cogitated by the understanding, are *noumena* or things thought but not experienced. Kant distinguishes these abstractions or hypotheses which the understanding forms to itself, with nothing in the sensuous

* Sir W. Hamilton uses the term "consciousness" in a similar manner. The question simply relates to the nature of our convictions: is the certainty to me of my own thought and existence, of the *same kind* precisely as the certainty to me of the existence of objects around me—even granting that I am equally sure of both!

† This principle is the key to a large part of Kant's speculations on "*Reason*."

faculty corresponding with them, into *negative* and *positive*. The notion the understanding represents to itself of a substratum to certain sensible properties which sustains or holds them, as it were, together (itself being no object of sense), Kant calls a *negative* noumenon. It is an object of sense, considered in so far as it is not an object of our sensuous intuition. It is the supposed substance or base to which all the sensuous properties belong, regarded abstractedly. On the other hand, a *positive* noumenon is something which is not at all an object of sensuous intuition, but which the understanding is supposed to have the power of presenting to itself as an object of knowledge by means of a kind of intellectual intuition—a faculty which Kant wholly denies to man. Several serious consequences flow from his theory of “positive noumena,” but they belong chiefly to his doctrine of “reason” as distinct from understanding. A stone considered in its *substance* merely, apart from its qualities, is a negative noumenon; an angel is a positive noumenon. He admits that the conception of these noumena, either positive or negative, is not self-contradictory; but he affirms that their possibility is, to us, incomprehensible, since all that is not phenomenon is to us a mere void. Understanding and sense must be conjoined; if we separate them, we suppose representations which we cannot apply to any determinate object.

It is evident that Kant's theory of positive noumena entirely limits our knowledge, properly so called, to what is sensuous, and borders on scepticism; he only avoids this rock by an inconsistent distinction between understanding and “practical reason,” on which we cannot now enter. His views on noumena, negatively considered, are essentially connected with the entire subjectivity of his theory of perception. Not only are all secondary qualities—sound, heat, colour, taste, and the like, *in us* the subject of them; the same is the case with all attributes connected with space and time, such as magnitude, succession, length of duration, etc. These do not exist in things, they depend on our sensuous faculty. We give to all our perceptions a certain space and time, and we speak of objective validity. But when we abstract all time-and-space relations, there remains nothing that we can regard as belonging to the object in and by itself, excepting that it is some unknown *x*. Neither the categories of understanding, nor the intuitive perceptions of sense, either separately or combined, can be referred to anything objective but phenomena. We can know nothing of a noumenal or “intelligible” world. His theory of negative noumena borders narrowly on the “material idealism” which he is so anxious to distinguish from his own “critical” or “transcendental” idealism. Surely it was an assumption to maintain

that things, as they are in themselves, are so different from what they are as manifested to us. If they are not as they appear to be—how do we know it? Very true we can only become acquainted with them by our senses; but their being sensuous proves them material in themselves. Their properties are their very nature; their phenomena are essential to them, although we may not detect all that is in them. It is a *petitio principii* to suppose that things, so far as known to us, are not revealed as they are, but in some other way. If our understanding and our senses are not conformed to the truth of things, they are of little avail to guide us to any kind of knowledge. While Kant limits our understanding entirely to sensuous things, he denies that even here we can have anything more than a relative and subjective knowledge. He denies that objective realities can be known, either by sense or understanding, or both combined, while yet he admits them, and makes their admission an important distinction of his system. He says he never doubted the existence of things, in themselves, (*Ding an sich*), as distinct from mere phenomena: yet his whole theory of time and space as applied to what we regard as the objects around us, by rendering matter or substance (whatever be our speculations with regard to its nature as atomic or merely dynamical) wholly dependent on our subjective capacities, is barely distinguished from the idealism of Berkeley.

Our author follows up his transcendental distinction of phenomena and noumena by a dissertation on the equivocal character or *Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection*,* which arises from not observing that distinction, and thus confounding the objects of the pure understanding with those of sense. Reflection in general, with Kant, is that state of mind which inquires into the relation of our different representations, in regard to the faculty to which they subjectively belong—the understanding or the senses. Transcendental reflection is the act of determining whether our representations are compared with each other as originating in the pure understanding or in sensuous intuition. Kant terms the source of our conceptions, either in the one or in the other, the transcendental “place” of them. If we compare our conceptions together without inquiring to which place (faculty) their objects belong, whether as noumena to the understanding, or as phenomena to sense, we shall be liable to be deceived into error. Now the relations, says our philosopher, in which conceptions may stand towards each

* Chalabyäus remarks that Kant's disciples have sometimes mixed up their own doctrines with their master's. Beck, one of his commentators, regards the *Reflexions-Begriffe* as categorical: Kant himself, however, says they are merely the comparison of representations as to their “place.” They constitute, in fact, an immediate appendix to the remarks on phenomena and noumena.

other, in our minds, at the same time, are these of Identity and Difference, Agreement and Opposition, the Internal and the External, and the Determinable and the Determining (or Matter and Form). These four pairs of correlates he terms the Conceptions of Reflection (*Reflexions-Begriffe*); and what is to be avoided is an amphibolous (ambiguous) use of these relations—a confounding of the empirical use of the understanding as applied to things sensuous, with its transcendental use as applied to certain indeterminate objects of its own framing (noumena).

1. *Identity and Difference.* Suppose I think of two or more drops of water as mere conceptions occurring repeatedly to the understanding, abstracting the way in which these objects present themselves to the sensuous faculty; then the understanding aims in thought to seize these representations, and finds in fact no difference between them. The conception of a drop of water, as such simply, is always the same, however often repeated. But, to sense, this identity cannot present itself. As phenomena in space, the drops are not merely thought by the understanding, but each is intuited (perceived) by the sense as occupying its own space; and, abstracting all other considerations, this circumstance alone makes them numerically different. It follows that objects may be identical in regard to the bare conception of the understanding, while they are different in regard to sensuous intuition.

Hence, says Kant, the fallacy of Leibnitz's doctrine of the "*Identity of Indiscernibles*;" or that no two things, in nature, can be exactly alike; for, if they were, they would not be two, but one and the same. Now this is only true of our conceptions, not of objects as phenomena; for, grant it to be possible that any two things might in all other respects be alike, they must still differ because they must occupy different spaces. Leibnitz here confounded phenomena with things regarded as in themselves—objects of pure understanding, noumena.

2. *Agreement and Opposition.* In regard to these correlates, again, we may have confusion in our notions. Realities, as conceptions of the understanding (*realitas noumenon*), says Kant, cannot be opposed. They cannot be so connected in one subject as to annihilate each other. Realities, as simple affirmations, are never in logical contradiction; in other words, no conception contains contrary affirmations. He means that, if you conceive of realities (things supposed as existing) logically only; you cannot unite in your conception of them opposite qualities excluding each other. The understanding may frame to itself the noumenal schema *triangle*, but not a triangle which has not three sides. On the contrary, the real in a phenomenon (*realitas phenomenon*)—real properties, may be opposed

to each other while united in the same subject, so as wholly or in part to destroy each other. You might keep water on the fire, says Kant, at a given temperature, continually, by always adding to it ice: or two forces may act in the same straight line in opposite directions, and thus counteract each other: or a pleasure may balance a pain.

The Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy maintained the principle, adopted by Leibnitz himself, that *Realities are never opposed to each other*; and this was the basis of his theory of evil in the *Theodicæa*. All evil, he said, is merely the absence of good (a reality). If good exists in the universe, evil cannot exist. It cannot be real, it must be a mere negation; for good and evil are opposed, and two realities cannot oppose each other. Hence Leibnitz regarded evil as simply a privation, the consequence of the limited nature of the creature; only in this way, said he, can evil find a place in the world along with good. Now, says Kant, it is true of our mere conceptions, in their logical character, that we cannot have contradictory elements; but it is not true of experience; it is not true of phenomena; and we know nothing of any things that are not phenomena: other things are mere hypotheses of the understanding. Real properties may be opposed, and are opposed in human experience. In this way Kant combats Leibnitz's argument that good is more real or positive than evil.

3. *The Internal and the External.* The interchange of these conceptions has also led to error. Our conception of substance or matter, as a phenomenon of external sense in space, is made up only of the properties of attraction and resistance. These determinations or forces acting, as we say, *in* it, are in truth merely external relations to other things; and the permanent phenomenon itself is merely a complex of these relations. But, on the other hand, when the understanding tries to conceive of substance in its essence, apart from all sensuous and external relations, as extension, impenetrability, contact, motion, and the like, (though this noumenon is to us really a *nescio quid*, or a nonentity,) the understanding must think of it, if at all, as having all its determinations absolutely internal. Its modifications have no relation to other things; they are only changes of our own internal state. Now, what other internal attribute of such an object as this can we think of, than that which our own internal sense presents to us—namely, the power of thought, or something having an analogy to it, such as the power of representation?

Our author brings to this test the *Monadology* and the *Pre-established Harmony* of Leibnitz; both which he regards as founded on an erroneous view of the difference between the internal and the external. Leibnitz makes the external relations of

things as only apparent: their true designations are internal. The understanding grasps the elementary materials of the universe as simple abstractions, without parts, in short, *monads*; and finds that they can only have internal functions—namely, the power of “representing to themselves the universe,” which they together constitute. And as the monads have thus no external relations, or any agency whatever on each other, the influences which we seem to see around us are not real. Objects, says Leibnitz, have no more influence among themselves than two clocks with no connecting mechanism, one of which points to the same hour which the other is striking. Hence the Pre-established Harmony, which accounted for the apparent effects of substances on each other, on the principle that the great First Cause, instead of interposing every instant and in every case, has fixed once for all the general laws by which substances are to correspond among themselves, though they have no real agency on each other.

4. *Matter and Form*, or the determinable and the determining. Our conceptions of these also require reflection, as to their relation to understanding or sense. *Matter* here signifies whatever may have determination given to it; *form*, its determination. In a conception of pure understanding something must be given, in order to its being determined. If I say A is B, the terms A and B are the given matter of the proposition, their relationship as expressed by the copula is the form. The matter must be known or thought before we can thus conjoin its elements by the mind. Hence, in the conception of the pure understanding, the matter or content must precede the form. But in the case of sense it is not so. Here, all objects are determined solely as phenomena; and the form of our intuitions, as a subjective quality of our sensuous faculty, must precede the matter or content of them: in other words, space and time are *à priori* in our sensuous nature, (for Kant, it will be remembered, makes them both sensuous,) and they precede all the phenomena of sense, that is, all the data of experience, and render them possible.

Now, according to Leibnitz, space is nothing but the order of things co-existing, and time the order of things successive. This is quite at variance with Kant's theory. Leibnitz erred, he says, by making space and time determinations of things themselves. Space was possible as a certain relation or order, in which substances have an apparent mutual communication; and time was the apparent sequence of their states, as causes and effects. He reasoned on the principle that the pure understanding can at once seize on objects and deduce their relations; whereas, it can only refer to objects by its categories, through the medium of sense, which in its forms of space and time is, *à priori*, the recep-

tivity of all phenomena. Leibnitz* could not believe that the form could thus precede things, and determine their possibility; he therefore made space and time possible through our human view of the relationship of substances to each other. As to what is peculiar to space and time, and what seems independent of things, he ascribed this to an unavoidable confusion in our conceptions. He made space and time not only determinations of the monads (noumena); he also made them, as conceptions, valid of phenomena, because he sought everything in the understanding, not allowing to sense a peculiar mode of intuition, but assigning to it only the "despicable office" of confusing and disarranging the arrangements of the understanding.

The above remarks on the "Conceptions of Reflection," it will have been seen, are intended by our author to show the nullity of all conclusions obtained by comparing objects with each other in the understanding alone; for phenomena are the only things which can to our human faculties possess objective reality, and this because they give us intuitions to correspond with our conceptions. We can only know even ourselves, says Kant, through the intuition of the internal sense, consequently as phenomena; and we can discover nothing but phenomena in our existence, however we desire to penetrate into their non-sensuous cause. Leibnitz, in applying to things the principle that what belongs to or contradicts a conception in general, also belongs to or contradicts all that is particular which is contained under it, forgot that particular conceptions are such because they contain more than is thought in the general one. Thus the conception *eagle* contains more elements in its meaning than the more general conception *bird*. Yet, on the above principle, his whole intellectual system is built. In the mere general conception of a thing, he abstracted necessary conditions of sensuous intuition, and then treated these conditions as though they were not to be met with at all. Two drops of water, in this way, would be one and the same thing if they were always conceived of by the understanding as exactly alike; but this, as we have already seen, ignores their necessary numerical difference in space. Leibnitz thought he could know the internal nature of things, by comparing all objects in the understanding, and by means of abstract conceptions. He neglected sense, and regarded it as a confused mode of representation, always to be corrected by the understanding, and not as a primitive and special source of representa-

* The *Reflexionsbegriffe*, and their amphiboly, would almost seem to have been invented by Kant for the refutation of some of the main points in the speculative philosophy of Leibnitz.

tions. He was thus led to a pretended system of knowledge. True, says Kant, the understanding limits the sensuous faculty, but without enlarging its own sphere. Sense must not pretend to grasp things in themselves, but only phenomena. Understanding thinks to itself an object *in se*, but only as a transcendental one, which is the cause of the phenomenon—an abstraction which cannot be thought as quantity, reality, or substance, because these conceptions require always sensuous forms. This object is—we know not where—or whether it would disappear or not with the sensuous faculty. We call it a noumenon; but since we cannot apply to it any of the categories, its representation is for us empty and goes for nothing, excepting to mark out the limits of our sensuous faculty, and to leave remaining a void which we can neither fill by possible experience, nor by the pure understanding.

Kant regards as necessary to the completeness of his Transcendental Analytic, a brief statement of his views respecting the different ways in which we may arrive at the conception "*nothing*." He says we are capable of forming the conception of an object in general, problematically understood, without its being decided whether it is something or nothing. Now, in order to this decision, we must proceed according to the categories.

1. To those of *Quantity* (all, many, one,) *none* is opposed. This conception is *ens rationis*, an abstraction of reason, like *noumena*, which are not possible in the sphere of reality. This kind of nothing is *empty conception without object*.

2. In *Quality*, the real is something affirmed: negation is the opposite of reality; that is a conception of the absence of an object; cold, or a shadow, are examples. Here we have *nihil privativum*: this nothing is an object emptied of all reality, an *empty object of conception*.

3. Under *Relation*, we find the sub-category of condition or dependence. Pure space and pure time are no objects of intuition: they are mere forms or conditions on which phenomena depend, though this *ens imaginarium* is often spoken of as object. This kind of nothing is *empty intuition without object*.

4. In regard to *Modality*: the object of a conception which is self-contradictory is a mere non-entity, because the conception is impossible; as, for example, a figure constructed of only two straight lines. This sort of nothing is a *nihil negativum*, or an *empty object without conception*.

The reader may take these "nothings" as at least an example of Kant's ingenuity. They are cleverly made to correspond, in a certain sense, with the categories; so as to show the several ways in which we may arrive at the conception of *nothing*. Nor can the praise of great ingenuity and acuteness be denied to the deve-

lopments which are contained throughout the "Analytic of Principles" according to the categories, whatever may be thought of some of the details. These details, however, are so mixed up with the categories themselves, that they to a considerable extent if not wholly depend on the merits of the latter.

This theory of the Categories has been severely criticized, both in Germany and elsewhere—not in regard to the idea, which is generally admitted, that thought must have its own constitution, and its ways of apprehending the objects of sense—but chiefly in regard to details. Indeed, although Kant's categories are merely subjective forms of the understanding, and applicable to phenomena alone, irrespectively of the question whether there be anything *real* as distinct from phenomena or not—nevertheless the categories are equally valid for the most dogmatic realism, so far as they are in themselves just. For whatever knowledge perception may give us, we must no doubt receive it according to the laws of the understanding as well as of the senses. The philosopher of Königsberg supposed that, like himself, the great Stagirite, in his ten categories, offered a subjective analysis of the elements of human understanding. Aristotle, however, aimed at the classification of external objects, though necessarily in relation to our faculties: Kant analyzed thought itself, in reference to objects. Kant's criticism of Aristotle's Categories (whatever be their own merits) is partly based on the error of supposing that his great predecessor's intention was exactly the same as his own; and he condemned Aristotle's list as a mere "rhapsody," and as hasty, incomplete, and confused. Kant took his categories from the arrangement of judgments, as he found it in the common logic; and he squared his list according to them. Hence he did not inquire into the relation of these abstract conceptions to each other as to their origin, but pronounced every one of them independent and irreducible. He said, for instance, that the conception of a *whole* was a combination of the conceptions of unity and plurality; while he nevertheless strenuously maintained that the third category in each set was as primitive and irreducible as the other two. In a similar way, he made *substance* and *cause* combine to produce "reciprocity of causation." Even if we admitted that the categories of the understanding actually present themselves to us under these Kantian forms, it should be asked: Have they always had these forms; if not, how did they assume them? In this way, it would surely be found that they are not all primitive and original, in the sense in which some of them are, but which he claims for all.

Independently of the principle on which our author proceeded, of adopting the ordinary logical forms of judgments as the basis of his pure conceptions of the understanding, without a special

criticism in justification of this method, we may well hesitate to accept this list of categories as a whole: for, not to insist on other objections, it is evident that considerable difficulty attaches, in some cases, to our receiving each sub-category as essentially distinct from all the rest, though Kant himself attached vital importance to this point. For example, if we say "the soul is not mortal"—this is a "*negation*;" "the soul is non-mortal" is a "*limitation*." One proposition denies that the soul is among mortal beings, the other affirms that it is among non-mortal beings; but then our negation has now become, in truth, an *affirmation* (reality): here then the categories of reality and limitation are confounded; and besides this, the meaning of the negation and the limitation is identical. A category of *predication*, in general, would, we venture to say, have absorbed all the three; and would obviously have been a much higher generalization. Again: *substance* and *existence* are given as pure conceptions wholly distinct from each other. Of course, we must take them both as only intended to refer to the phenomena of sense. Under the second "postulate of empirical thinking," Kant says: "Our knowledge of the *existence* of things reaches as far as our perceptions." Now may not exactly the same, according to his own theory, be said of *substances*? He expresses this postulate thus: "That which coheres with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is *real*." Is there not, here, the absence of any definite distinction between existence and substance, and do they not mutually involve each other? Is there not, moreover, also a confounding of *reality* with substance? But reality, substance, and existence, are all arranged under different heads—Quality, Relation, and Modality. At all events, in several cases, the distinctions are not so sharply drawn as to prevent their being confounded; and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a considerable sacrifice has been made, unwittingly, to the seductive influence of method and symmetry. Our space does not admit of any further remarks: we will however add, that whatever imperfection may attach to this famous list of categories—which are the work of great, but perhaps (as Sir William Hamilton remarks) of "perverted ingenuity," it must be admitted this does not essentially affect his main point—that we can *know* objects only as they are related to our faculties of sense and understanding, and that all our knowledge is *subjective*. His conclusion from this principle, that *we cannot know anything of the supersensible* is especially connected with another part of his system, the Transcendental Dialectic.

ART. IV.—ON THE OBSCURE MENTAL DISORDERS OF CRIMINALS.

THE mental disorders of criminals are of singular interest, more particularly those obscure affections which may be arranged as a transition series between positive criminality on the one hand, and criminality as the result of manifest insanity on the other. Cases of this kind are distinguished, perhaps, more by the anomalous mode in which the vicious or criminal propensities are manifested than in any other fashion; and their importance (as yet, perhaps, not sufficiently recognised) can scarcely be exaggerated; for, from the circumstances under which they are observed, they offer to the pscopathist an excellent opportunity for the careful and systematic study of many of those slight shadings off of the healthy into the morbid action of the brain, which are all-important in mental pathology and therapeutics. These cases, moreover, are equally important to the medical jurist; for from them, he may, with the greatest probability, hope to obtain many satisfactory aids in the diagnosis of certain obscure forms of insanity accompanied by criminal acts, for the want of which he is not unfrequently placed at disadvantage in a court of law.

A prisoner confined in one of our large prisons is so situated that he may be observed steadily and systematically, and the conditions under which he is placed, and their influence upon him, may be fully ascertained and accurately estimated. The evidence, therefore, which would be obtained regarding obscure mental affections under these circumstances might be expected to have peculiar value; and in its bearing upon the legal doctrines of the responsibility of the insane, it would doubtless have great weight, removed as it would be from the refracting medium of the procedure of a court of law. No evidence probably would more certainly and quickly operate with both the public and the bar in inducing them to admit the justice of the proposition, that when positive indications of the existence of a morbid state of the mind are ascertained to exist in a prisoner at the bar, he ought to be dealt with after a different fashion to the ordinary criminal. Punishment in such cases is not only useless, but it is commonly harmful; and if hopeless insanity be not determined by it, it most probably will aggravate the vicious disposition of the prisoner, and at the termination of his period of imprisonment he will forthwith be guilty of other and more serious criminal acts.

Prisoners of the class referred to require to be treated as lunatics and not as criminals, and their confinement should have for object the testing of their true state of mind, and the adoption

of such means for relief as may be deemed necessary ; while their release should be made dependent, in a great measure, upon the condition of the mind at the time.

In illustration of the foregoing remarks, and as a valuable contribution to mental pathology, we may quote several cases of the more obscure mental disorders of criminals which are recorded in the recently published Reports of the Directors of Convict Prisons in England, and also in Ireland.

Mr. Bradley, the able medical officer of the Pentonville prison, reports the following cases :—

“ W. G., aged 34, a labourer from Westmoreland, was tried at Worcester, on the 6th of March, 1854, and sentenced to four years' penal servitude, for a burglary. He was first confined in the city of Worcester Gaol, for about five months, and at his departure the governor gave him a character to the following effect:—His conduct was most refractory; he twice attempted to break out of his cell: he smashed the windows; *many times threatened the life of the governor and surgeon*; his ordinary language was too disgusting for repetition; and, in short, he was the ‘ vilest brute ’ he ever had in custody during a governorship of 35 years. From Worcester, the prisoner was sent to Millbank, where he remained but a few weeks, and was thence passed on to Pentonville. Here he was confined for upwards of a year, during the whole of which period, his conduct was marked by insubordination. He disturbed the prison, attempted an escape, *threatened the lives of the officers*, and to carry out his threats *devised several weapons of very ingenious construction*. When the term of separate confinement had expired, he was removed to Portland, where, as may be learned from his papers, he was, on account of highly mutinous and insubordinate conduct, after about three months' detention, removed to Millbank Prison, to be placed in the penal class. When he had been about five months in the last-named prison *he committed a murderous assault upon a warder*, for which offence he was sent to Newgate, tried at the Central Criminal Court, and sentenced to transportation for life. In pursuance of this sentence, he was, on the 14th April, 1856, sent to Pentonville for the second time. On entering the prison, and while in that courtyard awaiting his formal reception, *he threatened repeatedly that he would murder an officer* before the expiration of his imprisonment. His subsequent conduct was very similar to what it was during his former imprisonment here. He opposed himself to the rules, and murmured at the dietary, which he asserted was insufficient to maintain his strength. Sometimes he pretended to be too weak to leave his bed, or that he was actually at the point of death; at other times he maintained that immediate death was preferable to the completion of his sentence, and begged that he might be put to death. All this time his bodily health was good, and he retained his natural stoutness. The character originally given him by the Governor of Worcester Gaol was, to a certain extent, confirmed; for he appeared to be lazy and ill-conducted, morose, bloody-minded, and an impostor. His term of imprisonment

in separation having expired, he would have been passed on to one of the public works prisons, but that the whole tenor of his prison life rendered it probable that insanity in a latent or unrecognised form was present, although neither incoherence nor delusion was evident. It was therefore considered advisable to recommend his removal to Dartmoor, where he would be under medical observation while his mental condition continued to be in an unsatisfactory state, and where the discipline would be better suited to his case than that of the public works. Before the necessary warrant arrived, he one day preferred a request to be allowed some indulgences in addition to his diet, and when this was refused as unreasonable, *he savagely attacked the medical officer, and stabbed him with a weapon he had previously constructed for the purpose, which he had kept concealed in his coat sleeve, wounding also two of the warders who came to the rescue.* When spoken to shortly afterwards on the serious nature of his offence, he expressed no contrition, but, on the contrary, regretted that he had not 'killed the doctor,' as he had intended, alleging that for some time past his food had been 'powdered' or poisoned by the medical officer's orders. As this was manifestly an insane delusion, the prisoner was placed in the infirmary, where he was visited by an '*expert*' in insanity, who pronounced him to be a proper subject for a lunatic asylum. In accordance with this view of the case, in which I fully concurred, the prisoner was, on the 9th of April, removed to Bethlem Hospital, whence, after a detention of somewhat less than five months, he was, on the 29th of August, sent back to Pentonville. *With murderous threats* in his mouth, lavishing abuse upon the establishment he had just left, and persisting in the story of the 'powdered' food, his mental condition on readmission was but little altered since I last saw him. As I was convinced from long-continued observation of the case that the prisoner was still the subject of mental affection, and unfit, therefore, for the discipline of the prison, he was recommended for removal to Dartmoor, whither he was sent on the 7th of September, accompanied by a brief statement, in order to put the authorities of that prison on their guard concerning him. From Dartmoor I am informed he has been removed on account of bad conduct to Millbank, where I believe he at present remains, and in the penal class.

"I am fully persuaded that the above case should be regarded as one of insanity, with homicidal tendency, an example of the *monomaniac homicide* described by Esquirol, and as such to be rather a subject for treatment in a properly-constructed hospital for lunatics, than for the discipline of a prison. . . .

"W. W., aged 22, a carter and a reputed thief, was convicted at the Bolton Sessions, October 6th, 1853, of larceny, after a previous conviction, and was sentenced to six years' penal servitude. It appeared from the Caption Papers that he was first confined for about six months in the New Bailey Prison, where he was 'sullen,' 'idle,' 'insubordinate,' and was whipped for refusing to work. Thence he was sent to Wakefield Prison, where his conduct during an imprisonment of nine months was 'bad.' Thence to Portland, where he was de-

tained between 11 and 12 months, and where he obtained the following character from the governor: '*very bad,*' '*a most insubordinate and idle prisoner,*' '*I fear incorrigible.*' From Portland he was removed to Millbank. There he remained 15 months, during which period his general conduct was '*bad,*' and he was flogged for insubordination. From Millbank he was passed on to Portsmouth. He remained in the latter prison only 26 days, and was then, on account of refusal to work and continuous insubordination, removed (on the 20th January last) to Pentonville, to undergo a third period of probation in separate confinement. During his imprisonment here his conduct was very similar to what it appears to have been in other prisons. He was generally idle and insubordinate. At times he was violent, smashing the windows, and *threatening the lives of the officers.* Although no delusion was manifested, yet the silly laugh, the motiveless misconduct, and other features of the case, sufficiently indicated the existence of weakness or unsoundness of mind, and the necessity for special treatment. The prisoner was placed in the infirmary, and put to associated labour. Subsequently (on the 22nd of April) he was removed to Dartmoor, as an unfit subject for separate confinement. He was visited and examined by Dr. * * * *, who gave an opinion to the effect that the mental condition of the prisoner was such as to excite a grave suspicion as to his responsibility, although the symptoms were not sufficiently pronounced to justify a removal to a lunatic asylum.

"T. K., aged 17, convicted on the 3rd of November, 1856, of burglary, and sentenced to six years' penal servitude, was received at Pentonville, 6th April, 1857. He was a somewhat weak-minded lad who, when he had been here about seven months, exhibited considerable excitement, and gave way to paroxysms of ungovernable violence. Under suitable moral treatment in the infirmary, where he received special attention from the schoolmaster, he became orderly and tractable, and at present encourages a hope of amendment and recovery.

"H. W., a prisoner of sullen disposition, when he had been exactly a month in the prison, contrived to open a vein in his arm with a steel pen, avowedly with a suicidal intention. A second time he resorted to a similar proceeding; and when means were adopted to prevent him from inflicting injuries of this kind on himself, he threatened to starve himself, and for several days refused food, until at length, finding that nourishment was about to be administered by means of the stomach-pump, his resolution forsook him, and he took his meals in a natural manner. He was treated for some time in the infirmary in association, and subsequently was removed to Dartmoor as an unfit subject for separate confinement.

"R. D., received on the 17th of September from Dartmoor, was removed to Millbank as an unfit subject for the discipline of this prison, at the first convenient opportunity after his reception. The prisoner, aged 24, had been a private in the Royal Marines. He was tried on the 28th of September, 1854, by a general court-martial,

and sentenced to 14 years' transportation, for striking his serjeant. In pursuance of his sentence he was first sent to Maidstone Gaol. His conduct there was violent and disorderly, and after a detention of four months he was pronounced to be mad, and was removed to Bethlem. He was confined as a lunatic there and at Fisherton for about a year and three quarters, and was then re-conveyed to Maidstone Gaol. He remained two months in Maidstone, was again pronounced to be mad, and was again placed in Bethlem Hospital. After the lapse of five weeks he was discharged thence as sane, and removed to Millbank. At Millbank he was detained about six weeks. His conduct during that period was 'bad,' and he is said to have feigned an attempt at suicide. He was then removed to Portland, where his conduct for two months was 'very bad.' He attempted suicide, and was sent to Dartmoor. At Dartmoor he used threatening language, violently assaulted the officers, and was then, after three months' detention, removed to Pentonville, to undergo a period of probation in separate confinement.

"Such is a bare outline of this case, obtained from the prisoner's papers. From the time of his reception into Pentonville until his removal he conducted himself in so frantic a manner as to raise a grave suspicion of his sanity, independent of his previous history, which I think sufficiently shows that he was at all events an unfit subject for the discipline of separate confinement."

Upon three of these cases Mr. Bradley makes the following pertinent remarks:—

"The above case, that of W. G., and the two cases immediately following it, possess many features in common, and differ from each other but little, I believe, except in degree. They illustrate a peculiar class of prisoners received into Pentonville and the convict prisons at the present time. Prisoners of the class referred to are characterized by inveterate idleness, obstinacy, and insubordination, by gross and apparently motiveless misconduct. They are at intervals violent, and smash everything within reach. They assault officers, disturb the prison by shouting, and set all order at defiance. Some are also intractable malingerers; others threaten or attempt suicide. Such men occupy as it were a neutral territory between crime and insanity, oscillating from one to the other, until at length in some cases incoherence or delusion becomes apparent, the mental equilibrium is perceived to be lost, and they fall obviously into the domain of insanity; in other cases the mental condition continues doubtful, and in the prisons they are as often regarded as 'cracked' or crazy as they are in the lunatic asylums as criminals and impostors. On these the authorized prison punishments are found to be worse than useless, and the existing systems of discipline, whether 'separate' or associated, appear to be productive of little benefit. To deal effectively with them before actual insanity is established, a special and peculiar discipline is needed; for, so far as my experience extends, separate confinement is not attended by any good result; and as they are frequently sent back

to us from the public works, it would seem that the discipline there is equally fruitless."

Dr. Maurice Corr, the medical superintendent of the Philipstown Government Prison (Ireland), reports that during the last eighteen months he had been under the necessity of recommending that fourteen convicts should be transferred to a lunatic asylum. Several of the patients were entitled to their discharge at the time of their removal to the Central Asylum, and of these cases we are told that they had not expressed any desire for liberty, notwithstanding a lengthened imprisonment and frequent punishment; neither had they shown any regret under severe privations, nor any inclination to amend.

The following cases are quoted from the Appendix to Dr. Corr's Report:—

"J. H., sentenced to ten years' transportation, October, 1850. Transferred to Central Asylum, October, 1856. Entitled to discharge, on commuted sentence, October, 1856.

"Noted on committal sheet to Philipstown.—'Violent, mischievous, and very easily excited.' *Character at Philipstown.*—Extremely eccentric. *Conduct at Philipstown.*—He was invariably insolent to his superiors; disobedient to the utmost; addicted to inordinate fits of laughter, particularly during Divine Service, for which reason he was, at length, kept from attending chapel; repeatedly violent to officers and prisoners, rendering it necessary to retain him in almost continuous separation, which did not appear to annoy him in the least. After constant and careful surveillance I could not arrive at other conclusion than that this prisoner was of unsound mind, that he offered no hope of improvement while retained in separation, and that it would be extremely dangerous to place him in association."

"J. L., sentenced to seven years' transportation, October, 1852. Transmitted to Central Asylum, January, 1857. Entitled to discharge on commuted sentence, October, 1856. Re-committed to Philipstown from Central Asylum, December, 1857.

"Character at Philipstown.—Treacherous, excitable to dangerous violence, insolent, disobedient, and not to be trusted in association. *Conduct at Philipstown.*—Attempted to commit suicide, when detected in a plan to assault an officer; assaulted a warder with a trussel, another with a stone, the deputy-governor with a bucket—all these attacks being most treacherous; severely wounded one of a class of prisoners, at whom he flung a brick, and, although unobserved in the act, he voluntarily admitted it; stealthily, at night, endeavoured to burn his clothes by placing them in the stove fire; subject to outbreaks of passion approaching to frenzy, during which it was absolutely necessary, for his self-preservation, to place and retain him under restraint. His demeanour and conversation were remarkably strange in hospital, where he was, on two occasions, treated for violent pain in his head. In general, he obstinately refused to attend Divine Service. Such were some of the grounds on which I concluded that 'J. L. laboured under

dangerous mental aberration, with periodical fits of insanity; a conclusion not unnatural when dealing with a prisoner (if his conduct had been exemplary) entitled to discharge, who patiently endured repeated separations, personal restraint, low diet, &c., and who never expressed a wish or desire for his liberty. This prisoner, in two days after his arrival at Philipstown from the Central Asylum, made use of violent and obscene language to a warder, for which misconduct he was placed in a punishment cell where he remains up to this date, 11th January."

"J. R., sentenced to seven years' transportation, July, 1853. Transferred to Central Asylum, September, 1857. Entitled to discharge on commuted sentence, July, 1857.

"Character at Philipstown.—Treacherous, violent, dangerous; showed unmistakable signs of approaching fits, such as doggedness, refusal of food, eccentric conduct at exercise, hatred of those around him, &c. *Conduct at Philipstown.*—Repeated outbreaks of treacherous violence; broke windows, buckets, and articles within reach; tore up bed clothes and wearing apparel; made nuisance in cell, daubed the walls with it; assaulted officers; blasphemed loudly for hours; attempted to break out of cell; wore his clothes in a peculiar way; continually picked and scratched his private parts; prone to destroy walls and furniture. During lucid intervals spoke most rationally, so as to deceive strangers as to his real state, displaying considerable powers of reasoning; evincing desire for books, chiefly scriptural, which after a time he suddenly tore to pieces; invariably declined clerical advice; *was perfectly indifferent regarding his liberty, though well aware that his detention resulted from his own misconduct, and recoiled at mention of being restored to his friends.* Trials at association failed, owing to his frequent treacherous assaults on officers and prisoners. He was kept in separate confinement for twelve months up to his removal to Central Asylum. I considered him to be a dangerous lunatic."

"J. D., or H., sentenced to ten years' transportation, June, 1851. Transferred to Central Asylum, August, 1856. Entitled to discharge on commuted sentence, June, 1857.

"Marked on committal sheet to Philipstown.—'Supposed malingerer.' *Character at Philipstown.*—Remarkably silent, melancholy, morose, very quarrelsome when roused, even by speaking to him. *Conduct at Philipstown.* Had the habit of sitting for continuous hours on the sill of his cell window, shouting incessantly and becoming most violent when any attempt was made to remove him; would suddenly scatter and destroy his food, and, if remonstrated with by the warders, became dangerously excited, making desperate attempts to assault the parties present, succeeding, on one such occasion, in wounding the chief warder. After matured observation I considered it extremely dangerous to permit this prisoner into association. I looked upon him to be dangerously insane at intervals. I foresaw no prospect of amendment in separation.

"The inspectors of Lunatic Asylums state, in their Report for 1855-7 that 'D. is passionate, of very limited understanding; is of unsound mind, is a case for detention.'"

"W. H., sentenced to seven years' transportation, July, 1853.

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Entitled to discharge on commuted sentence, July, 1857. Remains at Philipstown.

"*Character noted on committal sheet to Philipstown.*—'Repeatedly punished for insolence—for assaulting officers—afterwards considered to be of unsound mind.' *Character at Philipstown.*—While tranquil he continually laughs like a fool; gives incoherent answers; appears to have extraordinary ideas about religion; retained from attending Divine Service, in consequence of his unruly conduct during it; subject to frequent fits of extreme violence. *Conduct at Philipstown.*—Assaulted officers; destroyed windows, bed-furniture, and body-clothes; passed urine and excrement on floor of cell. It has been found necessary to retain this prisoner in uninterrupted separation during the last twelve months, *no appearance of amendment being observed*, while he repeatedly offered such violence as to require personal restraint, reduction of diet, &c.—treatment endured without a remark and with evident indifference. He never alludes to his protracted separation; to his loss of commutation of sentence; nor speaks of his liberty. I certified that he was of unsound mind, subject to frequent paroxysms of dangerous lunacy."

"T. M'L., sentenced to four years' penal servitude, January, 1855. Transferred to Central Asylum, September, 1856.

"*Noted on committal sheet to Philipstown.*—'Is extremely violent when excited; is at all times most insolent; has been for a long time in separation, under medical surveillance.' *Character at Philipstown.*—He was exceedingly quarrelsome and easily excited to violence when checked; was an habitual blasphemer, an everlasting talker. *His conduct at Philipstown* brought on him repeated punishments with continued separation, of which he seemed perfectly regardless. His habits, previously to his conviction, were extremely intemperate, and led to frequent punishments for drunkenness. After continuous close observation, while he was in and out of separation, I concluded that he could not, with safety, be left in association; that he was subject to frequent aberrations of mind, which rendered him irresponsible for his acts; that, therefore, he should be deprived of opportunity to commit assaults, even though his insane paroxysms were interrupted by lucid intervals—a fact that, under all the circumstances of his case, including his former intemperance, induced me to recommend his transfer to the Asylum, as presenting favourable prospects of recovery."

Dr. Corr further informs us that the Philipstown Prison—

"Contains, under medical observation, a class rather numerous, of weak-minded, passionate, irresponsible convicts, who, without presenting decided symptoms of lunacy, are absolutely unfit for associated prisons, by reason of their dangerous propensities, easily-excited violence, and constant retention of officers and prisoners in fear of their temper and irregularities. Such a class is entirely unsuited to undergo the mildest form of discipline, against which each, after his own fashion, offers resistance, more or less violent. The sane portion of the prison population act in various ways towards men so affected, and help thereby to weaken discipline. The consequences are in-

vitable—the class referred to must be locked up in separation, and thus a case, in its incipient stage *quite curable*, steals along, under such treatment, into *confirmed lunacy*.”

Mr. Awly Banon, the medical officer of the Grangegorman Female Prison, in his report upon the sanitary and medical condition of that prison, refers to a series of cases of doubtful lunacy occurring among the female convicts, in the following words :—

“In my report for the year 1856, there occurs the following paragraph :—‘There is a class amongst the convicts with whom I find it very difficult to deal; I allude to those who, though they cannot be pronounced actually insane, are of such defective mental organization as to render them, in my opinion, not wholly responsible for the violence and excitement they too often exhibit. Of this class there are about six at present in the prison, two or three of whom require restraint and occasional separation.’ My attention during the year has been particularly directed to some of these women, whose conduct has given considerable trouble. Two of them, especially J. D. and E. P., were very frequently brought before the Directors for violent and outrageous conduct, the former frequently assaulting her fellow-prisoners, and even the matrons, without any apparent motive or cause whatever. This woman had been sent up from Cork Prison on the 12th May, 1857, to Newgate Prison, where she remained, until transferred to Grangegorman on the 18th July, 1857. Her conduct in Cork, Newgate, and Grangegorman, has been throughout bad; kindness or punishment being equally unavailing in correcting her in the slightest degree. The other prisoner, E. P., has been in Grangegorman for nearly three years, and she also has very often been equally violent, breaking the glass in her cell, and giving way to fits of passion without the slightest reason, over which she seems not to have the least control, but soon afterwards expressing her contrition. Under these circumstances, I have been frequently referred to, as to whether these women are proper subjects for punishment, or whether I consider them unaccountable for their conduct from defective intellect, and therefore fit subjects for transfer to the Criminal Lunatic Asylum. Not having been able, on frequent and careful examination, as yet to detect any symptoms of insanity, other than those already mentioned, I have, up to this time, declined to certify for their transfer, but continue to have them under constant observation, with a view to their ultimate disposal. Their punishments are generally modified, being principally confined to restraint, by the wearing of the new jacket for a short period; their physical strength not being such as to justify, for any lengthened period, their being placed on bread and water. It is but natural to suppose, that amongst so many, we must expect to meet with some few cases calculated to give embarrassment, and I cannot now give any other suggestions for the better management of these women, than to continue to keep them under constant surveillance and medical treatment when necessary; and should either of them exhibit further symptoms of insanity, to have her at once transferred to the lunatic asylum. One or two others amongst the convicts exhibit symptoms of weak intellect, but not one of the trouble-

some character of those above mentioned. One of them, M. A., whose commuted term of imprisonment expired, refuses to tell who her friends are, and is frequently found muttering to herself, and showing, by other symptoms, that she is decidedly of unsound mind. I think the best course, in her case, would be to send her to the district Lunatic Asylum on being discharged from prison, should her friends not be forthcoming."

In what manner prisoners of doubtful sanity should be dealt with becomes a question of very considerable importance. It is evident, from the cases which we have related, that imprisonment, whether of the associate or the separate character, aggravates, as a rule, the morbid condition of mind, and fails altogether of its proper effects. Dr. Maurice Corr suggests the establishment of an institution, intervening in character between a prison and an asylum, and conducted on the principles of a lunatic asylum. An institution so constituted, he conceives (referring particularly to Ireland), would offer the following advantages:—

"I. It would relieve pressure on the Central Asylum, by providing certain moral and medical tests for convicts who *appear to be deranged*, as to the *reality* of their symptoms, whether of idiocy, lunacy, or insanity; and thus, with the most feasible prospect of detecting *malingersers*, it would be sure to produce fair results in doubtful cases.

"II. It would secure the best chance of recovery in hopeful cases.

"III. It would afford ample opportunity for the application of reformatory treatment to all of those classes."

We entirely concur in the suggestion of Dr. Corr, and we believe that an institution of the character he mentions is as much required in England as in Ireland. The lunatic hospitals in London do not supply the need, and in the provinces the great county and the borough hospitals cannot be made available for doubtful cases of lunacy. The projected erection of a state lunatic asylum affords an admirable opportunity for the formation in connexion with it, either as a portion of that building or as a separate building, of a prison for the reception of criminals of doubtful sanity. Such a prison, duly regulated, would become a state hospital for cases of incipient or suspected lunacy among offenders; and its establishment would not only secure the advantages mentioned by Dr. Corr, but it would also put an end to those unsatisfactory and painful instances of frequent change from prison to asylum, from asylum to prison, and from prison to prison, shown in the cases, recorded by Mr. Bradley, of W. G., W. W., and R. D.

ART. V.—THE STATISTICS OF JUSTICE.

WHEN, in March, 1856, Lord Brougham addressed the House of Lords upon the "great subject" (as he phrased it) of Judicial Statistics, he explained the meaning of that term in the following words:—"It signifies the regular and constant record of the whole particulars connected with the administration of the law in all its branches; its administration by all courts civil and criminal, general and local; the state of those courts as to judges and other office bearers; their whole proceedings through every stage; together with every matter concerning the working of the law, though not having come within the cognizance of any tribunal—in a word, the record, in minute detail, and for the most part in a tabular form, of all the facts connected with the execution of our laws. Need there be more said to show," continued his Lordship, "I will not say the great value, but the permanent importance—nay, the absolute necessity, of this knowledge to the makers of these laws? Can we honestly and safely exercise our legislative functions without them—can we test the influence of our law-making without them—whether we should persist or not in the steps we have taken? Jurisprudence is eminently a practical science. It must be carried on with constant reference to the effects it has produced . . . Full and minute statistical details are to the lawgiver, as the chart, the compass, and the lead to the navigator." *

There is, however, another application of judicial statistics, and one which, in some respects, is scarcely less important than that which refers to legislation. They furnish concerning several of the most momentous questions in moral and social science the only reliable data, without which data we cannot hope to arrive at any satisfactory knowledge respecting the distribution, the increase and the decrease of crime; the causes which lead to its variations in amount in different localities and at different times; the influence of education, of punishment, and of reformatory measures in its repression; the prevalence, fluctuations, and criminal affinities of drunkenness and of prostitution; the extent of juvenile crime and of vagrancy; the degree in which our commercial dealings are infected with fraudulent and illegal transactions; and the intensity with which different classes of the population are affected by criminal influences. Judicial statistics, in short, must form the surest foundation of all inquiry into the moral and social condition of the whole or of any portion of a nation; because no clearer index, or one less liable to misappre-

* Hansard, vol. cxi. p. 1674.

hension, can exist of the moral state of a well-governed nation than the records of its courts of civil and criminal judicature.

Moreover, we may anticipate that these records will, in addition to the elucidation of the concrete moral and social questions referred to, furnish data by which the more purely psychological phenomena involved in them may, in several of their most interesting aspects, be investigated. Those obscure, yet gravely important epidemic manias of murder, of suicide, of infanticide, of fraudulent commercial transactions, and of other criminal offences, which appear to prevail from time to time, apart from what may be called the ordinary fluctuations of criminal acts, can, in the first instance, be examined only by the aid of systematic and permanent statistical records. Such information as we now possess upon any one of these so-called epidemic manias, has been derived, perhaps with one or two exceptions, from vague observations made at the time of the supposed prevalence; the state and condition of the specific form of crime in the interval being almost altogether unknown or neglected. It may be assumed that any extraordinary phenomenon occurring in the progress of a series of events cannot be successfully, or even correctly investigated, until the ordinary phenomena of the series have been determined; hence the necessity which exists for the careful registration upon a systematic and well-digested plan of all the ascertainable facts of a series. This statistical method must underlie all severe modes of investigation, in whatever manner these may subsequently be modified, linked together, and developed by hypothesis arising out of the conclusions to which the first portions of any series of observations or facts may appear to point.

Hitherto the judicial statistics which we have possessed in England, unlike those of France, Belgium, and other continental states, have been very fragmentary, incomplete, and difficult of access. The importance (if, indeed, the importance be yet fully felt) of a systematic registration of the proceedings of justice has not been admitted either by the Government or by the people of this country until very lately. For the statistics which we possessed previous to the year 1856, we were dependent mainly upon the voluntary efforts of a few individuals, and upon the spasmodic requests of members of Parliament for data, as the necessity might arise during the sittings of Parliament. In 1857, however, a Blue Book was issued by Government headed "Judicial Statistics," but containing only the statistics of criminal justice in England and Wales for the previous year; and last year another Blue Book was issued under the same heading, but which, in addition to the statistics of criminal justice for 1857, contained the outlines of a scheme for the collection of the statistics of the Common Law,

Equity, Civil and Canon Law Courts. The history of these Blue Books is somewhat curious and interesting, and we add a brief account of it, as a matter of justice to the gentleman to whom we are most indebted for them.

When the late Mr. Porter was appointed to the head of the Statistical Department of the Board of Trade, he represented to the Secretary of State the want that then existed of any effective statistics of crime and punishment. Mr. Samuel Redgrave, an accomplished statist, at that time and since attached to the Home Office, by the Secretary of State's directions, undertook to remedy the defect, and early in 1835 a series of criminal tables for the preceding year were published upon a classification and arrangement prepared and carried out by Mr. Redgrave. This arrangement and form of issue was continued, in nearly the same form, year by year, until 1855; but in the meantime a gradually increasing interest had been manifested on all hands respecting the criminal and vagrant classes of the population, prison discipline, and other questions connected with punishment and crime, and it had become manifest that the criminal tables published by Government, at first little heeded, but now of admitted value, were not sufficiently comprehensive. This arose from no fault of the compiler, but partly from the parsimony of the Government in objecting to the insertion of more than the barest details, on account of expense in printing (although the only expense to which the Government was placed for these tables was the printing), and partly from the imperfect character of the returns from which they had to be compiled. Towards the termination of 1855, Mr. Redgrave submitted to the Government a plan in detail for the enlargement of the Home Office Statistics of Justice; and early in 1856, Lord Ebrington, at the request of the English gentlemen who attended the Statistical Congress in Paris the preceding autumn, addressed a letter to Lord Palmerston, on the deficiency of the statistical organization in the different departments of the State; and this letter was ordered to be printed by the House of Lords, together with a letter addressed by Professor Leone Levi to A. W. Fonblanque, Esq., of the Statistical Department of the Board of Trade, on the Judicial Statistics of the United Kingdom as compared with the French Civil, Commercial, and Criminal Statistics. In March, 1856, Lord Brougham submitted to the House of Lords a Bill to provide for the collection of the statistics of justice, and he made a very eloquent and powerful appeal to the House upon the necessity of the measure. Lord Brougham's Bill was not proceeded with, but the Government was moved by the different proceedings mentioned, and Sir George Grey, then Secretary of State for the Home Department, directed Mr. Red-

grave to carry out the plan which he had submitted to the Government in the previous year, and the result of that gentleman's labours, up to the present time, are to be found in the Blue Books to which we have already referred.

It is difficult to estimate rightly the labour and thought which have been involved in carrying out, even in its present incomplete state, Mr. Redgrave's great scheme. Some notion of his work may be formed when we state that he has not had simply to arrange and place in comprehensive connexion statistics which had previously existed, or the means for obtaining which were ready to hand, but in the majority of instances he has had to make the necessary arrangements for the collection of the details the results of which he has laid, or is about to lay, before us. Some little time longer must elapse before his invaluable work can be carried out to the extent which he proposes; and it is worthy of being remarked, that for many of the returns from which his statistics are derived, he has to depend solely upon the good feeling of the officers of justice who furnish them, and that his own labour is simply one of love, undertaken, we believe, in addition to his more specific duties.

Whether it is wise to allow work of such incalculable importance to the community to depend in any degree upon voluntary contributions, or that the founder and chief worker should receive only such honour (flattering as it may be) as will be awarded to him by scientific circles, is somewhat more than doubtful.

The Blue Book of Judicial Statistics for 1857 (to which we shall confine our attention) is divided into two parts. The first contains, (1) the returns of the Police and Constabulary; (2) the returns of Criminal Proceedings; and (3) the returns concerning Prisons, Reformatory Institutions, and Criminal Lunatics. The police returns are entirely new, and appear for the first time in the statistics for 1857; but these returns do not yet include the whole kingdom—a regular police force having still to be organized in several districts. The criminal proceeding returns are similar to those previously published under the title of Criminal Tables; and the prison returns present, for the first time, at one view, information previously scattered in several reports. The second part of this Blue Book contains copies of the forms which it is proposed to make use of in recording the statistics of the Common Law, Equity, Civil, and Canon Law Courts, when the arrangements for the collection of those statistics shall have been completed.

The following is a summary of the facts contained in this Blue Book which come within the scope of this Journal:—

In 1857, there were committed in England and Wales 57,273

crimes; 32,031 persons were apprehended; and 17,861 persons were committed or bailed for trial. Several persons often take part in a single crime, or several crimes may be committed by a single person. These, and a few other liabilities to error, occur in the returns, without the means for correcting them; but subject to these drawbacks, it would appear from the returns that great differences occur between the number of offences and the number of arrests in different classes of offences. In crimes against the person, the number of persons apprehended equals, and often exceeds, the number of offences committed; in attempts upon the dwelling, burglary, housebreaking, &c., the apprehensions were 2084, the number of offences committed, 5428; and in robbery and attempts to rob, 854 apprehensions occur, to 1029 offences committed.

The number of persons proceeded against summarily was 369,233, of whom 291,030 were males, 78,203 females. Of these individuals, 192,235 males, and 41,524 females, were convicted by the justices. The offences with which the large number of persons summarily dealt with were charged, "represent," Mr. Redgrave remarks, "the vices, rather than the crimes, of the population." The offence first in magnitude is assault, for which 36,300 males were convicted, and 8560 females. The arrests for this offence amounted to 76,029, of which 2584 were made for aggravated assaults on women and children; 12,750 for assaults on peace officers; and 60,695 for common assaults. Next in order of amount to assault stand drunkenness, and being drunk and disorderly. For these offences 44,894 persons were convicted, of whom 35,867 were males, and 9027 females. Following in order of amount, come petty thefts, for which 20,577 persons were convicted, 15,832 males and 4745 females; vagrancy, for which 18,023 persons were convicted, 10,302 males and 7721 females; offences punishable under Police Acts, for which 17,415 persons were convicted, 13,206 males and 4209 females; offences under Local Acts, and Bye-Laws, for which 16,703 persons were convicted, 15,533 males and 1170 females; offences under the Ways Acts, including the Turnpike, Highways, and Stage Carriage Acts, for which 14,226 persons were convicted, 14,044 males and 182 females; offences of wilful damage and trespass, for which 10,168 persons were convicted, 8341 males, and 1827 females; offences under the Licensed Victuallers' and Beer Acts, for which 9224 persons were convicted, 8376 males and 848 females; offences relating to servants, apprentices, or masters, for which 5373 persons were convicted, 5102 males and 271 females; and nuisances and offences against the health, for which 3107 persons were convicted, 2702 males and 405 females.

The character of the persons who were in the custody of the police during the year is shown in the following table :—

Characters.	Males.	Females.	Total.
Known Thieves.	18,556	4,546	23,102
Prostitutes	—	24,282	24,282
Vagrants and Tramps	14,272	4,998	19,270
Suspicious Characters	40,112	6,692	46,804
No known occupations	5,218	1,696	6,914
Previous good Characters	112,017	14,548	126,565
Characters unknown and not ascertained	124,257	30,070	154,327
Total	314,432	86,832	401,264

"Upon the above large data," writes Mr. Redgrave, "it is shown that of those proceeded against by indictment 54·0 per cent. were of the criminal class, 19·1 per cent. of previous good character, and of 26·9 per cent. the characters were either unknown or were not ascertained. Of those proceeded against for the lesser offences determined by Justices 27·9 were of the criminal class, 32·6 per cent. were of previous good character, and of 39·5 per cent. the characters were unknown or unascertained. Altogether 120,372 persons of the criminal class or suspected to belong to it were in the hands of the police in the year 1857, and of these 24,282 were prostitutes. What proportion these large numbers bear to the whole class which they represent, there are at this time little means of determining. In the last Census 304,109 persons were described as in criminal occupations, that is, as vagrants or persons of no stated employments, but these are probably very much under the mark. It would be useless, however, to enlarge upon this question, though one of great interest, as I hope next year, by the aid of the police, to include in these statistics a census of the criminal class at large, including all known thieves and depredators, receivers of stolen goods, prostitutes, suspected persons, and vagrants and tramps, and to show the number in the jurisdiction of each separate Police Force, with the number and class of their houses of resort."—(p. x.)

The coroners' returns (which are included in the police returns) show that 20,157 inquests were held in 1857; 13,941 upon males, and 6216 upon females. These numbers show a decrease of 2064 inquests, upon the previous year. The cause of this decrease is not very apparent, unless it is to be attributed to the more close control exercised by the Quarter Sessions, in the disallowance of the costs of inquests, which the court deem to have been unnecessarily held. The findings of the juries were as follows :—

	Total.	Proportion per cent.
Murder	184 . . .	·91
Manslaughter	187 . . .	·93
Justifiable homicide	6 . . .	·03
Suicide, or self-murder	1349 . . .	6·69
Accidental death	8930 . . .	44·30
Injuries, causes unknown	237 . . .	1·18
Found dead	2949 . . .	14·63
Natural death :—		
From excessive drinking	323 . . .	1·60
Disease aggravated by neglect	143 . . .	·71
Want, cold, exposure, &c.	167 . . .	·83
Other causes	5682 . . .	28·19

The periods of life of the persons upon whom inquests were held, were: under 7 years, 5496—27·3 per cent.; above 7 years and under 16, 1716—8·5 per cent.; 16 years and under 60, 9731—48·3 per cent.; above 60 years, 3214—15·9 per cent.

Of the suicides, 960 were males and 389 females; and of those who died from excessive drinking, 229 were males and 94 females.

From 1848 to 1855, the variation in amount of commitments for trial was not great, and if this “be considered in relation to the undoubted constant increase of the aggregate of population and wealth,” it “must be held to indicate a decreasing ratio of criminality.” It is important to know that this “stationary character,” as Mr. Redgrave terms the comparatively slight variations existing in the number of commitments during the period referred to, is also contemporaneous with a marked diminution in the severity of the punishments awarded to offenders. Since 1855 a very considerable decrease of commitments has taken place, in consequence of the operation of the Criminal Justice Act of 1855, which enlarged the summary jurisdiction of the magistrates. In 1857, an increase to the extent of 4·3 per cent. occurred upon the commitments of the previous year, and this increase extended over 82 counties; and as several of these had an effective police, the increase could not be attributed to the extension of the police force which had taken place in the kingdom during the year. This increase seems to have arisen in the great seats of manufacture and trade. It was most considerable in Lancashire (21·5 per cent.), Yorkshire (5·3 per cent.), and Cheshire (3·9 per cent.); very slight in Cumberland, Northumberland, and Durham; slight also in Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, Warwickshire, and Worcestershire; but there was a slight decrease in Derbyshire, Staffordshire, and Gloucestershire. In the agricultural districts, the results were more mixed. There was an increase in Lincoln, Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridge, Hereford, Berks, and Hants; a decrease in Essex,

Northampton, Bedford, Oxford (considerable), Bucks, Sussex, Wilts, Dorset, and Somerset. "In the metropolis, where any change affecting the working population is not so immediately felt, the decrease in Middlesex shown in the two previous years still continues, but not to the same extent; while in Surrey and Kent, a large portion of the population of which is located in and on the boundaries of the metropolis, the commitments increased." (p. xii.) In Wales there was an increase in seven counties; it was most marked in Glamorganshire. Of the border counties of the Province, an increase was shown in Monmouth and Hereford—large in the former county—and a considerable decrease in Shropshire.

The state of the different classes of crime, in reference to the slight increase of 1857, was as follows:—*Offences against the person* have been gradually increasing during the last three years, and in 1857 they increased 12·4 per cent., but entirely on the lesser offences—the common assaults. *Violent offences against property* have slightly increased since 1853, but the increase of 1857 was trifling. *Offences against property without violence* have decreased about 36 per cent. since the passing of the Criminal Justice Act, but there was an increase of 3·3 per cent. in 1857 upon the previous year. *Malicious offences against property* had increased, but in 1857 they were below the average of the last ten years. *In forgery and offences against the currency*, there was a decided increase in 1857; and *Miscellaneous offences* continued without much variation, "the chief noticeable fact being an increase last year (1857) of perjury, though the numbers are still much below the higher average which arose in 1851, when parties to suits were rendered liable to give evidence."

"Since 1848 there has not been a single commitment for any offence against the Crown or Government—nothing bearing the stamp of treason, sedition, or seditious riot. The year just past has been one of great trial to the labouring population; large numbers have been out of work, numbers 'on strike;' but it is proper to mention to their credit, and as an instance of their improvement, that there has been no recurrence of the seditious meetings or riotous disturbances which have heretofore almost uniformly attended such times of suffering and difficulty." (p. xiii.)

Of the persons committed, 4927 were, on trial, acquitted and discharged; 19 were acquitted on the ground of insanity; 16 were found insane (making a total number of 35 detained as insane); and 15,307 were convicted—of whom 2 in 1000 were sentenced to death; 0·7 per cent. to transportation, 16·2 per cent. to penal servitude, now the sole great secondary punishment; and 82·8 per cent. to imprisonment for various periods.

“The capital convictions,” writes Mr. Redgrave,

“decreased last year to the average of the years immediately preceding 1856. They were for the following offences, to each of which the decrease extended, except to the robberies which under this head are confined to the violent class which alone continues capital:—

OFFENCES.	1857.	1856.	1855.	1854.	1853.	1852.	1851.	1850.	1849.	1848.
Murder.	20	31	11	11	17	16	16	11	19	23
Attempts to murder, attended by dangerous bodily injuries	9	10	10	7	8	11	6	8	12	6
Sodomy	10	11	20	15	9	14	18	14	18	18
Burglary, with violence to persons	6	13	2	4	6	13	15	5	10	7
Robbery, attended with wounds	7	2	5	7	14	5	13	10	3	3
Arson of dwelling-houses, persons being therein . . .	2	2	2	5	1	2	2	1	4	3
Total	54	69	50	49	55	61	70	49	66	60

“The executions last year (as in the previous sixteen years, with one exception,) were all for murder. Of the twenty persons convicted of this crime, thirteen were executed; their names follow, with such brief particulars of the circumstances of their crimes as could be accurately ascertained. I cannot avoid the remark, which arises in going through these cases, upon what slight and sudden provocations such heinous crimes appear in five instances to have been committed, while in four cases (including two of the preceding) the murderer was under the influence of drink, and in two instances had been actually drinking with his victim. In four cases the wife of the murderer was his victim.

“*Cheshire*.—John Blagg, aged 47. Murder of a gamekeeper by a poacher, supposed from revenge, not in an affray. *Essex*.—Michael Crawley, aged 62. Murder of his wife, arising out of a sudden quarrel. Charles Finch, aged 26. Murder of a young woman with whom he had cohabited; motive not very apparent. *Kent*.—George Keble Edwards, aged 18. Murder of his brother, supposed in his sleep, from revenge for having reproached him with his idle, dissolute life. George Bave, aged 26. Murder by a seaman in her Majesty’s service of a corporal of Marines, upon whose report he had been reduced. Stephen Fox, aged 23. Murder, from passionate revenge, of a young female to whom he was engaged, on her discarding him for his improper conduct with another woman. *Lancaster*.—Edward Hardman, aged 28. Murder of his wife, from a desire to marry another, and from religious differences. Henry Rogers, aged 37. Murder by the master of a merchant ship of one of his crew, by continued acts of barbarous treatment. *Middlesex*.—Robert Thomas Davis, aged 40. Murder of his wife in a sudden paroxysm of drunken jealousy. *Somerset*.—Thomas

Nation, aged 22. Murder of a companion with whom he had been drinking, to rob him of five pounds. John Beale, aged 30. Murder and robbery of a young woman with whom he had formerly lived as a fellow-servant; having enticed her from her situation under pretext of marriage, but with the design to plunder her of her reputed savings. *Stafford*.—George Jackson, aged 20. Murder and robbery committed under the influence of drink. *Glamorgan*.—John Lewis, aged 39. Murder of his wife; supposed in an attempt to obtain the possession of half a sovereign, to continue a drunken fit.

"To this list must be added the name of the following convict, who was convicted in December, 1856, but whose execution was respited (and did not take place till July, 1857): *Kent*.—Thomas Mansell, aged 28. Murder by a private soldier of his corporal, upon very groundless revenge, on small provocation." (pp. xv.—xvi.)

The prison returns show an increase of commitments to County and Borough prisons, and the Government prisons, in 1857, to the extent of 6·9 per cent. as compared with the previous year, and this notwithstanding the great falling-off in the commitments under the Mutiny Acts, consequent upon the termination of the war. The chief increase occurred in summary convictions, and in the commitments of debtors and on civil process. These latter commitments—which had decreased, under the operation of the Acts relating to proceedings for debt, to an average of 3621 for the three years 1845-7—have, since that date, continuously increased, until they reached 14,339 in 1857—25·7 per cent. above the preceding year; and they now form 10 per cent. of the whole number committed to prison. "This large and steady increase arises from the operation of the County Courts Acts, which, while they give no direct powers to arrest and imprison for debt, authorize the judges to commit for any period not exceeding forty days a defendant who refuses or neglects to pay a debt or damages on judgment obtained against him." (p. xxi.)

One test of the effects of prison discipline in the reformation of offenders is the number of previous commitments. The information upon this point is still defective. "It is, however, shown that 29·6 per cent. of the total committed last year (1857) had been previously in prison." The numbers recommended as far as ten times were as follows:—

Previous Commitments.	Proportion per cent.	Previous Commitments.	Proportion per cent.
Once	13·0	Five times	1·3
Twice	5·7	Seven times and above five .	1·6
Thrice	3·1	Ten times and above seven .	1·2
Four times	2·1	Above ten times	1·7

The ages of the persons committed "mark strongly the large proportion of the young in the criminal class, though the

temptation to the female arises at a rather more advanced period than the male." The proportion of each sex per cent. was :—

	Under 21.	21 to 30.	30 and above.
Males	35·9	30·6	33·5
Females	28·9	35·2	35·9

The proportion per cent. of prisoners at each period of life in the commitments was as follows :—

Ages.	Proportion per cent.	Ages.	Proportion per cent.
Under 12 years	1·5	40 years and under 50	9·8
12 years and under 16	8·5	50 years and under 60	4·2
16 years and under 21	24·0	Above 60 years	2·2
21 years and under 30	31·8	Age not ascertained	·3
30 years and under 40	17·7		

There was a marked decrease in the number of commitments under 16 years of age. This may in part be accounted for by the protracted detention of young criminals in Reformatories, who would otherwise swell the prison returns by their repeated commitments for short terms.

The country of birth was ascertained on the whole of the commitments within 1·4 per cent., and with the following results :—

Birthplace.	Proportion per cent.	Birthplace.	Proportion per cent.
England	77·8	Ireland	14·5
Wales	2·3	Colonies and East Indies	0·5
Scotland	1·9	Foreign countries	1·6

These results "are chiefly remarkable in the large proportion of prisoners of Irish extraction. They amount to 14·5 per cent. on the total commitments, and equal 1 in 362 of the population of Ireland; while the proportion from Scotland is only 1·9 per cent. on the total commitments, or 1 in 1204 of the population of that country." (p. xxiv.)

The returns of the degree of instruction among prisoners (excepting the debtors and military prisoners) show that 35·5 per cent. could neither read nor write; 58·0 per cent. could read, or read and write imperfectly; 5·1 per cent. could read and write well; 0·3 per cent. had a superior degree of instruction; and of 1·1 per cent. the degree of instruction was not ascertained. These returns differ only, in comparison with previous years, in showing a slight tendency to an increase of prisoners of the instructed class.

The occupations of those committed are shown in the following table; and it will be seen that the great majority of the commitments are from the uneducated and unskilled :—

OCCUPATIONS.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Proportion per cent.
No occupation	10,306	17,413	27,719	22·2
Domestic servants	1,252	3,504	4,756	3·8
Labourers, charwomen, needle- women	42,152	8,062	50,214	40·2
Factory workers	4,588	2,033	6,621	5·3
Mechanics and skilled workers	22,332	659	22,991	18·4
Foremen and overlookers of labour	177	8	185	0·2
Shopmen, shopwomen, clerks, &c.	1,379	75	1,454	1·2
Shopkeepers and dealers	2,562	1,414	3,976	3·2
Professional employments	281	21	302	0·2
Sailors, mariners, soldiers	5,073	—	5,073	4·1
Occupations not ascertained	975	557	1,532	1·2
Total	91,077	33,746	124,823	100·0

Mr. Redgrave has the following important remarks upon female committals:—

“For several years the increasing proportion of the female committals has been the subject of remark, and is a discouraging sign among some evidences of improvement which the returns present. Of the commitments for trial in 1857, the proportion of females was 21·0 per cent.; and of the summary convictions 28·3 per cent.; of the total commitments 24·3 per cent. But the females form a very much larger proportion of the re-commitments, and prove the greater difficulties in the way of female reformation after the taint of commitment to prison. It has just been stated, that of the commitments 24·3 per cent. are females, but of the re-commitments no less than 32·6 per cent. are females, and the case is aggravated as the number of re-commitments increases; for after the seventh previous commitment the number of females exceeds the males, and in the highest grade ascertained, ten times and above, is more than double the number, and yet it must be remembered, the female is little more than 1 to 4 of the total committed. With regard to age, it will be found that the career of crime does not begin so early in the female as the male. Under 16 years of age, the proportion of females to males is 13·4 per cent. only. In the five years between that age and 21 years, the proportion is doubled—26·9 per cent. But the largest proportion of females is found between the age of 21 and 30 years, when it reaches 29·9 per cent. In the whole of the remaining period of life, 30 years and above, the proportion falls to 28·3 per cent. In instruction the females are behind the males. 18·8 per cent. only of those who can ‘read and write well’ are females, while 30·7 per cent. could ‘neither read nor write.’ The chief fact with regard to country is, that while of the natives of England the females were 25·0 per cent., of the large number of natives of Ireland who appear in prison returns, the proportion of females was 38·5 per cent.” (p. xxv.)

The rapid increase of the Reformatory system is evidenced by the increase of the numbers of children under detention from 594

to 1528 during the course of the year. Of those committed in 1857, numbering 1119, 429 could neither read nor write; 441 could read, or read and write imperfectly; 194 could read and write well; 7 had a superior degree of instruction; and of 48 the degree of instruction was not ascertained. 61 of the children were under 10 years of age, and none exceeded 16 years of age. The unprotected state of these children may be gathered from the following summary of their social condition on admission:—“Of 98, both parents, and of 309, one parent was dead; of 19, both parents, and of 37, one parent had deserted them; of 5, both parents, and of 32, one parent was in prison; and 130 were otherwise without the control of both parents, and 82 of one parent; so that of the 1119 committed during the year, 252 were entirely without parental care and control, and 460 had lost the care of one parent.” (p. xxxvi.)

The criminal lunatics, the returns concerning which conclude the first part of the Blue-book, comprise—

“1. Those who are found by juries to have been insane at the time of committing the offences with which they were charged. 2. Those who on being arraigned for any offence were found to be then insane and unfit to be tried by a jury empanelled to determine that issue; or those who on their commitment for trial are, to avoid the necessity of this course, certified to the Secretary of State to be insane under stat. 3 and 4 Vict., c. 54. 3. Those committed by justices, who are apprehended under appearances of insanity, denoting a purpose to commit crime, and are without proper control. And 4. Those removed from prisons who have become insane during their confinement. All these lunatics are removed to lunatic asylums, hospitals, or licensed houses, under the orders made by the Secretary of State, and their detention under different forms is for their safe custody so long as they continue insane. The numbers so confined in the year ended the 29th September, 1856, were—

	Males.	Females.	Total.
Under detention at commencement			
of the year	457	129	586
Received from other asylums . . .	26	6	32
Committed in the year	100	31	131
Total	583	166	749
Discharged or removed; viz.:			
Died	33	6	39
Escaped	7	—	7
On becoming sane	12	7	19
Removed, sane, for trial or punishment	27	7	34
Removed to other asylums . . .	26	6	32
	105	26	131
Remaining under detention . . .	478	140	618”

The offences with which these lunatics were originally charged are shown in the following table :—

OFFENCES.	Number of Persons.			OFFENCES.	Number of Persons.		
	Males.	Females.	Total.		Males.	Females.	Total.
Murder	85	40	125	Forward	416	131	547
Attempts to murder	70	6	76	Fraud & embezzle-	1	—	1
maim, &c.	—	5	5	ment	1	—	1
Concealing birth,	2	2	4	Receiving	28	4	32
and infanticide	9	—	9	Arson & malicious	5	4	9
Manslaughter	11	—	11	burning	3	—	3
Rape	3	—	3	Other malicious of-	3	—	3
Unnatural offences	—	—	—	fences	19	5	24
High Treason	25	5	30	Forgery	33	10	43
Seditious language	3	—	3	Uttering counter-	29	6	35
Assaults	30	—	30	feit coin	1	—	1
Indecent exposure	6	2	8	Breach of the peace	1	—	1
of the person	9	—	9	Vagrancy	1	—	1
Burglary & house-	4	—	4	For want of sure-	1	—	1
breaking	1	—	1	ties	42	6	48
Robbery on the	158	71	229	Dangerous persons	583	166	749
highway, &c.	416	131	547	at large			
Sheep stealing				Insane wandering			
Horse stealing				abroad without			
Cattle stealing				control			
Larceny—by ser-				Deserters & under			
vants, from per-				court-martial			
son, &c.				Other offences			
				Total			

Of these lunatics, 124 were found insane by jury; 15 were acquitted, insane; 55 were certified to be insane, or committed as such by justices; 4 were committed as dangerous lunatics by justices; and 551 were detained under order of the Secretary of State.

The detention of criminal lunatics in an asylum depending upon their return to sanity, the period of their confinement is necessarily undefined. Of the criminal lunatics under detention in 1857, 189 had been in confinement one year or under; 107, two years and above one; 66, three years and above two; 123, five years and above three; 141, ten years and above five; 62, fifteen years and above ten; 36, twenty years and above fifteen; and 25 above twenty years.

Of those lunatics who had been in confinement upwards of fifteen years, 18 had been guilty of murder, 15 of attempts to murder or maim, 1 of manslaughter, 1 of an unnatural offence, 3 of assaults, 1 of indecency, 1 of burglary, 14 of larceny, 4 of

arson, 1 of uttering counterfeit coin, 1 of a breach of the peace, and 1 had been committed to prison for want of sureties.

The total cost of this class of prisoners in 1857 amounted to £19,836 9s. 6d.

ART. VI.—ON CONVULSION.

IN ancient times, the prevalent idea was that a convulsed person was possessed and supernaturally excited by some good or bad spirit. It seemed as if the convulsion was not to be accounted for by any kind of natural power. And this idea, most assuredly, is one which derives not a little support from the text of the New Testament, where instances are mentioned in which convulsions of one kind or another were cured by the direct casting out of an evil spirit. In modern times a different explanation is offered, and "nervous influence," among other influences, is called upon to do the work of the wayward or malignant spirit of times past. The idea appears to be this:—Muscle is a living thing, and contraction is the outburst of this life. In other words, it is supposed that muscle is endowed with a vital property of contractility, and that muscular contraction is brought about when this property is put in action by certain agents, such as nervous influence and electricity. It is supposed, indeed, that this property of contractility is roused or excited or *stimulated* into a state of action when the muscle contracts under ordinary circumstances, and that this property is roused or excited or stimulated beyond measure in convulsion. In this, at least, the modern hypothesis agrees with the ancient opinion, that in each instance the convulsion is looked upon as the manifestation of additional life in the muscles,—a life foreign to the individual in the one case, an excess of life belonging to the individual in the other case.

The present, however, is an age of change, and among other things doomed to change, may be these opinions. At any rate, it is now maintained, and with no small show of reason, that muscular contraction is produced, *not* by the stimulation of any vital property of contractility belonging to muscle, but by the simple cessation of the action of certain agents—electricity and others—which had previously kept the muscle in a state of relaxation or expansion. It is maintained that convulsion in every form, and under every circumstance, is explainable in the same manner, and in this manner only. In a word, a physical and intelligible hypothesis is offered in place of a vital and unintelligible hypothesis—for to call a phenomenon vital, is to confess that it is unintelligible.

The hypothesis to which we here refer, and which has been

advocated for several years by Dr. Radcliffe, has been brought out recently in a much more circumstantial and satisfactory form*—a form so satisfactory that we think it necessary to do what we can to make it known, for it is assuredly of high moment to all who are concerned in the study of diseases of the brain and nervous system to have right notions on the subject of convulsion.

Dr. Radcliffe begins his inquiry into the physiology and pathology of muscular action by showing that muscular contraction is *not* produced by the stimulation of any property of contractility belonging to muscle; and first of all he attempts to show that the action of electricity in muscular contraction is not that of a stimulus.

The principal facts under this head are these:—Muscle, in common with nerve and other, if not all, animal tissues, is the seat of definite electrical actions. These actions are only manifested in irritable and living muscle; they are proportionate to the degree of irritability and vitality; they die out as the signs of irritability and vitality disappear; and when these signs have disappeared, and the muscles have passed into the contraction of death, *rigor mortis*, they are altogether at an end. In ordinary contraction, also, there is an unmistakeable *weakening* of that electrical action which naturally belongs to muscle in the state of relaxation or elongation. This fact is very curious, and it is well to hear what Dr. Radcliffe has to say about it:—

“It would also seem as if the muscular current were *weakened* during ordinary contraction; indeed, there can be no reasonable doubt that this is the case. In demonstrating this very important fact, Dr. du Bois-Reymond makes use of the *gastrocnemius* of a frog with a long portion of its nerve attached. This muscle is placed upon the cushions of the galvanometer, and the nerve is arranged in such a manner that a series of shocks from an induction coil can be passed through a portion of it. As soon as the muscle is laid upon the cushions, the needle of the galvanometer is deflected to some distance from zero, and it continues to be deflected, though not to same extent, so long as the muscle remains in a state of rest; as soon as the muscle is tetanized by passing the interrupted current through a portion of the nerve, the needle immediately travels back again and oscillates on the other side of zero. These are the simple facts. As soon as the muscle is tetanized, that is to say, *the needle is acted upon by a reverse current*.

“Now it cannot be supposed that this current is due to the irruption of a current from the induction apparatus by which the muscle is tetanized into the circuit of the galvanometer, for both galvanometer and coil are carefully insulated. Moreover, there is the same reverse current

* “Epilepsy and other Convulsive Affections.” Second Edition. Churchill, London. 1858.

(only in a less marked degree) when the muscle is tetanized by other means, as by subjecting the nerve to mechanical or chemical irritation, or by acting upon it by heat. Nay, the same current is seen to be produced by strychnine in a gastrocnemius which is still in living connexion with the nervous centres by means of the ischiatic nerve.

"Nor is the reverse current, which is manifested during tetanus, to be regarded as a proof that there is a muscular current during contraction, whose direction is contrary to that of the current which plays during the state of rest. On the contrary, it is possible that the muscular current, before the state of tetanus was induced, may have given rise to a reverse current within the circuit of the galvanometer by evolving the secondary polarity of the platinum plates, and that this reverse current may be manifested during tetanus, in consequence of the proper muscular current having become *weakened*. And that this is the true explanation may be seen by the following modification of the same experiment.

"The only difference between the experiment as modified and the original experiment is this—that one of the electrodes, instead of being connected with the galvanometer by a continuous piece of wire, is connected by a broken wire, of which the two ends are made to dip into a small cup of mercury. The difference, that is to say, is in a simple contrivance for rapidly breaking or closing the circuit; for it must be plain that the circuit is broken when an end of the wire is raised out of the mercury, and closed when the same end is replaced in the mercury. In performing the modified experiment, the muscle is first laid upon the cushions, and a note made of the degree to which the needle of the galvanometer is deflected. Then the muscle is removed from the circuit of the galvanometer, and the instrument depolarized by raising one end of the wire out of the mercury. In the next place, the muscle is tetanized, and while it is in this state it is included in the circuit of the galvanometer by replacing the end of the wire in the mercury. In this way, then, the current of the tetanized muscle is for an instant separated from the reverse current of secondary polarity, which is caused by the continued action of any current upon the instrument, and the result is that the needle travels in the *same* direction as that in which it travels under the current of the untetanized muscle, *but not to the same distance from zero*. In other words, the muscular current of the tetanized muscle is found to be *weakened*, but not changed—as it would appear to be if no care be taken to eliminate the influence of secondary polarity from the experiment. In several instances in which I repeated this experiment upon the ordinary frog, the primary deflection of the needle, under the current of the elongated muscle, was from 40° to 60°, and the permanent deflection from 5° to 7°; whereas the primary deflection of the needle, under the current of the tetanized muscle, was from 8° to 15°, and the permanent deflection from 1° to 2°."—(pp. 28-30).

Here, then, are two facts to begin with—two facts which are of primary and fundamental importance. The one is, that the contraction of death, *rigor mortis*, does not come on until the

electrical action of muscle—or the muscular current, as it is called—is at an end; the other is, that the muscular current is weakened in ordinary muscular contraction. These are the facts; the inference arising out of them, according to Dr. Radcliffe, is, that muscular contraction is *antagonized* by the muscular current.

Nor is a different inference deducible from the action of artificial electricity upon muscle. For what are the main facts? The first fact is, that, except at the moment when the circuit is made and broken, the muscle is kept in a state of relaxation or elongation during the whole time that a constant electrical current is made to pass through it. The second fact is, that a contracted or tetanized muscle is relaxed or elongated by the passage of a constant current through it. But for the contractions which attend upon the moment when the circuit is made and broken, the facts, indeed, would seem to show, if they show anything, that muscular contraction is antagonized rather than caused by the action of the foreign electrical current upon muscle. Nay, the contractions which attend upon the moment when the foreign current begins and ceases to pass, may be no objection to this view; for at the time when these contractions happen, there may be a momentary annihilation of electrical action arising out of certain opposing reactions between the foreign and muscular currents, which reactions are very clearly pointed out by Dr. Radcliffe, but which would take us too long to explain in this place.

In the next place, the object is to show that muscular contraction is not produced by “nervous influence.” Here, first of all, Dr. Radcliffe speaks of the nerve current—which current is an unquestionable fact in physiology—and shows that it agrees with the muscular current, in that it affords evidence of enfeeblement during muscular contraction. Take a beautiful experiment by Dr. du Bois-Reymond as an instance in point:—

“A frog is fastened upon a suitable frame, and then, after tying its common iliac artery, the ischiatic nerve is cut low down in the ham and dissected up to the vertebral column. After this the lower end of the nerve is bridged over the cushions of the galvanometer, so as to touch one cushion with its end and the other cushion with its side, and a note is taken of the degree to which the needle of the galvanometer is deflected by the ‘nerve current.’ The animal is then poisoned with two or three drops of a solution of nitrate of strychnia, and the effect of the tetanus upon the ‘nerve current’ is attended to by watching the movements of the needle of the galvanometer. The experiment is simple and the result unmistakable; for when the tetanus occurs, *the needle recedes three or four degrees nearer to zero*, and this not only during the principal attacks, but also during those single shocks which are produced on touching the animal. It is seen further that the needle continues at this point so long as the tetanus continues, and that it again diverges from zero when the

spasm passes off. It is seen, indeed, that the 'nerve current' is enfeebled during muscular contraction. In some frogs upon which I repeated this beautiful experiment, the primary deflection of the needle under the nerve current *before* the supervention of the tetanic symptoms was from 15° to 20° , and the permanent deflection from 2° to 4° ; and, *after* the supervention of these symptoms, the primary deflection was from 3° to 4° , and the permanent deflection scarcely perceptible." (pp. 44, 45.)

With respect to the action of a foreign current upon the nerve, it is also found that the results, so far as muscular action is concerned, are precisely analogous to those which attend the action of this current upon muscle, in that, except at the moment when the current begins and ceases to pass, a relaxed muscle remains relaxed, and a contracted or tetanized muscle relaxes and then remains relaxed, so long as a constant current is made to pass through a living nerve. The contractions attending upon the time when the current begins and ceases to pass, are also referred to a momentary annihilation of electrical action, arising out of certain opposing reactions between the nerve current and foreign current, which reactions are clearly pointed out; and not only so, but an apparent explanation is found, in certain intelligible differences of these reactions, of the reason why the degree of contraction at the commencement and cessation of the current is different when the current is said to be inverse, and when it is said to be direct,—and also of those curious revivals of contraction on changing the direction of the current which are known as *voltæic alternatives*. For these matters, however, we must refer to the work itself.

In short, it would seem as if muscular elongation is coincident with the *action* of natural or foreign electricity upon the nerve, and that muscular contraction is connected in some way with the diminution or annihilation of this action, and not with the stimulating action of electricity upon a vital property of irritability inherent in nerve.

After these considerations, Dr. Radcliffe adduces facts which seem to demolish the idea that muscular contraction is produced by any kind of stimulation derived from the nervous centres. Thus:—

"In these experiments, weights of different sizes are suspended from a small hook that has been previously attached to one of the hind legs, a little above the heel. The frog is then held up by its fore limbs, and a weight that is just sufficient to put the hind leg gently upon the stretch is placed upon the hook. In the next place the toe of the weighted leg is pinched, and the weight is changed for one heavier, until the animal is no longer able to withdraw its leg from the torture to which it is subjected. This being done, the next thing is to divide the spinal cord immediately behind the second pair of nerves; and to go on testing the muscular power of the paralysed

legs. The results are very strange. Immediately after the operation, the muscular power that can be put forth by the weighted leg when the toe is pinched is sometimes nil, but generally it is no more than a third or fourth of what it was before the operation. Fifteen minutes later this power is evidently rallying. In twenty or five-and-twenty minutes it has recovered all it had lost. An hour after the operation it is greater than it was before the operation—perhaps doubled. An hour or two later still, it is certainly doubled, and possibly trebled; and from this time up to the twenty-fourth hour, when the increase generally attains its maximum, it goes on slowly augmenting. The particulars of two experiments with very fine frogs (A and B) were as follows, the weights raised being expressed in grammes :

	Before the Operation.	Immediately afterwards.	5 minutes afterwards.	15 minutes afterwards.	25 minutes afterwards.	1 hour afterwards.	2 hours afterwards.	4 hours afterwards.	24 hours afterwards.	48 hours afterwards.
A	60 Gram.	20	45	60	80	130	140	140	150	150
B	60 Gram.	10	30	40	60	100	120	130	140	140

“ When the increase of the muscular power has attained its maximum, it may remain nearly stationary for six, ten, fifteen, or twenty days, and after this time it falls by slow degrees. In a month, if the animal lives, this power will have fallen to its original value before the operation ; and at the expiration of six, seven, or eight months, it may have fallen still lower, until it is not more than a third or a half of this value. It is possible, however, that the increased muscular power would not have failed in this way if care had been taken to exercise the paralysed limbs by galvanism.

“ Nor is it easy to agree with Dr. Marshall Hall in thinking that this increase of muscular power is due to an increased stimulation of the muscles on the part of the spinal cord (which inordinate stimulation had come into play because the controlling influence of the brain had been withdrawn), for there are other experiments which show plainly enough that the muscular power is augmented, not only in a similar but even in a higher degree, after the muscle has been cut off altogether from the spinal cord.

“ In the paper on muscular irritability, to which reference has already been made, and which is deserving of study, as well for the facts as for the opinions contained in it, Professor Engel, of Zurich, has shown that muscles are more prone to enter into the state of contraction after the complete removal of the cerebro-spinal system. In this experiment he clips out the whole of this system, bones and all, and, after five or ten minutes, he finds that the muscles have become so irritable as to be thrown into a state of contraction by a blow on the table. He finds, indeed, that the muscles are as irritable as they are in narcotized frogs.

"Some very conclusive evidence to the same effect is also furnished in the following experiment by Dr. Brown-Séquard. In this experiment the spinal cord of a frog is divided immediately behind the roots of the brachial nerves, and then the nerves proceeding to one of the hind legs, cut through at the points where they leave the cord. *Two hours later both the hind limbs are separated from the body, and the contractility of their muscles is tested by the prick of a needle and by galvanism. This is the experiment. The result is, that the 'irritability is augmented' in both these limbs, and that this augmentation is most considerable in the limb whose nerves had been divided—in the limb, that is to say, which had been cut off from the spinal cord.*" (p.p. 60—63.)

Even the action of the will upon muscle is not allowed to be that of a stimulus:—

"Is it not certain," says Dr. Radcliffe, "that the will acts in this case by stimulating the muscle to contract? It is difficult, no doubt, to think differently. It is more than difficult to wean the mind from so old an idea. But, on the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the will may have *acted* in bringing about muscular contraction, not by imparting anything to the muscles, but by withholding something from the muscles; and this being the case, we may well refuse to allow a mere opinion respecting the action of the will, however sanctioned by time that opinion may be, to rank as an objection to a view of the action of 'nervous influence' in muscular motion, which view appears to arise necessarily out of the general history of 'nervous influence' as concerned in muscular motion." (pp. 64, 65.)

The action of blood upon muscle is considered after the action of nervous influence; and here the conclusion is, that contraction is not the result of stimulation. Many experiments are cited in favour of this view, and one of them will serve as an example. This was performed by Dr. Brown-Séquard upon the arm of a criminal who was guillotined on the 12th of July, 1851, at eight A.M.:—

"This arm, which was severed from the body, was in a state of perfect *rigor mortis* at 11 P.M.—fourteen hours after decapitation—and at this time the experiment was commenced by injecting a pound of defibrinated dog's blood into the brachial artery. As the blood began to penetrate into the vessels, some reddish spots appeared in different parts of the skin of the forearm, of the arm, and more particularly of the wrist. Then these spots became larger and larger, and the skin acquired the appearance it has in rubeola. Soon afterwards, the whole surface had a reddish-violet hue. A little later still, and the skin had acquired its natural living colour, elasticity, and softness, and the veins stood out distinct and full as during life. Then the muscles relaxed, first the fingers and lastly the muscles of the shoulders, and on examination they were found to have recovered their lost irritability. At 11.45 P.M. the muscles were more irritable than they had

been at 5 P.M., at which time the corpse was first examined; and this degree of irritability was kept up, without abatement, until 4 A.M., when fatigue compelled Dr. Brown-Séquard for the time to abandon the experiment. When the experiment commenced, the temperature of the blood was 73° Fahr., and that of the room 66° Fahr." (pp. 67—68.)

After relating these experiments, Dr. Radcliffe proceeds to combat Dr. Brown-Séquard's theory, that muscular contraction is caused by the stimulus of carbonic acid in the blood, that is, by venous blood:—

"It may, indeed, be questioned," he says, "whether the convulsions of asphyxia are not rather due to the want of the stimulus of red blood than to any stimulus derived from the black blood with which the system has become charged; for it is certainly true that the muscles are similarly convulsed when an animal is bled to death. In other words, it is certainly true that the muscles are similarly convulsed, as well when the animal is left without blood as when it is left full of venous blood.

"Nor can it be allowed that the (apparently) more powerful contraction of the left ventricle during the first moments of asphyxia are due to increased stimulation on the part of the venous blood; for the fuller and firmer pulse, and the rise of the mercury in the hæmady-nometer may be owing, not to increased contraction in the ventricle, but simply (as is indeed allowed on all hands) to the fact that there is some impediment to the free flow of blood through the capillaries of the systemic circulation—an impediment, that is to say, by which the systole of the ventricle is made to expend itself with greater force upon the coats of the intermediate arteries.

"Again, it may be questioned whether the muscular contractions which are produced in the two other experiments, when black blood is injected into the vessels, may not also be due to the want of some stimulus belonging to the red blood rather than to the action of any stimulus derived from the venous blood. At any rate it is well known that the uterus has often contracted and expelled its contents when a pregnant animal has been bleeding to death. And there are several facts on record in which the human uterus, even, has expelled its burden after the mother has yielded to the utter syncope of actual death.

"As it seems, however, the grand difficulty in the way of accepting this idea—that muscle is stimulated to contract by venous blood—is a chemical difficulty. For what is the main difference between arterial blood and venous blood? It is that the oxygen of the former has in the latter become displaced by carbonic acid. Now, carbonic acid has an action upon all parts of the nervous system which minister to intelligence or sensibility—upon all parts of the frame indeed, with the supposed exception of those which minister to motion—which action is so obviously opposed to that of stimulation, that it is extremely difficult to suppose that carbonic acid can be a stimulus in any case. Indeed, it is so difficult, as to make it well nigh impossible to entertain such a supposition for a single moment."—(pp. 74—76.)

The next point in the argument is to show that muscular contraction is not produced by the stimulation of any mechanical agent. This section of the argument is not altogether satisfactory. The idea is, that the needle, or any other mechanical agent which has provoked the contraction, may have served to *discharge* the electricity with which the muscle is in a manner charged, and that contraction may be the result of this discharge; and, certainly, some difficulties in the way of this hypothesis are disposed of with considerable cleverness. After this, it is shown that the history of muscular contraction, as seen in the vesiculæ seminales, or bladder, or bowel, or uterus, is at variance with the idea that this contraction is called into existence by anything like mechanical stimulation. The case of the uterus must serve as an instance of the way in which our author treats this part of his subject:—

“And, certainly, the doctrine of stimulation is not wanted to explain the parturient contractions of the uterus. At the time of labour this organ returns from the state of progressive expansion in which it had been kept during the period of pregnancy; and as *one* cause of the previous state of expansion would seem to be found in the increasing vital activity of the fœtus, so now *one* cause of the return from this state would seem to be found in the failure of this activity—a failure brought about, first in the mother, and afterwards in the fœtus, in consequence of the growth of the fœtus having then passed the limit beyond which it cannot pass without trenching upon the supplies necessary for the proper nourishment of the mother. It would seem, also, that this return of the uterus from the expanded state, or, in other words, this contraction of the uterine walls, must compress the vessels going to the placenta,—that the vital activity of the fœtus must suffer a corresponding depression from this interference with the sufficiency of the placental respiration—and that this depression must again lead to contraction in the uterus—for if this organ contracted in the first instance in consequence of a depression of this kind, there is no reason why it should not do so again. And, further, it would seem that this second contraction must lead to a third, and the third to a fourth; and that thus, the uterus acting upon the fœtus, and the fœtus reacting upon the uterus, contraction must follow contraction, until the completion of birth. Nor does it follow from this hypothesis that the uterine contraction should be unintermitting, for it is quite possible (this among other reasons) that the blood which is displaced from the uterus during contraction may temporarily ‘stimulate’ the system of the mother to a degree which is inconsistent with an unintermitting continuance of contraction in any of the muscles belonging to the involuntary system. At any rate, it is quite impossible, upon any rational view of parturition, to refer the contraction of the uterus to any ‘stimulation’ on the part of the fœtus, without ignoring the whole of the previous history of pregnancy.”—(pp. 86—88.)

That muscular contraction is not produced by the stimulation

of *light* is argued from the apparent expansion which takes place under this influence in the cushions of the sensitive plant, and in the iris. And, certainly, it is more easy to suppose, with Bichât, that the iris expands, and in this way closes the pupil, than to suppose that this closure is brought about by the action of sphincter fibres, which have a very doubtful existence.

Nor are we allowed to say that muscular contraction is produced by the stimulation of heat or cold; for the fact is, that the muscular current and nerve current—which currents, according to the premises, would seem to antagonize contraction—are annihilated or greatly weakened by that degree of heat or cold which is sufficient to throw the muscle into a state of contraction.

And, lastly, it is shown that muscular contraction is not produced by the stimulation of any chemical or analogous agency. Here a good deal of evidence is produced, and, among the rest, some recent experiments by Dr. Harley upon the action of strychnia and brucia, which seem to show most conclusively that these poisons act, first of all, by rendering the blood less apt to appropriate its stimulating element oxygen, and, in the second place, by diminishing the irritability of the muscles. Reviewing the whole evidence belonging to this part of the subject, there appears to be no sufficient reason why *rigor mortis* may not be taken as the type of muscular contraction in general:—

“For what,” asks Dr. Radcliffe, “is the case with respect to this form of muscular contraction? The case is simply this: As long as there is any trace of that action of which the ‘muscular current’ is a sign, so long is there no *rigor mortis*. As long as there is any trace of that action of which the ‘nerve current’ is a sign, so long is there no *rigor mortis*. If this action dies out speedily, as in persons in whom the vitality of the frame has been exhausted by long life, or by chronic disease, such as consumption, the muscles become speedily rigid; if this action dies out slowly, as in persons who have been cut down suddenly in the full glow of life, the muscles are equally slow in becoming rigid. Once contracted, moreover, the muscles remain contracted until they break up in the ruin of final decay—an event which happens most speedily in the case where the muscle retains its physical integrity least perfectly. And this is precisely as it should be according to the premises; for according to the premises all that is necessary to the commencement of *rigor mortis* is the cessation of that action of which electricity is a sign, and all that is necessary to its continuance is the absence of this action and the physical integrity of the muscular fibre. In a word, it is possible to explain those unexplained and seemingly contradictory facts which constitute the distinctive features of that contraction into which the muscles pass after death; and hence *rigor mortis* may be accepted, not only as a type of muscular contrac-

tion in general, but as an *experimentum crucis* in favour of the proposition—that *muscular contraction is not produced by the stimulation of any contractile power belonging to muscle.*”—(pp. 99, 100.)

Having attempted to show that muscular attraction is not to be referred to the action of any stimulus upon any property of contractility inherent in muscle, the author's object is next to show "that muscular elongation is produced by the simple physical action of certain agents—electricity and others—and that muscular contraction is the simple physical consequence of the cessation of this action." In this section of the argument, a good deal is said to show that the peculiar changes of form in muscle, in contracting and in passing out of this state, and the law of contraction during life and after death, are susceptible of a purely physical explanation. As to the changes of form, it is shown, by the experiments of Mr. Joule, of Manchester, that a bar of iron, when it ceases to be magnetic, loses in length and gains in breadth, without undergoing any change of volume—precisely as a muscle does when contracting; and, consequently, the change of form in a muscle, under these circumstances, cannot be looked upon as a vital phenomena. After this, it is shown that certain facts, which at first sight do not appear to be altogether consistent with the physical mode of regarding the phenomena of muscular contraction, may be disposed of. It is shown, for example, how the diminished degree and diminished power of muscular contraction after death—how the loss of power as the muscle contracts upon itself, and how the waste of substance in proportion to the number of contractions—may be accounted for without supposing that the contractile power is a vital endowment.

Dr. Radcliffe's third and last object, in the physiological part of his work, is to show "that the special muscular movements which are concerned in carrying on the circulation—the rhythm of the heart, and those movements in the vessels which are independent of the heart—are susceptible of a physical explanation when they are interpreted upon the previous view of muscular action." Our space will not allow us to enter into this part of the argument, and a hint or two as to its character must suffice. Thus, when speaking of the action of the blood in producing the cardiac rhythm, Dr. Radcliffe says:—

"Upon any existing theory of muscular action it is more than difficult to understand why the *ventricles* remain distended with blood during the full half of the rhythmic period, if the *ventricular systole* is in anywise called into existence by the stimulation of the blood; but this fact is not altogether unintelligible if, on the contrary, it be supposed (as must be supposed upon the previous view of muscular action)

that the office of the blood will rather be to antagonize the systole and induce the diastole. Indeed upon this view the difficulty appears to be at an end, for according to it the ventricles are thrown into the state of diastole by the stimulation of the blood which has been injected into the coronary system of vessels, and they remain in this state until this blood has given up its arterial properties and so ceased to be stimulating. And certain it is that the different action of the ventricles in anæmia and plethora is calculated to strengthen this idea. Thus: in plethora the pulse (which is the direct test of the action of the ventricles) is full and slow; in anæmia it is small and quick. In the one case, that is to say, the ventricle fills to distension with rich blood and the systole is deferred—in the other case, the ventricle takes in a small quantity of poor unstimulating blood, and the systole follows with scarcely any delay. The facts, indeed, are the very opposites of what they would be found to be if the blood stimulated the ventricle to contract, for in that case the pulse must be small and quick in plethora, and full and slow in anæmia. But if, on the other hand, the blood provokes the ventricle to the diastole by causing elongation in the muscular fibres composing this chamber, then it is intelligible that the ventricle should dilate more fully, and the dilatation continue for a longer time, when the blood is rich and warm, as in plethora, than when it is poor and watery, as in anæmia.”—(pp. 115, 116.)

* * * * *

“On realizing the phenomena of the heart’s action more distinctly, it becomes even still more improbable that the systole of the ventricle is caused by any kind of stimulation, and of the blood more particularly. For what are the facts? At the systole the blood rushes through the coronary arteries into the coats of the heart, and the diastole of the ventricles is attendant upon this rush. And after the blood has remained in these coats until it may be supposed to have lost some of its arterial properties, then the systole returns. These are the simple facts; and thus if stimulation has to do with the phenomena at all, it is with the diastole and not with the systole.

“It appears, indeed, as if the *ventricular diastole* were due, partly to the force with which the blood is injected into the coronary arteries at the ventricular systole, and partly to the elongating, electro-motive effects of the arterial blood upon the cardiac fibres. It appears, also, as if the diastole of the ventricles were made to continue as long as the blood retained its arterial properties, and that the systole returned when the oxygen was exhausted and the arterial converted into venous blood. And thus, it appears as if the rhythm of the ventricles had a *part* of its explanation; for according to this view, so long as the proper blood continues to be supplied, and so long as the ventricle continues to be capable of responding to it, so long must the systole give rise to the diastole, and the diastole be followed by the systole.

“A little further examination will also serve to show that the *systole of the auricles* must be contemporaneous with the *diastole of the ventricle*; for this *systole of the auricles*, there is reason to believe, is, in great measure, the mere *falling in* of the auricular walls

upon the sudden withdrawal of blood from the auricles by the diastole of the ventricles. There is reason for this opinion in the absence of valves at the mouths of the veins opening into the auricles, and the reason is obvious. For if the auricles had to contract primarily like the ventricles, is it not fair to assume that there would have been valves to prevent the reflux of the blood from the auricles into the great veins? And if so, then there is no difficulty in accounting for the rhythm of the auricles; for the *auricular diastole*, which is virtually coincident with the ventricular diastole, will be partly due to the same cause as the ventricular diastole—namely, the rush of blood into the coronary system of arteries—and partly to the onward current of blood which is continually setting in from the veins; and the *auricular systole* will be *mainly* due to the collapse of the auricular walls upon the sudden passage of blood into the ventricles at the ventricular diastole.”—(pp. 117—119.)

* * * * *

... “And if, under ordinary circumstances, the blood acts in this manner, then there appears to be no great difficulty in understanding how it is that the heart, or a portion of the heart, may go on pulsating after removal from the body. For why should oxygen dissolved in the blood act differently from oxygen diffused in the air; why, for instance, should not the air, which bathes the surface and permeates every interstice, provoke a diastolic state in the separate heart or a fragment of the same, by rousing that polar condition which in the nerves and muscles is designated under the name of the nerve and muscular currents? Why may not the systolic state supervene upon this diastolic state when the polar condition fails, in consequence, as it were, of the arterial air having become converted into venous air? And why, again, should not the diastole return after every systole, so long, that is, as the muscle is capable of responding to the action of the oxygen, for it may well be supposed that the commotion of the systole will displace the venous air and bring the muscular and nervous tissues into relation with fresh quantities of arterial air? Assuredly there is no evident reason to the contrary, and there is one reason why this view should be received, and this is to be found in the fact that the rhythm is rendered more rapid, and even revived for some time after its actual cessation, by placing the heart in oxygen instead of atmospheric air, and that it is brought to a stop by placing the heart in a vacuum or by immersing it in hydrogen or nitrogen or carbonic acid.”—(pp. 123, 124.)

Passing from the domain of physiology to that of pathology, Dr. Radcliffe proceeds to consider the conditions in which muscular contraction is in excess; namely, the different forms of tremor, the different forms of convulsion, and the different forms of spasm. In doing this, the interparoxysmal condition, the paroxysm, the appearances after death, the pathology, and the results of treatment are all passed in review, and the conclusion arising out of each part of the inquiry is found to be in harmony with

the previous view respecting the physiology of muscular action. In no part is it found that tremor, or convulsion, or spasm, is brought about by excess of stimulation, actual or relative. We are altogether unable to follow Dr. Radcliffe step by step in a subject so extensive, and all we can attempt to do is to give a hint or two as to the character of the argument, and refer to the book itself for further information. These hints, we think, may be best taken from the parts where the pathology of tremor, or convulsion, or spasm, is deduced from a consideration of the phenomena connected with the vascular system. We think that these hints may be best taken from these parts; for, seeing that the functional activity of the system is in direct relation to the supply of arterial blood, it is to be expected that the key to the whole problem will be found in the condition of the circulation. Thus, the supply of nervous influence to the muscles is proportionate to the activity of the circulation of arterial blood in the nervous centres and nerves, and this supply cannot properly be kept up when the circulation flags. What then is the condition of the circulation in those cases where muscular contraction is in excess? The answer furnished by Dr. Radcliffe is, that this condition is always what it ought not to be if the muscles were over-stimulated at the time. In *simple epilepsy*, for instance—

“The frigid and clammy hand, the foot that will scarcely keep warm before the fire, the pale and sallow or dark and venous complexion, the habitual feeling of chilliness, are facts which appear to show that the circulation is wanting in vigour; and this inference is fully borne out by the pulse, which in simple epilepsy is rarely otherwise than weak and slow. Plethora, in the form so often exhibited in the butcher, is never met with, and feverish reaction is a rare occurrence, even as an accident. There are, indeed, cases of *epileptiform* disease, in which the circulation may exhibit a greater degree of activity; but these cases, as will be seen in the proper place, present no real objection to the conclusion that the habitual state of the circulation in epilepsy is one of depression.

“Nor is there any evidence of a contrary character in the fit itself. Upon the eve of the fit, if any change can be perceived, it is in all probability one in which the skin has become paler and more dusky than usual, and the pulse more feeble. At the instant of the fall, in many, if not in all instances, a corpse-like pallor overspreads the countenance—a phenomenon which can only be explained on the supposition that syncope is impending; a moment or two afterwards, a dull-red flush, rapidly deepening into livid blueness, or even blackness, takes the place of the paleness which had first overspread the countenance, the face and neck become frightfully bloated, and everything shows plainly that all respiration is at an end. This state of suffocation continues during the whole course of the convulsion, and so perfect is it, that

little or no arterial blood can find its way into the arteries during the convulsion.

"There is, however, one fact which may be thought to show that there is an increased injection of arterial blood into the vessels during the convulsion. Such injection is evidently very imperfect at the onset of the fit—in many instances at least; for upon no other supposition can we explain the corpse-like paleness of the countenance, and the feeble and silent pulse at the wrist. This is evident. But if the finger be kept upon the wrist, it may be found that the pulse may rise during the convulsion, until it has acquired a force and fulness which it never had in the intervals between the fits; and if the hand be placed over the heart at this time, it may be found that this organ is beating tumultuously and with great violence. It may also be found that these signs of vascular excitement will continue for some time after the convulsion is over. These facts are evident and unmistakable, but they do not show, as they might seem to do at first sight, that more *arterial* blood is injected into the arteries at this time. On the contrary, they necessitate a totally different conclusion when they are subjected to a strict scrutiny.

"Now it cannot be doubted, that the effect of cutting off the access of air to the blood is to prevent the free passage of the blood through the pulmonary capillaries, and to overload the right side of the heart and the venous system generally, at the expense of the left side of the heart and the arteries springing from it. In this way the right side of the heart may become so much distended that the auriculo-ventricular valves are separated, and the beatings of the ventricle are made to tell as much in driving the blood back into the veins, as in sending it onwards into the lungs. But it is not right to suppose that the arteries are empty. If, for example, the carotid of a rabbit be exposed, and a ligature placed around the windpipe, it is found that the blood continues to flow through the vessel, that the originally scarlet colour becomes darker and darker, until at last it is as black as that of the blood in the neighbouring jugulars. Two minutes to two minutes and a half are occupied in this transformation of the scarlet into black blood. It is found, also, that this black blood will escape from the cut vessel in as full a stream and with as much force at the expiration of two minutes or two minutes and a half from the commencement of the process of suffocation, as it did before the aëration of the blood was at all interfered with. Nay, it is even found that at this time the black blood will escape with greater force and in a fuller stream than it did when it was red; for on fitting a hæmadynamometer into the vessel and testing the force of the pulse-wave before and after the tightening of the ligature upon the windpipe, the mercury in the instrument is seen to rise to a higher point than that to which it rose previously. Indeed, at this time it is evident, without the aid of any instrument, that the artery is more distended and more tense than it was before. This phenomenon is explained by the late Professor John Reid, who has investigated the condition of the circulation in suffocation more carefully and successfully than any other observer, as the result

of an impediment to the free passage of the black blood through the systemic capillaries similar to that which prevents the free passage of the same blood through the pulmonic capillaries; and it is more easy to entertain this view, and to suppose that, in consequence of this impediment in the systemic capillaries, a greater proportion of the force of the left ventricle is expended in distending the arteries, than to suppose that the ventricle is 'stimulated' to increased action under these circumstances. And, lastly, as explaining the peculiarity of the pulse in suffocation, it is to be remembered that the blood is sent along the arteries with greater force and increased velocity during violent attempts at *expiration*, and that the pulse becomes soft, feeble, and less frequent during violent attempts at *inspiration*; and hence it may be supposed that the increased fulness and force of the pulse during the suffocation of epilepsy may be owing partly to the fact that during the whole of this time the air is prevented from entering the chest by the firm spasm of all the muscles concerned—a state which may be compared to that which obtains in forced and prolonged expiration.

"Hence, the increase in the strength and fulness of the pulse which may take place during the convulsion of epilepsy is no proof, as it might appear at first sight, that the brain as well as the rest of the system is at this time supplied with an increased quantity of arterial blood; for the black and bloated face and neck, and the absolute suspension of the respiratory movements, show most clearly that the pulse is then filled, not with red blood, but with black.

"After the convulsion there is little to notice in the circulation. When the convulsions cease, the respiration is speedily restored, and the re-admission of arterial blood into the system may be attended with some transitory and inconsiderable febrile reaction; but this reaction has nothing whatever to do with the convulsion, for when it appears the convulsion has departed, and if the convulsion returns it is not until the reaction has first taken its departure.

"Arguing, therefore, from the corpse-like paleness and comparative pulselessness of the onset of the paroxysm, and from the signs of positive and unmistakable suffocation by which this stage of paleness and pulselessness is succeeded, the only conclusion would seem to be that the convulsion of epilepsy is connected with the want of a due supply of arterial blood. Indeed, the whole history of the paroxysm, as deduced from the condition of the vascular system, would seem to show that there is something utterly uncongenial between epilepsy and anything like arterial excitement."—(pp. 156—161.)

Nor is the case different in *epileptiform convulsion* connected with certain diseases of the brain — chronic softening, chronic meningitis, tumour, induration, hypertrophy, atrophy, congestion, apoplexy, inflammation—with fevers, with certain suppressed secretions, with irritation in the gums and elsewhere, and with the moribund state. In each case, on examination, the condition of the circulation is always the reverse of what it ought to be, if

the muscles were over-stimulated at the time. In *inflammation of the brain*, for instance:—

“In *inflammation of the brain* the condition of the circulation is not uniformly the same at all times, but this condition, as will be seen by reflecting on what has been already said, varies little with respect to the convulsion.

“*Simple meningitis* begins with paleness of the skin, a feeble depressed pulse, cutis anserina, vomiting, rigors, perhaps convulsion. Then follow rapidly the symptoms of high febrile reaction and cerebral inflammation—the pulse becoming hard and frequent, the breathings irregular and oppressed, the skin, particularly the skin of the head, hot and burning. These symptoms of high febrile reaction and inflammation continue for two or three days, and then give place to an opposite state of things, in which the pulse loses its force and becomes weak, small, irregular, and the breathings are interrupted with frequent sighs and pauses. Or if at this time the pulse retains any degree of resistance, it is evident from the dusky colour of the skin and the suspirious and laboured respiration, that the whole of this resistance is not due to the injection of arterial blood into the artery. Now it is in this stage of collapse which follows the period of inflammatory and febrile excitement, or else in the stage of collapse which precedes the febrile and inflammatory excitement, and never during the actual period of excitement, that the convulsion happens. And this rule is constant. Indeed, the history of simple meningitis shows most conclusively that vascular excitement is as incompatible with convulsion as it is with rigor or subsultus.

“In *tubercular meningitis* the pulse is weak and variable from the very first, now quick, now comparatively slow, rising in frequency when the head is raised from the pillow, and falling upon lying down again; and from the very first, the respiration is irregular, unequal, and interrupted with frequent sighs and pauses. For some time there may be some little disturbance of a hectic character, particularly in the evening; but this soon comes to an end, and the prostrate pulse forgets to put on even this faint semblance of fever. In some cases, there may indeed be a short stage of fever, and something like cerebral inflammation, especially in young children; but as a rule, the symptoms are altogether of a passive, non-febrile, non-inflammatory character. In any case, however, the convulsion is connected with an extremely depressed state of the circulation, and never with a state of febrile and inflammatory excitement, if there be such a state.

“In *rheumatic meningitis*, also, there is little or no febrile excitement from the beginning, and the pulse has become feverless and utterly weak before the convulsion happens.

“In *general cerebritis*, the pulse, at first slow, soon becomes variable and readily affected by changes of posture: the respiration, also, is very variable and suspirious. From the first, indeed, there is scarcely any fever, and little heat of head, except the phenomena of cerebritis are mixed up with those of simple meningitis; but if such symptoms are present, they soon pass off, and give place to symptoms of slow

sinking—a state in which hour by hour the breathing is more interrupted with sighs and pauses, and the pulse more powerless, unless it may derive some fictitious power from the difficult circulation of imperfectly arterialized blood, in which case the dusky countenance and the purple lips will show very clearly that the vessel is not altogether filled with arterial blood.

“In *partial cerebritis* there is even less febrile disturbance than there is in general cerebritis, and at no stage of the malady is there anything like increased vascular action.”—(pp. 309—311.)

Such is a free sketch of the argument by which Dr. Radcliffe attempts to show that convulsion in all its forms—tremor, convulsion proper, and spasm—must be looked upon in a very different light to that in which we have been in the habit of regarding it. The subject is one of great importance—of special importance in psychological medicine; for is not convulsion a most common symptom of disorder of the brain? The subject is one also which claims immediate, as well as serious, attention; for if Dr. Radcliffe is right, the natural conclusion is, that the more appropriate means of treatment will be, not those which are calculated to calm excessive stimulation, but those which will sustain and rouse the powers of a flagging system.

ART. VII.—ON THE STATE AND CONDITION OF LUNACY IN IRELAND.*

IN 1856 a Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into the state of Lunatic Asylums and other Institutions for the custody and treatment of the Insane in Ireland, and into the present state of the Law respecting Lunatics and Lunatic Asylums in that part of the United Kingdom. The Report of the Commissioners has now been made public, and it is unfavourable, not only as regards the condition and management of both public and private institutions for the insane in Ireland, but also as regards the existing state of the Irish Law of Lunacy. From several omissions, however, and also from not a few misapprehensions of the Commissioners, it appears to us that the unfavourable aspect of their Report has been unnecessarily, although, without doubt, unintentionally, heightened, and that,

* Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry into the State of the Lunatic Asylums, and other Institutions for the Custody and Treatment of the Insane in Ireland.—(*Blue Book*.) 1858.

Observations on the Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry into Lunatic Asylums, &c. (Ireland), in a Letter to the Right Honourable Lord Viscount Naas, M.P., Chief Secretary. By J. Nugent, M.D., Inspector of Lunatic Asylums. (Her Majesty's Stationery Office.) 1858.

in consequence, the Report does not present a correct notion of the actual state and condition of Lunacy Legislation and Management in Ireland.

The returns laid before the Commission show that, on the 1st of January, 1857, the number of insane poor in Ireland amounted to 9286, of whom 5934 were maintained at the public charge, and 3352 were at large. The returns made to the Commissioners do not correspond with the returns of the Inspectors of Lunacy for the same period. These returns give the total number of insane in Ireland, exclusive of epileptics at large and in work-houses, as being 11,452, of whom 5441 were at large. The inspectors estimate that, of the total number of insane at large, as recorded in their returns, 600 lunatics and idiots were not paupers. Thus, according to this calculation, the insane poor would amount to 4841. The returns upon which the Commissioners' enumeration is founded distinctly specified that the "poor" alone should be included; the inspectors' estimates were founded on returns obtained irrespective of social condition.

The Census returns show that the total number of insane in Ireland on the 31st of March, 1851, was 9980. A comparison of the Census and of the Lunacy Inspectors' returns, "made at an interval of between five and six years, and obtained through the same sources of information, shows a considerable increase in the amount of insanity in Ireland."—(p. 2.)

It is to be regretted that the Commissioners have not given an estimate of the proportion of insane to population in each of the two periods referred to, and also of the probable rate of increase in the amount of insanity.

The insane poor, who are maintained at the public charge, are distributed in the District Asylums (sixteen in number), the workhouses, the gaols, and the Central Criminal Asylum.

Concerning the District Asylums, the Commissioners report that the rules which exist (themselves imperfectly conceived) for the government of those institutions are frequently imperfectly carried out, disregarded, or altogether violated; that the books which are required to be kept for recording, at regular periods, the condition of the inmates, are either not kept, or if kept, there is a want of uniformity in the mode in which the entries are made; that the Governing Boards of the institutions do not, as a rule, meet sufficiently often; that there is great diversity in the rules of admission; that the hygienic arrangements of both the old and the new asylums are not satisfactory, particularly the ventilation and warming; that in several asylums there is an inattention to cleanliness; that the provision for the recreation of the inmates is deficient, if not altogether wanting; that the wards have commonly a bare and uncomfortable aspect;

that, though the dietary usually appeared equal, if not superior, to that which the inmates had been previously accustomed to, there were great variations in different asylums, and the returns of consumption showed inexplicable inconsistencies with the tables of allowances; and the Commissioners remark, "If the returns of consumption are correct, the patients cannot receive the amount of food professed to be allowed to them."—(p. 14.) Further, the Commissioners object to the use of skimmed-milk and butter-milk in asylums. The Commissioners report, also, that the bedding is ample in quantity, but not sufficiently good in quality; that the bedsteads are often of bad construction; that the clothing is in general sufficient, and of fair quality, but that it requires improvement; and that the distribution of outdoor exercise, or labour, among the inmates, is not satisfactory on the whole. The Commissioners also object to the treatment of the sick in cells, as is practised in several asylums, even where a proper infirmary exists—which, however, in a few instances, was found to have been converted to another use. Moreover, the Commissioners report that the prescription, wine, and dietary books are negligently kept, and that there is a "culpable disregard" of the rule which regulates the use of restraint. This rule requires that "the Manager is to take charge of the instruments of restraint, and is not, under any pretence, to allow the unauthorized use of them to any person within the establishment; all cases placed under restraint, seclusion, or other deviation from the ordinary treatment, are to be carefully recorded by him in the daily report, with the particular nature of the restraint or deviation resorted to; but in no case shall the shower-bath be resorted to without the authority of the physician."—(p. 16.) In some instances the Commissioners found that the managers were not even aware of this rule; in others, it was found that the instruments of restraint were left in charge of the attendants; and several instances are mentioned in the Report in which restraint had been had recourse to without the knowledge either of the manager or visiting physician of the asylum. In two of these instances the restraint was unjustifiably harsh and protracted.

It is a somewhat singular fact that, while the Commissioners have, throughout their Report, kept constantly in view the great proposition that an asylum should be an institution for the treatment as well as for the detention of the insane, they should have altogether passed over, without observation, the data submitted to them, and printed by them in the Appendix to the Report, which indicate the character of the asylums of Ireland as curative institutions for the insane. When these data, so important to a

right knowledge of the subject of investigation, are examined, a suspicion is excited that the generally unfavourable opinion of the Commissioners upon the District Asylums arises in no small degree from their having raised a false standard of comparison. We do not desire for a moment to convey an impression that we in any way approve, or would wish the continuance of those irregularities and defects in management that the Commissioners report; but the omission upon their part of any allusion to the most creditable, as well as most important feature of the asylum returns, is a circumstance much to be regretted.

From the Tables of Admissions and Discharges of the different District Asylums, it would appear that the proportion of recoveries, calculated on the admissions, for the whole of the District Asylums, on an average of five years (1852-56), was 39·2 per cent.; and that the mortality of the same asylums, calculated upon the whole number of insane within them during the same period, was 10·5 per cent. These proportions, both of recoveries and deaths, compare very favourably with those occurring in English County Asylums, the mortality being below, and the recoveries almost equal to the proportions found in those institutions. Drs. Bucknell and Tuke give the following averages (for periods not stated) of the recoveries and mortality of fifteen English County Asylums:—

	Proportion of Recoveries per cent. of admissions.		Mean Annual Mortality per cent. Resident.
Average of six English County Asylums receiving private and pauper patients	46·87	—	10·46
Average of nine English County Asylums receiving paupers only	36·95	—	13·88
Average of the fifteen Asylums	41·91	—	12·17

The general condemnation of the Commissioners is, so far as we can gather from the medical returns with which they furnish us, and from which the foregoing statistics of recoveries and mortality in the District Asylums are taken, in a great measure inconsistent with the medical results obtained in those institutions. Faults there undoubtedly are, both in the hygienic condition and general management of the District Asylums; but we must not, on that account, ignore their merits.

Moreover, Dr. Nugent, one of the Inspectors of Lunacy in Ireland, in a letter to the Right Honourable Viscount Naas, M.P., Chief Secretary, points out that the opinions of the Commissioners respecting the dietary of lunatics, the disuse of the infirmaries in several asylums, and the negligent use of the pre-

scription and wine books, are founded on misapprehensions. The inconsistencies in the consumption and the diet-tables, to which the Commissioners refer, may be explained by the variations ordered from the ordinary diet by the physicians. The disuse of the infirmaries in several asylums can be, and is, satisfactorily accounted for; and it appears that a bye-law exists (however ill-advised it may be) giving the physician the option in using the books referred to.

Dr. Nugent seeks also to explain in some degree the instances of cruel restraint mentioned by the Commissioners. When, however, as would appear to be the case in the District Asylums, the number of attendants is not sufficient for the effective carrying out of a system of non-restraint, and the wages paid to the attendants are not liberal enough to secure persons of a degree of intelligence that would enable them to comprehend and carry out fully the requirements of a non-restraint system, it becomes almost necessary to use more or less restraint in the treatment of the insane; but the liability to abuse becomes also great, and the necessity for stringent rules regulating the use of the means of restraint, and for the strict observance of those rules, cannot be too carefully enforced.

Concerning the lunatic wards in workhouses, the Commissioners report that they are most unsuitable for the detention of the insane; and upon the condition of the insane in them at the present time the Commissioners write:—

"The unfortunate creatures have commonly no one to attend to them but some of the other pauper inmates, who are but little capable, or little inclined to concern themselves with looking to their wants or necessities. The result is, that the condition of these wards, and the lunatics detained therein, is usually most unsatisfactory. In many cases the bedding is ill attended to, the persons of the lunatics were often most filthy, their clothing bad, and no effort at cleanliness was observable, in this apparently condemned division of the workhouse. In some workhouses, however, the bodily condition of these afflicted beings was as carefully attended to as in an asylum, though we cannot say that in any their moral treatment was much studied. The cases, are, however, generally chronic or idiotic."—(p. 18.)

Dr. Nugent directs attention to a fact, upon which the defective care of lunatics in workhouses mainly depends, and which seems to have escaped the attention of the Commissioners, namely, that the strict law of Union discipline does not recognise paid servants in workhouses, and forbids their employment, "consequently the demented and idiotic classes are dependent on the charitable offices of the pauper inmates of these institutions."—(*Letter*, p. 11.)

Concerning the gaols as places of reception for lunatics, the

Commissioners report that they are most unfitted for such a purpose, from the absence of all arrangements in these buildings for the treatment of the insane; and concerning the Central Criminal Asylum, which was opened for the reception of criminal lunatics in 1860, the Commissioners report that, although it is provided with all modern improvements, and well conducted, the arrangements for ventilation and heating seem to be defective, and there is a general absence of any means of amusement for the inmates, and of any pictures or decorations to relieve the monotony of the whitened walls of the day-rooms and galleries.

Of the condition of other establishments for the insane, according to the Report, the following is a summary:—

Previous to 1857, an establishment, connected with the House of Industry of the city of Dublin, and known as the Hardwicke Cells, existed in that city, and afforded accommodation for 108 lunatics. This institution was very inefficiently managed, and in 1857 the inmates were removed to a new establishment at Lucan. Of the character and management of this establishment, which is maintained by a Parliamentary grant, the Commissioners speak in favourable terms.

Concerning the Private Asylums, the Commissioners report that they, "generally, are not well adapted for their purpose. They are usually old mansions, or private houses, which have been converted to their present use, and their arrangements are not convenient for the purpose of an asylum" (p. 32); and concerning the benevolent institutions for the insane, two in number—St. Patrick's Hospital, Dublin, and the Bloomfield Retreat—the Commissioners report that the objects of the former institution have not been satisfactorily carried out, the reception of paying patients having become the most marked characteristic of what was intended to be a charitable institution; but of the Bloomfield Retreat, a small asylum belonging to the Society of Friends, the Commissioners express approbation.

Of the condition of the insane poor who are at large in Ireland, the Commissioners give the following classified summary:—

Inane.	Idiotic.	Well treated.	Neglected.	Dangerous.	Troublesome.	Harmless.	Resident with Relatives.	Resident with other persons.	Living alone.	Vagrant.
621	2041	1707	1595	62	241	3029	2371	336	60	565
3352		3302		3352			3362			

The asylum accommodation, notwithstanding that this has

been considerably extended within a few years, is still inadequate. The insane poor at large, according to the Commissioners' returns, amount, as previously stated, to 3352, and Dr. Nugent considers that additional accommodation ought to be provided for 2400, that being about the number of insane poor at large, who, according to his calculations, require to be placed under proper control. In several districts the want of additional accommodation is severely felt; and if several of the recommendations of the Commissioners are carried out, the necessity for further accommodation will be still more felt.

A defective state of the law respecting lunatics and lunatic asylums is to be regarded, according to the Commissioners, as the main source of the imperfections which they report in the condition and management of lunatic asylums generally in Ireland. Moreover the Commissioners imply that no sufficient means exist by which the perfect action of the law, even as it at present stands, could be effectively secured. The Inspectors of Lunacy, with whom rest the superintendence and direction of asylums, have so great an amount of duty to perform, that it is impracticable for them to give that narrow attention to the internal regulation of asylums which might be desired, or is necessary; and the committal of all that relates to the building, fitting up, and extension of asylums, to the present Board of Control, as well as the mode in which the power is evoked, that rests with the Lord Lieutenant in Council, to erect new asylums, are not the means best fitted to obtain good results.

An entire reconstruction of the lunacy laws is proposed by the Commissioners, and they suggest that a Central Board should be created which should have the full direction and superintendence of all asylums, public and private, as well as the control of single lunatics. This Board, it is further suggested, should consist of three salaried members, two of whom should be members of the medical and one of the legal profession. The Commissioners do not propose to associate any unpaid Commissioner (as in the case of England and Scotland) with the salaried Commissioners, for the following reasons:—"First, because we do not think that any unpaid members, whose services could be made available for the purpose, would give additional weight to the authority of the Board; secondly, because it is not likely a regular attendance would really be ensured on the part of the persons so appointed, and whose position and ability might point them out as qualified for the discharge of the duties belonging to the Board; lastly, because we think it of great importance that the Commissioners should not merely sit at the Central Office, to order and direct the management of the asylums, but that they should be themselves kept constantly informed of the actual con-

dition of the asylums, and the lunatics under their control, by discharging the duties of inspection" (p. 26). The Commissioners should perform the duties of inspectors, and should have full power of examination into all that relates to the management and condition of asylums, with the right of entrance into them at any hour, night or day; they should, also, have the right to sit at the meetings of Boards of Governors, but not to vote. In all that relates to the increase of asylum accommodation and the erection of new asylums, the Central Board would advise the Government, and superintend the carrying out of such measures as might be determined upon; the Board would, also, have supreme control over the licensing and government of private asylums, and it would become the medium of simplifying and making more satisfactory, the proceedings respecting Chancery lunatics.

At present rate-payers or their representatives, Grand Juries and Town Councils, have no voice whatever in determining the management of asylums, the increase of asylum accommodation, and the erection of new asylums. The two latter measures rest altogether with the Executive Government, which also provides the funds necessary for the construction, alteration, and expenditure of asylums, recovering the sums advanced by rates laid upon the district for which the asylum is erected. The Commissioners propose that the rate-payers, or their representatives, should in future have a voice in a matter which so nearly concerns their interest as the provision of additional asylum accommodation, or the erection of new asylums; and that Grand Juries and Town Councils should have the privilege of electing a portion of the governors of asylums, now nominated entirely by the Government.

The Commissioners also suggest that a new code of regulations should be drawn up for the internal management of public asylums.

We concur in the suggestion of the Commissioners in regard to the formation of a Central Board having the superintendence and direction of the general and internal management of lunatic asylums and the control of single lunatics, but we doubt whether the constitution of the Board, as proposed by the Commissioners is that best calculated to secure its objects; and whether, if the suggestions were carried out concerning the relations which should exist between the Central Board, Boards of Governors and Grand Juries, unless the opinions of the two latter bodies are to have more weight than seems to be contemplated by the Commissioners, the relations proposed would not lead to frequent and perplexing embroilments.

Dr. Nugent makes a suggestion respecting the constitution of the proposed Central Board, which merits attention, and with

which, if it be feasible, we are disposed to coincide. He writes—

“ Though I may be opposed to the constitution of a Board of three—two physicians and a lawyer—one on a larger and more influential basis may be worthy of much consideration by your lordship. I allude to a Central Board, of which the Lord Chancellor would be Chairman, with four unpaid Commissioners, one of whom might be a Judge of the Court of Queen's Bench (for criminal lunacy), and two others members of the Privy Council, with three paid Commissioners, two of them to be physicians, the third a barrister. A Board so constituted must, *per se*, command full control, and an unquestionable authority throughout the kingdom.”—(*Letter*, p. 18.)

We may not dwell upon the numerous suggestions which are made by the Commissioners respecting the particular management of asylums and alterations of the law, except in one instance relating to medical arrangements. The Commissioners agreed in suggesting that a Resident and Visiting Physician should be attached to each public asylum, and four of their number considered “ that the resident physician should be solely responsible for the treatment of the patients, both as regards their bodily health and their mental disease ; but that he should be assisted, when necessary, by a visiting physician, whose duties, however, should be confined to cases where his attendance may be required in consultation with the resident physician.”—p. 9. One of the Commissioners (Dr. Corrigan) considers, however, that the attendance of the visiting physician—

“ Should not be dependent on the discretion either of the Resident Physician or Local Board, but that he should visit the institution daily, that while the Resident Physician and Manager should have general charge of the institution, and be responsible for the treatment of the insane, as such, the duty of the Visiting Medical Officer in this regard should extend only to cases where his attendance may be required in consultation by the Resident Physician, but that the Visiting Physician should daily visit all cases whatever confined to bed, in seclusion, or under restraint ; that he should see, with as little delay as possible all cases of injury, accident, and child-birth, and record such observations on them as may appear requisite ; that he should be directly responsible for the treatment of the sick as distinguished from the mere insane ; that, in all cases of discharged patients, the certificate of discharge should be signed by both Resident and Visiting Physicians ; and that, in all cases of death, the record of the illness and cause of death should be signed by both the Resident and Visiting Physicians.”—(p. 9.)

It is not apparent from the Report upon what grounds Dr. Corrigan forms his opinion that the medical functions of the resident and visiting physicians should differ, or why indisposition occurring in an insane person apart from and in addition to his insanity, should constitute a sufficient reason for his being trans-

ferred to the charge of another medical man, who is not responsible for the treatment of the mental affection. That a patient should be seen daily by two medical men, the one of whom is to confine his attention and to be solely responsible for his mental state, the other for his bodily state, seems to us a speciality of practice which, to say the least, is somewhat paradoxical; and we cannot conceive what advantage either the patient or the institution can derive from it. Moreover, that the visiting physician, who is to be solely responsible for the bodily ailments of the lunatics, should also act as consulting physician to their mental ailments, makes the paradox, if we may so write, still more paradoxical.

Dr. Nugent, although appearing to coincide with Dr. Corrigan's opinion concerning the duties of the visiting and resident physicians, differs from the opinion of the Commissioners, that the resident physicians should not perform civil duties; for he writes—"I really do not see (if aided by a Visiting or Consulting Physician) what employment the Resident can have to occupy his whole time as a public salaried officer [particularly if the patients do not exceed 200 or 250], unless he superintends the general domestic economy of the establishment."—(p. 5.)

The Commissioners direct attention to the insufficiency of the wages of the domestics in the public asylums, and the inadvisability of low wages under these circumstances. We may add that the salaries of the officials appear to be on a scale which is not commensurate with the importance of the duties performed. In particular, the salaries of the inspectors of lunacy are characterized by a parsimony which contrasts very strongly and unsatisfactorily with the salaries attached to some of the legal appointments of secondary importance in connexion with the Irish government.

We have only entered so far into the details of the Commissioners' Report as would enable us to present to our readers an idea of its general tendency and character. Dr. Nugent, in the letter to which we have several times referred, has officially and most justly protested against the almost unbroken series of condemnatory conclusions of the Commissioners respecting the management and condition of the lunatic asylums in Ireland. From his long and intimate acquaintance with everything that relates to these institutions, Dr. Nugent's opinions merit very high consideration; and with regard to the important questions of increased asylum accommodation, district requirements, expenditure, and monetary arrangements, the value of his views and suggestions cannot be over estimated.

In addition to the very creditable character of the asylums in Ireland, as curative establishments (to which we have already

referred), Dr. Nugent states that they have been remarkably free from abuse, and that accidents are of rare occurrence in them, which he attributes to the carefulness of the attendants. "Only four cases of suicide, and not one of a homicidal nature, are recorded as having taken place within five years, notwithstanding that in that period no less than 2000 lunatics, committed to gaols on sworn depositions as 'dangerous' to themselves or others, had been transferred thither; and that at the date of their (the Commissioners') statistical returns, there were 551 of the class still remaining."—(*Letter*, p. 2.)

ART. VIII.—DON QUIXOTE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY.

BY DR. MOREJON.

From the French of Dr. J. M. GUARDIA.

"As there are an infinity of wise things which are done in a very foolish manner, so there are foolish things which are done in a very wise manner."—MONTESQUIEU.

A VOLUME might be written on the instances of madness transmitted to us by antiquity. I do not speak now of the extravagances and absurdities abounding in the biography of conquerors, emperors, and kings, which belong to the department of history and ethics, but solely of the aberrations of intelligence, which enter into the domain of mental medicine. Nothing is better known, for example, than the mania of Thrasyllus of Æxone (a district of Attica), who thought himself proprietor of all the ships of the Piræus; and everybody has read in Horace the amusing history of that inhabitant of Argos, who seated alone at the theatre, applauded, with all his strength, an imaginary play and absent actors. A king of Persia, Xerxes, was enamoured of a plane tree. A young man of Athens fell in love with a statue of Good Fortune, and died in consequence. The physician Mene-crates pretended to be Jupiter, and Philip, king of Macedon, could not cure him of his conceit. Ælian, to whom we owe many of these instances, speaks also of a fool who amused himself with counting the waves of the sea, and of an idiot who sought a staircase in a pitcher (*qui cherchait un escalier dans une cruche*).*

These isolated facts are curious, but less interesting than those instances of epidemic madness, so frequent in ancient times. I might cite many, but will only mention the gaiety of the Tiryntians, reported by Athenæus (Book VI.), after Theophrastus, and the delirium that Lucian† has described, with much wit and malice.

* Ælian: *Hist. var.* xiii. 17.

† Lucian: *Quomodo hist. sit conscrib.*, 1.

He recounts that at the end of a representation of the Andromeda of Euripides, given to the inhabitants of Abdera in broad daylight, in the middle of summer, all the spectators were seized with an attack of burning fever. When the fever was characterized by profuse perspiration, and bleeding from the nose, the sick began to run in the streets, declaiming with a loud voice the rôle of Perseus, in imitation of Archelaus, a famous actor of the time, who had played in the piece. Lucian gives an ingenious, and almost medical explanation of this singular epidemic (*πανδημὶ ἀπαντᾶς*), of the manner of its attack, of the transformation it underwent, and of the crisis which terminated it. At the beginning of winter a sharp frost, which came on suddenly, put an end to the delirium of the Abderites. Democritus was well avenged of the folly of his fellow-countrymen.

It is known that this illustrious philosopher, given up to the contemplation of nature, passed his life in solitude, a stranger to the things of the world, or only mixing with them to show the absurdity of them. This wisdom had the appearance of madness. People were afraid of it, and sent for Hippocrates. The doctor arrived, conversed with the invalid; and soon perceived that it was not necessary to administer hellebore. He had rightly guessed. Borden remarks, acutely, that in this case, it was medicine which judged philosophy, and that philosophers would do wrong to forget it. He pretends also that philosophers have never been able to impose on physicians, who go straight to the causes of things.*

However this may be, the author of the *Letter to Damagetus* (an apocryphal article in the Hippocratic collection), where this history is recounted at length, pretends that Hippocrates found Democritus occupied in seeking in the entrails of animals, the nature and causes of madness, and the means of curing it. But he would have had considerable difficulty in arriving at a conclusion, if it is true that he considered this world to be a large lunatic asylum, of which the inhabitants pass their time in mocking at one another, while each is ignorant of his own condition. This was precisely the subject of his witticism. It will be seen that Democritus resembles certain philosophers of our time, who, standing very high in their own estimation, consider the rest of mankind as actors in a pleasant comedy, and amuse themselves with this spectacle as a relaxation from the greatness of their own thoughts. He differs from them altogether in one respect—that he was charitably willing to correct those errors of humanity, which serve as diversion to these brilliant wits. In his opinion, man from his birth till his death was incessantly diseased. It has been remarked on this subject, that he also must have been in the same case; so

* Borden : *Rech. sur les maladies chron.*, t. II, p. 805, des Œuvres complètes.

that however we may admire his wisdom, we may apply to him the words of La Fontaine—

“Il connaît l'univers et ne se connaît pas.”

Democritus places the seat of madness in the liver, and its cause in the bile. Aristotle has remarked after him, that the greater number of men who have distinguished themselves in arts, in letters, or in science, have been of a melancholy temperament. Atrabilioussness played a prominent part in the ancient theories concerning mental aberration, and the word melancholy still belongs to science. This observation is singular; it will serve to explain the ancient saying, “There is no man so great but he has his grain of madness.”

A fortune is often in a word, and so it ought to be: there are many small wits who seek to console themselves with their mediocrity. Unhappily, men of imagination and intelligence are come to their aid, and impelled by very different motives, they have endeavoured to include in the annals of mental malady, famous sages and illustrious *savans*, such as Socrates and Pascal.

This is not the place to examine the expediency and the utility of those retrospective researches, the fruit of an erudition more ingenious than patient, to which a solid base is always wanting,—that of personal experience and clinical observation. To endeavour to demonstrate the madness of those great minds who have astonished the world by the example of their life, or by the sublimity of their works, would be an ungrateful task, if it were not a dangerous paradox. Besides, there is in the examination of these delicate questions, an essential point which must not be neglected. It is necessary to inquire attentively into the general ideas, the beliefs, the opinions, the mental condition of the contemporaries of these great men, for the greatest men are before their time, and the opinion of the crowd exercises a permanent and positive influence upon them. Since this is the case, it is more important, perhaps, to pay attention to the mass than to individual instances, the observation of whom belongs, but indirectly, to the general history of epidemic maladies.

Precisely thus has Cervantes proceeded. He attempted to cure his country of a chronic malady, which presented all the characters of an epidemic. The reading of the romances of chivalry, had long perverted the taste of the public, and turned their heads. The great discoveries, the distant expeditions, and the prodigious conquests of the Spaniards, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, contributed not a little to favour the spirit of adventure, and of heroic extravagance, which finally resulted in the decline of the Spanish monarchy. Some philosophic commentators have suggested—not without apparent reason—that the Chevalier

Don Quixote is none other than Spain herself, already distempered and dreaming, on the brink of ruin, of that universal empire, which she pursued so madly without being able to obtain it. This is not the place to decide whether the preceding hypothesis is well-founded, or otherwise. However the case may be, Cervantes has written the history of a lunatic, the celebrity of which is great in the republic of letters. For two and a-half centuries, it has delighted all who knew how to read it. Its renown has carried it to the four quarters of the world, and it may be said without fear of exaggeration, that after the Bible, Don Quixote is of all books the most universally known and appreciated. No ancient author has had a greater number of interpreters. However, the commentators have not said all that may be said, and the subject is so far from being exhausted, that the last comer finds always something to glean in this fertile field. Dr. Morejon (Don Antonio Hernandez) has enjoyed this good fortune. In his great posthumous work, *sur l'Histoire Bibliographique de la Médecine Espagnole*, this author, one of the most learned men of the age, has consecrated to the immortal work of Cervantes a new and special article, which illustrates in its most favourable aspect the ingenious history of the Chevalier of La Manche. He there demonstrates with great acuteness that medicine should claim Cervantes as rightly belonging to it; and for my part I think, after having read his plea, that the faculty may adopt it, and be proud of it. If Molière has exercised a beneficial influence upon the dignity of the medical profession by his keen satire upon charlatans and quacks, how much more does Cervantes deserve the gratitude of all true physicians—he who has never spoken evil of them, and who has done such signal service to science.

These considerations have led me to think that many who have devoted themselves to the study of mental maladies would be glad to read this curious commentary. I have therefore translated it from the Spanish original with all possible fidelity. I have only allowed myself to omit one page of introduction and encomium, which suppression will have the effect of abridging somewhat this memoir.

In the last section of his *Histoire de la Médecine Espagnole au XVI. siècle*,* Dr. Morejon expresses himself thus:—

"This history would lose its greatest ornament if I neglected to mention Cervantes. He well deserves to find a place there on account of the medical observations which adorn his greatest book, and which have almost escaped the attention of his most ardent admirers.

* *Historia bibliográfica de la medicina española*, tomo II, parte 7, siglo XVI, § XX. CONCLUSION.—*Bellezas de medicina practica descubiertas en la obra de Cervantes*, pp. 166-180.

"The astonishing abilities of Cervantes, his fruitful imagination, the richness and grace of his style, the end which he proposed to himself, and which he attained in writing his immortal *Don Quixote*, viz., the ruin of the chivalrous romances, a style of reading equally pernicious and frivolous—these are titles which have rendered his name glorious in the world. He deserves the praises of medical men also for the ability he has displayed in the description of the kind of madness known under the name of monomania" (no; the mania of Don Quixote was multiform).

"Many learned men, national and foreign, have devoted their talent and learning to the critical examination of the work of Cervantes. The analysis made by the Spanish Academy at the commencement of the magnificent edition of 1780, deserves to be read for all which concerns the subjects on which it treats, whether one would study in Cervantes, considered as a writer, the invention of the fable, the qualities of the action, the characters of the personages, the merit of the narration, the propriety of the style, or the utility of the moral. Still, to make this analysis complete, a profound knowledge of medical philosophy is necessary, a knowledge naturally foreign to this illustrious company. They may well place Cervantes in the same rank as Milton, Virgil, and Homer; but they could not appreciate nor make known his great merit in the description of that form of mental alienation of which he has treated, and in which he surpasses the celebrated Aretæus, the greatest painter of maladies, the Raphael of medicine; *y á quien por su habilidad en este ramo se la conoce por el Rafael de la medicina*.

"Moses and Homer have each been honoured by a dissertation; the first, thanks to some very limited notions of chemistry, the second, for his anatomical acquirements, although very imperfect. Thucydides, Virgil, and Suetonius, for having described the plague, are praised by physicians, and cited as models in the description of pestilential maladies. Montesquieu holds also his place in the history of medicine, in consequence of his theory of the influence of climates on institutions—a theory which he has copied from the Spaniard Huarde. And does not Cervantes still better deserve to be offered to the Spanish student as a model for the description of disorders of the mind? To examine this question, we must analyse the predisposition, the occasional causes, the development, the progress, the treatment, the prognosis, and the termination of the madness of the famous Don Quixote—a novel affection in the history of mental alienation, and created by the brilliant and fruitful imagination of the Spaniard Cervantes Saavedra.

"There is no hospital or asylum for lunatics where one may not see some insane person who thinks himself pope, king, cardinal, bishop, general, or captain, count, duke, or marquis—poor, or rich and powerful, possessed with a spirit good or bad. But we do not find in the annals of insanity a lunatic so benevolent, so amorous, so desirous of the public good, as the knight-errant, who wishes to banish from the world all evil-doers, fools, and cowards, with all the wrongs and iniquities that they have committed, and to pour a consoling balm upon the sufferings and labours of the unfortunate; in a word, the hero who wished to disenchant the unrivalled Dulcinea del Toboso, whose madness, described

by the enchanting pen of Cervantes, in a manner so exact, and so true, has proved that he was right in saying that history written in this way enjoyed immortality—very different from that which, for want of these ornaments, soon passes from life to death. Let us analyse, then, the madness of Don Quixote under all its aspects, without losing sight of the conditions which permit the philosophical physician to form for himself a complete idea of a malady according to the laconic and profound precept of Hippocrates,—‘that it is necessary in the study of diseases to take account of their qualities, causes, forms, seat, development, the time of their continuance, and their termination.’

“Cervantes had to describe a particular kind of madness. He begins by studying the circumstances (*condicion*) and the habits of his subject, the species, the character, and the nature of the affection that he is going to depict, including the predisposing and occasional causes which most contributed to its development. He marks its seat, reviews its periods, its changes, and its termination. He reasons upon the prognosis, adopts the most suitable mode of treatment, conforming himself so exactly to the rules of art, that he may serve as a model to all philosophical students of medicine.

“The details which form the *ensemble* of this medical history are arranged in such perfect proportion, and in such harmonious combination, that they result in a perfection of beauty equally charming and attractive.

“*Predisposition and Causes.* Conditions which predispose to madness: 1. Temperaments, bilious and melancholy.—Don Quixote was ‘tall of stature, of a robust constitution; his visage thin, his skin shrivelled and hairy.’ 2. Ripe or mature age.—Don Quixote ‘touched on his fiftieth year.’ 3. A penetrating and cultivated mind.—Don Quixote had wit, an excellent memory, and a good education. He possessed all the accomplishments of a knight-errant—theology, jurisprudence, medicine, botany, astronomy, mathematics, history, and others besides. 4. Pride of race and nobility.—Don Quixote was a gentleman (*hidalgo*) of La Mancha, descended directly through the male line (*por linea recta de varon*) of Gutierre Guijada, the conqueror of the sons of the Comte de Saint-Pol. 5. Violent exercises.—Don Quixote was a great hunter of hares. 6. The transition from a life of activity to one of idleness.—Don Quixote neglected almost entirely the exercise of the chase, and even the management of his own affairs. 7. The use of a highly-flavoured diet, mucilaginous and difficult of digestion.—Don Quixote ‘ate generally for supper hashed meat, pulse on Fridays, giblets on Saturdays, and stuffed pigeons on Sundays.’ 8. The seasons of summer and autumn.—Don Quixote had his greatest fits of madness the 28th July, the 17th August, and the 3rd October. 9. Amorous passions.—Don Quixote was much enamoured. 10. Excess of reading.—Don Quixote sold several acres of arable land to buy books of chivalry and of erotic poetry. 11. Prolonged night-studies.—Don Quixote ‘read without ceasing day and night, so that by reason of reading, and for want of sleep—other things conducing to the same result—his brain was so disordered that

he lost his reason.' We find specified in these last words, with as much precision and clearness as Hippocrates or Boerhaave could have used, the diseased organ, the seat, and the immediate cause of the malady.

"*Symptomatology.* The word madness is generic; it embraces different kinds, and even varieties; the symptoms also are always related to the diversity of the causes which produce them. When once Don Quixote had completely lost his reason, he imagined that all he had read in books of chivalry, and in amorous poetry, was real. From that time he dreamed of nothing but of quarrels, battles, defiance, wounds, declarations and proposals of love, pains and cares, and other impossible extravagances. He got it fixed so firmly in his head, that all these dreams of the imagination—the fruit of his readings—were true, that there was no history to him more certain. Then he conceived the design of making of himself a knight-errant, and going round the world in search of adventures. This is the specific character of this strange and singular madness; the whole of these circumstances constitute what is called in medicine *le syndrome symptomatologique* (the enumeration of symptoms without necessary relation to determinate maladies). Thus the forms and the symptoms of the affection of Don Quixote are constituted by a series of successive attacks of arrogance, of pride, of courage, of fury, of audacity, which manifested themselves, each in their turn, during the course of his malady in each of its periods. It appears always, that the exterior objects which fell under the notice of the invalid, far from producing in him regular sensations or images, occasioned serious disturbances in his judgment, reproducing themselves in his imagination in a manner conformable to the interior disposition of his deranged brain.

"*Times and periods of the malady.* All diseases, without exception, the longest as well as the shortest, have their periods. Cervantes has not endeavoured to dispense in this case with the rule imposed by Galen. The first appearances, the increase, the persistence and the decline of madness, are indicated in a masterly manner in his work by the adventures and escapades of Don Quixote.

"The madness makes its appearance in the summer, and announces itself in this way. The hero talks to himself in his apartment of things concerning chivalry—analogous to the occasional causes of his complaint. He fences, sword in hand, against walls, as if trying to conquer giants, felons, and robbers, over whom he desired to triumph, to redress all wrongs, and to demand satisfaction for all injuries and offences.

"Afterwards he began to prepare all sorts of arms, and conceived the project of going all over the world, exercising the profession of a knight-errant—a project which he executed by his escapade of the 28th of the month of July, one of the hottest days of the season, and in the night of which the first violent attack of his insanity manifested itself, followed speedily by his meeting with the half-naked boy tied to the trunk of an oak, and the merchant of Toledo.

"The increase of the malady is marked in the first place with the second expedition of the ingenious hidalgo, until his return to his

home. In this second interval took place the battle with the wind-mills; the encounter between the hero of La Mancha and the Biscayan; the adventures of the unmerciful jockeys, of the inn mistaken for a castle, of the funeral procession, of the fuller's mill, and of the helmet of Membrin; the deliverance of the galley slaves, the penance in the retreat of the Sierra-Morena, the fight against the leather bottles of red wine, and the skirmishes with the members of the Holy Hermandad and the flagellants. In the account of this period of aggravation, Cervantes engages irresistibly the admiration of every philosophical physician. In this part of his book he has, to my mind, described that kind, or rather that variety of mania, of which Aretæus has said, at the close of the chapter devoted to it, 'There exists another kind of delirium in which the sufferers tear their limbs, piously believing that it is the will of the gods, and that they are pleased with this conduct.' The picture painted by the Spanish author of the insanity of Don Quixote, imitating *le Beau Ténébreux*, surpasses the original of the physician of Cappadocia.

"It is here that Cervantes has collected all the features which mark the greatest intensity of this malady—namely, incredible power of enduring long-continued watchings, prolonged and frightful abstinence from food, insensibility to the action of cold, profound sighs, tears, fervent prayers, a marked inclination to tear his clothes or to deprive himself of them, to remain in his shirt, to cut capers and throw somersaults, heels over head—developing enormously the strength of nerves and muscles—mortification of his body in honour of the goddess of his amours, the unrivalled Dulcinea.

"In the retreat of the Sierra Morena, a particular well worthy of the attention of medical philosophers is the meeting of Cardenio. In general the insane live apart, shunning each other, despising and ridiculing each other, neither sympathising nor consorting together, except in so far as their delirium is analogous; and even in this case they quarrel about a trifle, but are easily reconciled. This fact precisely has been noted by Cervantes with a masterly hand, in the episode of this gallant young man, driven mad by believing that Don Fernando had carried away his idol, Lucinda. We see also an example of those lucid intervals continually presented by the insane. The account of his misfortunes given by Cardenio to the curate, in one of these intervals, deserves to be read in confirmation of this truth. Another trait which merits the attention of medical men is the custom which the insane have of changing their name. In the course of this period, Don Quixote takes the name of the Knight of the Rueful Countenance, and in the subsequent period that of the Chevalier of Lions.

"The shades which distinguish the alternatives of moral character in monomania are, pride, arrogance, an exaggerated sentiment of personal courage, and confidence in personal vigour. Don Quixote boasted on all occasions of the strength of his indefatigable arm; and on one occasion he went so far as to say to his esquire, that heaven had never created, and hell had never seen, any one who could intimidate him, or cause him to feel afraid.

"The last journey of the hero, until his defeat at Barcelona by the Knight of the White Moon, at the end of which he returned home for the third time, constitutes the period of persistence and decline of his madness. The symptoms of this period were: the cart of the parliament of Death, the fight with the Knight of the Looking-glass, the meeting with the lions, the cavern of Montesinos, the famous adventure of the enchanted bark, that of the afflicted duenna, the unequal fight with Tosilos, the battle with the bulls, the adventure of the beautiful Morisca, that of the pigs, of the enchanted head, and at last, that of the Knight of the White Moon, when the transition from one malady to another commences—a transition which the Greeks call *metaptosis*, and which is one of the most curious and difficult subjects of practical medicine.

"*Transformation of Madness.*—Diseases pass sometimes, or extend themselves from one organ to another, without any diminution of the primitive lesion; or they change from one place to another, the organ first injured remaining without damage, but always preserving the first essence of the evil. At other times they change both their seat and their nature, when a malady supervenes which differs from the first,—a question important to practical medicine, and unhappily little studied. Cervantes offers us an example of this transformation of disease. An acute fever attacked Don Quixote, and immediately all the physical and general characters of the primitive affection were altered. A curious alteration in three points of view: first, for practical medicine; then in respect to legal medicine, for without this transformation Don Quixote could not have made a will, or at least his testament would have been null; lastly, by reason of the influence this change had on the prognosis and the termination of his disease.

"*Prognosis.*—The sudden change from madness to a bitter dejection, a profound melancholy, and the complication of an acute fever, the abrupt passage from madness to reason,—so many circumstances which must inspire fears for the life of the patient. These were, precisely and collectively, the phenomena which presaged the death of the celebrated knight.

"*Curative Plan and Moral Treatment.*—The greatest title of Pinel to glory is, on the testimony of Broussais, the application of moral treatment to mental derangement. But this glory is due to the Spaniards rather than to Pinel. This French author, in his valuable work, praises the method adopted in the lunatic asylum of Saragossa, where, before his time, this theory was put in practice. This idea Saragossa borrowed probably from Valence; and two hundred years before Pinel, Cervantes handled it magisterially with so much genius and ability, that one cannot but admire the medico-moral strategy which he employs to calm the fury and the transports of his knight-errant,—a means not less original than that which he used to banish from Spain the epidemic of bad taste which led everybody to read books of chivalry.

"To direct the moral treatment of melancholy and mania, it is necessary to study profoundly the human heart and intellect in general, and in particular that of the patient. Cervantes fulfilled these two condi-

tions. He knew Don Quixote as well as if he had been his own son, and no one better than he could discover the means of relieving him.

"Six persons figure in the history, taking part in the treatment, with different rôles, to fill the two extremes of the epigraph of Boerhaave: the curate (a learned man), Master Nicholas, and Sanson Carrasco, favour the whim of the knight; the canon of Toledo, the governess, and the niece, dispute it vigorously.

"To commence the treatment, they decided first on the removal of the efficient cause of the disease; and in order to do this, they examined and burned the books of chivalry and love in a room, of which they blocked up the door, and they pretended that all this was done by enchantment: this was the most sensible conduct that could be adopted in such circumstances. The learned magician, Mugnaton, came in a cloud, riding on a serpent; he flew out of the roof, and left the house full of smoke.

"Such is the general precept applicable to all maladies; it may be said that it is a miracle to see one single person cured as long as the causes producing the disease continued to exercise their influence.

"However, they did not succeed at once in producing the desired effect; first, on account of the economy of the romance, of which the action terminated coldly at the cessation of the disease; and in the second place—and this is an observation important to our point of observation—in consequence of a trifling inadvertence of the niece, who confounded the name of Freston or Friton with that of Mugnaton; for it is necessary to proceed with much prudence and sagacity, the least negligence rendering all such plans abortive.

"It was by a ruse of this kind that the curate of his village, and the barber, found means to entice him from the Sierra Morena, where his extravagance reached its highest point. They disguised themselves at the inn; the curate with a doublet of velvet bordered with white satin, and the barber with a long beard, half-white half-red (the tail of a red ox); a disguise changed soon for another of the same sort, which they thought more effectual.

"The beautiful and unfortunate Dorothea throws herself at the feet of the knight-errant, and relates her troubles to him. She pretends to be the Princess Micomiconne, and obtains from him a promise of satisfaction for her wrongs. By this excellent pretext they succeed in drawing the madman from the Sierra; they bring him to the inn, where he falls into a profound sleep, complicated with a kind of somnambulism known in Spain, analogous to the state of his exalted imagination, and prelude to a remission of his madness, during which they can, without much resistance, transport to his home the poor madman, in a cart drawn by oxen.

"The determination taken by the curate and the barber, to pass nearly a month without seeing the invalid, for fear of renewing the recollection of passed things, until he should begin to give evidence of the recovery of his reason,—this determination was excellent; and if he had remained without seeing any of his family or his own house, it would have been better still. The dietary regimen which was prescribed and followed was the most suitable.

"The invectives of the governess at the time when the madness begins to reappear; the threats she holds out to go and complain loudly to God and the king if he did not remain quietly at home, and keep good order there; and those of the niece, when she made him observe that all that he detailed about knights-errant was fable and falsehood, and that his histories, worthy of the fire, deserved at least the censure of the inquisition, or some mark which should brand them with infamy as destroyers of good morals,—these complaints and these menaces were very suitable means, and the most powerful in Spain, and thus they were used by the canon of Toledo.

"The third trick of this kind was the agreement of the curate and the barber with the bachelor Sanson Carrasco, who, disguising himself in his turn, under the name of the Knight of the Looking-glass, fought a first time with Don Quixote—not, however, with the success and satisfaction which he had in the second encounter at Barcelona, when he took the name of Knight of the White Moon.

"The same plan is followed until the approaching end of the complaint of Don Quixote, when he resolves to turn shepherd. The bachelor urges him strongly to bestir himself, and begin a pastoral life. He tells him that he has already composed an eclogue, and purchased from a farmer of Quintanar two famous dogs to guard his flock, answering to the names of Barcino and Butron.

"The last but one of the moral stratagems resulted in the weakening of the madness of Don Quixote—a weakening painted by Cervantes with so much exactitude and truthfulness, that he seems to have borrowed the pencil of the doctor of Cappadocia, if indeed the Spanish author has not improved upon his colouring: the terms are almost alike in both authors, but the last is the most brilliant in exposing the moral phenomena of the decline of madness.

"Not only did Cervantes precede Pinel in the moral treatment of madness, but Broussais himself, in the theory which has made him so many proselytes in Europe; for the Spanish author establishes the point that 'the stomach is the laboratory where health is manufactured,' and by these words concerning the madman of Seville, he shows that he knew the relations which exist between this organ and the perturbations of reason. But the man to whom he has for two centuries been giving a good lesson is Hahnemann—this modern sectary, who, under the ridiculous name of homœopathy, pretends in these days to dazzle inexperienced youth, giving as new a doctrine known for ages in Spain, where it has been used in a manner judicious and philosophic—very different from that adopted by this maker of systems.

"Cervantes himself avows that the only object of his book was to banish the objectionable love of reading books of chivalry, which were doing so much harm. This result, a doctor of La Mancha, Sanchez Valdes de la Plata, had not been able to accomplish; he had pursued the same design, in conformity with the general principles of medicine—*contraria contrariis curantur*. The author of 'Don Quixote,' penetrated with the truth of an observation of Hippocrates—viz., that diseases are often cured by similar causes to those which produced them—decided to make use of the method now called homœopathy.

"From the time of the Middle Ages to the Crusades, Spain was infected with the romances of chivalry. Cervantes composed also a chivalric romance, which was intended to make all the rest disappear, to cure the reason of its pernicious credulity, and to leave the immortal work to all classes of society, and especially to physicians, who may discover there still more beauties than I have been able to point out.

"Only one thing is wanting to my mind in the work of Cervantes to make the work complete—that is, a *post mortem* examination of Don Quixote. Perhaps he omitted to insert it because he was convinced of the insufficiency of pathological anatomy in this class of diseases, or because the lunatic, having recovered his reason, the dryness of the brain was no more the immediate cause, nor the seat of the cause transformed into another disease; therefore, in consequence, nothing would have been found corresponding to the wanderings of the imagination. Perhaps, also, the true motive was the impossibility of doing it, surrounded by the prejudices of his family and his neighbours—and especially in a village. We find no mark of this in the history of the Cid Hamet Benengeli. Notwithstanding this omission, the history of the ingenious hidalgo Don Quixote is described in accordance with all the rules of medicine; for there are not many physicians who, in the writing of diseases, remember all the scientific conditions necessary to the description of a morbid state—a thing arduous and difficult after Sydenham.

"There is in the work of Cervantes the same truth as in his imagination—order, clearness, careful imitation of nature, and an application of moral means, more ingenious and more appropriate to the cause of lunacy than any that would have been imagined by Pinel, or any of his predecessors. Until this time painting had not been applied to the service of medicine, except to represent the different stages of the *pellagra* (*rosa de Asturias*), of other diseases of the skin, and of some diseases of the eyes. Perhaps this idea is born in Spain, for I have seen at Madrid some very ancient pictures representing the different symptoms and stages of the *mal de St. Lazare* (*mal de Sar. Lazaro*, a kind of leprosy—this term is applied sometimes to *teigne*)—a disease so widely spread formerly amongst us that there were many hospitals for its special treatment; but it is happily now almost extinct.

"In its turn, the skill of the engraver is employed to preserve to us the features of chivalric extravagance displayed in the malady of Don Quixote. Some of these characteristics strike us with admiration and surprise. A single man attacking two imaginary armies; the adventure with the fuller's mill, of which the terrible crash in the middle of a dark night would have struck terror into any other heart than that of Don Quixote; the descent to the cavern of Montesinos, which surpassed the descent of Eneas into Hell (the author adds, *in search of Creusa, his wife*), and which the historian, Cervantes, describes with as much art and sublimity as the Poet of Mantua, giving us in the same way an example of that asphyxia so common among divers and those who descend into deep places:

"Let medical men, then, study 'Don Quixote,' not only for a moment's amusement after the labours of the day, but for the sake of

contemplating the work of a genius in the description of mental diseases. To observe how completely Cervantes had present to his mind all the conditions requisite to this kind of investigation, and to consider with what ability he has described a new kind of madness, and how he has succeeded in making this lunatic interesting without making him ridiculous, so that his hero, among all his extravagances, inspires a secret interest in the success of his chivalric adventures.

"Let them examine in this history the lucid intervals or periods of calm, and they will there find all the proper characteristics—increase of memory, *bon-mots*, and sallies of wit—that is to say, the moral features which distinguish the malady with the remains of a good education, the politeness and urbanity of the hidalgo. Thus he is seen in the palace of the Duke, and at the house of Don Antonio Moreno, at Barcelona, altogether transformed, with all the distinction and courtesy of a chevalier; and even in his conversations, in his stories, and in the episodes which embellished the work, giving lessons and precepts to all classes of society. A new tribute of admiration to be paid by the medical profession in addition to all those merited by this great genius!

"Immortal shade of Cervantes! In the midst of the profanities which doctors dare to utter—in the midst of so many detractors among the members of the most benevolent of professions—thou livest for them—thou dost distinguish with consideration and respect the men of learning, wisdom, and talent, regarding them as divine. Receive, then, the tribute of gratitude; and while art and literature elevate thee to the most envied pinnacle of glory, I will consecrate a more durable monument to thine honour in giving thee a place in the history of Spanish medicine!"

Montesquieu has remarked, in speaking of the Spanish, "The only good book they have is that which shows the absurdity of all the rest." It was scarcely possible to give Cervantes better praise at the expense of the most illustrious of his predecessors and successors. But while this may be true, it must be conceded that a nation may well console itself, if it possesses but one book that is worth a whole library. The testimony of Montesquieu, who can never be accused of partiality to Spain, deserves, however, some consideration. We might oppose to it, if necessary, the feeble arguments of some commentators who have thought, I know not why, that Cervantes painted himself in the portrait he sketched of Don Quixote—an hypothesis by no means probable, if we bear in mind that by the side of this insane hero the author has taken care to represent, in the person of the esquire, Sancho Panza, good, popular, or common sense. This consideration alone is sufficient to destroy an hypothesis which appears to me to be entirely without foundation, and which, if it were true, would have no other effect than to place Cervantes in M. Lélut's museum of great men—an honour Cervantes can well do without;

for I venture to think he would not be in his right place, although in very good company.

It appears to me, then, that instead of amusing oneself with these useless speculations, it would be infinitely better to follow the example of Doctor Morejon. We have just read his plea, and seen that nothing is wanting to it: the exordium is remarkable, and springs out of the subject. The peroration is eloquent—rather too much so in my opinion—but thus he expresses his own convictions.

That which strikes me most in this curious article, is the number and force of the accumulated proofs in favour of the medical instinct, I might even say the talent of observation of Cervantes. Let me not be mistaken. The author of "Don Quixote" was an observer of vast and profound genius. The half of his life was passed in travelling; consequently he had seen much and he remembered much. Over these elements of all kinds his acute intelligence exercised itself. He spread profusely over these varied recollections all the richness of his imagination, so that to the truth of nature he added the charm and *prestige* of art.

In travelling through the principal universities and the great cities of Europe, Cervantes had certainly not failed to visit, for his instruction, the houses and asylums for the insane, at that time so well regulated in Spain. Lunatics played a considerable part, and held a prominent place in his works. Every one knows that among his moral romances (*novelas ejemplares*), one of the most interesting is that of the licentiate Vidriera (*el licenciado Vidriera*), a poor wretch who had passed his youth in study in the midst of the schools, surrounded by books, resisting all the seductions of love, who, by means of an amorous philter administered by a woman without his knowledge, was thrown into a languishing sickness, and immediately afterwards into a most extraordinary mania. The licentiate took it into his head that his body was made of glass. In consequence of this delusion, he took the most minute and comical precautions to preserve this too fragile exterior from contact with surrounding objects.

These repeated observations of diversified cases of insanity prove not only the sagacity and profoundness of the genius of Cervantes, but they prove also the noble feelings of his excellent soul, which had sympathy for all the misfortunes, and compassion for all the sufferings of man. How well he knew the depths of the human heart, and what a great painter he is in this department! How natural and how true are his pictures! Is there any personage more imaginary, and at the same time more real than "Don Quixote"? He interests and diverts us; he leaves us amused and thoughtful; he makes us dreamers and philosophers; and at the end of his adventures, when the supreme

moment arrives, this sublime madman recovers the full use of his reason, he makes himself ready for death with a calm and resigned wisdom which touches us and moves us profoundly. Such is the incomparable art and privilege of genius. Too much time cannot be given to the study of those great authors who have put all their souls into their works, and who represent the age in which they lived. Although the saying of Montesquieu is too witty to be true, it is not less certain that Cervantes may be considered to represent in himself the wit, the manners, the character, and the genius of Spain in the sixteenth century.

As to the work of Dr. Morejon, I refrain from expressing such an opinion upon it as it deserves, leaving it without fear to the judgment of the reader. I will not deny that I think very well of it. I think it new and original, very interesting, extremely curious, and worthy to figure in the best editions of "Don Quixote." It is to be hoped that future editors of this immortal work will give it an honourable position beside the most approved commentaries, such as those of Clémencia and of Navarrete, to which it serves naturally as complement. Whoever shall undertake to write a philosophic history of mental derangement should make a point first of consulting the book of Cervantes and the medico-physiological work of Dr. Morejon.*

ART. IX.—ON THE INSANITY OF CHILDREN.

M. BRIERRE DU BOISMONT has lately published some remarks upon this subject, in noticing the dissertation of M. le Paulmier.

M. Brierre du Boismont accounts for the comparative exemption of childhood from mental aberration, by the absence of many of the causes so potent in its production in adult life; not that children do not feel acutely, but their sensations are of a fleeting nature, and in this lies their protection. Nevertheless, children who inherit a disposition to mental disease, or who possess a highly-nervous temperament, and who are exposed to favouring circumstances, occasionally manifest undoubted symptoms of the malady.

Haslam, Perfect, Franck, Burrows, and Spurzheim, have given cases of children under eleven years of age. Greding gives an account of a child of eighteen months, which died of ma-

* The Memoir of Dr. Morejon has been noticed successively by MM. A. de Puebusque and A. de Latour, who have given extracts of it in their valuable works on Spanish literature.

asmus. It was brought into the asylum at Wuldham with its mother (who was insane), and was then scarcely nine months old. It was subject to paroxysmal nervous attacks, which ended either in an indescribable laugh, or in a fit of mania, during which the little creature tore everything she could lay hands upon. Jacobi refers to several cases of insanity in children, in the asylum at Siegburg. Esquirol treated two children—one of eight and another of nine years—and a girl of fourteen, all labouring under mania; he was also consulted about a child of eleven, in which the disease was melancholia.

Marc gives an account of a little girl of eight, who freely admitted that she wished to kill her own mother, her grandmother, and her father. Her object was, to be possessed of their property, and to have an opportunity of indulging her passions. The child was morose, pale, and silent; when spoken to, her answers were very abrupt. Her health was improved by a residence in the country, but on being brought back to town, she became again pale and melancholy. For a long time the cause remained undiscovered; at length it was found that she practised onanism, which she openly avowed, regretting at the same time that she had not the opportunity of indulging her passion with boys.

M. Brierre du Boismont has himself noted four cases, of children of six, seven, and ten years of age, in whom the symptoms of mental disease were manifest; and at present he has under his care a female child of three and a half years old, born of a paralytic father, which shows the strangest caprices; at one time sad and melancholy; again in the most violent fits of rage, without any cause, and not to be appeased. The intelligence of the child is far beyond its years.

The cases of insanity brought under notice by Le Paulmier cannot be said to belong to childhood; his children are young people; for of thirteen examples, three are fourteen, two fifteen, three sixteen, and five seventeen years of age. Before, however, analysing Le Paulmier's work, Brierre du Boismont turns to English, French, and American authors for information on the subject. In Turnham's "Observations and Statistics of Insanity" there is a table of 21,388 cases. Under ten years, eight cases, and from ten to twenty, 1161 cases are noted. According to Turnham, the greatest number of cases of insanity occurs between thirty and forty. In the United States, however, physicians have remarked the disposition to mental disease is stronger between twenty and thirty than between thirty and forty; and this is fairly ascribed to the earlier age at which young men enter the world and engage in business and politics. One of these beardless men of business said to his physician, "I am

convinced this kind of life which I lead will drive me mad or kill me ; but I must go on." In four American asylums, which contained 2790 patients, 33·73 per cent. were between twenty and thirty, and 24·41 per cent. between thirty and forty years of age.

That the kind of education which the youth in the United States receive has a powerful influence on the development of insanity is proved by Evans and Worthington, in their reports of the Pennsylvania asylums.

Dr. Wigan gives, in his unpublished writings, an account of crimes committed by young people without any object. The age of the youthful malefactors was between sixteen and seventeen for girls, and between seventeen and eighteen for boys. There was this in common, that there had not previously existed the slightest animosity towards the persons against whom they perpetrated outrages. According to Wigan, the greater number of these young people had epistaxis, which, among the females, appeared with the regularity of menstruation. The crimes were generally committed after the temporary cessation of this habitual flux.

Delasiauve and Schnepf have also furnished information on the insanity of early life. The statistics of v. Boutteville exhibit insanity amongst children in no insignificant proportion. The maximum is presented between the ages of thirty and thirty-four. From five to nine, 0·9 per cent.; ten to fourteen, 3·5 ; from fifteen to nineteen, 20 per cent.

Aubanel and Thorpe observed in the Bicêtre, in the year 1839, eight cases of mania in children, and one of melancholia, from the age of eleven to eighteen years. Mental disease is undoubtedly more frequent in childhood than is generally supposed. Hereditary tendency to disease, and ill-directed education, play an important part in its production.

A writer in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, for August, 1848, has with much ability accounted for the frequency of insanity in France. Le Paulmier recognises three forms of mania—maniacal excitement (*excitation maniaque*), mania, and incoherent mania. In the first grade of mania the dissociation of ideas is not always recognisable—it nearly resembles the early stage of drunkenness ; in the more advanced degree the dissociation of ideas is remarkable ; while in the highest it is such, that no longer two sentences, and sometimes not even two parts of one sentence, are connected.

The diagnosis of the mania of children is at times difficult ; meningitis may be confounded with it ; but in general the headache, the dilatation of the pupils, and the nausea and repeated vomiting, afford means of fixing the line of demarcation. Mania

with stupor (*d'une sorte de stupeur exaltique*) approaches closely certain forms of mental alienation which occur after epileptic seizures, and in which the excitement is associated with obtuseness and hallucinations (*obtusio hallucinatoire*). With respect to prognosis, the insanity of early life, according to the observations of Le Paulmier, ends in recovery; however, Delasiauve has made the remark, that a great susceptibility remains, a disposition to a return of the mental disease; and accordingly, that many patients may be found in the wards appropriated to adults, who had formerly been successfully treated in the division assigned to children.

M. Briere du Boismont concludes his notice of M. le Paulmier's dissertation by giving the result of his own experience. He says, that in a list of forty-two young people in whom the mental disease commenced between fourteen and sixteen years of age, eighteen times was it inherited from their parents.

In by far the greater number of cases, the disease has manifested itself partly under the influence of hereditary predisposition, and partly under the influence of puberty or menstruation. On inquiring from the parents the character of the children, the answer has almost always been, that they were, without any cause, sometimes sad, and at other times wild and ungovernable; they could never apply themselves steadily to work; they had no talent, or if it existed, it only flared up brilliantly for a moment; they would submit themselves to no rules. Some were apathetic, and were not to be excited by emulation; others exhibited a volatility which could not be restrained; many had been subject to spasmodic attacks. The incubation period was often protracted. In eighteen instances recovery took place, but the persons were liable to relapse; there also remained a remarkable strangeness of character, and an inability to assume any fixed position in life. Some afforded insecure evidence of the recovery being permanent. The conclusion is, that though, in a certain number of cases, recovery takes place, the mental alienation of children and young people is a most serious disease—partly from their antecedents, and partly on account of the imperfect development of the organs. Adducing the foregoing facts in opposition to Le Paulmier's, M. Briere du Boismont nevertheless accords to the dissertation the meed of his approbation, looking upon it as the production of a thinking mind, and as a proof that themes selected by authors themselves are more productive of fruit than those which are the subjects of prize essays.

REVIEWS.

The Human Mind in its relations with the Brain and Nervous System.
By DANIEL NOBLE, M.D. London, 1858.

A GOOD handy-book on physiological psychology would be a boon to the public, but although the work now lying before us might in bulk, style, and in some respects intention, be considered as a handy-book, it could scarcely be denominated good; for the main object of the author is to set forth certain views on mental physiology which he entertains, but which have not met with general acceptance among physiologists.

Dr. Noble's special opinions on mental physiology are well known among English physiologists, and in a previous number of this Journal (No. XXVIII.) we had occasion to notice their merits as suggestive of inquiry; but now that these opinions are republished in a more elaborate guise, it behoves us rather to examine their demerits, more particularly as the present work is addressed to the amateur and general student as well as to the physiologist and psychologist.

We object to the views which Dr. Noble takes of the position of psychology in scientific research. He writes:—

“In order that a system of analytical psychology should be attained, standing in true scientific relation with our knowledge of the brain, we ought to be able to appreciate the varying phases of consciousness, in watching their outward manifestation, with some of that readiness and accuracy wherewith we can estimate physical conditions. Were this within our power, considerable advances might be made towards a correct and detailed psychology, duly associated with our information concerning the structures within the head. But the inevitable absence of objective standards by which to measure the value of mental facts, materially reduces their comparability among themselves, and with other facts; on this account psychical phenomena do not admit of any natural or perfect system of classification, neither do they allow themselves to be linked-on to physical facts with anything like philosophical exactitude. Yet, of course, scientific induction demands very distinct recognition of the comparable worth of all the circumstances which lead to it.”—(pp. 3, 4.)

In this paragraph neither the actual nor the probable position of psychology is, we believe, correctly stated. Recondite and difficult as researches into the nature of psychical phenomena may be, still it does not follow that they will ever stand without the pale of precise and systematic knowledge. Recent progress in psychological research has been such as to warrant the assertion that the conditions upon which it must be followed are becoming clearly known. This is a fundamental condition of scientific research, without which no positive and satisfactory advance can be made. “Psychology holds,” as Morell observes, “its proper place in the logical co-ordination of the sciences at large, and will only be *perfected* when all the under-lying data shall have been duly explored and comprehended.” Moreover,

notwithstanding Dr. Noble's opinion that psychical phenomena do not allow themselves to be linked on to physical facts with anything like philosophical exactitude, yet he subsequently proceeds to give a summary of what he deems to be "the probable, and the *more* than probable, physiology of the nervous system and the various portions of the encephalon, pointing out the correspondence in some detail between it and the more prominent facts of psychology."—(p. 34.)

Again, Dr. Noble writes :—

"In a very early stage of physiological inquiry, the seat of the Soul, or Conscious Principle, was a theme of elaborate and ingenious hypothesis. Hippocrates and Hierophylus place it in the fibres of the brain; Democritus, in the region of the temples; Strabo, in the space between the eyebrows; Epicurus allocated it in the breast; Diogenes, in the left ventricle of the heart; the Stoics, with Chrysippus, in the whole heart; Empedocles placed it in the blood; Plato and Aristotle, with the more elevated schools of philosophy, connected the soul with the whole body; and Galen suggested that each part of the body had its particular soul. In later times, however, conclusions have been attained with regard to the functions of the Encephalon—the structures within the head—which leave no reasonable doubt that the conscious principle has its special seat in that region; conclusions abundantly sustained by evidence from all sources."—(pp. 5, 6.)

Here the soul is confounded with a mode of its manifestation, *consciousness*: a weighty error, we conceive, in psychology.

Common sensation, Dr. Noble defines to be "a sense consciousness not limited to any particular organ, but referring itself more or less to the whole frame. . . . This sense resides principally in the skin; it is especially acute at the mucous orifices; it exists, however, in the interior tissues, but in a degree less intense. It is best illustrated by the simple notion of *existence*."—(p. 48.) It would seem that under the designation of common sensation, Dr. Noble includes the special sense of *touch*, and the *common sensibility* of some authors and the *cænæsthesia* of others; but of this latter form of sensibility more hereafter. Dr. Noble conceives that it is through common sensation that we appreciate the state of the muscles, "experience the *muscular sense*." He then proceeds :—

"This fifth sense (common sensation) is, presumably, awakened through the vesicular extremities—the peripheral expansion—of fibrous filaments. Whether the grey substance and white fibres originating and conducting common sensation be the same as those which subserve the spinal reflex function is uncertain. But this much may be admitted, the communicated impression ascends along the posterior columns of the spinal cord, and attaining gray vesicular centres, produces a consciousness of *common sensation*."

"Physiologists are not agreed as to the identity of these ganglionic structures; they may be expected, however, like the other sensory ganglia, to be somewhere at the base of the encephalon; and I am, myself, disposed to think that the vesicular nuclei within the lateral lobes of the cerebellum—the corpora dentata—constitute the encephalic site of this sense. Many years ago, Foville assigned this function to the aggregate cerebellum; and others, with great plausibility, have advocated this opinion. Dr. Carpenter, however, in his *Human Physiology*, argues against it, on the ground that neither ablation of the organ by opera-

tion, nor the destruction of it by disease, have been found to involve the loss of any sensorial capacity. But there may be considerable doubt as to whether, in recorded cases of this kind, the ganglionic extremities of the upper and posterior portion of the spinal cord—the cerebellic termination of the so-called restiform bodies—were actually lost, even though the lobes and their cortical vesicular investment should have disappeared. I doubt if the extension of disease or of experimental excision to structures so closely contiguous to the medulla oblongata as these corpora dentata, would be compatible with the maintenance of functions essential to life; although the removal or destruction of the bulk of the cerebellum, might suggest no such difficulty. Besides, it is notorious that, in the case of animals, movements purely reflex will sometimes be mistaken for those indicative of common sensation. But, probably, the cases already observed with respect to this point, are too few for any decisive conclusion.”—(pp. 49—51.)

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“The anatomical connexion which exists between the corpora dentata and the posterior columns of the spinal cord, through the corpora restiformia, favours the hypothesis which I have advanced; and various physiological and pathological facts would appear to strengthen it. The experiments of Magendie and Longet show that the slightest touch of the restiform bodies induces violent pain. Hutin relates a case in which the sense of touch was so exalted, that, upon the least contact, intolerable pain and restlessness ensued, with corresponding muscular contractions, resembling those produced by an electric discharge. The patient ultimately died in the most terrific convulsions, prostrate and exhausted. On examination after death, there was found, amongst other changes, atrophy of the cerebellum. ‘Its medullary centre, as compared with that of another subject, was a third less in size in either hemisphere. The white substance, which in the normal condition occupies the centre of the corpus rhomboidale, had ceased to exist, so that the fimbriated margins of this portion approached the centre, and only formed a small pyriform, very hard, grayish brown body.’

“Mr. Robert Dunn, of London, a very acute and reflecting practitioner, published a few years ago an interesting and instructive case of tubercle in the brain, wherein there was noticed, amongst other phenomena, imperfect paralysis of the right arm and leg, consisting in failure of common sensation. The patient was a little girl about two years old. ‘She could move her arm about,’ says Mr. Dunn, ‘and could grasp anything firmly enough in her right hand, *when her eyes and attention were directed to it*; but if they were diverted to something else, and the volitional power withdrawn, she would *let the object which she had been holding fall from her hands, and without being conscious of the fact*.’ Describing the post-mortem appearances, Mr. Dunn states, ‘On making an incision through the lateral lobes of the cerebellum on the left side, I found I had cut through a tubercular deposit, a little to the outer side of the median line (the site of the corpus dentatum), in a state of softened degeneration.’” —(pp. 52—54.)

The experiments of Dr. E. Brown-Séquard seem to afford conclusive evidence against the anatomical arguments of Dr. Noble in favour of the *corpora dentata* of the cerebellum being the ganglionic centres of common sensation. The former gentleman has satisfactorily shown that the posterior columns of the spinal cord are not channels by which sensitive impressions are transmitted to the encephalon. Neither division, nor removal of a portion of the posterior columns is followed by a diminution of sensibility, but, on the contrary, by a marked increase of sensibility in the parts below the portion of the columns incised or removed; and ablation of the restiform bodies is

followed by the same results, sensibility being in nowise diminished, but conspicuously increased in the parts below. The conclusions at which Dr. E. Brown-Séguard has arrived from experimental and pathological research, respecting the relations of the posterior columns to sensibility are as follows :—

“The posterior columns of the spinal cord are not, as it has been imagined, a bundle of fibres, from the posterior roots of the spinal nerves going to the encephalon.

“The restiform bodies are not a collection of fibres, chiefly from the sensitive nerves of the various parts of the body, going up to the encephalon, and therefore the cerebellum is not the recipient, through the restiform bodies, of most of the sensitive fibres of the trunk and limbs.

“Deep injuries to the posterior columns of the spinal cord are always followed by a degree of hyperæsthesia greater than after the laying bare of the nervous centres, hyperæsthesia which appears in all parts of the body behind the place injured.

“All the parts of the encephalon which are situated in its posterior or superior side are like the posterior columns of the spinal cord in this respect—that a marked degree of hyperæsthesia always follows a transverse section upon any of them. If a complete transverse section is made upon any part of the restiform bodies, sensibility becomes very much increased in every part of the trunk and limbs. Hyperæsthesia is also, but at a less degree, one of the results of a transverse incision of the cerebellum, in the processus cerebelli ad testes, and in the tubercula quadrigemina.

“The posterior columns of the spinal cord are much less sensitive than they are said to be, and it even seems that the apparent sensibility depends upon the fact, that when they are irritated, the posterior roots, which are sensitive, are also more or less irritated.

“The restiform bodies seem to be deprived of sensibility to mechanical excitation.”—(*Lancet*, August 7th, 1858, p. 137.)

Passing over the additional evidence, as well pathological as experimental, which might be adduced to show that the centre of common sensation, or the path of sensitive impressions to the sensorium cannot be in the cerebellum, we would merely add Dr. E. Brown-Séguard's remarks on the case related by Mr. Dunn, and quoted by Dr. Noble. “The case,” writes Dr. Brown-Séguard, referring more particularly to the opinion expressed by Dr. Carpenter, that the cerebellum might be the seat of the so-called muscular sense, “certainly seems to be a valuable one; but what can it prove, when we know that movements have remained regular, and, consequently well guided, in many cases in which tubercles, or other morbid products, or various alterations, have existed at the same place where the deposit was found in Mr. Dunn's case.”—(*Lancet*, August 28th, 1858, p. 220.)

Dr. Noble appears to regard the *Cænæsthesia* and *Emotional Sensibility* as one and the same phenomenon :—

“There is yet a sensibility more elevated in the psychical scale than either external sensation or the physical appetites; I refer to that all-pervading sense of substantive existence which German psychologists have named, in some of its phases, *Cænæsthesia*—general feeling, and sometimes self-feeling (*Selbst-Gefühl*). It connects itself, apparently, with the peripheral termination of

sentient nerves throughout the whole body, but particularly of those supplying the thoracic and abdominal viscera.

"*Emotional Sensibility*, as in the whole of its modifications it may not be inappropriately designated, is experienced in an especial manner about the præcordial region. Its local intensity, indeed, would seem to correspond very much with the prevalence of the vascular system. Under appropriate influences, this sensibility, although more or less general, is always most acutely experienced in the neighbourhood of the large vessels, and most of all about the centre of the circulation; and hence we have the popular as well as poetic localization of 'the feelings' in the *heart*. Yet emotional sensibility is not, like external sensation, of a quasi-physical character; it certainly is not the tactile sensibility of the vascular tubes, which may be affected by many causes influencing the circulation, without there being any resultant effect upon the 'spirits'—another form of popular phraseology which sufficiently indicates, in certain respects, the varying states of this so-called *cœnæsthesia*." (pp. 60, 61.)

We have already seen that in the term *common sensation* Dr. Noble seems to include the *cœnæsthesia* properly so called. To make, however, the term *cœnæsthesia* equivalent to emotional sensibility must have the effect of confusing or rendering valueless the signification of a tolerably well understood word. By *cœnæsthesia* we have always been accustomed to understand that modification of sensibility which is usually referred to the ganglionic nervous system, and which is familiarly spoken of as common feeling. But, as Feuchtersleben remarks, the word feeling in this term only stands for sensation. Moreover, the term self-feeling differs from the term common feeling in signification, inasmuch as a psychical element is involved in the former.

There is no reason to believe that the relation of the *cœnæsthesia* to emotion differs from that of any other form of sensation; that is to say, that the psychical relations of the *cœnæsthesia* are brought about in a different fashion to those of other forms of sensation. This Dr. Noble himself appears to admit, for in his chapter on "The Emotions and their Composition," he writes:—

"If, as I have supposed, the misnamed optic thalami and the corpora striata constitute the ganglionic centres of the several kinds of emotional sensibility, we must in these processes regard them as acted upon from above—from the region of intelligence, the hemispherical ganglia—through the medium of intercommunicating white fibres; just as in *cœnæsthetic* phenomena dependent upon more physical states, the same centres are supposed to be acted upon from below, through nervous filaments distributed to the organs and structures very generally."—(p. 129.)

Elsewhere, however, throughout the book, Dr. Noble uses the term *cœnæsthesia* as equivalent to emotional sensibility. Indeed, there is a want of clearness in the mode in which he makes use of the last mentioned term, and also of the term *common sensation*.

It is not necessary to dwell upon the opinion that the optic thalamus and corpora striata are the ganglionic centres of the so-called emotional sensibility. This conclusion forms a sort of corollary to the opinion that the seat of common sensation is in the corpora dentata of the cerebellum, and it is rendered in a great measure untenable by the evidence

in favour of that opinion altogether failing. In addition, the vagueness of Dr. Noble's use of the term "emotional sensibility" vitiates the more specific arguments by which he seeks to determine its seat.

Dr. Noble's remarks on Dr. Carpenter's theory of Unconscious Cerebration are of considerable interest; but does the phrase which Dr. Noble makes use of, "elaboration and perfecting thought *without thought*" rightfully express Dr. Carpenter's idea; or the subsequent phrase, "*involuntary and inattentive thinking*," satisfactorily account for the phenomena sought to be explained in the theory of unconscious cerebration? Dr. Noble writes thus:—

"I conceive that the particular facts, which seem to countenance the theory of unconscious cerebration, will certainly admit of some more obvious and simple interpretation than one which renders it necessary to regard nerve-substance as elaborating and perfecting thought *without thought*; a process, it appears to myself, which would not be altogether unlike the production of melody by a notoriously unmusical instrument without the sensible manifestation of sounds.

"I would here propose to the reader's attention a fundamental consideration bearing upon this question, which is, that the human consciousness, apart from other analyses of which it is susceptible, is traceable under the two forms of *direct* and *reflex*. In the former case ideas are in some sense automatic, and for the most part transient; in the latter they are in their origin to some extent voluntary; or, springing up spontaneously, they become designedly retained in the consciousness, and constitute the material, so to speak, of an objective regard. In solitary musing, when there is no intended application of mind to any subject, but rather a passive contentment in our emotional states, consciousness is mostly of the direct character; and, under such circumstances, thoughts and feelings evolve themselves involuntarily—without any sort of effort or purpose. From time to time, however, these mental products are arrested by a reflex act, and the mind voluntarily turns in upon its own thoughts and feelings, thus contemplating not only that which it knows and feels, but its very self at the same time as knowing and feeling.

"Now, although we ordinarily remember facts and mental processes, very much in proportion as they have engaged the attention and a certain reflex consideration at any time, this rule is by no means absolute. Ideas and feelings once experienced may at any time revive in the consciousness, and yet not always be recognised as having previously had existence; particularly when at former periods they have never been subjected, by attention, to a reflex mental process. Undoubtedly, under these latter circumstances, numberless thoughts, and reasonings, and ideas of external occurrences, pass for ever from the consciousness; but this is far from being always the case; again and again will they return, without any systematic identification. And are not most of the phenomena cited by Dr. Carpenter, in support of his theory of unconscious cerebration, explicable by these laws of spontaneous thought, according to which our mental operations are frequently unremembered when repeated. 'Of the thoughts which occur to us suddenly, and which seem to us purely spontaneous, not a few are reminiscences, more or less faithful, of what we have before read, heard, or thought; and consequently they proceed from a preparatory fact which we do not remember' (Balmez).

"And yet this recovered thinking, when attentively regarded, will sometimes seem to have the lucidity and perfection of a special revelation, and may well seem as though it were the product of some unconscious operation of the mental organ. Still, by careful consideration and examination, we shall at

times procure demonstration of the contrary. In composition we frequently hit upon an idea, or a word, or the turn of a phrase: it strikes us as a happy thought, and appears to be the spontaneous evolution of our own minds. We afterwards discover, possibly by an accident, that we had heard or read it, yet we had forgotten all about it, and had believed it to be our own. And can we doubt that, in the same way, we sometimes recall our past thinking, deeming it to be new, because we have no conscious remembrance of it? Through ignorance of these laws of thought, or inattention to them, unjust accusations of plagiarism are sometimes made; but 'a writer is not a plagiarist, although he makes ideas his own which have originated with others. But it is often true that man imagines he creates, when he only recollects.'

"In more particular illustration of these phenomena, it may be noted that a book shall be read and soon laid aside; the reader may then pass on to something else, and in a very brief period be unable to render any very clear account of what he has read. Some months afterwards, when the subject of the work becomes a topic of conversation, he is probably surprised that he has derived considerable information from it. How do we explain facts of this kind? Why, in many of such cases, the person situated, as supposed in this illustration, will discover, upon attentive self-examination, that in his passive musings the contents of the book had been in his spontaneous thoughts; and that, under such circumstances, an acquaintance with its subject had been gradually, but still consciously, perfected. This mental process may probably be with some accuracy designated *involuntary and inattentive thinking*, but not with justice an *unconscious action of the brain*. I am decidedly of opinion, myself, that the explanation now offered of these well-known phenomena will more or less cover all the psychical processes that have been cited to establish a doctrine of Unconscious Cerebration." (pp. 94—99.)

In a chapter on the "Physiological Potency of Ideas," Dr. Noble illustrates his subject by several singularly interesting cases; and in a subsequent chapter he demurs to pleasure and pain being made the last analysis of emotion. He writes:—

"The inward feelings called forth, as emotion, by the agency of thought, may, of course, be pleasurable or painful; but any account which represents the 'Emotions' as merely the pleasure or the pain which accompanies certain intellectual states, constitutes a very incomplete description. Yet the late Mr. James Mill, the Rev. Sydney Smith, and many others, would seem to reduce them to so very simple a character; although in practical and extended discussion, other views become implied, in disregard of strict logical consistency. Benevolence, considered in this way, becomes the pleasure experienced in contemplation of the happiness of others, and the pain at witnessing their misery; and fear, again, as the pain that ensues upon the expectation of calamity; an analysis being thus attainable with all our emotional states—passions, affections, and sentiments alike.

"Now, I think it will be conceded, upon reflection, that we must admit the specifically distinct character of our varying states of consciousness, as recognised in Hope, Fear, Grief, Pride, Vanity, Love, and other such inward experiences. 'Sentiment,' says Rosmini, 'has various states, pleasurable and painful, with gradation and *variety* of pleasure, and with gradation and *variety* of pain.' And, somewhat more explicitly, in another place, he observes:—"The sentiments correspond with *orders of reflection*; so that there are as many orders of feeling (pleasurable or painful) to be noted as there are orders of reflection exercised by man, and the number of these is indefinite.'" (pp. 130—132.)

In this opinion of Dr. Noble's many psychologists will concur.

We have confined our attention to the portions of this work in which Dr. Noble's opinions are most prominent, and we have thought it our duty to state in what respect we differ from him. This course was more necessary in regard to a work which will probably find its way largely into the hands of amateurs and general students, by whom Dr. Noble's opinions will most likely be received, from the authority of his name, as of higher value than he himself would desire; for the learner is not always apt in distinguishing hypothesis from ascertained fact, even when, as in the case of Dr. Noble's hypotheses, he is duly cautioned by the author.

Of the whole of Dr. Noble's work, it may be said that it is most interesting to read, and that it contains no small amount of information very agreeably set forth.

The Ganglionic Nervous System; its Structure, Functions, and Diseases.

By JAMES GEORGE DAVEY, M.D. London. 1858.

"IT is the nature of an hypothesis," says Tristram Shandy, "when once a man has conceived it, that it assimilates everything to itself as proper nourishment; and, from the first moment of your begetting it, it generally grows stronger and stronger by everything you see, hear, read, or understand." We fear that the hypothesis set forth in the work which we are about to notice is but another illustration of this profound dictum. Dr. Davey is of opinion that the ganglionic nervous system, or, in other words, the sympathetic nervous system, is the head and front of all the functions of organic life. "If," he writes, "the *organic functions*, as they obtain in the 'animal,' are to be referred to the *ganglionic nervous system*; or, what is the same thing, to the *irritability* of which it is the immediate seat, it follows, admitting the existence or operation of the same 'organic functions' in the vegetable kingdom, that plants are necessarily endowed with nerve-structure, and that *this* constitutes the *analogue* of the *ganglionic nervous system* in man and the higher animals."—(p. 4.)

This sweeping corollary fittingly paves the way for the observations which Dr. Davey conceives warrant the conclusion, that the organic functions, as witnessed in the animal economy, are to be referred to the ganglionic nervous system.

As to the structure of this system, he arrives at the following conclusions:—

"*a.* The ganglionic nervous system first exists in a molecular form; and that it is made up of globules dispersed throughout the homogeneous texture of the animal, as in the acriti, the lower Entozoa, &c.; as such it has also been presumed to exist in the early human embryo.

"*b.* These nervous globules, arranging themselves in a longitudinal series, form filaments, and these 'filaments' at length form a central point, a ganglion (*solar ganglion*, Anderson).

"*c.* Ascending the scale of animal creation, and arriving at the *Mollusca*, nervous matter is found secreted about and around the œsophagus, and on the dorsal aspect of the animal (supra-œsophageal ganglion); this nervous

matter becomes, in the higher animals and in man, the tubercula quadrigemina or medulla oblongata.

"d. Still ascending, the cyclo-ganglionic nervous system becomes more complicated, whilst the several tissues and structures subordinate to the same, including the cerebro-spinal system, are proportionately amplified; the increased development of the former, and the general augmentation and addition of parts in the latter, being in the relation to each other as *cause* and *effect*." (pp. 65, 66.)

Now, although we must confess to an inability to comprehend, from the text, the precise meaning of the ganglionic nervous system first existing in a molecular form, as affirmed in segment *a* of the conclusions; or to solve the paradox of a globular nervous system co-existing with homogeneity of texture in an animal; we cannot remain in doubt as to the signification which Dr. Davey desires to be attached to the presumption respecting the existence of the ganglionic nervous system in the early human embryo. Dr. Davey writes, *apropos* of Dr. Carpenter's views on cell-growth:—

"Now, if we will be at the trouble to inquire more particularly into these 'cells' so constantly mentioned by Dr. Carpenter; if we will take the pains to investigate the nature of their vital properties, their specific offices in the animal economy, we shall, I think, conclude presently that the aforesaid *cells* are nothing more or less than the 'nervous globules' (the seat or source of 'nervous sensibility,'—Anderson), distributed in the homogeneous structures of the Polygastrica and Polypifera, &c., and found to constitute the very sum and substance of the early embryo (human). What says Dr. Carpenter then of the 'cells,' *alias* 'nervous globules?' At page 87, we find his evidence in favour of the identity here mentioned thus expressed—viz.: 'It seems to have been established, as the aggregate result of the labours of many observers, that in animals as in plants, all the parts in which active *vital* changes are taking place essentially consist of cells, which may be regarded as the *real instruments* of these operations.' At page 103 there occur these words: 'Still we shall find the general rule to hold good, that all the animal tissues are developed in the first instance through the medium of cell-life; and that in the organs subservient to the strictly *vital* operations, *cells* remain the essential instruments.'

"The inevitable conclusion from the facts and reasoning of Dr. Carpenter is, that the organic or vegetable functions, as observed in even plants, and in the lowest forms of animal life, are due to 'vital operations' consequent on their 'cellular type of structure.'

"I cannot myself doubt that nervous matter *is* present in 'a diffused form,' *i. e.*, incorporated with the other tissues, in all those animals wherein no *distinct* nerve structures have been made out. I cannot dissociate the positive *vitality* of such animals from a highly elaborated (imperceptible?) nervous organism. There seems every reason to believe that the 'cell-life' mentioned by Dr. Carpenter is, in all respects, identical with the 'impetum faciens' of Hippocrates, the '*materia vitæ*' of Hunter, the '*nisus formativus*' of Blumenbach, the 'irritability' (*motions without force*) of Haller, the 'creative force' of Muller, and so on." (pp. 58, 59.)

To confound, as has been done in the paragraphs quoted, the general doctrines of cell-growth and the nature of cells with the attributes and properties of certain cells having a special function, and which are stated to exist in what are nevertheless asserted to be homogeneous structures; and, also, with the cells which constitute the human

embryo in its earlier stages of development, is to reduce the whole matter to verbiage, of which the meaning entirely escapes our comprehension.

It is needless to examine the remaining conclusions of Dr. Davey on the structure of the ganglionic system, as they are based more upon the opinions quoted above on the nature of cells than upon actual examination.

Dr. Davey is scarcely happier in his speculations upon the functions, than he is upon the structure of the ganglionic nervous system. He considers that it "performs" the whole of the organic functions (those which give us "the notion of life"), excretion, nutrition, exhalation, absorption, calorification, &c.; that it presides over the brain and spinal cord; and that it is the source of *instinct*; in short, that the ganglionic nervous system is the source and mainspring of all the vital actions of *an* organism.

It is not always easy to follow the course of the argument by which Dr. Davey arrives at this startling generalization. The existence of "irritability" in an animal from which the brain and spinal marrow have been removed, or in a limb which, as in the experiments of Sir B. Brodie, is left attached to the trunk by the blood-vessels only, he considers as being dependent upon the ganglionic nervous system (pp. 74-77); but he advances no argument in support of this conclusion other than his preconceived notions of the supreme importance of the system in the animal economy. Not only is the ganglionic system regarded as the cause of "irritability," but it possesses itself the said "irritability,"—whatever that may be, for in one place Dr. Davey uses the term as synonymous with vitality (p. 74); in another as equivalent to contractility (p. 77); in a third it becomes "a peculiar kind of sensibility" (p. 79); and in a fourth it represents the "true spinal phenomena" (p. 75). Concerning this phenomenon, "irritability," Dr. Davey writes:—

"I have on many occasions performed the experiment on the frog, as detailed by Dr. M. Hall, and I have invariably found that the removal of the viscera and ganglionic system, as described by him, is fatal to the life of the animal; and that what Dr. M. Hall has called the 'true spinal phenomena' (irritability) as manifested by the eviscerated and headless being, are continued no longer than *that peculiar kind of sensibility* (contractility) which may be at any time observed in the heart or intestinal canal, and so on, of any animal, after the removal of either from the trunk. That the vitality of the spinal cord—and not less its capacity to execute its normal functions in the animal economy—is derived from the ganglionic nervous system, is to my mind certain, and not less easy of demonstration than is the presence of the sun at noonday.

"One word more, ere I conclude my criticisms of the experiments of Drs. le Gallois and Hall. The latter gentleman finishes the description of his famous experiment on the frog with these few words—viz., 'Having thus, then, clearly laid before you the distinction which I wish to insist upon—namely, that there is not a division of the nervous system into two parts only, but into three, pervading all the different parts of the whole animal frame—I shall venture to term them the cerebral, the true spinal, and the ganglionic systems.' I would remark that, whilst accepting this division of the nervous organism, I would submit that both the first and the second named are de-

pendent on the third; that they derive not only their very existence and integrity from it, but also perform their respective functions in virtue only of the influence they receive from it; and that they are, as it were, employed by it to establish our dependency on, and relationship to, the external world, of which man forms a part." (pp. 79, 80.)

And further, Dr. Davey writes:—

"The cerebral and spinal systems of nerves together perform the *animal functions*, which, in the words of an eminent physiologist (Blumenbach), prove us feeling, thinking, and willing beings; they are the actions of the senses, which receive impressions; of the brain which perceives them, reflects upon them, and wills; of the voluntary muscles, which execute the will in regard to motion; and of the nerves, which are the agents of transmission; the brain is their central organ. The ganglionic system of nerves, with the solar ganglion for its central organ, performs the vital or organic functions—these are altogether independent of mind, and give us simply the notion of *life*. Secretion, nutrition, exhalation, absorption, and calorification, &c., being under its immediate influence and control throughout the whole body, it must preside equally over the *brain* as the stomach, equally over the *spinal cord* as the liver or uterus. In point of fact, if either one of these organs or viscera just named were removed from the influence of the ganglionic nerves entering so largely into its very composition, its specific vitality must cease—*i. e.*, the function it was wont to exercise would end in the individual—its contribution to the sum total of *life* would be withheld." (pp. 80, 81.)

Having thus exhausted the relation and asserted the supremacy of the functions of the ganglionic nervous system in organic life, it becomes necessary to ascertain the relation of that system itself to vital laws. Assuming, therefore (as Dr. Davey does), "for argument's sake," that there is such a thing as an "organizing principle," or "creative force" (p. 81), and "granting, for the sake of argument, that the *ganglionic* nervous system is the source and origin of this *power*, or *organizing principle*, or *creative power*" (p. 84), whence did the system receive its being? Dr. Davey at first asserts that it is not in the power of man to offer anything more than a very general reply to this query; but, bold of heart, he struggles through the *niffenheim* of the *nissus formativus*, and having previously written that "Even if the result of life—the functions of a part—should be called its life, life could not be said to be the result of organization, but of a power to which organization is an instrument" (p. 83); he arrives at the conclusion that life is a product of the nervous system.

"In considering the effects of certain vivisections on animals, as well as the consequences of accident to man, in so far as both these involve more immediately the ganglionic nervous system, the attention is with much certainty arrested by the fact that in the *annelida* 'their division into separate fragments does not destroy the organism, but, on the contrary, gives rise to the production of several distinct beings.' This circumstance is, in itself, highly interesting, and demonstrates to us the fact that the animal tissues (organism) at this particular stage of development are sustained in their integrity equally by the several *ganglia* forming a part of the ganglionic nervous tissue; whilst in man, including the more perfect animals, the vital principle (the '*anima*') is in *great part* generated in a central organ (the *solar ganglion*), and from it diffused through the whole body.

"It is rightly inferred that *life*, regarded in the abstract, is identical throughout all animate nature; in every genus, species, and variety; and in

each individual of all three of these artificial divisions, 'life' is seen, or rather *known*, in connexion only with an especial nervous apparatus; and that these stand in relation to each other as *cause* and *effect*, it would seem impossible to doubt."—(pp. 105, 106.)

Here, then, we have the assertions that organization is the result of life, and that life is the result of organization; *i. e.*, life is the cause of life—the cause of the cause—a *reductio ad absurdum*.

We need not dwell upon the pathological reasons with which Dr. Davey seeks to support the foregoing propositions, nor detail the facts which he conceives demonstrate the truthfulness of his opinion, "that both the ordinary *nutrition* and, what is more, the *reproduction*, equally with the decline (atrophy) or decay of the organism (the very converse of the nutrient process), must be attributed only to the operations of the organic or ganglionic nervous systems," &c. (p. 114); neither need we do more than refer to his assertion, "that the successive increase of parts above the *medulla oblongata* is attributable to the operation of a preliminary cause—viz., the 'formative power,' or the ganglia of the sympathetic, *the germ of all animal life, whether cerebral, spinal, or organic*" (p. 116). It is simply requisite to direct attention to the transformation of the "formative power" into the ganglia of the sympathetic, in the preceding quotation, and to mention the subsequent conversion of the "*nisus formativus*" into the "*solar-ganglion*, including the ganglia of the great sympathetic" (p. 127). We may not touch upon the development of the argument by which Dr. Davey seeks to show that secretion, nutrition, and animal heat, have their source in the ganglionic system, and it is only necessary to quote the statements that—

"The *storge* is an *instinctive act*, peculiar to birds, &c.; and the great *animal heat* which attends it affords reason to conclude, that both instinct and animal heat have one common cause or origin." (p. 127, *note*.) "The presence of instinct is, it appears to me, an indication of the activity of the organic functions—*instinct* is one of these; it is always seen in combination with them; it partakes of their activity or otherwise. Instinct is ever manifested in proportion to the development of the organic nervous system; and, inversely, to that of the cerebro-spinal system. It is the substitute for intelligence, for reason. Instinct is to the wasp or beaver what experience (reason) is to man. Instinct prompts the idiot to the same automatic movements which are directed to the supply of its physical wants, as experience and reason may and do a healthy and sane man to eat, or sleep, or walk, and so on."—(pp. 135, 136.)

Moreover, we may only quote, without attempting to ascertain their signification, certain conclusions which, with other conclusions, are attached to a paper of considerable length on the excito-motory or diastaltic nervous system, and added to the physiological division of the work:—

"That both the external and internal excito-motory phenomena are alike dependent on the vital stimulus imparted by the great sympathetic nerve; and, in the former instance, through the instrumentality or medium of the *medulla spinalis*.

"That such is the relationship between the great nervous centres, viz., the brain, spinal cord, and the solar ganglion, that the second (viz., the spinal cord), being at one time under the dominion of the first, i. e., the brain, and at another time under that of the third, i. e., the solar ganglion, and being thus intermediate, will now manifest a cerebral or voluntary power (and this the result of consciousness, and, of course, volition), and then (the antecedent circumstances being dissimilar) display one of an involuntary, automatic, or instinctive, or excito-motory character; but this only, of course, when the organic nervous apparatus is in the ascendant, and the brain comparatively quiescent—or, in other words, when sensation (spinal) and motion, and not consciousness and volition (cerebral attributes) are in operation; if I may be allowed so to express myself.

"That the great sympathetic nerve is endowed with a specific and independent power, to which both the brain and spinal cord, and with them, of course, their functions are subordinate."

Dr. Davey's views on the pathology of the ganglionic nervous system, and the treatment of its diseases, are founded upon his physiological notions, and the vices of the latter prevail also in the former.

The purely speculative character of the majority of Dr. Davey's opinions renders it unnecessary that we should discuss the questions which he broaches; and the reasons which have determined physiologists to adopt the opinions which Dr. Davey seeks to controvert, are detailed at length in every standard work on physiology.

PLEA OF INSANITY—TRIAL FOR MURDER.

WE copy from the *Times* of December 18th and 20th, the subjoined report of the trial of James Atkinson for the murder of Mary Jane Scaife. This case presents several points of interest. It is the first case within our recollection of a judge admitting, in a most liberal spirit (as evidence in favour of the prisoner), the fact of his strong hereditary predisposition to insanity. Evidence of this character is generally considered as inadmissible in criminal as well as in civil cases. We are much gratified to find that there are enlightened judges on the bench who do not close their eyes to the importance of testimony of this kind, and who are disposed to view such facts as important when considered in connexion with the analysis of obscure cases of mental disease set up as an excuse for crime.

James Atkinson, aged 24, was indicted for the wilful murder of Mary Jane Scaife, at the parish of Hamthwaite, in the West Riding of York, on the 1st of August last. The prisoner refused to plead when arraigned, and by his lordship's direction the jury were sworn to try whether he stood mute of malice or by the visitation of God. Mr. Anderson, the surgeon to the gaol, was then sworn, and stated that the prisoner, in his opinion, could both hear and perfectly understand what was said to him. After this evidence the jury found that the prisoner stood mute of malice, and by his lordship's directions a plea of "Not Guilty" was recorded for him.

The prisoner, who is a young man with dark hair, small head, and narrow, but high forehead, appeared during the trial listless and indifferent, and as though incapable of fully appreciating his awful position.

Mr. Price and Mr. West appeared for the prosecution; Mr. Bliss, Q.C., Mr. Middleton, and Mr. Maule for the defence.

Mr. Price, in stating the case to the jury, said it was impossible, after the course taken by the prisoner, to shut his eyes to the nature of the defence intended to be set up. If the facts led the jury to the conclusion that the prisoner had inflicted the wounds which had caused the death of the deceased, it would be their duty to find him guilty. The father of the deceased was a small farmer near Darley, and the prisoner was the son of a flax-spinner at Darley, and acted as his overlooker. The prisoner and the deceased had courted for several years. Shortly before this sad event there had been a gala at Bewerley Park, at which the deceased and the prisoner were, and a man named Gill, a farmer of the neighbourhood, was there and had paid the deceased some attentions which had apparently excited the prisoner's jealousy. Shortly after this, on the 1st of August, the deceased met the prisoner as she was coming from church with her sister, and he walked towards her home with her, a man named Furness walking with her sister. The prisoner and the deceased were seen to go up a lane called Stump's-lane, and the prisoner was the last person seen walking with the deceased alive. The deceased next morning was found in the ditch in this lane, with her throat cut, and dead, and the prisoner was in consequence apprehended. It appeared that early that morning the prisoner had gone into his brother's bedroom, and had made a statement that he had cut Mary Jane's throat—"the Lord have mercy upon him, he had murdered his sweetheart." On being taken into custody, he repeated this statement, and subsequently made a lengthened statement, detailing the particulars of the crime, when before the magistrates. The learned counsel stated in detail the facts that will be found stated at length in the evidence.

William Scaife, the brother of Mary Jane Scaife, sworn, stated that he resided at Darley. His father was a farmer, and resided at Darley. The prisoner had kept company with his sister for five or six years. They were sweethearts. He last saw them together at Hurtwith Chapel on Sunday, the 1st of August, about eight o'clock at night. They were going in the direction of Darley, which is about a mile off. They were coming down a lane called Nidd-lane, and going towards Stump's-lane, which comes out between Darley and a place called Wreake. Stump's-lane was the nearest road to Scaife's house. A week before witness had been at a gala at Bewerley Park. His sister (the deceased) and the prisoner were both there. A Mr. Geoffrey Gill was there talking to her. His sister left the gala about eight o'clock.

Cross-examined.—It was a fine summer's evening, and people were walking about. He heard no cry.

William Downs, a farmer at Darley, uncle to the deceased, also spoke to seeing the deceased and the prisoner turn up Stump's-lane on Sunday night, the 1st of August. He was courting her, and he had often seen them together. In August, 1856, she went to Manchester, and returned in September, 1857. Mr. Geoffrey Gill, a farmer at Kettlesing, had paid attention to his niece. The prisoner's father had a flax-mill, and the prisoner, who was 24 years of age, was mechanical overlooker.

Richard Howard, glass and china dealer, living at Darley, knew the prisoner and the deceased. He saw them together going up Stump's-lane on the 1st of August. About twenty minutes past five o'clock next morning he was out looking after a mare in Stump's-lane, when he found the body of a woman laid in the ditch bottom. It appeared to be on the knees and fallen back in the ditch bottom. It was blood all over, and the mouth and eyes wide open. He immediately went back and alarmed his neighbours, and they returned and made it out by the dress that it was the body of Mary Jane Scaife. They went for the police, and Mr. Horton, the surgeon.

Cross-examined.—When he saw the prisoner and the deceased walking together they were "linked" together, and appeared as loving as he had ever seen them.

John Clifton, policeman, of Darley, went to the house of the prisoner's father on Monday, the 2nd of August. He had previously seen the dead body of Mary Jane Scaife. He found the prisoner in his bed-room. He charged him with feloniously murdering Mary Jane Scaife. He said "I have; I have murdered my sweetheart." I afterwards asked him where the knife was, and he said he would go along with me and show me. We crossed three fields, and he found the knife produced (a small clasp knife) in a dry well. It was open, and the large blade was bloody. On the way to Ripon Gaol he said, "I have had this on my mind for three weeks, and I told her I would murder her if she would not have me." There was no blood on his hands then.

Cross-examined.—There was a small scratch on his finger.

Thomas Atkinson, the brother of the prisoner, examined.—He lived at Darley, with his father. When the prisoner came home on the night of the 2nd of August he came into witness's room between four and five o'clock. Witness was in bed. He said, "Lord have mercy upon me, what have I done? I have murdered my sweetheart. I must have. Have I done it? I must have."

Cross-examined by Mr. Bliss.—I was asleep a few minutes after he came home before he came into my room. He was quite undressed. I had observed a change in him lately. I had seen that he was troubled with something for some weeks before this happened. He had a brother John, who had been dead nine or ten years. The prisoner was about 24. Witness was 29 years of age. He had five sisters living and one step-brother, and two older brothers than himself. Witness could read and write only middling. He looked over the mill occasionally. The prisoner worked at mechanical work at the mill, and overlooked a little. He only did simple work. The prisoner was very passionate, and he had seen him put into a rage for a very trifling cause. If ever he was checked, he got into a rage for very trifling things. He was then quite ungovernable. He had seen him fight on those occasions like a madman. He could not say much about the prisoner's behaviour to his mother, as he was then only 11 years old. The prisoner had behaved very badly to witness sometimes. If he said half a word it would derange his mind. The knife produced was his brother's. The prisoner had four watches. One was a little silver Geneva watch. Witness knew he intended to give that watch to the deceased. His brother John had been not altogether right. He also got into rages for very trifling causes.

Mr. Price objected to this evidence as collateral.

Mr. Bliss said this was the very essence of the inquiry, which was whether the prisoner was of sound mind at the time or not.

His Lordship admitted the question. It was clearly evidence in such an inquiry; what was the state of mind of the brothers and sisters of the prisoner was most important evidence to establish whether insanity was hereditary or not in his family.

Cross-examination resumed.—He had an aunt Ann, the sister of his mother. She used to get into rages in the same way as his brother for very trifling causes. She was quite insane once. She got wrong with her own mind and was put into an asylum.

Re-examined.—When his brother fought he would seize a hammer or anything. Three of his sisters were married. His eldest brother worked at the mill. He never heard that his brother had bought watches and sold them to the mill-hands.

Mr. Richard George Horton, surgeon, at Darley, was sent for on the 2nd of

August to Stump's-lane. When he got there he found the dead body of Mary Jane Scaife. He examined the body. The cause of death was the division of the windpipe with some sharp instrument. A knife like the one produced would have done it. Her dress was saturated with blood. Her bonnet was lying under her in the ditch, her parasol broken and soaked with blood.

Cross-examined.—He arrived there at six in the morning. The body had been dead several hours. There were eight distinct cuts or gashes in the throat, and two punctured wounds, one on the right cheek and one on the left clavicle. The skin was flayed off near the ear. There were three cuts across the windpipe, and the left jugular vein was severed. Several of the wounds he considered must have been given after death, as no blood had flowed from them. When the body was taken to the inn, the prisoner had desired to kiss the deceased. Witness had resided seven years in the neighbourhood. He was the medical attendant of the prisoner's family, and knew the prisoner. He should consider him a man of very weak mind. He was very readily excited if at all thwarted, and to a fearful extent. A man of decent education would not be excited by such frivolous matters as he had known the prisoner excited by. He had known him in paroxysms of passion and outrageous—almost in a frenzy. He could not say that he would be absolutely without control at such moments. He never saw the prisoner insane; but from what he had known of the prisoner's temperament there was a possibility of his becoming so. He is afflicted with goitre; it is of no great size, and he had consulted witness about it. He did not know that goitre and cretinism are necessarily associated together. He thought, under similar circumstances, the prisoner would do the same thing again. But possibly he would never feel the same with regard to any other girl. He had attended the deceased by the prisoner's request in March last for a miscarriage.

Re-examined.—When that connexion existed between them he could easily imagine that, if she declined to marry him, he would be so excited as to commit the crime he had done, and he believed the prisoner would do it again under similar circumstances. Violent passion might be aroused in him from various causes. Violent passion was not a symptom of weak intellect. The prisoner was a weak, frivolous, vain young man. In his paroxysms of passion he might be subjected to momentary insanity. He had been given way to so much at home, and his temper had been so little thwarted—in every argument they had given way to him so much, that he considered he was master of all, and if thwarted, momentary insanity might appear. If he had been differently educated, he probably might have been very different.

William Pullen, joiner, at Darley, saw the prisoner and deceased in Stump's-lane on August the 2nd. Witness observed to a friend, "These are close acquaintances." The prisoner said, "Not so close as some of you think."

Cross-examined.—He did not find so much fault with his sense except in this case. He was childishly fond of the deceased—never happy except with her. His conversation was not the same as other young men's. He was rather deficient. His conversation was not very amiable, and he generally repeated it over again, and laughed. He was teased for that. He seemed very passionate, and his passion was excited by mere trifles. Whenever he was checked or thwarted, he was very resolute, even about trifling things. Witness was related to the Scaifes.

Re-examined.—He had seen other young men after the deceased. The prisoner seemed jealous of her if he saw any one else talking to her. He would laugh at his own talk before anybody else would.

Mr. Price proposed to put in the prisoner's statement.

This was objected to, on the ground that it was not taken according to the provisions of the statute.

The objection was overruled, and the statement, which is as follows, was put in evidence :—

"The reason I murdered her was because she would not have me. She told me her parents would not let her have me, and she said, 'My father was not against it;' and the last words she said were, 'It's all my mother that has caused this disturbance, Jim.' She cried out, three times, 'The Lord help me; the Lord forgive me;' and I hope the Lord will forgive her. I told her I could not be happy without her; I could not rest in this world. She said it was all false; that I cared nothing about her, I had behaved so badly to her. It was all because she was queer with me made me do it. I told her I should murder her if she would not have me, because I could not rest. I told her I had not been happy for three weeks, or more than that. She told me she had not been happy since her parents were against it; they were always calling her. Her mother was the worst, she said. Her mother never let her alone day in and day out. Her father never said anything to her, never changed words about it. I was in the house on Sunday at tea time with her. Her sister was there, and her mother came in; her sister and her were in the house and I was in the kitchen. She came out from her mother, and said, 'Come, go out before my mother comes in.' I did as she wanted me, and we both thought she did not see me, and I went out into another house on the contrary side of the road—my father's house, but not where he lived. I should, perhaps, stop an hour there, waiting of her and her sister coming out to go to chapel. Her mother and her sister came out before her, and, perhaps, would stand talking a quarter of an hour or ten minutes, and then she came out. I went to her, and then the two sisters went up the lane and the mother went home. I followed them up the lane, and overtook them in a field that takes into Stump's-lane, where I murdered her. She did not talk to me much, but her sister did. I went down to the bottom of the lane called Stump's-lane with them, and my sweetheart told me to go home to change my coat—to get my black coat on. I said that would do that I had on for me, and we parted at the bottom of the lane. I said to myself I would go to Furniss, the other sister's sweetheart. There were some more people with Furniss. I stopped a little bit and then I walked forward. There was some more people set and standing on some wood below. I went and sat myself down, and talked a little bit, and Furniss came up, and some more with him; and I got up after a little bit, and I went against Furniss. I asked him if he was going to Hartwith. We set off down the lane together, and he thought it was a long way to go, he said; however, we kept moving on slowly while we got to the new line, and her brother came to us. We were set upon a wall. We talked a little bit, and I pulled out a shilling and sixpence, and asked if they could knock the shilling from under the sixpence, and the sixpence to remain on the finger end. They tried to do it, and they did it after a little bit. Then we set off all three of us to chapel. The girls had gone before we set off. When we got to the chapel gates we went forward to the public-house. We each of us got a glass of ale. Then we came down to the chapel again. Then all the people came out of the chapel. We followed after them. I went to my sweetheart, but she did not talk to me much never afterwards. She said she thought we should have to part, as they called her so. She said they had been calling her after I left the house; her mother had near have gone crazed; and we walked on together and left her sister and Furniss. We walked on to the Stump's-lane bottom. When we got a little way she took her arm out of mine. I wanted her to put it in again, and she would not. I told her I could not be happy without her until I married her. She thought we could not be happy—she was sure we could not be happy. She told me I should behave badly to her. I said I should not if she would marry me. I'd be content with her, but not without her. She said we had better part a little bit. I told her many times I could not part with her unless I did something with her. I told her I thought there was some one else she wanted, and I could not bide any one else to have her. She said we could both do without one another a little bit. Then I took hold of her. She was walking on the side of the road. She was all the while awkward with me, and would not go on quietly, so I stopped her where she was; I took her by the throat, and told her I would murder her if she did not go on quietly. She said it was all false. She said I only wanted to make her believe so. Then I took her

by the throat and tried to choke her. She cried out when I took her by the throat, and I thought some one would hear, and we both got up and walked on a little bit, and I pulled my knife out and showed her it. She cried out, 'Let's go home, Jim; let's go home, Jim.' I seized her and cut her throat, and she cried out, 'It's all my mother, Jim, that has caused this disturbance.' Then she cried out, 'The Lord help me,' three times, to the best of my recollection, and then she fainted away, and then I left her. I went over the wall; shut the knife and put it into my waistcoat pocket. I went up the fields and wandered about, perhaps an hour, or an hour and a half; and I thought I would go and tell her parents, but I could not go then. I came back. I thought I would go to her again, and I got a little bit down the lane. My heart failed me, and I could not go to her. Then I got over the wall again to the other field on the other side of the road, and I took the knife out of my pocket again and opened it, and put it in the wall top; then I took across the field home to a little dam there is of my father's, and washed the blood off my hands and face; then I took across the field home. When I got home, my father and them were up. I did not go into the house; I went into the shed where the waggons and carts are, and sat me down till I thought they had all gone to bed; then I went into the house. I could not eat any supper. I went to bed. I could not rest all the night. I got up in the morning and told my brother as he told you, and have nothing more to say.

"JAMES ATKINSON."

This was the case for the prosecution.

Mr. Bliss then proceeded to address the jury for the prisoner. He said he had to desire, what he was quite sure the jury were ready to give him, their patient attention through this case. They had heard of the part which related to the prosecution. They and the prosecution had been informed of the nature of the defence, but they had yet had no opportunity of hearing the witnesses on the part of the prisoner who were to prove it. It was to the prisoner's case, and to the evidence to be offered for him, that he now invited their attention. He thought they would find, when they had heard the case through, that it was only to be deplored; that they were not called upon by their verdict for revenge on the prisoner, although there were grounds for measures of caution and security, and to provide against any similar occurrence for the future, upon their conviction that the prisoner was not a man who was to be treated as having that degree of understanding which was requisite to make him responsible for such a crime. They saw before them at the bar one of those objects who, for the mysterious purposes of Providence, had been sent into the world not gifted with the ordinary understanding of man—not having his intellect developed beyond that of a child of eight or nine years of age, subject to passions excited by frivolous causes, and not able to control them when in paroxysms of rage—one with a mind insensible to the character of the act which he did, and driven by a blind fury to do what he had not the understanding to prevent at the time. They had before them a young man of 24, afflicted with goitre, or swelling of the neck, which was the not unusual accompaniment of the kind of insanity called "cretinism," and they would hear that he had unhappily come by this from hereditary taint of his family. They would find that family conspicuous for idiocy and lunacy; that his brother was an idiot; his aunts were lunatics; that his father's brother was a furious lunatic; that his grandmother had brought lunacy into the family; that this malady was traceable to even more remote generations, and they would find six or seven lunatics in the family, in every generation—in the prisoner's own generation, in his father's, in his grandfather's, and even in his great-grandfather's generation. They would be told that this unhappy disease was in its nature hereditary; that its existence in father or mother or grandfather proved that it existed in the family, and that it might break out in any member of the family descended from that stock. They would find an effete and worn-out stock affected with idiocy and lunacy on both sides of the house; and if the prisoner had not, from this cause and from defect of understanding and ability,

the power to understand the consequences of his acts, he was not responsible for them. They would have more than this proved, and it was to this evidence he directed their particular attention. They would have the opinions of learned physicians of great experience and skill in these matters, who had carefully examined the prisoner, and whose opinions on such a matter were infallible, and they would tell them that the prisoner was an imbecile, incapable of appreciating the circumstances under which he was placed at this time, and insensible to the nature of the act which he had done; that he was so far below the average of human understanding and capacity that he could not be looked upon as acting according to the usual dictates of reason when placed in any situation which could disturb the poor feeble intellect which he possessed. By nature his capacity was not capable of being further developed than it had been, and he stood before them at the age of 24 with the capacity of a child of ten years of age. With a capacity so unequal to control his passions and the violence of his animal instincts, he was utterly unable at the time to resist the impulses of passion, and would to-morrow repeat this dreadful act, if placed in the same circumstances. He need not tell them if he proved this of the prisoner that he was entitled to their acquittal; for our law was not so barbarous as to exact from such an intellect that which it did exact from everybody else. Although they might hear idle statements that a man was sane enough if he could walk about and do something like other people, far be it from the jury-box, when executing justice, to apply such rules to him. It would be a cruelty and a barbarism which society had never been able to bear. Not even in the times when lunacy was so little understood that lunatics were treated with chains and whips could such a sentence ever be executed. But our law at the beginning of this century had made a very salutary provision for such cases as this. Lest such a man should be allowed to go at large who had committed such a crime as this, and that this might not influence the minds of jurors, our law had humanely provided that if a prisoner should be acquitted on the ground of his insanity, it should be so found by their verdict, and that in such a case he should never have the opportunity of repeating his offence but that he should be locked up for the remainder of his life. The law was wise and good, and they would execute it in the spirit of the law, and would take care that no man was subject to the dreadful punishment of the law attached to this crime about whose sanity they had a doubt. It was not necessary that they should believe him to be raving mad, for the word "insanity" applied to various states of the mind. It was sufficient if he was shown to be incompetent of knowing the consequences of his acts, and was so far imbecile as not to know the character of what he was doing, whether it was right or wrong. For the commission of this dreadful crime no motive had been proved. No jealousy had been proved. Nothing more had taken place to account for it than a mere lovers' quarrel. Would that in a sane mind account for such an act as this? What sane man would have acted as the prisoner had done? He had made no attempt to escape. Nothing had been denied him by his sweetheart. The intimacy had been carried on for years to the last extremity; they were walking lovingly together. It was impossible to account for the murder under such circumstances, except on the grounds suggested by the defence, that the prisoner's intellect was weak, that trifles easily inflamed him into rage, and that when in that state he was utterly insensible to the consequences of what he did. The prisoner was the eighth child of Thomas Atkinson, his father. His brother John, who was an idiot, now dead, was the ninth child. The prisoner, from early youth, had been incapable of learning more than the mere rudiments of education. He knew nothing of arithmetic or the New Testament. He was unable to do anything but the most trifling things. He had never more capacity than a child

nine or ten years of age; but his passions and animal instincts had grown with his growth. His statements made after the murder indicated the state of his mind. His reasons assigned for the act were not such as could have influenced any sane man. He had given his sweetheart ten wounds, some after death. What criminal so barbarous and unrelenting that he could not be satisfied with the blood of his victim but he must inflict on her wounds after her death? If possessed of sane intellect, such a thing could not have happened. What was there in the circumstances of the case to excite such horrid bitterness and malignity? This act had been done by the poor girl's sweetheart—by him who had wished to kiss her after her death. How could such an act be done by him, unless done under one of those paroxysms of excitement and insanity to which the prisoner was said to be subject, and when he was not responsible for his acts? The prisoner had a brother who was an idiot. His mother had two sisters who were both lunatics, and one of them had died in an asylum, and the other had attempted to destroy herself. In the next generation the brother of the grandfather of the prisoner was given to violent outbursts of passion, and at last broke out raving mad. He had a daughter Susannah, who was now alive, an idiot. The grandmother of the prisoner brought lunacy into the family too. Her mother was a lunatic, and the same hereditary malady was traceable higher in her family. Here was sufficient to prove that there existed in this unhappy stock an hereditary taint which reduced them below the ordinary level of humanity. He should prove to them by the testimony of competent men that the prisoner was an imbecile, and that he was one whom to hang would be an act of barbarity and a disgrace to our laws. The learned counsel concluded an able speech by calling the following witnesses:—

Thomas Atkinson, flax-spinner, of Darley, the father of the prisoner, examined.—Is the son of the late Thomas Atkinson, and Grace his wife. His mother's maiden name was Reynaud. His first wife was called Mary Dalby. He had had nine children by his wife Mary, three dead. The prisoner was the youngest but one. The youngest was called John. He was born in 1837. He died thirteen or fourteen years ago, at ten years of age. The prisoner went to school to Snow's and Atkinson's. He could not tell how long he was at school. After he left school he turned him into the mill to job, sewing lists and oiling the machinery, and to look after the hands and see that they were at work. He never bought or sold for him. He never kept the books for him or wrote the letters. He was not so sharp as some of his children. When he was put out of the way he was very dangerous. Any trifling matter that did not agree with his mode of thinking put him out of the way. There were only five young people in the mill; he was very violent with them sometimes, and one of them, named Wilson, he used to caution, as he feared he would do him some harm. Three weeks before this happened he saw a difference in the prisoner. He got low-spirited, and seemed to have no talk. His son John was four years before he could walk, and he never could understand him properly. He was rather curious, and not right in his faculties somehow. The prisoner when crossed used very bad language, and was bewildered in his looks; he never dared cross him. On such occasions he would push about and seem to be in quite a rage. His wife had a sister called Ann Dalby. She was in an asylum once or twice in her life. She had a sister called Eleanor. She was wrong in her mind. His grandmother on the father's side was named Medley; she was before his time. His father had a younger brother named James. He had heard tell of him, but never saw him. His grandmother on the mother's side was named Dalviel.

Cross-examined.—His wife's two sisters were in Wakefield Asylum. One was dead. His son, the prisoner, had attended a night school in the winter for a year or two. His son attended at the mill, and sometimes took off a wheel when witness told him. The prisoner "brayed" his younger brother, and was

cruel in his disposition. He had named him as one of his executors in his will, made two years ago.

Re-examined.—His wages were 5s. a-week.

Joseph Trees, joiner, of Darley, sworn.—He had lived at Darley all his life, and had known the prisoner. He met the prisoner on the morning of the 1st of August last—the day of the murder. He showed witness a Geneva watch—a small ladies' watch. He said he had got it from Robert Scaife, and he thought it would suit Mary Jane. He had three other watches. He saw him that night walking with the deceased. He looked as though he was in trouble. He had noticed that the prisoner was very passionate. He would throw things about in his passion.

Honan Potter examined.—He had married a sister of the prisoner, and had lived in the same house with him. He was a very passionate person. In his mind he considered him "rather short," and very dull. He got into raging passions for very trifling matters. He always considered him not right. On the Sunday of the murder he saw him; he looked in a wild state, worse than usual, and he had remarked on it when he got home. He seemed very fond of the deceased, as if he could not bide her out of his sight.

Cross-examined.—He had six children; one of them was 19. Some of them sometimes got into violent passions and for trifling causes. When in his passions the prisoner would do anything to be master. He cooled down when he was taken no notice of.

Re-examined.—The prisoner got into different passions to any he ever saw his children in.

Richard Gill examined.—Was a yarn dyer and maker-up for the prisoner's father, and had been in his service for the last eight years. He knew the deceased; she and the prisoner always seemed very loving. The prisoner used to call her his intended. He always considered the prisoner as a stupid man, very much given to passion. If crossed in the least, he was in a passion. He always considered him as a man not sound in his mind. Witness knew the prisoner's brother John. He always considered him out of his mind.

Cross-examined.—He was one of the men in the mill overlooked by the prisoner. He used if crossed to get into violent passions. He thought he would have killed his little brother once; he was nearly 16. He knocked him down and kicked him. He never tried to knock a man of his own size down. Witness never durst cross him. He had crossed witness many a time. He never attacked witness. Witness was between 60 and 70 years of age.

Re-examined.—He really was afraid the prisoner would have killed his brother once. The young one got away and got home. Witness dared not cross him because of his passion. He feared he would strike him.

Christopher Atkinson sworn.—Is no relation to the prisoner. He was formerly in the army and in the Peninsular war. He went afterwards to Shaw-mill, kept by John Atkinson, the uncle of the prisoner, and he then removed to Darley. He kept a school. The prisoner and his brother John, who was a complete idiot, attended his school. The prisoner while at witness's school was very dull, of weak mind and weak intellect. His manner was eccentric and singular. He was very passionate, and at other times quite low, and would scarcely answer a question. He had seen the prisoner frequently in a passion, and had had many complaints against him. Of late years he had also seen him in passions. He raved like a madman.

Cross-examined.—He foamed at the mouth. He would then cool down and would scarcely answer a question. He had been a schoolmaster forty years. The prisoner was by no means fit to be an overlooker.

Re-examined.—He never had a boy of so violent a temper as the prisoner. He never got master of his letters properly.

Joseph Snow, schoolmaster, examined, gave similar evidence. The prisoner,

in his judgment, was not capable of consecutive thought. On one occasion he was present when the prisoner came home, and smelling a smell of cooking, he asked what there was for dinner. His mother told him. He then asked when it would be ready. His mother told him. He said, "I want some now." His mother told him it was impossible, it was not cooked. He had a stick in his hand, and he violently struck the clock with it, and his mother, to appease him, took the dinner out of the oven as it was, and gave him some. He was then eight or nine years of age. He knew nothing about the New Testament or arithmetic, or beyond *Reading made Easy*.

John Dalby examined.—Is the brother of the prisoner's mother. He had a sister Ann and Eleanor. Ann was not of sound mind. She was twice in a lunatic asylum, once twenty-five years ago for a year, and again fourteen years ago for two or three years. She attempted several times to commit suicide. She was uneasy and restless, and had delusions. His sister Eleanor was also taken to Wakefield Asylum. She died there.

Jane Dalby, the wife of the last witness, gave similar testimony.

Formal proof of the insanity of the two Dalbys and the medical certificates of their insanity were given, and also of the admission of Samuel Reynaud as a lunatic in 1824, born an idiot, with hasty temper.

Ann Atkinson, widow of James Atkinson, great-uncle of the prisoner, examined.—Her husband's mother's maiden name was Medley. She was married about 54 years ago. Her husband had been in an unsound state of mind. He studied about his soul till he got quite wrong. He jumped through a window and injured himself, and was pursued and bound, and taken care of. He was ill again in the same way several times. One of her daughters by her husband was of weak intellect, and wrong.

Isabella Reynaud, wife of John Reynaud, age 81, examined.—Her husband was brother of the prisoner's grandmother. Her husband's mother's name was Dowgill. She was out of her mind. Her husband at those times guarded her and took care of her. She shouted and sang all the night long. She knew Thomas Reynaud, her husband's brother, and he had a son named Samuel, born an idiot, who was sent to the asylum at Wakefield.

Mr. John Kitching examined.—Is a surgeon, and has had the medical management for 16 years of the Retreat, a Quaker lunatic asylum near York. He had visited the prisoner, with a view to ascertain his capacity and intellect, seven times, about an hour each visit. The result of his investigation was that the prisoner, in his opinion, was an imbecile. He meant by that a person whose mental powers had never arrived at maturity, but had stopped very far short of it. His mental powers had not gone beyond the capacity of a child of eight or nine years of age. He imputed that to arise from a very imperfect constitution, both mentally and physically. His physical constitution corresponded with his mental. His powers of observation were exceedingly low; his memory very deficient. He had scarcely any power either of reflecting or judging. The result of his examination was that, in his opinion, his moral powers had equally suffered in this very defective development. He had very confused notions of the New Testament, and of arithmetic. These examinations led him to the conclusion that he was not in mind more than a child. He considered his animal instincts and passions were disproportionately strong compared with his powers of mind, which he believed unable to control them. He was physically feeble, and had a large goitre. These were appearances usually found attending an imbecile. Goitre was a common accompaniment of imbecility. Insanity was hereditary. He had heard the evidence, and he had no doubt whatever the prisoner was in an unsound state of mind when he killed the deceased. He was not capable of estimating in a correct and healthy manner the nature of such an act, nor was he capable of restraining himself from the commission of any act from a consideration of the consequences.

Nor did he believe that even now he could be restrained from again committing the same act under the same circumstances.

Cross-examined.—He had on two former occasions come to give evidence of the insanity of prisoners. Once was in Dove's case. He did not say the prisoner's head was the worst he ever saw. He had asked him what a man thought with—if he thought with his heart? and the prisoner answered he thought not. He had asked the prisoner if a man could think with his legs cut off? and he said he could not tell what he would think then. He had measured his head, and said it was small. He classed him as an imperfect idiot and partial imbecile. The development of the intellect depended partly on the education and partly on the healthy condition and growth of the child. He should be of opinion that the prisoner had not been a healthy child from his appearance.

Mr. Kitching's cross-examination on abstract propositions was resumed at great length. The general result of it was that he did not believe that the prisoner at the time he committed the crime, from its attendant circumstances and from what he had heard and knew of the prisoner, was of sound mind. His animal instincts were greatly developed and beyond his control. He had heard from him that for a long period he had had sexual intercourse with the deceased. He did not know the difference between right and wrong in the sound and healthy manner of ordinary men. Witness had given evidence in Dove's case. He then propounded the opinion that if a man nourished an idea until it gained such possession of his mind as to injure his health and produce a morbid change in his brain, it then might become an uncontrollable condition of mind, impelling him to carry out the idea, and that he then would not be responsible.

Mr. Bliss objected to this reference to Dove's case, the object of which was to import prejudice into this.

Re-examined.—He had 112 patients in his establishment; 10 or 12 of them were imbeciles, and some of them could read and write and attended religious services. He had some imbeciles in his establishment who knew more of religious truths than the prisoner. There was no difference of opinion among learned men in his profession that a man might nourish an idea until it gained possession of him and became an uncontrollable condition of mind. He had learned that the prisoner's religious sentiments had been gained since his incarceration.

Dr. Caleb Williams, licentiate of the Royal College of Physicians, had been 30 years in his profession, and was visiting physician to three lunatic asylums. He had visited the prisoner for the purpose of making himself acquainted with the state of his mind several times. He thought he had very little power of reflection and very small power of judgment. His manner was peculiar. He was slow in answering questions, and his manner indicated a considerable effort of memory and understanding. He frequently said, "I don't remember." "I cannot tell," "I am not sure." His memory was very defective. Witness examined him as to his knowledge of trees and domestic animals, with which a man in his position was likely to be familiar. He appeared to possess very little knowledge of the locality where he lived. His moral faculties were very feeble. His instincts and passions were very strong. Witness should think that he had not sufficient mental and moral power to control his passions or instincts. He appeared to have a very imperfect appreciation of death. His knowledge seemed scarcely to exceed that of a child of eight or ten years of age. During a sudden outburst of passion witness believed he would have no power to appreciate the nature and quality of an act. He believed, from the evidence he had heard, and from what he knew of him, that he was incapable of appreciating the crime he had committed. Insanity was hereditary, and when it had existed in parents was very likely to show itself in

children, and break out in sudden outbursts of passion. The character of the prisoner's mind was that of an imbecile—a man of defective mental power. In his opinion, the murder was perpetrated when the prisoner was in a state of violent passion, and in that condition he would have no power to restrain himself. Imbeciles were liable to violent outbursts of passion. From the opportunity he had had of judging of the prisoner, he should think he had always been an imbecile. His appearance and manner suggested the consideration whether the prisoner was feigning imbecility, and he had directed his attention to that subject, and came to the conclusion that he was not feigning. He had used every means which his skill could suggest to test the state of his mind, and he had no doubt that he was an imbecile.

Cross-examined.—He had given evidence in five criminal cases to prove the insanity of the criminals. Imbeciles were capable of some education, and therefore improved; he did not agree in the opinion that they remained always the same; they sometimes got worse. His memory would improve by exercise. The prisoner told him he had never seen a fir-tree, and did not know what a beech-tree was, and had an imperfect knowledge of domestic animals. He said he did not know a hare, and did not know what a pheasant was. He had not asked him whether he knew a cat, a dog, a horse, a cow, a donkey, or a pig. He thought the prisoner had a very imperfect sense of right and wrong. He did not believe that the prisoner would ask forgiveness of the father and mother of his victim, unless he had been urged to it. If he did it spontaneously, it would show he had some appreciation of right and wrong, but he believed the prisoner to be incapable of such appreciation. A sane man might, probably, steal, because he had not sufficient power to control his passion for money. He believed the prisoner when he committed the crime did know that he was committing the act of cutting the deceased's throat, but he did not know the nature and quality of the act; he did not know the moral nature of it—whether it was right or wrong. Weak persons, and those descended from insane ancestors, are prone to violent passion, and had not the same power of control as other persons. He had examined the prisoner in arithmetic. He did not know what 6 times 5 amounted to. He did not know how much 2 and 2 made. He should be surprised to learn that the prisoner had advanced as far as "Proportion;" if he had, it did not alter his opinion regarding him. He might have answered on the trial of Dove, that, "if a man nourished any passion until it became uncontrollable, that was moral insanity."

Re-examined.—If a man so nursed a passion it usually injured the health, affected the nervous system, and he became the subject of disease of the brain. He did not think the prisoner was capable of planning such a "murder"—it was the impulse of the moment. If he had hated the girl, he did not believe him capable of assuming to the world that he loved her. Education could not improve the prisoner beyond the range of an imbecile.

Mr. Samuel William North, surgeon, of London, and demonstrator of anatomy at York, had been nine years in practice, and was surgeon to a private asylum containing 40 patients for four years—Dunnington House, near York. He was also surgeon to the workhouse at York, where they had an average of 30 to 40 imbecile inmates. He had visited the prisoner in gaol six times, the last time last Wednesday, about an hour each time. He had applied tests to him to ascertain the state of his mind, and had arrived at the opinion that he was an imbecile. In his physical structure he had the stooping posture and bent knees common among imbecile persons. His manner of speaking was slow and hesitating, as though he had considerable difficulty in apprehending questions, and his answers were preceded by observations such as "I don't know," "happen." He did not change when speaking of the murder. His mental capacity was far below a man of his years of his class. He had the capacity of a child of 11 or 12 in his own station of society. The higher

faculties of his mind were deficient. He did not consider "memory" one of the highest faculties of the mind; it was frequently possessed to a great degree by imbeciles; but the prisoner's memory was defective. He was deficient in the qualities of comparison and reflection. Witness knew the neighbourhood of Darley. There was a large wood of fir-trees there. He asked the prisoner what kind of country it was where he lived, but he could get no information from him such as would have guided a stranger, nor of the people who lived there. He put to him, "Suppose a man received 2s. 6d. a-day wages, and worked all the week, how much would he have to receive for a week's wages?" He made three or four guesses at the sum, none of which were correct. He asked several similar questions and got incorrect answers. He asked how much 1s. a-day would be at the end of the week, and that he answered correctly. He was asked if he knew where he was; he said, "I don't know; they tell me it is York Castle." He asked him all the particulars of the charge against him, and he seemed not in the slightest degree affected. He should say of his moral power, in the common broad acceptation of the term, he did not know right from wrong. The prisoner was examined as to his animal passions, and his answers showed that he indulged them to an inordinate extent. His experience of men of the prisoner's class was that they always indulged their animal propensities, and this was a general character of imbecility. He believed at this present moment that he was an imbecile—to use a common expression, "a natural" fool. A "natural" was a common term among the lower orders. The character of the crime and the prisoner's conduct subsequently were in keeping with his weak state of mind. He thought he had not a full and sensible knowledge of the criminality of his act. Imbeciles, while violent in their passions, were also timid. He believed when in those passions they had no complete knowledge of what they were doing, nor of controlling themselves. Any one form of insanity in an ancestor might be succeeded by a different form in the children. It was common experience. The more numerous a person's ancestors afflicted with insanity were, the more likely was he to have insanity. It was a conclusion upon which all medical men agreed.

Cross-examined.—This was the first time he had been examined in such a case. Sometimes idiots were gibing, muttering fools, but rapidity of utterance certainly did not characterize all forms of insanity. He asked him if he knew Brimham Rocks, a famous place in his neighbourhood, and he could tell him nothing about it. He asked him if he knew the road to Harcastle-garth, a village two miles from Darley, where the prisoner lived, and he said he did not know. He thought the prisoner knew that he was cutting the deceased's throat, but not that it was a crime. Although the prisoner had called this a crime, witness did not know that he knew it was one. Insane people often used sane expressions. He believed that the prisoner repeated the words by rote. In the general and common acceptation of the term he did not believe that he knew the difference between right and wrong.

Dr. Forbes Winslow examined.—Is a physician and a D.C.L. of Oxford, lives in Cavendish-square, London, and has studied medicine all his life. He had visited the prisoner for more than an hour the day before yesterday, and examined him most carefully as to the state of his mind, with a view to this inquiry. He appeared to him to have the physiognomy of a class of persons called "imbeciles." The expression was fatuous and vacant, as often seen in persons subject to *dementia*. He had the peculiar slouching gait and attitudes of that class. He has also a large goitre, and knowing that that feature is often seen with a low order of intellect, particularly among a class of people in Switzerland called "cretins," and from his general aspect altogether, had he met him in a room, he should have been much struck by his imbecile appearance. He was remarkably slow and dull of apprehension. He answered in monosyllables, and as if he had difficulty in giving an answer. He had a

slow, sluggish style of thought, and answered with difficulty questions which a child of five or six years of age would have readily understood. He questioned him as to his unhappy condition, and he did not appear to know where he was. He said he was told he was in York Castle. He did not know whether it was in Yorkshire; it might be in London. He asked him if he knew he had committed a dreadful crime. He said, "Parson tells me so." He asked if he was to be tried. He said "I supposed so. Parson tells I is to go before judge." He asked him as to the existence of a God. He answered "I never seed Him." He asked him if he knew who our Saviour was. He said he didn't know; parson told him about hell, and that it was fire. He did not know where it was, it might be in Yorkshire or London. He did not seem to know things which children of ordinary knowledge were acquainted with. He did not know whether the Queen was a woman or a man. He was able to repeat the Lord's Prayer correctly, at which witness was rather surprised, considering his past answers. He had seen a vast number of imbeciles, both at home and abroad. It was usual, in some conditions of sad imbecility, for patients to show a proper knowledge of the great truths of religion. They very rarely forgot the lessons of early days. Imbeciles were capable of being instructed up to a certain point, and even idiots. That experiment had been tried in the various idiotic institutions. He had never known an imbecile do a sum in "Proportion;" but one might, by careful and continuous training, be educated to that extent. It was utterly impossible for the prisoner to understand such a sum. It was a lamentable fact that just as the higher faculties of the mind sunk down, the animal passions began to master the understanding, and took the place of reason. Imbeciles often showed great affection. Indulgence in sexual intercourse would be very likely to absorb the rest of the mind. Imbeciles were constantly put to manual labour in the great establishments in the country, and were quite capable of many ordinary occupations. They constantly did it. Most of the land in connexion with our great lunatic asylums was worked by imbeciles and lunatics. The facts of the present murder were consistent with the acts of an imbecile. From his examination of the prisoner, he was in a state of imbecility, not responsible for his actions, of stunted intellect, born in that condition, and he could not bring his mind to believe that he ever could be looked upon as a healthy-minded person and responsible for his actions. He might have a physical consciousness of an act done. This was a case respecting which he had not the slightest doubt, and he never saw a case clearer to his mind than the state in which the prisoner now was.

Cross-examined.—There were cases of feigned insanity. He had seen such cases, but had not been deceived by them. He could not tell where Hell was, nor could witness. He had no idea who God was. Witness should expect a child of five or six properly instructed would be able to give some notion who God was. Cretinism was not confined to Switzerland—there was a great deal in Lancashire. Goffre was not confined to lunatics—certainly not. Imbecility came on as life progressed. He did not agree with Dr. Taylor's definition. He did not agree with Dr. Taylor's opinion that one-half the world might reason itself into the belief that the other half was insane. Dr. Taylor was an eminent man, but he had not had much experience in this branch of science. An imbecile was one whose brain was stunted in its development, and as a consequence the mind was feeble, the brain being the organ of thought. He never knew of a sound-minded criminal who had covered his victim with wounds. He had in a number of cases refused to give evidence in support of a plea of insanity, and had made it a rule to refuse to go into a witness-box to prove a prisoner's sanity on a charge of murder. He had in many cases been called as a witness in support of a plea of insanity. He thought the prisoner had been in this stunted state of intellect for years, and he could not conceive that the

prisoner had a right appreciation of the wrongfulness of the act he was doing when he committed the murder. (A letter written by the prisoner from the gaol was read, full of religious scraps and quotations.) The witness thought the letter showed more apprehension than he should have given the prisoner credit for. (Another letter was read.)

Mr. Bliss objected to this evidence. The defence having been disclosed by the cross-examination, these letters ought to have been tendered as evidence in chief.

Mr. Price said the plea of insanity rested on the defendant to prove, and he could not meet that defence until it was raised. The issue he had to prove was the murder.

Mr. Bliss, in reply, said his friend was perfectly right if he had not known, from the defence set up by the cross-examination, that insanity was the defence. He now changed the case. He went partly into the case before, and now again went into the other part.

His Lordship was of opinion that the evidence was admissible by way of reply.

Examination continued.—If the letter read was a spontaneous act, and the prisoner had not been directed to write it, it exhibited more power of mind than he should have supposed the prisoner possessed. (A third letter was read from the prisoner while in gaol.) If spontaneous, the prisoner seemed to have more appreciation of his position than he should have imagined.

Re-examined.—It was possible for an imbecile visited by a religious man or clergyman to express himself in the terms of his visitor for a short time. Unless he had been very much deceived, the prisoner could not retain such ideas long. There was nothing in his conversation with the prisoner on religious matters corresponding in the slightest degree with those letters. He should not for a moment have believed him capable of spontaneously writing such letters. He had not a shadow of a doubt as to his condition. He might be taught a few Scriptural phrases. He was not feigning insanity when he saw him. Many imbeciles were capable of writing long and kind letters. He had known many such instances. Taken by themselves, the letters were no safe test. He had taken for his conclusions the whole case together.

Mr. North was recalled.—The prisoner's was not a case of feigned imbecility. This was the case for the prisoner.

Mr. Price called evidence in reply, proving the prisoner's letters.

Mr. Jackman, who taught the prisoner at a night school, was called to prove that he had advanced in arithmetic as far as "Proportion."

Mr. Anderson, the surgeon of the York Gaol, was called, and proved visiting the prisoner in his capacity as officer of the prison. In his opinion the prisoner was sane, and answered the questions put to him like a sane man of his class in life.

Cross-examined.—Some four or five medical men in York had devoted their lives to the study of lunacy. He did not think that those gentlemen were better able to give an opinion on questions of lunacy than himself. Such gentlemen, from devoting themselves exclusively to one subject, were liable to be a little crotchety.

Mr. Green, Under-Governor of the gaol, stated that the prisoner had written letters in the common wardroom, and he believed he had not written any letter under dictation or in the presence of the chaplain.

Cross-examined.—During the last six weeks the Wesleyan minister had visited him twice a week. He was not present. There were no writing materials in the room where they were.

Mr. Bliss then addressed the jury in reply to this evidence with great force. The learned counsel denounced the attempt which this last evidence showed to hunt an idiot to the scaffold. He knew the excitement when a verdict was at

stake, and that when men got their blood up in such a pursuit, there was no fox-hunting equal to man-hunting. He denounced the attempt to sneer down the evidence of men like Dr. Forbes Winslow, Dr. Williams, and Mr. Kitching and Mr. North, who had devoted themselves to this branch of study, by the presumption and ignorance of men like Mr. Anderson, with his limited experience of York gaol. And for what? In order that this man might be hanged, and that an imbecile might be strangled on the gallows—an act of barbarity sufficient to make the very stones of York cry out against it. He called on the jury to attach no weight to evidence like this when contrasted with the mass of evidence he had adduced contradicting it. This was a question of medical testimony altogether. Which did they believe? Mr. Anderson, or the medical testimony opposed to it. The letters of the prisoner put in evidence, he submitted, established rather the imbecility which was said to be the character of the prisoner. There was in them an attempt to deal with ideas newly acquired, and a repetition of the same scriptural quotations, sometimes misquoted, which indicated imbecility; and they were told that letters alone were no test of sanity, but that imbeciles were often able to write proper letters. The letters were, he suggested, the promptings of the Wesleyan minister who had visited the prisoner two or three times a-week, and had been written from his promptings, with infinite labour. That Wesleyan minister the prosecution had not dared to call. When examined as to “hell,” his answers were, “Parson says it’s so and so.” That was the key to the letters. He had been prompted and urged to write them. Was it upon a conflict of testimony like this that this man was to be hanged, against the opinion of the men he had called? The execution of such a man would be a disgrace to the jurisprudence of this country.

Mr. Price replied at considerable length on the whole evidence, contending that the facts showed the prisoner to be sane. Feeling the greatest respect for medical testimony supported by facts, he called on the jury to reject the testimony of a set of hired advocates in that profession, who went about to prove the theories of their own crotchety brains. The learned counsel then went with great minuteness and detail through the evidence in an able address, which occupied upwards of two hours and a-half in the delivery.

THE SUMMING UP OF THE JUDGE.

The Court was again thronged this morning, but was not so crowded as during the two previous days of the trial. The prisoner, whose conduct throughout the trial strangely contrasted with that exhibited by him for some days after the murder, did not appear to have suffered much mental anxiety, and during the summing-up, as on the preceding days, he maintained a degree of impassiveness which was painful to witness, and which was only explicable on the assumption that he was unconscious of what was passing around him, or was acting a part with the most consummate skill.

His Lordship said, the prisoner was indicted for the wilful murder of Mary Jane Scaife, on the 1st of August last, and the jury had two questions to decide, first, whether, supposing the prisoner to be of sound mind, he was guilty of the murder; and, second, whether he was of sound mind at the time he committed it. The plea set up by his learned counsel was, that at the time he committed the crime he was not a person capable of governing his actions—that he was in a state of mental insanity, and was, therefore, not responsible. They had had a very long inquiry, and he must say that one-half the time would have done justice to every person, for, on looking at his notes, he found questions asked over and over again, the only object of which could be to embarrass their minds as to the conclusion to which they must come. The real question for their decision was the state of the prisoner’s mind at the time he committed the offence. It was most important that all persons who were guilty of great crimes should be punished; but whilst it was important that

the guilty should not go unpunished, both humanity and justice demanded that they should closely investigate a plea of insanity, so that they might not be guilty of the barbarity of sending a man, irresponsible for his actions, to the gallows. The case, as he had previously stated, had lasted twenty-and-a-half hours, of which five had been consumed by speeches of counsel. When the wise and salutary rule was laid down with reference to the speeches of counsel, which was now the practice, it was prognosticated that their criminal courts would be made, as they had seen the previous night, the arena for display—the arena in which to struggle for victory rather than for truth—and he put it to them, whether some of the remarks which had been made were not those of mere advocates, rather than of gentlemen whose duty it was to instruct the jury, and aid them in coming to a just conclusion. It was indifferent to himself or to the jury whether the prisoner was found guilty or not, provided they sifted the case, and came, in the exercise of their best judgment, to a true conclusion. Truth was their object; and it should be remembered that this was not a *Nisi Prius* cause, where every point was to be fought to the last, but a case of the gravest importance, involving no less an issue than the life of the prisoner at the bar. To proceed, they must first decide whether this was a murder, and next, if the prisoner was of sane mind. There could be no doubt as to the first question, for they had not only the evidence of several witnesses, but the prisoner's own confession. That confession would leave no doubt that at the time he made it he was a person responsible for his acts, and knew that he had committed the crime of murder; but, as they would remember, the learned counsel for the defence made no point of that, his case being, that at the time the murder was committed the prisoner was not master of his actions—that he was then insane, and unable to distinguish between right and wrong. The plea of insanity was a very general term, and included delusion, under which a person might be able to transact ordinary business; raving madness, idiocy, and imbecility, and all classes of mental disease where a person could not distinguish between right and wrong. The question for their decision, to establish the prisoner's insanity, was, that at the time he committed this act he did not know the difference between right and wrong—that he was not in a state of mind to know that he was doing wrong. That was the definition of the law as laid down in the House of Lords, and by learned judges—in other words, as they had heard, whether the prisoner knew the nature and quality of the act, that he knew it was a wrong act. If he did, then he was responsible; if, on the other hand, he had been visited by the Almighty, and had been born into the world with a mind not capable of such a distinction, he was irresponsible, and they were bound to find him not guilty, leaving him in his Lordship's hands for future detention and security. The mere fact that he committed an outrageous act was no evidence of insanity, and he must deprecate any such idea as that stated by Mr. Kitching, if he understood him correctly, that a person of sound mind could not have committed this murder. Do not be carried away with any such notion, because it would be giving impunity to every person committing a great crime, as it would lead to the doctrine, the greater the crime, the greater the chance of escaping unpunished. He must also warn them as to the passion of a man. If a sane man flew into a passion, and murdered a fellow-creature, he was clearly responsible, because such a man was bound to control his feelings, and keep his passions in check. But, if a man was so diseased in his mind that his passion overpowered his reason, and incapacitated him from knowing that he was doing wrong, then he was not responsible. They had had a long argument, and the learned counsel for the prosecution had cross-examined the witnesses with great ability, but he had never struggled with the real strength of the case. The case for the prisoner rested upon his early character, his conduct at the time of the murder, and the influence likely to have been ex-

erted upon him by his ancestors, through hereditary descent. As to his early history, the account generally given was, that he was a person of weak intellect, a simple person, and liable to fly into paroxysms of passion. They had two or three witnesses for the prosecution, and four for the defence, who spoke to this point. It might be said that they were near relatives, but who, their evidence being received with due care, so well able to know the prisoner's habits and disposition? They all said he was subject to paroxysms of frenzy; and upon that they were told, what they knew, that persons of imbecile intellect were men of strong passions, and liable to paroxysms of rage. Two of the medical men had examined the prisoner six times, another seven, and Dr. Winslow had examined him once. They were all well-acquainted with the subject of insanity, and they all held him to be of a class of insanity called imbecility. Their distinction between idiocy and imbecility was this. Idiocy, they said, was that state in which a person was born bereft of reason; imbecility, that state in which a person was born with weak powers of mind, and which could only be developed within a limited extent. Imbeciles, however, could do many ordinary kinds of work, as might be seen in most lunatic asylums. There was another class of evidence well worthy their consideration. It was proved that insanity in all shapes was hereditary. It did not follow that a man was insane because his grandfather or grandmother was insane, but it was said in this case, that such a fact was corroborative—that where insanity existed in former generations, they might expect to find it in subsequent generations, and the doctors told them that this was a link in the chain, but only a link. Without knowing the early history of the prisoner, it would have been weak, indeed a mere matter of opinion; but with that knowledge it was most important. Now, in the whole of the three hours' reply of the learned counsel for the prosecution, he never addressed himself to the combined evidence of these three steps in the case—that he was a person of weak mind, subject to paroxysms, that his conduct at the time of the murder was extraordinary, and that his family had been subject to the dreadful affliction of insanity. This was the mode in which the jury must look at the case, and it was for their consideration entirely—a matter requiring serious consideration. It might be said that two of the medical gentlemen belonged to a sect, worthy of all respect, but who entertained a strong opinion as to capital punishments, and were disposed to find persons guilty of capital offences insane, but they must not permit themselves to cast such an imputation on those gentlemen, unless upon very strong grounds. On the part of the prosecution, seven witnesses were called, four of whom spoke to the circumstance of the murder, and three to the early life of the prisoner. His brother John spoke to his confession of the murder, and stated on cross-examination that he had observed a change in him for some weeks, which was fully accordant with the prisoner's own statement that he had had the murder on his mind for three weeks. As to that fact, it would be for them to say whether it was a diseased mind pondering on something to be accomplished, or a sane mind brooding with malice over the commission of a crime. The brother spoke of him as being able to do only simple work, as getting into a rage from trifling causes, and as fighting and looking like a madman. He also proved that he had had the knife above a year, which showed that it had not been got for the purpose. Mr. Horton, the surgeon attending the prisoner's family, after referring to the *post mortem* examination of the deceased, said he was a person of weak mind, readily excited by trifles to a fearful extent. Mr. Horton also told them that he had a goitre, and he might as well tell the jury to dismiss that point from their consideration at once, because there were many very clever, sharp people who were afflicted with the goitre, and its connexion with cretinism seemed to be only a matter of opinion. On re-examination, the witness said the prisoner was a weak, vain, frivolous young man, and likely to fall into fits of momentary

insanity, though he had never seen him in that state. The witness Pullan also spoke of him as having a foolish idiotic laugh, and easily excited to violence. Here were three persons who spoke of him as of weak mind and subject to violent passion. Then there were the circumstances of the murder. On the one hand, it was maintained that they proved premeditation and malice, the motive of jealousy being suggested; and on the other, it was argued that the prisoner flew into a paroxysm of frenzy, depriving him of his reason, and that he then committed the act. It was for the jury to decide, and in doing so they must take the surrounding circumstances into consideration, and judge how far it was consistent with the prisoner's imbecility that he afterwards sobered down to a state of consciousness, so as to make the statement he did before the magistrates. He now came to the evidence on behalf of the prisoner. Four of those witnesses were connected with the prisoner's family, and though that might be a subject requiring their attention, they were better qualified to form an opinion than those who only saw him since November last, whilst in gaol, and when he might be said to be acting. The father, who gave his evidence very fairly, without exaggerating anything, said he had no control in the mill, neither bought nor sold anything, could not keep the books, was not so sharp as other children, and was very violent when excited. He also gave evidence as to the insanity of two of his sisters. As to the prisoner working in the mill, they had the evidence of Dr. Winslow that it was a common thing in the Continental asylums to set imbeciles to even more difficult work than that in which the prisoner was engaged. On cross-examination he admitted that he had made a will in which he had appointed the prisoner one of his executors. That was a fact worthy of their attention. It appeared inconsistent with his other statement that he did not think him so sharp as other children. It was probable, however, that the thought never crossed the father's mind. Joseph Trees spoke of him as being passionate and resolute; and Horar Potter, who married his sister, and had lived with him, said he was passionate and rageous in trifling matters, and he never considered him quite right. Richard Gill also spoke of him as not of sound mind. He had already told them that if a man of sound mind committed a murder in a passion he was responsible, but if a person of weak mind were overcome with passion, and did not know whether what he was doing was right or wrong, then he would not be responsible. The schoolmasters, Atkinson and Snow, spoke of him as a dull, passionate child at school, who got into frenzy, and foamed at the mouth for trifling causes. Then they had the four medical men—men eminent in their profession. They gave their opinions, and the jury must consider what opportunity they had for forming the opinions they expressed. Scientific men no doubt did differ very materially as to their evidence in courts of law, and the only test which could be applied was the means they had of forming their opinion. In this case, the four witnesses called had been long connected with the treatment of insanity, and, as they had heard, paid frequent visits to the prisoner in gaol, asking him some six or seven hundred questions. The result was that they all agreed in describing him as an imbecile, and they told them that it was a characteristic of imbeciles to be subject to violent passions, which overcame what little reason they had. Mr. Anderson had been much abused for giving an opinion, which was forced from him by Mr. Bliss, and for saying that men who devoted their whole time to one study were apt to become crotchety. There was no doubt of that; but they must not reject the opinions of eminent men for that reason alone. He should only direct their attention to the evidence of Dr. Williams and Dr. Winslow, as the others agreed with them on the main points. They both spoke of the prisoner's physical appearance as being striking. Dr. Williams said he had but little power of reflection and small power of judging. His moral faculties were also feeble, and his instincts and passions were so strong that he would not have

the power of controlling them. The witness stated that he did not think he could appreciate the nature and character of the offence he committed; and in reply to questions, he said he had examined the prisoner with the view of testing whether he was feigning or not, and he was of opinion that such was not the case. Dr. Williams was asked whether hatred, revenge, and jealousy were not the predominating passions which led to crime, and no doubt they were, but would not jealousy operate as much upon a diseased mind as upon a sane mind? Dr. Williams had no doubt as to his being an imbecile, and irresponsible for his acts. The evidence of Dr. Winslow was even stronger. He had only had one opportunity of examining the prisoner, but he declared it to be the worst case he had ever seen,—that his physical appearance was such that it would have excited his observation anywhere, whilst his mind was only that of a child five or six years of age. He said that he might be taught to read and write, and to do sums in arithmetic, but he was sure that the prisoner could not do a sum in Proportion. The prisoner's grosser passions were strongly developed, and he had not the slightest doubt that he was an irresponsible being. On cross-examination, he said he did not think this was a case of feigning; but admitted that he should be surprised if the prisoner could do a rule of Proportion, and that he must have been grossly deceived if the prisoner could spontaneously write such letters as some which were read to him. The letters showed more apprehension of right and wrong than he gave him credit for, and he did not think he was capable of writing such letters spontaneously. He might write them if prompted or under pressure. He had known imbeciles write such letters, and it would not alter his opinion unless he knew the circumstances under which these letters were written. Here were four witnesses, all eminent in their profession, who, whilst differing upon some points, agreed in considering the prisoner an imbecile, and as being incapable of appreciating right from wrong. In addition to this, they had evidence as to six or seven of his ancestors, both on the father and mother's side, and of one brother, who were insane. That was the case for the prisoner. The previous night three letters from the prisoner had been put in. They contained many most pious observations, and he could not detect in them any wandering of mind. They were written free from excitement, but, though quoting a beautiful passage from Isaiah (which in one form or other was in them all), and speaking of repentance and redemption, they did not develop anything to show that the prisoner knew at the time what he was writing about. The doctors told them that imbeciles did write long and correct letters, showing a just appreciation of religious truth, and unless they knew the circumstances under which these were written, their opinion would not be altered. The prisoner, it appeared, had been attended by the chaplain, by the weekly lecturer (Mr. Stewart), and by a Wesleyan minister, and it was suggested that these letters might have been written under their suggestion, and that the prisoner merely used the passages and Scripture terms impressed by them upon his mind. After expressing his conviction that the obligation to call these gentlemen as witnesses rested with the prosecution, his Lordship proceeded to refer to the evidence of Mr. Anderson. That gentleman had done nothing more than his duty in attending there. Mr. Anderson had seen the prisoner three times a week since he came to the Castle, and thought him sane, but he had not tested him on a variety of subjects, and for that length of time which the other medical men had done. His Lordship also referred to the evidence of Mr. Griesbach, the schoolmaster at the Castle, and to that of Mr. Jackman, as to the prisoner getting to the rule of Proportion in arithmetic, and remarked that they had no evidence to show under what circumstances he did so. Such, said his Lordship in conclusion, were the facts. If they thought that the prisoner at the time he committed the act knew the distinction between right and wrong—that the act

was a wrong one, they must find him guilty; if they thought he did not know that the act was a wrong one, they must acquit him on the ground of insanity, and he had then the power to commit him to an asylum. He had gone over the whole of the case with care, and it was for the jury to return such a verdict as in the exercise of their best judgment they thought ought to be given.

The jury retired at five minutes past eleven, and after they had been absent three hours and a half,

Mr. Bliss reminded his lordship that he had not directed the jury, in case of doubt, to give the prisoner the benefit of it.

His lordship replied that he had given the jury such directions as he thought were necessary.

Mr. Bliss pressed the point, upon which

His lordship said:—I did not direct them specifically upon that; but if I had said more, I might have said something much more injurious to your client.

The jury returned into court at ten minutes past three.

In reply to the Clerk of Arraignment, the foreman first gave a verdict of "Guilty," upon which some of the jurors called out, "Not guilty;" and he then corrected himself and said, "We find the prisoner NOT GUILTY, on the ground of Insanity."

The prisoner was then ordered to stand down by his lordship. It was difficult to observe any change in him; but his cheek seemed somewhat blanched, and his eye struck us as brightening up as soon as the verdict was returned.

The following article upon the foregoing trial, from the leading newspaper of the district in which the murder occurred, and the accompanying letter upon criminal responsibility, addressed to the editor of the *Times*, are worthy of being quoted.

THE DARLEY MURDER.—The acquittal, on the ground of insanity, of the wretched creature who was tried last week at York for the murder of his sweetheart at Darley will, we believe, be received with general satisfaction. No one can read the evidence without coming to the conclusion that Atkinson's intellect is originally of the very lowest type, and that such as it is, it has received an exceedingly small amount of education, either directly or from circumstances. At the same time, while his mind was thus stunted, his passions appear to have been placed under little restraint by those around him, and the rule both at home and in the factory was to let him have his own way in everything. It seems to have been generally understood at Darley that the prisoner was weak and foolish, although, perhaps, no one would have ventured to call him either an idiot or a madman. We are assured by those who had the opportunity of seeing him at York, and who were, in the first instance, rather prejudiced against the defence set up, that his appearance was quite that of an imbecile. When the history of the prisoner's family was given to the Court, there was quite enough to explain any amount of insanity in himself. His younger brother, the next in age to himself, was an idiot, and both on his father's and mother's side such a fearful amount of idiocy and insanity was proved as it is perfectly shocking to contemplate. The medical men examined for the defence, who are persons of standing and reputation in their profession, agreed in regarding the prisoner as an imbecile whose mind was hardly more developed than that of a sane child of eight or nine years of age, and stated their belief that he could not correctly appreciate the moral nature of his acts. We are quite disposed to admit that we cannot go so far as some of these gentlemen in their definition

of insanity; but the question in this case is, not whether on some subjects Dr. Winslow and his fellow-witnesses hold mistaken views, but whether they had sufficient grounds for thinking Atkinson an imbecile. Those grounds they stated to the Court, and taking them in connexion with the whole of the prisoner's previous history, with the opinion which his neighbours had formed about him, with his striking personal appearance, and with the melancholy annals of his family, there can be little doubt that the jury came to a proper decision. It must be remembered that the verdict of acquittal on the ground of insanity in criminal cases amounts virtually to a sentence of imprisonment for life among criminal lunatics—a fate not much less appalling to contemplate than death on the gallows. These acquittals on the ground of insanity are not likely, therefore, to increase crime; for no sane man would be induced to commit murder by the hope that he might possibly by a plea of insanity be consigned to a lunatic asylum for life instead of to the gibbet.—*Leeds Mercury*.

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.

To the Editor of the Times.

Sir,—In *The Times* of Saturday last there is the record of a trial at York, which has a terrible interest alike for the physician, the statesman, and the public. I write in ignorance of the verdict which will be pronounced upon the unhappy man, James Atkinson, tried on the Northern Circuit for the murder of his sweetheart. Before this letter can reach you, however, that verdict will have been spoken, and will consign the prisoner either to the condemned cell of the gaol or to the wards of an asylum for criminal lunatics. Of the fact of the murder there is no doubt. The motives, too, such as they are, seem plain enough. It is the old, old story—passion and pride, jealousy and affection, the strongest emotions of the mind and the most untameable lusts of the flesh doing the devil's work in a weak, untaught, unfurnished, irascible, brutal nature. The whole essence of the case is contained in the prisoner's declaration, which is an awfully simple and natural exposition of one of the lowest phases of humanity. He had threatened to murder the girl if she would not have him. "I told her," he says, "I could not be happy without her; I could not rest in this world. . . . I told her I should murder her if she would not have me, because I could not rest." He had frequently been known to be in similar paroxysms of rage; the girl herself, probably, was accustomed to them—"he had treated her so badly," she told him. According to other witnesses, the slightest cause sufficed in this poor wretch to bring on an ungovernable fit of passion. When in this state he foamed at the mouth, and lost for the time all self-control; when he cooled down, he would not speak to any one. He had once nearly killed his younger brother. "He knocked him down and kicked him; he never tried to knock a man of his own size down." This vicious temper was quite apparent even when he was at school; a marked instance of it occurred when he was eight or nine years of age. According to his teachers, moreover, he was at that period "very dull, of weak mind and weak intellect," . . . "not capable of consecutive thought." He appears to have made very little progress even in the most elementary education; and although his father employed him in his business as a kind of overseer of the workmen, he never could be trusted with buying and selling. One of the witnesses considered him "rather short," and "very dull." Another thought him "a stupid man, very much given to passion;" and further, had "always considered him a man not sound in his mind." His brother had been an idiot, and died at ten years of age. He himself had a goitre. His two maternal aunts were insane. Several of the father's relatives also had been of unsound mind. That is the whole story in so far as it bears on the question of criminal responsibility. It is impossible by commentary or argument to make it any clearer.

My object in writing you now is, not to anticipate the decision of the jury as to whether this fearful tragedy was the result of an insane impulse or not. Take either case. Suppose it to be ruled that this young man was not insane outright, and that his crime was that of a coward and a bully, turned into a wild beast for the time under the influence of jealousy and lust. The picture is repulsive enough, and in any case it is not unlike the object. Still, can it be fairly said that society has done its duty towards this dangerous being? His tendencies were well known, and had often produced outrages which made him a terror to his family and to the neighbours. Were there no means of bringing this moral nuisance under the notice of the authorities at a point short of murder? and if brought into notice, were there no means by which it could be controlled in time?

Suppose, on the other hand, that the jury declare the act to be that of a madman, will any one doubt that the protection now to be afforded was really due long before? Was it necessary that this unfortunate man should cut a throat in order to prove himself insane? Or would it not have been at once humane and just, not to say politic and expedient, to try this question long before the murder; say when he knocked down his imbecile brother and kicked him within an inch of his life!

These questions are, perhaps, more easily asked than answered. But they are of immense importance to the public, and often present themselves in an embarrassing form to those who, like physicians and magistrates, have to deal with unhealthy and vicious natures. The medical man of the family in this case did not see it to be his duty—probably he was never asked—to interfere. I cannot wonder at it, for it is probable he could only have interfered at the risk of his own life, or, if he had placed the patient in an asylum, at the risk of an action for false imprisonment. But more and more every day we who practise the healing art are led to consider what is to be done with those who, from hereditary or acquired mental deformities, may be said to be ever on the verge of insanity or crime, even if they have committed no overt act. Must the drunkard drink himself into *delirium tremens*, and how often, before he can safely be set down as insane? Must he utterly ruin his family, perhaps attempt his own life, perhaps murder his nearest of kin, as was done the other day at the Bridge of Ean, and as is recorded in one case in the very paper which contains the trial of James Atkinson? Must the low, disgusting, selfish, corrupting elements be allowed to fester in the breast of an irreclaimable savage, until they break out into acts of the nature recorded in this and many other cases? Or will the opinion of society—will your powerful pen, for instance—justify the interference of the law to protect those who are clearly unable to control themselves, whether they are technically and in the eye of the law insane or not? Doctors and magistrates could do much in this direction; but they cannot act unless supported by the law, and by that public opinion which gives its application in particular cases.

I am, &c.,

Edinburgh, Dec. 20.

A PHYSICIAN.

THE JOURNAL
OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE
AND
MENTAL PATHOLOGY.

APRIL 1, 1859.

ART. I.—LITERARY FOOLS.—GUILLAUME POSTEL,
CHRISTOPHER SMART, AND OTHERS.*

"INFIRMITY, that decays the wise, doth ever make the better fool," sagely remarks the vanity-stricken Malvolio, in the "Twelfth Night," how truly, we may learn best from the writings of those fools who have been impelled to wield the pen. "I venture to affirm," writes Nodier, "that if a curious book in bibliography has still to be written it is the bibliography of fools, and if a singular, piquant, and instructive library has still to be formed, it is of their works." This observation forms a fitting epigraph to a second essay by M. Delepierre on Literary Fools, than which a happier illustration of the opinions both of the poet and the bibliographer could not well be conceived.

But the bibliographer needs to hasten slowly in the tempting field which a literary history of fools opens out, for fools are of two classes—the positive and the relative. The folly of the former is absolute, and results from the infirmity that decays them; the folly of the latter is relative to the higher degree of wisdom which is supposed to judge. The wise man, however, if he be as prudent as wise, will hesitate before he places his finger upon this or that work, and says this is the result of folly, for it has happened, and might perchance happen again, that the folly of one age has become the wisdom of the next. The bibliographer must therefore take heed that he does not with his pen torture the memory of some unhappy individual in a manner more lasting than that which Campanella underwent at the hands of the Inquisition. "I have been shut up in fifty prisons," writes that philosopher in the preface to his *Atheism Vanquished*, "and submitted seven times to the most severe torture. On the last

* "Essai Biographique sur l'Histoire Littéraire des Fous." Par Octave Delepierre. (*Privately printed.*)

occasion the torture continued forty hours. Bound with tight cords that broke my bones, suspended, my hands tied behind my back, above a sharp piece of wood which devoured the sixteenth part of my flesh and drew away ten pounds of blood, cured by a miracle after six months of sickness, I was thrown into a ditch. Fifteen times have I been placed in judgment. The first time when it was asked: How then does he know what he has never learned? Has he a demon at his command? I replied: In order to learn what I know, I have used more oil than you have drunk wine. At another time I was accused of being the author of the book *The Three Impostors*, which was printed thirty years before my birth. I was again accused of entertaining the opinions of Democritus, I who have written books against Democritus. I was accused of fostering bad sentiments against the Church, I who have written a book on the Christian monarchy, wherein I have shown that no philosopher could have imagined a republic equal to that which was established at Rome under the Apostles. I have been accused of being a heretic, I who have composed a work against the heretics of our times. . . . Finally, I have been accused of rebellion and heresy for having said that there are spots upon the sun, the moon, and the stars, contrary to Aristotle, who makes the world eternal and incorruptible. . . . It was for that they cast me, like Jeremiah, into the dungeon where there was neither air nor light."—(*Cousin:—Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, t. ii. p. 287.)

Moreover, we must not too hastily add to the list of fools men who have so fretted themselves or been fretted with their zeal for learning and the enemies they had made thereby, that they may, as Pomponatius described himself, be compared to Prometheus bound to Caucasus, devoured by the need of study as by a vulture, unable to eat, drink, or sleep, an object of derision to the foolish, dread to the people, and umbrage to the authorities. "If the wise erred not," says the old proverb, "it would go hard with fools."

M. Delepierre in his present essay confines himself to the class of fools which we have termed positive, and which is formed of individuals who were truly insane. It is not, however, an easy task at all times to draw clearly a line of demarcation between those eccentric and silly authors who crop out in every period, and those authors whose works have been prompted by, or are tinged with, insanity.

Literary fools may be separated into four divisions—the theological, the literary, properly so called, the philosophical, and the political. Let it not, however, be supposed that the literary records of these fools are invariably fantastical, for not unfrequently they contain fragments expressed, as Polonius would

have said, with "a happiness that often madness hits on, which reason and sanity could not so prosperously be delivered of."

The author or authors of *The Spiritual Squirt for Souls Constipated in Devotion*, and *The Spiritual Snuff-Box to make Devout Souls Sneeze*, might well have had a niche in the theological division of literary fools; but these mystical extravagances are out of the direct line of our subject. Coming more strictly within its bounds are the records of one named Paoletti. He was a Jesuit, and was deranged a long time in consequence of his arduous labours as a missionary in South America. He had been in confinement on account of his madness five years, when he composed a work confuting the doctrines of Thomas Aquinas, and he endeavoured to prove that God used the symbolical instruments of the Jewish rites to determine who should or who should not receive the divine favour. He designed a diagram purporting to show the mode in which the holy vessels employed in the Tabernacle were made use of in order to indicate the future lot of the children of Adam relatively to predestination. In an engraving accompanying the work, God is represented surrounded by angels, and presiding at the manipulation of the symbolical vessels: the divine and the human will are represented as two balls moving in a circle, but in different directions, and in the end finishing by meeting in a common centre. Paoletti wrote also another treatise during his madness. In this work he argues that the aborigines of America are the direct descendants of the devil and one of the daughters of Noah; consequently that it is impossible for them to obtain either safety or grace.

More noted than Paoletti is Guillaume Postel, who lived in the sixteenth century. Once a Jesuit, he was dismissed the Order by St. Ignatius on account of his fantastical notions. He was imprisoned many years in Rome; fled to Venice; was accused of heresy before the Inquisition; was declared innocent, but insane; and afterwards made a second journey to Constantinople and Jerusalem. At Rome he was infatuated with an old woman whom some deemed a courtesan, and whom he called his *Grandmother Jane*. He maintained that Jesus Christ had redeemed man only, and that the redemption of woman would have place by the Mother Jane. He endeavoured to prove this opinion in a work written in Italian, and entitled *La Vergine Veneta (The Venetian Virgin)*; and in another work in French, printed at Paris, and entitled, *The Three Marvellous Victories of the Women of the New World, and how they ought in justice to command everybody, even those who have the Monarchy of the Old World*.

He pretended that the angel Gabriel had revealed to him divers mysteries, and he believed that the soul of St. John the

Baptist had been transfused into him. He asserted also that when he wrote another of his works (*De Nativitate Mediatoris*), he was inspired by the spirit of Jesus Christ, and that he acted only the part of the copyist. He was condemned to be burned alive, by a decree of the Parliament of Toulouse, but he died in 1581 at the Monastery of St. Martin des Champs, leaving behind him many works, some of which are devoted to the fancies which beset him.

About the same epoch lived Geoffroy Vallée, who became a monomaniac when young. He is said to have had as many shirts as there were days in the year, and he was accustomed to send them to be washed in Flanders, at a spring famous for the purity of its waters. In Paris he gave way to dissipation, and when his reason became manifestly altered, his family placed him under guardianship. He then wrote a book, a tissue of nonsense, but for which he was condemned as an atheist, and, with his book, he was burnt at the stake on the 9th February, 1574. But one copy of the book is known to exist, that which formed the basis of the process which led to the author's death. It was made manifest at his examination that he was insane, because he was questioned before a physician.

The title of his work contains several barbarous anagrams, and it scarcely admits of translation. It runs thus—*La Beatitude des Chrétiens, ou le Fléo de la foy, par Geoffroy Vallée, fils de feu Geoffroy Vallée et de Girarde le Berruyer, ausquels noms de père et mère assemblez il s'y treuve : Lere, geru, vrey fléo de la foy bygarrée, et au nom du filz : va fléo règle foy, aultrement guere la fole foy.* "The Beatitude of the Christians, or the Flower of the Faith, by Geoffroy Vallée, son of the late Geoffroy Vallée and of Girarde le Berruyer, which names of father and mother together will be found in it: Bind, take charge of (?) faith true flower of the lapsed faith, in the name of the Son: go flower control faith, else cure mad faith."

Antoine Fusy or *Fusi*, a Doctor of Divinity of the University of Louvain, takes his place in the category of literary fools, on account of the unintelligible extravagances of his works, one of which is entitled *The Sharp-shooter of the True Church against the Abuses and Enormities of the False.* In a work having the title of *Mastigophorus, or the Precursor of the Zodiac*, he defends a wild medico-physical discovery which he believed that he had made, but which is scarcely fitted for quotation.

Simon Morin, an ignorant and illiterate man, was possessed with the errors of the illuminati, and composed several works, one of which, written in 1601, was entitled, *An Evidence of the Second Coming of the Son of Man*, and in it he asserts that he himself was the Messiah. He was condemned to be burned

alive, and he suffered at the stake, his works being destroyed with him, on the 14th of March, 1663. The President de Lamoignon, having demanded of Morin if he had written that the new Messiah would pass through the fire, he answered yes, and that it was of him that the prophet had spoken in the fourth verse of the sixteenth Psalm, "*igne me examinasti, et non est inventa in me iniquitas.*" He had promised to rise on the third day, and a multitude assembled at the place of execution to witness the resurrection.

In the theological category we find also *François Dosche*, who tells us at the termination of the title-page of one of his books, that, "not having the means to print it entire, he has, in order to give it to the light, begun with the end, being as anxious to bring forth the truth of God in him as a pregnant woman is to give birth to her infant:" *John Mason* who proclaimed the visible reign of Christ (whose temporal throne was to be established at Water-Stratford, near Buckingham) and who believed that he received a visit from the Lord: and *Jean P. Parizot*, who attempted to demonstrate that in Genesis and the Evangel of St. John it was announced that the three elements of the Trinity were found everywhere in nature. Salt, the generator of all things, represented God the Father; mercury, in its extreme fluidity, God the Son, spread throughout the universe; and sulphur, from its property of uniting salt and mercury, God the Holy Ghost. He was condemned to the stake for the impiety of one of his works. He deserved the sentence, not for the impiety of the work, but for the excesses which arose out of it.

Other instances might be cited of writers whose brains have been turned by theology anterior to our own time; but, to come nearer to the present day, we may mention *J. A. Soubira*, the self-called *Apostle of Israel, Messiah of the Universe, Poet of Israel, Lion of Jacob*, &c. Among his works are found *The Second Messiah to the Whole World*, (1818. 8vo.); *Counsel to all the Powers of the Earth*, (1822. 8vo.); *The End of the World Predicted by Soubira, its Epoch fixed, that of the Coming of the Messiah of Israel, and of the first day of the Age of Gold, or of the New Terrestrial Paradise*, (8vo.); *The Wandering Jew to his Bankers*, (8vo., 2 pages); "666," (1828. 8vo.), &c. The pamphlet having the sole title of "666," is composed of prose and verse, and the number 666 is placed at the extremity of each line in every stanza. This is the first stanza:—

" Les banquiers de la France	666
Des organistes de la foi	666
Et des concertes de la cadence	666
Vont accomplir la loi	666
Et contrememir l'alliance	666."

Lastly, a merchant named *Cheneau* of Mennetout-sur-Cher, made himself notorious, in 1848, by several mad works, one of which is entitled, *Instructions how to obtain Children Healthy in Mind and Body, and as perfect as may be*. Before publishing this work, which he designated "the new religious basis and its mode of organization, in which all will recognise the divine power," he had affixed to the walls of Paris a posting-bill, containing a protestation against all oppressors, and headed *The Will of Jehovah in Christ Jesus, sole God, manifested through his servant, Cheneau, merchant*.

After all, was poor Cheneau far wrong in the idea that underlies his system of moral re-organization, that hereditary transmission plays a greater part in morals than is commonly admitted?

If we turn now to instances of literary fools proper, we find, in the seventeenth century, *Nathaniel Lee* writing in one of the cells of Bedlam dramas, and also verses, which latter excited the praise of Addison, but which indicate the madness of the author. It is told of Lee that, while writing one of his dramas, a cloud chanced to overcast the moon, whereupon he cried, "Jove, snuff the moon!"

In the eighteenth century we find *Alexander Cruden*, the author of the well-known *Concordance of the Holy Scriptures*. He was several times confined in lunatic asylums. His insanity, probably induced by disappointed affection, was distinguished by extraordinary attempts to do good in ridiculous ways. After being released from a confinement in the Bethnal-green Asylum, he wrote a whimsical pamphlet, retaliating upon his keepers, and entitled, *The London Citizen exceedingly injured, giving an account of his Adventures during the time of his severe and long Campaign at Bethnal-green, for nine Weeks and six Days, the Citizen being sent thither in March, 1738, by Robert Wightman, a notoriously conceited, whimsical man, where he was chained, handcuffed, strait-waistcoated, and imprisoned, &c.* After a subsequent confinement he wrote another singular and wild work, entitled *The Adventures of Alexander the Corrector*,—alluding to his principal employment at the time as a corrector of the press.

About the same period lived *Christopher Smart*, whose insanity did not extinguish a high degree of poetical power which he possessed. He had received a brilliant education at Cambridge, where he took off the prize for the best poem five years in succession. He became insane in 1794, and it was necessary to confine him in an asylum; but although he was deprived of pen, ink, and paper, he composed there a poem of nearly one hundred stanzas to the glory of the Prophet King David. These verses were traced with a key on the wood panels of his chamber. Several of the verses bear the true stamp of the poet, and M. Delepierre thinks that they almost warrant the doubt whether the writer was insane when

he composed them. The poem is not included in Smart's collected works, but the following noble stanzas will convey an idea of its character :—

- “ He sang of God—the mighty source
Of all things—the stupendous force
On which all strength depends ;
From whose right arm, beneath whose eyes
All period, power, and enterprise
Commences, reigns, and ends.
- “ Sweet is the dew that falls betimes,
And drops upon the leafy limes ;
Sweet Hermon's fragrant air,
Sweet is the lily's silver bell,
And sweet the wakeful taper's smell
That watch for early prayer.
- “ Sweeter in all the strains of love,
The language of the turtle dove,
Pair'd to thy swelling chord ;
Sweeter, with easy grace endued
The glory of thy gratitude
Respired unto the Lord.
- “ Strong is the lion—like a coal
His eyeball—like a bastion's mole
His chest against his foes,
Strong the gyre eagle on his sail,
Strong against tide, the enormous whale
Emerges, as he goes.
- “ But stronger still, in earth and air,
And in the sea, the man of prayer,
And far beneath the tide,
And in the seat to faith assign'd—
Where ask is have, and seek is find,
Where knock is open wide.
- “ Glorious the sun in mid career ;
Glorious the assembled fires appear ;
Glorious the comet's train ;
Glorious the trumpet and alarm,
Glorious the Almighty's stretch'd-out arm ;
Glorious the enraptured main.
- “ Glorious—more glorious is the crown
Of Him that brought salvation down
By meekness, called thy Son ;
Thou that stupendous truth believed,
And now the matchless deed's achieved,
Determined, dared, and done.”

Smart died in 1770. He translated the Psalms, Phædrus, and Horace in prose. His poems were published in 1791; Garrick and Johnson favoured him with their friendship, and the last wrote his life.

Had Smart been permitted to have the same liberty as *Edme Billard*, a literary fool who about the same period amused the Parisian public, he might have died as tranquilly. Billard wrote four plays, *The Joyous Moribund* (1779), *Voltaire Appreciated* (no date), *The Weeper in Spite of Himself* (no date), and the *Suborner* (1782). These plays, although evidently written by a person of diseased mind, are not wanting in gaiety.

Thomas Lloyd was persuaded that he was the most sublime poet in the world. His *Sketches in Bedlam, or Characteristic Traits of Insanity* (London, 1823), is a work which contains a most extraordinary and heterogeneous melange of malice, pride, talent, lying, vile failings and great qualities. When, during his confinement in Bedlam, he was enabled to obtain paper, he began to write verses; but as it usually happened that they did not please him, he would throw them into his drink to clean them, as he said. Whatever he had in his pockets or that came to hand, his insanity prompted him to mingle with his food: pebbles, tobacco, bits of leather, bones, coals, were thrown into his pottage, after a process which he termed scientific. Whatever he cast in he conceived that it gave some agreeable flavour to the food, and if he had not been watched he would have swallowed everything with the gusto of an Apicius. He announced that his knowledge was universal in tongues, science, history, and music. Although often liberated, it was as often necessary to replace him in confinement. He lived beyond the sixtieth year.

Johan Carl Wezal, born in 1747, and who became insane when thirty-nine years of age, wrote several works under the delusion that he was God. Some of these writings were printed under the title *Opera Dei Wezelii W. S. des Gottes*.

A very interesting history is cited in the *Records of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia, 1802), of a barrister named Milman, whose reason was overturned by the shock experienced from the awfully sudden death of a lady he was about to lead to the altar. She was struck dead by lightning just before the time appointed for the performance of the marriage ceremony. It was necessary to confine Mr. Milman in an asylum; but as he had long periods of tranquillity he was suffered to make excursions into the country. He had lucid intervals, but whilst they continued he could never be left alone three hours consecutively without danger of relapsing into wildness, or becoming fatuous. Previous to his insanity he had manifested no marked imaginative powers, his aptitude being towards the positive and abstract sciences; but

during the lucid intervals of his malady he exhibited no inconsiderable degree of fancy, and from time to time he committed to paper certain reflections and descriptions remarkable for vigour and freshness, and the air of pleasantry which runs through them. The following is an example:—

“Nobody has any business to expect satisfaction in a pure country life for two months, unless they have a decided genius for *leisure*. If a man expects to live in a country, of course he must have something to do, and do it all the while. But to gather up yourself and sit down in a plain country-house, without bears and lions about it, without anything to do but to rest; with no marvels or phenomena, but only the good, real, common country; if you mean to be happy in this, I repeat you should have the element of *leisure* very full and powerful within you. You cannot be happy if you are in a hurry. You must not be in a hurry to get up or sit down; you must not be in a hurry to get up in the morning, or to retire at night: you must regard it quite the same thing whether you look at a tree ten minutes or thirty; if you walk out, never must you look at your watch; go till your return; if you sit down upon a breezy fence or wall, it should be a matter of indifference to you whether it be four o’clock, or five, or six. There can be no greater impertinence than to say, ‘It is time to go!’ There is no such thing as time to a man in a summer vacation.

* * * * *

“Yet amid the tranquil, dreaming, gazing life, one cannot always be quite as serene as one would. For example, this morning, while the dew was yet on the grass, word came that Charley *had got away*. Now Charley is the most important member of the family, and as shrewd a horse as ever need be. Lately he had found out the difference between being harnessed by a boy and a man. Accordingly, on several occasions, as soon as the halter dropped from his head, and before the bridle could take its place, he proceeded to back boldly out of the stable, in spite of the stout boy pulling with all his might at his mane and ears. This particular morning we were to put a passenger friend on board the cars at 8.10; it was now 7.30. Out popped Charley from his stall like a cork from a bottle, and lo! some fifty acres there were in which to exercise his legs and ours, to say nothing of temper and ingenuity. First, the lady, with a measure of oats, attempted to do the thing genteelly. Not he! he had no objection to the oats, none to the hand, until it came near his head, then off he sprang. After one or two trials, we dropped the oats, and went at it in earnest—called all the boys, headed him off this way, ran him out of the growing oats, drove him into the upper lot, and out of it again. We got him into a corner with great pains, and he got himself out of it without the least trouble. He would dash through a line of six or eight boys with as little resistance as if they had been so many mosquitoes! Down he ran to the lower side of the lot, and down we all walked after him—too tired to run. Oh! it was glorious fun! the sun was hot, the cars were coming, and we had two miles to ride to the depôt! He did

enjoy it, and we did not. We resorted to expedients—opened wide the great gate of the barn-yard, and essayed to drive him in; and we did it too, almost; for he ran close to it,—and just sailed past, with a laugh as plain on his face as ever horse had! Man is vastly superior to a horse in many respects, but running on a hot summer's day, in a twenty-acre lot, is not one of them! We got him by the brook, and while he drank, oh, how leisurely! we started up and succeeded in just missing our grab at his mane. Now comes another splendid run. His head was up, his eyes flashing, his tail streamed out like a banner, and glancing his head this way and that, right and left, he allowed us to come on to the brush corner, from whence, in a few moments, he allowed us to emerge and come aloft after him down to the barn again. But luck will not hold for ever, even with horses. He dashed down a lane, and we had him. But as soon as he saw the gate closed, and perceived the state of the case, how charmingly he behaved! allowed us to come up and bridle him without a movement of resistance, and affirmed by his whole conduct that it was the merest sport in the world, all this seeming disobedience; and to him I have no doubt it was!"

Two singular examples close M. Delepierre's instances of literary fools proper. In 1884 a M. G. Desjardins published in Paris, under the title of the *First Babylon* (*Première Babylone*), the first part of a vast drama entitled *Semiramis the Great*. The work is composed of five hundred octavo pages, and many passages are printed in Hebrew, Persian, Arabic, and Chaldee, as well as other characters. Some notion of this madly extravagant book may be obtained from the extract which follows, taken from the fifth *Section of Bitterness*, vulgarly called Act, part of which is in verse and part prose. Voices innumerable and cavernous are heard issuing from the profundities of the earth, and the Prince of Prophets, *God's-Judgment*, says to them:—

Arise! shake from a vast and sluggish wing,

The eloquent night-dust of three thousand years,—

and from the bottom of the sepulchres in which this vast accumulation of generations lies, comes forth the myriad-voiced answer—

Behold, in horizontal ranks we raise us!

"Then the kings, princes, and chiefs innumerable of nations commence, helter-skelter, a kind of round or immense chain, supported behind by the stampings and acclamations of the nations. In the ranks are found mingled and carried along both beasts and brutes contemporaries of the ancient actors of this Apocalyptic scene; all creation, every generation of beings brought forth, reptiles, birds, quadrupeds, all flesh multiplying and moving, great lions in the ranks of gigantic warriors, dromedaries, ostriches, giraffes, boas, elevating their long necks, or advancing spirally in the midst of travelling men; lofty elephants, colossal mastodons their eldest brothers, erecting the monstrous serpent of their trunk above the heads and horns of ancient races, princely, royal, and antediluvian. And above all, the stork, the

ibis, and great vultures fly, all rolling together the thick waves of their round, all lightened in the travel of their whirling chain, by rays from the red and flaming face of God; and muttering, roaring, and shrieking these words, each in his tongue, whilst revolving :—

“ We represent both the storm and the dreadful thunder
Which grumbles around the mount, which corrupts the earth !
During the long horror of a day of chastisement,
We imitate the rigours of the last judgment,” &c.

It seems to us, although it does not appear to have struck M. Delepierre's mind, that this scene of Soubira's has been inspired by the Oriental legends respecting the great Solomon, King of the Genii, and the Mahomedan legends of the condition of man in the interval that exists between the resurrection and the judgment. Solomon is described as having at his command the whole of the beasts and birds that have destructive powers, and when he contended with the evil genii on the earth, advanced the beasts of prey,—lions, tigers, leopards, wolves, &c.,—together with elephants, and every other kind of animal capable of taking part in a struggle; in mid-air sailed Solomon sitting upon his magic carpet, and accompanied by myriads of good genii; and above all flew an army of eagles, vultures, and other birds. The Mahomedan legends tell us that at the resurrection of mankind, the genii, and every variety of animal, will be collected on a vast plain (commentators differ as to its locality), and there for a space, some think of forty years, others of fifty thousand, all created beings, rational and irrational, will experience in advance the lot which will be theirs at the last judgment.

The last example of literary fools proper is a *M. Paulin Gagne*, author of several poems, one of which entitled *L'Uniteide, or the Woman-Messiah*, of which the action is placed in the two thousandth year of the Christian era, was published in 1858. It contains a ridiculous agglomeration of fantastic names and absurd verses. Among the *dramatis personæ* are *L'Ane-Archide*, “daughter of Despotism and of Liberty;” *Demounias*, the forerunner of Antichrist; *Panarchie*, the *Dive Insania*, the *Bœuf Apis*, *Archimonde*, and his illustrious spouse *La Presse*, *Patati-culture*, and many other extraordinary personifications, the names of which are even less extraordinary than the verses and ideas accompanying them. For example, turning into anagrams the names of modern socialistic reformers he places them all in presence of *L'Ane-Archide*, who says to them—

Speak !

Wide awake, if I can, I to your dreams will listen.
Speak Pierre Xourd, Nodourp, Urdel Nillor,
Louis Cnalb, George Nas, Narrédianoc without gold,
Tebac, Ogu without fear, and all ye great apostles,
Who on the head of others aspire to march.

Then the poet expresses, through their mouths, the different systems of these gentlemen in so far as he somewhat loosely comprehends them. The first canto terminates by the entry of the *Woman-Messiah* into Paris.

The second canto contains the same personifications as the first, with the addition of ambassadors from the sun and the moon, inhabitants of the stars, *Aurithéocratie*, *Ratiothéie*, &c. The comet *Trouble-tout* (*Trouble-all*) comes also on the scene, and has a discussion with *Ratiothéie*, and sings a song, *le Galop de la Comète*, to the air *Les Défenseurs de la Religion*.

Nations, I come to toll the final hour
Upon the bells of this vast universe!
Already death has hewn out a huge coffin
And made all ready for the mighty convoy:
Tremble, O nations! no longer have ye shelter,
And utter swiftly your most sad adieu!
Tremble, O nations, before my flaming tail!
O nations, wallow in the fierce chaos of fire.

In the third canto *La Socialiforce* has a long discussion with his partisans, which terminates thus:—

I found for aye the golden age of the belly,
Whose pleasant sway our time has much enlarged:
The belly is the fount of revolutions,
And eke creations and destructions.
The Empty-bellies through the long night thunder;
The Well-filled bellies glow with radiant light;
The Hollow-bellies are not worth a jot.
But I will fill them, for they loudly praise me.
Come then, dear friends, and let us hasten swiftly
To trick out feasts that shall astound the world.

The scene of the fifth canto is placed "wheresoever you wish it," and the text is filled with indecent matter. The scene of the thirty-eighth act of the eighth canto is a vast potato-field, and *Potato-culture* opens the scene in a discourse containing seventy-two lines, of which the following is an example:—

Nations and kings, I am Potato-culture,
Daughter of nature and this frying-age;
* * * * *
For aye I have adored this dainty fruit,
Once as an extra eaten by the gods.

This tirade ends with:—

In the potato lies the health of all!

In the same scene, *Carotti-culture* also addresses the kings

and nations, and sings a parody of the *Marseillaise*, entitled *The Universal Carrot (la Carotte universelle)*, commencing—

“Allons, Enfants, de la Carotte
Le jour de gloire est arrivé.

Chorus:—

Aux armes, Carottiers, formez vos bataillons,
Marchons, que la Carotte inonde nos sillons.

M. Gagne tells us in his preface, that “the vast subject of his humanizing and Christian poem should form the universal poesy of humanity, and the school of truth.” Madame *Elise Gagne*, the wife of the author, adds an epilogue, in which she tells us that after the reforms indicated in the poem are carried into effect, abundance and happiness will prevail upon the earth.

The poem, indeed, is no pleasantry on the part of its author. “The whole proves,” writes M. Delepierre, “that he employed all the resources of his intellect in writing this *chef d'œuvre*.” We must add that the poem is written in rhyme. Other poems written by M. Gagne, are *Le Suicide*, *La Monopanglotte ou Langue Universelle*, *Le Délire*, *L'Océan des Catastrophes*.

In the section of M. Delépierre's Essay devoted to Philosophical and Scientific Fools, Kant is mentioned, who became insane towards the close of his life, and who has a place among literary fools, inasmuch as recently a work has been discovered in Germany, written by the great metaphysician during his insanity. The next illustration is derived from the fifteenth century, towards the close of which lived, at Pisa, one *Gragani*, a physician, who became mad, and during his confinement in a mad-house he wrote a work entitled, *De Philosophiâ Aristotelis*, which was published, to pacify the writer, at Pisa, in 1496. In this curious book, of which one copy alone, in the library of the Vatican, is known to exist, Gragani attempts to prove that the name of Aristotle was a myth, and that that philosopher never had being.

In 1529, a work was published in Florence entitled, *The Anatomy of Language*. It was written by a physician named *Joseph Bernardi* during his confinement in an asylum. Among other curious opinions, he maintained that the whole race of monkeys had the faculty of speech, but that they carefully kept the gift secret. He drew upon the walls of his cell an anatomical diagram of a monkey's throat, and sought to prove that the construction clearly showed the faculty of speech and even of song. Bernardi asserted that in the first editions of the voyages of Marco Polo, it had been well established that monkeys could sing. What added to the curiosity of all this was, that a Jesuit, Father

Cremoni, wrote a refutation of Bernardi's treatise, and maintained that, although the work of his adversary was well written, the thesis was contrary to the testimony of Holy Writ, and consequently could not be true. How aptly does the biting remark of Jaques apply here—

"The wise man's folly is anatomised,
Even by the squandering glances of a fool."

Bernardi lived ten years after the publication of his work, but he never fully recovered his reason.

In 1622, there appeared at Salamanca, under the title of *De Philosophia*, a work written by *Miguel de Flores*, formerly a professor in the university of that city. He had become insane in consequence of concussion of the brain, occasioned by a fall from a carriage. The insanity continued many years, but as he was peaceable, he was suffered to be at liberty. His mania was characterized by an incessant desire to write; and he would carry his manuscripts along with him, stopping the passengers in the streets to read to them his lucubrations. Four years before his death, his friends published one of his essays, and "it is remarkable," writes M. Delepiere, "since that in it is contained the germ of the system developed in our days, under the name of the *atomic theory*, by Father Boscovitch, Dr. Priestley, and others. De Flores represents the Deity as occupying the centre of creation, and all things created as concentric circles, more or less removed the one from the other. Eccentric engravings give an idea of the theory of the author. They depict the Divinity setting in motion all things by the mechanical action of the arms and legs."

Robert Hall finds a place in this section, and also *Thomas Wirgman*, who was the author of many works, and who dissipated a great fortune in printing them.

Wirgman lived not long ago, and among other freaks, he addressed a letter to George IV., in which he declared that if the principles set forth in his book, the *Devarication of the New Testament*, were not adopted, neither the king nor his subjects would be saved in the other world. The title of the work named runs thus:—"The development of celestial power, the aggregate of spiritual existence, the sublimity of creative energy, the positive realization of voluntary action, and the blended harmony of suprema wisdom, truth, and goodness."

Wirgman's mental failing was not manifested in his writings only, but also in the mode in which his books were fabricated. He had paper made in such a fashion that each leaf of his books was of divers colours; and if the colours did not happen to please him, he would have other paper prepared. He would also frequently change the arrangement of a book in passing through

the press. Thus it happened that the book just named, although possessing only 400 pages, cost him £2276 sterling.

Another of Wirgman's works was entitled, *The Grammar of the Five Senses*, and purposed to be a course of metaphysics for infants. The work is illustrated by nineteen coloured diagrams, and of it the author states: "When this (grammar) is adopted, virtue will supersede crime, and establish peace and harmony on earth."

Wirgman was a goldsmith by trade, and he had retired from business with a fortune of £50,000. This was altogether wasted in printing his books, and he died destitute. (*Essay on Bluet d'Arberes*, by M. Delepierre, p. 11.)

Last in the list of philosophical fools is *William Martin*, a brother of *Jonathan Martin*, who set fire to York Cathedral. His first work was entitled, *A New System of Natural Philosophy on the principle of Perpetual Motion*—Newcastle, Preston, 1821. In the title-page he designates himself *Natural Philosopher*; and in the preface he tells us, that having in vain attempted to solve the problem of perpetual motion mechanically, he renounced the subject as impracticable. But the very evening of the day on which he had come to this decision, he had a dream, partly strange and terrible, partly very agreeable; and from this dream he awoke perfectly convinced that God had chosen him to discover the great secondary cause of all things, and the true perpetual motion. Martin wrote several books.

From M. Delepierre's section on Political Fools, we shall quote only three examples.

One *Demons* in the sixteenth century distinguished himself by two works, the title of one of which is as follows: "*The disputative and potential Sextessence obtained by a new method of distillation, according to the precepts of white magic and invocation of Demons, counsellor of the presidial* [an inferior court of judicature] *of Amiens, as well to cure the hæmorrhage, wounds, and venereal ulcers of France, as to change and convert things noxious and abominable into things good and useful.*" (Paris, 1595, 8vo.)

Francois Davenne, who believed among other things that he ought to supplant Louis XIV., and who wrote several very curious tracts, proposed two modes in which to demonstrate his sovereign puissance and royal authority. "Take," said he, "the Cardinal, the Regent, the Duke of Orleans, the Princes, the coadjutor, and those whom the world esteems most holy; light a furnace, throw all into it, and let the individual who comes out without injury from the flame, like a phoenix renewed, be considered the protégé of God, and be ordained prince of the people."

The second proposition, made lest the former one should not be accepted, runs thus:—"Let the Parliament decree my death for

having dared to tell the princes truth. Let them execute me, and if God saves me not from their hands in a supernatural manner, let my memory be blotted out. If God does not deliver me from the hands of the executioners, there will be an end of the matter; but if the supernatural arm snatches me from their claws, let them be sacrificed in my stead."

In his *Plea of the Eternal Wisdom*, he has the following quaintly expressed thought: "My soul, I immolate thee upon the scaffold of my ideas, with the hand of my desires, by the sword of my resignation."

In 1848, one *Herpain* of Genappe, whose mind had been deranged by ideas of social progress, under the pseudonym of Usaner, published a little work in 18mo., developing a theory of language which he termed *Langage physiologique*. He sent copies of the work to all the legislative assemblies of Europe. That destined for the English Parliament, was addressed *To the Legislators of the great English Nation by their servant Herpain, author.*" In a note at the end of the introduction he suggests the use of certain ciphers in place of the letters ordinarily made use of; for example, "Stat5ng facto opro lit2al ni, ni fo22al ovo otano," &c. Fortunately he adds a translation, which is not a bad example of his style of writing:—"Immediately that your majestic presence had lit up the nothing (*néant*), the nothing became the medium of existence. Then you willed to sway favourably the essences, and the principles of beings were produced by your generous fecundity," &c.

Thus far we have dealt with the literature prompted by insanity, and which is a manifestation of the loss of mental equilibrium. But there is another class of literature of the insane. In several of the lunatic asylums in this kingdom literary composition is encouraged as a curative occupation for the inmates. The Crichton Royal Asylum, in Scotland, has its journal, *The New Moon*, edited, conducted, written, and printed by the lunatics in the establishment. This journal is issued monthly, and has been in existence many years. Some years ago a series of *Memoirs of Mad Poets, Mad Philosophers, Mad Kings, Mad Churls*, by the inmates of the Crichton Institution, were published, and more recently a small volume of poems by the lady patients was printed. The Royal Edinburgh Asylum for the Insane has also its monthly journal, *The Morningside Mirror*, which has been regularly published about twelve years. This journal is also entirely written and printed by the patients. In the Hanwell Asylum literary composition is also encouraged.

Two poetical extracts from *The New Moon*, illustrative of

that happiness of expression which often madness hits on, may fittingly close our illustrations of the literature of madness :—

I.

On the Death of my Bulfinch.

Oh, couldst thou know, my little pet,
How much thine absence I regret!

Ah! 'twas a day like this
When thou into my little room
To cheer me with thy voice didst come,
Which now I hourly miss;
And 'neath this shade of woe, alone,
Lament my little Goldie gone.

Whene'er thou saw'st me shut within
My room, thou cheerily wouldst sing,
And all thy art employ;
At thy lov'd voice, so sweet and clear,
All care would quickly disappear—
My sadness turn to joy;
And all the trouble of my lot
Be dissipated and forgot.

Wise people do, I know, believe
That birds, when they have ceased to breathe,
Will never more revive;
But—though I cannot tell you why—
I hope, though Goldie chanced to die,
To see him yet alive!
May there not be—if Heaven please—
In Paradise, both birds and trees?

I've had such dreams—they may be true;
Meantime, my little pet, Adieu!

II.

Go! sleep my heart in peace!
Bid fear and sorrow cease:
He who of worlds takes care,
Our heart in mind doth bear.

Go! sleep my heart in peace!
If death should thee release,
And this night hence thee take,
Thou yonder wilt awake.

This last poem might have been written by Herrick.

It may be due to M. Delepierre to express our high appreciation of his admirably written and daintily printed essay, but it is hardly just to our readers, seeing that the great majority of them

can only know it through the means of our imperfect abstract, and consequently we might unhappily excite a desire which could not be gratified. The essay is printed for private circulation, and the last line on the last page runs thus :—" *Nota.—Cet Essai n'a été tiré à part qu'à 50 exemplaires.*"

ART. II.—ON THE ARTIFICIAL PRODUCTION OF STUPIDITY IN SCHOOLS.

It is related of a learned judge, that he once praised a retiring witness in the following words : " You are entitled to great credit, sir. You must have taken infinite pains with yourself. No man could naturally be so stupid."

We cite this well-worn anecdote because it contains, probably, the earliest public recognition of the principle which the title of our article is intended to convey. Existing in all ages of the world, in all conditions of life, and described by a copious vocabulary in every language, stupidity is something which it has never been possible to ignore or to forget. The fact of its all-pervading presence, its vitality in the most different climates and scenes, has tended to convince mankind of the necessity of an evil which they have never failed to perceive ; and which has served, from time immemorial, as a subject for the lamentation of the wise, and a basis for the calculations of the designing. The lessons of proverbial wisdom, the results of hasty generalization, and the daily experiences of life, all point out, or seem to point out, that stupidity is inseparable from the existence of the human race ; and that it must appear, not in every individual, but in many individuals of every community. It follows, that the persons in whom the phenomenon is most conspicuously manifested are regarded with something of the compassion which attaches to physical infirmity ; and enjoy, in a certain degree, the power of blundering, with the privilege of being exempt from punishment. " *Davus sum, non Œdipus ;*" and the happy Davus eludes responsibilities which a wiser man would be compelled to bear. " *Le jour va passer, mais les badauds ne passeront pas ;*" and the *blagueur* need never doubt that he will find dupes when he requires them.

We have long entertained a conviction that this passive acquiescence in stupidity, as an ultimate fact of human nature, and this confident expectation of its unmitigated recurrence in each succeeding generation, are founded upon errors of considerable

practical importance. By directing attention to causes that are remote, they induce forgetfulness of those which lie at every man's door; and, by bringing into prominence the stupidity which is irremediable, they lead us to neglect examination of that which may be prevented.

In truth, the varieties of hebetude are numerous. It must be admitted that some of them are displayed by persons whose intellects are obscured by organic defect, "native and to the manner born," in the nervous apparatus,—by continuing deficiency, or excess, in the composition or quantity of the circulating fluid; and it is probable that, in many cases of this nature, the scalpel, or the microscope and test-tube, would fail to disclose the cause of the infirmity. Inherited diathesis, or hereditary disease, may doubtless weaken the faculties of the mind, as they evidently weaken the physical powers of the body, and may produce effects varying in degree from idiocy to mere dulness of apprehension. We are far from saying that in these instances stupidity can neither be alleviated by judicious, nor confirmed by improper treatment; but we indicate them as affording a substratum of truth to popular prejudices touching the general invincibility of the state in question, and as giving evidence of its centric rather than eccentric origin.

But leaving this subdivision of the stupid entirely out of consideration, and remarking, by the way, that the word stupidity is misapplied when used to denote the mere absence of brilliant talent, we would call attention to the large class of persons who are dull and obtuse, not by reason of any probable congenital deficiency, nor by an unfair comparison with great wits or geniuses, but by comparison with what the individuals themselves clearly ought to be—with what they would have been had their faculties been developed in the right way. And this comparison is not so difficult as it may appear; for the simple reason that the human capabilities do not greatly depart, save in exceptional cases, from the standard of mediocrity. Among a score of men taken at random, but approaching to equality in point of conformation, we may observe that physical strength or endurance will vary only within very narrow limits: there being perhaps a single athlete, or a single weakling, and a remainder composed of individuals whose powers are not precisely on a level, but nearly so.

Let us suppose, however, that among the twenty men there were a certain number who had been employed from their early years in pursuits calculated to produce muscular vigour and hardihood, and who had observed all rules and precautions likely to ensure to such pursuits their most favourable effects. It is certain that, whatever differences might exist amongst themselves,

these men would surpass all their competitors. Bendigo, the champion of the prize ring, was one of a triple birth, and was the weakest child of the family in which, by reason of diligent training, he is now the strongest man.

So universally has this principle been recognised and acted upon, that in every barbarous or half-civilized community, or under all circumstances which give an unquestioned superiority to bodily strength, we may find evidences of special care to foster and increase it. The "games" obligatory upon the little Spartans, the exercises of "gentle youth" during the age of chivalry, the description given by Mr. Catlin of the early training of the American aborigines, are all instances in point; and all show the recognition, under circumstances widely dissimilar, of the principle that the powers of the human organism are bestowed only *in posse*—to be developed by culture, or to dwindle under neglect.

The state of physiological knowledge permits us to lay it down as an axiom that what is true of one system or apparatus, among those given to man, must also be true, *mutatis mutandis*, of the rest. Without in the least degree failing to perceive the dependence of the higher faculties upon a spiritual nature, we must also perceive their dependence, during this life, upon the qualities of their material organs, the nervous centres; and the dependence of these qualities upon the laws which regulate nutrition and cell growth. We are therefore entitled to assume, *à priori*, that, precisely as the methods of the trainer raise the physical powers of his disciples to the highest point attainable by each organism, so analogous methods would raise the intellectual powers in the same manner and degree. The conclusion which may be formed by reasoning is not unsupported by experience; but the masters of the art are few, and the examples of their skill are rare.

In an age of bodily repose, with nearly all locomotion artificial, with money as the principal purveyor, and with A 22 to remove the necessity for self-protection, it is not surprising that men are careless about their physical powers, and think them hardly worth the trouble which their full cultivation would entail. Under circumstances in which strength of arm and fleetness of foot have afforded the chief sources of security, or have opened the most direct paths to renown, there has never been an approach to indifference about the means by which these qualities might be attained. If physical education be now almost wholly neglected, it is because the utility of its results has been diminished by the progress of civilization.

But this age of bodily sloth and weakness is also, it must be remembered, an age of intellectual activity and strength. The wide diffusion of knowledge, the facilities for travel, and the ap-

plication of philosophy to the comforts and conveniences of life, have increased a thousandfold the value, to each possessor, and to the whole human race, of the perceptive and conceptive faculties of the mind. Every one who observes the facts within his sphere, and reflects upon them, may find the key to some as yet unopened door in the temple of nature, or may excogitate results calculated to increase the happiness of man. The career that offers itself to the intellect surpasses immeasurably all that has ever been offered to the corporeal powers; and it might therefore reasonably be expected that intellectual development would be the subject of the same foresight now, which the development of the corporeal powers was wont to call forth in former days. It might be expected (although strength and activity of limb are left to come of themselves, under the unaided influence of that playful restlessness of the young which provides against muscular atrophy) that the training of the higher faculties of the mind into due vigour and perfect symmetry would be carefully studied as a science, and diligently practised as an art. It might be expected that the mechanism of observation and of thought, the nature and order of the processes by which, chiefly, wealth, and power, and fame are to be acquired, would be the subjects of an attention corresponding to the degree in which wealth, and power, and fame, are prized. It might be expected that every one—the poor man to the extent of his means, and the rich man to the extent of his knowledge—would seek to confirm and strengthen in his offspring the qualities by which the world is ruled.

That the endeavour would not be fruitless, we have abundant evidence. Reasoning from an analogy which cannot fail, we find that the human organism scarcely ever approaches, under the influence of casual impressions or spontaneous acts, to anything like the full measure of its powers. The average athlete is but the corporeal perfection of the average man—a perfection the result of labour, and which the common games of youth or pursuits of manhood are insufficient to produce or to maintain. The most striking example upon record of the physical predominance of one class of men over all others with whom they came in contact, was furnished by the Roman legionaries, in the days of the Roman conquests. It may be explained by the system which trained each legionary like a gladiator; and it disappeared as that system was relaxed and abandoned. "*Nulla enim alia re videmus populum Romanum orbem subegisse terrarum,*" says Vegetius, "*nisi armorum exercitio, disciplina castrorum, usuque militiæ.*" The citizens of Rome, as such, could possess no natural superiority over, and in some cases not even an equality with, the inhabitants of the countries they subdued; but the citizens of Rome were trained to the exercises and formed to the

discipline of war. Their physical powers were improved to the utmost, and they were inured to every variety of labour, fatigue, and hardship. The world has not witnessed a school of mental education upon a method so excellent, or upon a scale so grand; but the proverbial sagacity of the Jesuits, and the proverbial erudition of the Benedictines, may be cited to show that the mind will respond, always in some degree, and often vigorously, to a stimulus greater than that which is supplied by the usual events of life. It has been well said that nature throws forth her able men as a salmon does its spawn, but produces her great ones as a lioness does her cub—singly, and at rare intervals. Whenever the want of an able man is felt and acknowledged, it is almost invariably supplied from among a limited circle of lookers-on, one of whom will find in the occasion a means of at once discovering and developing capabilities formerly dormant. The various persons whose duties have required them to undertake original investigations into the phenomena of physical science, have nearly always exhibited a remarkable intellectual growth as one reward of their exertions. They have become more cautious, more sagacious, more diffident than before; and there is not the slightest reason to suppose that they were, in the majority of instances, men of exceptional natural powers. On the contrary, the parallel facts connected with the muscular system, and the remarkable uniformity with which the faculties of reflection and judgment expand and strengthen under proper use, may conjointly be taken to prove that the ordinary life of civilized Europe does not develop either body or mind in a degree at all commensurate with their capacities for action. The cricket-field and the boating-club produce a certain amount of vigour and hardihood; but their most ardent votaries would be exhausted by the pastimes of a savage, or by the daily drill and duty of a soldier of old Rome. From the universities, and from schools of the first order, issue many men unquestionably of high attainments, and some of great and cultivated parts; but the aggregate of both classes may be said to have a point of resemblance to Brummell's finished cravat, and to suggest that a large number of "failures" have been quietly conveyed downstairs. In schools of an inferior kind, the attainments of the pupils are less conspicuous; and the existing state of mental education may be summed up in the earnest and weighty words of Professor Faraday, who declares that, "in physical matters, multitudes are ready to draw conclusions who have little or no power of judgment in the cases; that the same is true of other departments of knowledge; and that, generally, mankind is willing to leave the faculties which relate to judgment almost entirely uneducated, and their decisions at the mercy of ignorance, prepossessions, the passions, or even acci-

dent." The same authority says again, that "society, speaking generally, is not only ignorant as respects education of the judgment, but is also ignorant of its ignorance."

It must be conceded, we apprehend, that in the present day no man is called upon to undergo a course of severe physical training, or to exercise the muscular system to the acme of its powers. But it must also be conceded that there have been conditions of society which rendered such training the duty of every one, and in which it was enforced by a public opinion of the most rigid kind. We think that, in the times in which we live, the duty of mental cultivation is at least equally binding, and that its performance requires to be prompted by the same incentive.

For we are convinced that a very large proportion of the stupidity now existing in the world is the direct result of a variety of influences, educational and social, which operate to the prejudice of the growing brain, either by checking its development altogether, or by unduly stimulating the sensorium at the expense of the intelligence. In the former case, general obtuseness is the result; and in the latter, subjugation of the reasoning powers to the sensations or emotions. We are entitled to think these conditions strictly artificial; and to look upon them as distortions, analogous, in some respects, to the physical distortions of Hindoo fakirism.

The educational influence which, more than any other, is concerned in producing them, appears to us to be due to confusion of thought on the subject of those very distinct realities called knowledge and wisdom. While the prevailing weaknesses of the human mind—those apparent to the philosopher, and those also which are manifest to the vulgar—are alike due to want of wisdom, the efforts of ordinary instructors, and the general current of the events of life, are chiefly valued as they appear calculated to impart knowledge. It is not surprising that such should be the case, a great impulse having been given to education in this country at a time when the operations of the mind were not sufficiently understood to allow of a just discrimination between them. Learning, and (prior to the modern development of various branches of science) learning of one especial kind, was essential to the attainment of a position in which wisdom could be conspicuously displayed. It followed that every man whose wisdom was known to the public, was known also to be

"A scholar, and a ripe and good one;"

while the illiterate, whatever their natural powers, were almost compelled to remain among the "mute inglorious Miltons" of the community. Moreover, learning was a thing apparent and undeniable, easily perceptible to many who were unable to fathom

its depths ; while wisdom could only be recognised by the kindred wise, or in a fruition not always directly traceable to its causes. Hence, and in a manner not difficult to comprehend, arose a general impression that the acquisition of knowledge was the principal or even the only means of gaining wisdom ; and this impression was confirmed by experience of the fact that mental development is frequently coincident with efforts to learn. The exact relation between the two is not easy to define, even with all the aid afforded by recent advances in psychology ; but, in former times, it was the opinion of the most advanced educationists, that a certain routine of teaching afforded the best discipline for the growing brain, and that this routine, when aided by good abilities, was certain to produce the highest attainable results—so that men of moderate or inferior performance, who had received “ a good education,” were considered to be the failures of nature, and not of the preceptor. The hypothesis was most comfortable, serving to shift responsibility from tutors and professors, and to place it where it was borne without a murmur ; while the necessary interval between the schools and life was sufficient to render obscure any possible connexion between bad teaching and eventual stupidity. During the universal prevalence of such principles as these, commenced a movement which was formerly described as “ the march of intellect,” but which was, more correctly, a march of schooling. Men of various calibre, and various degrees of learning, were cordially united in an attempt to elevate the masses by education. For this purpose they organized a scheme by which to pour forth knowledge like water, and, in carrying it into practice, they spared neither age nor sex. Cheap publications explained everything—in a manner to be comprehended by everybody. The fathers of England were taught (with diagrams) the philosophy of their daily duties ; the mothers, of their household avocations. Even unhappy little children, struggling through the sands of school, were caught and engulfed by the advancing wave. The great and good promoters of the original measure were overwhelmed by the co-operation of innumerable amateurs, who expected to make learning universal, by addressing, to the untaught, condensed statements of scientific results, and who looked forward to a time when the intellectual vigour of the community would be gauged by the reports of the Society for the Confusion of Useless Knowledge, or by the sale of illustrated penny serials, as the material prosperity is at present by the quarterly returns of the Registrar-General. The idea seemed to be, that the diffusion of knowledge would act as a stimulant upon all minds of sufficient natural power, and would call forth their energies—would set them thinking, comparing, judging ; and that the rest of mankind,

those not vitalized by the potent influence, were to be regarded only as *caput mortuum*, unworthy of consideration in a philosophical sense, however formidable in point of numbers.

Notwithstanding the great and sudden illumination to which we have referred, there is no evidence of any remarkable advancement, any increase at all commensurate with the pains bestowed, in that cultivation of mind by which alone knowledge can be applied or rendered useful. In every rank, children are taught many things which were unknown to their forefathers; and the operations of the Committee of Council on Education have wrought a marvellous change in the position, with regard to learning, of the sons and daughters of the labouring poor. But school work cannot be correctly estimated by the results of the half-yearly examination; and requires to be tested more severely, and more truly also, by the events of life. The reports of Her Majesty's Inspectors, especially for 1855-6, are well calculated to direct attention to this view of the case; and they show that the improvement which was hoped for, nay, almost expected, as a result of teaching, has not yet been realized. The young adults who have passed through aided parochial schools do not present any marked superiority, either moral or intellectual, over others who have not had that advantage; and the learning acquired at these institutions would appear to be of the most transitory kind. The words (already quoted) of Professor Faraday, rendered doubly emphatic by the known and habitual caution of their author, may be taken as conclusive with regard to persons of a higher station; and the whole evidence appears to show that the reasoning faculties, in all classes of the community, are very imperfectly and insufficiently developed—imperfectly as compared with their natural capabilities—insufficiently when considered with reference to the extent and variety of information with which they are called upon to deal. We are compelled to seek for the causes of this deficiency in an educational system that makes no adequate provision for mental training; and we think that a brief review of the relations between the nervous centres and the impressions that form the basis of knowledge will enable us to point out the precise nature of the chief errors in existing practice, and to define the principles by adherence to which those errors might be obviated.

The first point to which we would call attention is the existence, in the young of the human species, of a distinctly *duplex* educability: depending upon distinct functions of the brain. It may be taken as conceded, we apprehend, by all physiologists, that the encephalon of man differs from that of other Mammalia chiefly by the super-addition of parts whose office it is to control the succession of ideas, and to determine

the course of conduct. The powers of *re-collection*, comparison, reflection, and volition, are attributes essentially human; or, at least, are possessed by men in common with higher intelligences alone. The powers of sensation, ideation, and spontaneous remembrance, are possessed also by the lower animals; and are sufficient to explain all the particulars of their conduct.

It is manifest, therefore, that the education of a child may be conducted, in the direction, and to the extent, in which it is possible to educate a horse, a dog, or an elephant, without necessarily trenching upon, or at all arousing, any faculty that is distinctly human in its nature. The child, moreover, possesses an endowment, of a purely sensational or animal kind, in which brutes are deficient: namely, the power (subsidiary to the gift of language) to remember a great number of sounds, and to imitate them with facility; so that, just to the extent of this power, the sensational educability of the human race exceeds that of the lower animals.

It should be remembered, moreover, that the functional activity of the sensorial tract of the encephalon is an absolute necessity of animal existence; and that, in men and brutes alike, it is provided for by an energetic tendency to spontaneous development under the influence of its appropriate excitants. In what may be termed the natural life, a blind submission to the promptings of sensations, present or remembered, would, in all ordinary cases, supply the wants, or gratify the passions of man. It is only in life modified by human aggregation that these promptings require to be controlled by an exercise of will, guided by a prior exercise of judgment; and therefore, while Divine Providence has endowed the human race with sensational faculties that are called into vigorous action by daily wants, or by physical impressions from without, we may observe that the higher powers of the mind, in a great majority of instances, cannot be matured excepting by assiduous cultivation.

In this respect, however, there is probably a considerable original diversity between individuals; and we are much inclined to think that herein consists the chief cause of gradations of ability among persons who neither greatly surpass an average standard, nor fall greatly short of it. Observation teaches that it is far more easy in some children than in others to carry instruction beyond the sense-perceptions, and to call the intellect into activity; but it teaches also that the supposed difficulty often arises from an improper selection or application of the means employed, and is simply a failure to open a lock with a wrong key. The apparently dull child not unfrequently receives the necessary stimulus from a trivial circumstance, from a conversation, a book, or a pursuit, and may grow into

a gifted man; while a parallel transformation may be accomplished, much later in life, under the influence of some new opportunity for action. It is possible that, in minds of the highest order, the intellectual faculties may possess the character of spontaneity which is commonly limited to the sensorial tract; but, in all ordinary cases, these faculties require to be excited in the pupil by their presence, and their activity, in the teacher.

The sensational and intellectual functions of the human brain are not only distinct, but also, in some degree, antagonistic, through the application of the ordinary law of nutrition to their respective organs. The portions of the encephalon that are most employed will receive the largest supply of blood, and will be the seats of the most vigorous cell-growth, precisely as the same rule will apply to the development of muscle; while on the other hand, a certain duration of disuse, or of restricted use, will occasion atrophic changes, and will be followed by that functional impairment which is a natural result of structural degeneration. It follows that men of the highest intellectual activity are often somewhat inattentive to impressions made upon their senses; and also that great sensational acuteness is often purchased at the cost of some torpor, as regards the operations of the judgment.

Upon testing the educational customs of the present day by even the most elementary principles of psychology, it becomes apparent that a very large number of children receive precisely the kind of training which has been bestowed upon a learned pig. There are scarcely any schoolmasters who have in the least degree studied the operations or the development of the mind (indeed it is only within a very few years that this study has borne any fruit of great practical utility); and those who have not done so cannot realize the existence of a kind of learning which is sensational alone. Indeed, it is more in accordance with ordinary preconceptions to refer brute actions to a process of reasoning, than to consider that any human actions are automatic. The truth is, however, that the first impressions made upon the consciousness of a child have a strong natural tendency to expend themselves through the sensorium; and usually do so, unless directed higher by the manner in which they are produced or maintained. For the purpose of such direction, time is an element of the first importance; and the idea which would be grasped by the intelligence after a certain period of undisturbed attention, will excite the sensational faculties alone, if that attention be diverted by the premature intrusion of something else that solicits notice. And while, in almost every child, the power of intelligent attention may be aroused by care, and perfected by perseverance, the natural inclination is towards a rapid succession

of thoughts, variously associated, and remembered in their order without being understood. The faculty of comprehension, like all others, is a source of pleasure to the possessor, even in the first feeble attempts to bring it into exercise ; and hence, as well as from the impulse given to nutrition, when once a habit of endeavouring to comprehend has been formed, although in very young children, it is not readily relinquished ; but, on the contrary, is applied to the most unpromising materials.

In schools, however, under the stern pressure of the popular demand for knowledge, it is an extremely common practice to accumulate new impressions with greater rapidity than they can be received, even by children who have enjoyed the inestimable advantage of early domestic training towards the right employment of their higher faculties. The work laid down can often only be accomplished by means of the promptitude that is a chief characteristic of instinctive action. The child who uses his sensorium to master the sounds of his task, uses an instrument perfected for him by the Great Artificer. The child who uses his intelligence must perfect the instrument for himself, must grope in the dark, must puzzle, must catch at stray gleams of light, before his mind can embrace the whole of any but the simplest question. The former brings out his result, such as it is, immediately ; the latter by slow degrees, often first giving utterance to the steps by which he is reaching it. The former is commonly thought quick and clever ; the latter slow and stupid : and the educational treatment of each is based upon this assumption, widely as it is often at variance with the facts. The child whose tendency is to sensational activity should be held back ; and be made to master the meaning of everything he is allowed to learn. He is usually encouraged to remember sounds, is pushed forward, is crammed with words to the exclusion of knowledge, is taught to consider himself a prodigy of youthful talent. The child who tries to understand his lessons should be encouraged, praised, supplied with food for thought of a kind suited to his capacity, and aided by a helping hand over the chief difficulties in his path. He is usually snubbed as a dunce, punished for his slowness, forced into sensational learning as his only escape from disgrace. The master, in many cases, has little option in the matter. Children are expected to know more than they have time to learn ; parents and examiners must have show and surface, things only to be purchased at the expense of solidity and strength. A discreet teacher may often feel sympathy with the difficulties of a pupil ; but the half hour allotted to the class is passing away, the next subject is treading upon the heels of the present one, the child must complete his task like the rest, and so a budding intellect may be sacrificed to the demands of custom.

Among the children of the educated classes the circumstances of domestic life usually afford to the intelligence an amount of stimulus which, if not of the best possible kind, is at least sufficient to compensate, in some degree, for the sensational work of school. The easy nursery lessons of the pre-scholastic age, the story-books of childhood, the talk of parents and friends, all furnish food for leisurely reflection, all serve to suggest those strange questions that are one chief evidence of thoughtfulness in the young. Minds thus prepared may often flourish, in spite of subsequent excessive teaching; and by forgetting nine-tenths of what has been learned, may find it possible to understand the rest.

In what are called "Elementary schools," however, those aided by the nation for the instruction of the children of the poor, we do not find this accidental provision against the paralyzing effects of the prescribed routine. For the most part, the children have grown up like wild animals, excepting for the advantage of an occasional beating; and their nervous centres have received few impressions unconnected with the simplest wants of existence. Coincidentally with an entire absence of intellectual cultivation, they usually display a degree of sensational acuteness not often found in the nurseries of the wealthy; and arising from that habitual shifting for themselves in small matters which is forced upon them by the absence of the tender and refined affection that loves to anticipate the wants of infancy. They go to school for a brief period; and the master strives to cram them with as much knowledge as possible. They learn easily,—but they learn only sounds; and seldom know that it is possible to learn anything more. In many cottages there are children who, as they phrase it, "repeat a piece" at the half-yearly examination. We say, from frequent experiments, that they will learn for this purpose a passage in any foreign language as easily as in English; or that they will learn an English paragraph backwards way, if told to do so; and that, in neither case, will any curiosity be excited about the meaning of the composition. In ordinary practice, the master explains what they repeat, saying, this means so and so; and the pupils have sufficient sensational acuteness to remember the sounds he utters, and to reproduce them when called upon. They do not usually understand what "meaning" is. An urchin may be able to say correctly that a word pointed out to him is an adverb or a pronoun, may proceed to give a definition of either, and examples of instances of its occurrence, and may produce an impression that he understands all this, when the truth is that he has only learned to make certain noises in a particular order, and when he is unable to say anything intelligible about the matter in language of his own. Or he may repeat the multiplication table, and even work by it, saying that

seven times eight are fifty-six, without knowing what fifty-six is, or what seven times eight means. He knows all about seven or eight, not from schooling, but from the lessons of life, from having had seven nuts or eight marbles; but of the fifty-six, which is beyond his experience, he knows nothing. The nature of the mental operations of such children is perhaps as little known, to the teacher, to the vicar of the parish, or the kind ladies who take an interest in the school, as the nature of the mental operations of the inhabitants of Saturn. The adults distinctly understand a thing which they feel to be very easy, and do not know that any children *can* talk about it correctly without attaching an idea to their words. They often think the teaching satisfactory which enables the pupil to explain things in set phrases. They do not realize the possibility that the explanation may be as little understood as the statement which it explains—that it may be like the tortoise in the Hindoo myth, which supports the elephant, but which, requiring support itself, only removes the difficulty by a single step—that it may be a second unknown quantity balancing the first in the equation $x = y$. Such, however, instead of bare possibilities, are too frequently actual results.

The best recorded illustration of such sensational learning is given by the Rev. Mr. Brookfield, H.M.'s Inspector, in his official report for 1855-6. Mr. Brookfield called upon two children, aged about eleven years, "who did their arithmetic and reading tolerably well, who wrote something pretty legible, intelligible, and sensible about an omnibus and about a steam-boat," to write down the answers of the Church catechism to two questions. It must be observed that they had been accustomed to *repeat* the Catechism during half an hour of each day, in day-school and Sunday-school, for four or five years, and the following is what they wrote:—

"My duty toads God is to bleed in him to fering and to loaf withold your arts withold my mine withold my sold and with my sernth to whirchp and to give thinks to put my old trast in him to call upon him to onner his old name and his world and to save him truly all the days of my lifes end.

Again—

"My dooty tords my Nabers to love him as thyself and to do to all men as I wed thou shall do and to me to love onner and suke my farther and mother to onner and to bay the queen and all that are pet in a forty under her to smit myself to all my gooness teaches sportial pastures and marsters to oughten mysilf lordly and every to all my betteres to hut nobody by would nor deed to be trew in jest in all my deelins to beer no malis nor ated in your arts to kep my ands from

pecken and steel my turn from evil speak and lawing and slanders not to civet nor desair othermans good but to larn labor trewly to git my own leaving and to do my dooty in that state if life and to each it his please to god to call men."

Again—

"They did promis and voal three things in my name first that I should pernounce of the devel and all his walks pumps and valities of this wicked wold and all the sinful larsts of the flesh."

A story equally characteristic has recently appeared in the *Glasgow Commonwealth*. It relates that a traveller in one of the western islands of Sootland was assailed by a pert and communicative little boy, who offered to repeat to him the names of all the capitals in Europe, and who did so without error or apparent difficulty. The traveller, being a person of inquiring mind, rather sceptical as to the value of the lad's acquirements, asked him if he knew the name of the island he lived in (Skye); and, to prevent any misapprehension of the question, it was repeated in Gaelic, but no name was forthcoming. He knew the name of the parish, and of almost every capital in the world, but not of the island he lived in. The traveller then ventured another question, "Now, my lad," quoth he, "you have told us the names of nearly all the capitals in the world; is a capital a man or a beast?" "It's a beast," said the boy, quite decisively.

The paraphrase of the Catechism recorded by Mr Brookfield has been often quoted; but we have thought it worthy of reproduction here, if only on account of the observations which that gentleman has made concerning it. He remarks, very justly, that the error is not a mere matter of spelling, not a phonetic expression of ideas that are understood, but that it involves absolute non-apprehension of the meaning of the passages. He is startled by the discovery of this non-apprehension, and thinks it traceable to the almost obsolete language of the Catechism, while he believes in the general intelligence of the children, as shown by their power of writing what was not nonsense about certain objects. We cannot, of course, express an opinion otherwise than from the facts before us; but we are strongly tempted to believe that these objects were familiar to the children out of school, and that their knowledge of them was gained from experience rather than from teaching. We have observed similar non-apprehension, over and over again, of matters expressed in current phraseology; but school teachers and managers seldom observe it, because they seldom look deep enough. They are mostly unacquainted with the complexity and extent of sensational operations in the young; they have scarcely ever been accustomed to analyse the acts of the mind, and they think they have probed the depths of intellectual

consciousness before they have even approached the surface. Working with the intelligence themselves, and feeling more or less a sense of discomfort in connexion with what is obscure, a *besoin de comprendre*, a necessity to puzzle, they have no experience of that tranquil resting upon remembered sensations which is, we believe, the most frequent result of their tutorial labours.

We have already referred incidentally to a learned pig, and to the parallelism between its training and some kinds of human education. Persons familiar with the tricks taught to animals are aware that these may all be described as muscular actions performed each consecutively to its proper signal. On hearing the finger nails of the master click together, the animal does something in obedience to the sensation; nods its head, or shakes its head, or stands erect, as the case may be. It has no idea that the nod is an affirmation, or the shake a negation, and probably has no thirst for knowledge about the matter, being content to play its part correctly, and to escape the whip. In the case of children, the medium of communication is different, and the kind of response is different; but the faculty in action is commonly the same. The words of the pig's master are mere by-play, intended to amuse the audience, and the signal is conveyed by other sounds. The words of the human teacher or examiner, his questions for instance, are the signals to the child, each requiring its appropriate answer; but like the signals to the pig, they are aural sensations, capable, as such, of producing muscular action through the medium of the sensorium alone. The responses of the child are in words—that is to say, in sounds that he has been taught, and that he remembers, but of which he need not understand one iota in order to repeat them, any more than the pig need understand the affirmative or negative character of its nod or shake. In the human species articulate speech is an act precisely analogous to locomotion, requiring the combined and harmonious working of several muscles, and the guidance of sense, but in no way essentially connected with the intelligence; and the child may make the right noises in the right order, just as the pig does not nod its head when the signal requires it to be shaken.

A general idea of the facts which we have endeavoured to state was conveyed to the public, many years ago, by a phrase now almost forgotten. Educationists found, by experience, that children managed to retain sounds without meaning, and they called the process “learning by rote.” Books, pamphlets, and speeches bore witness to the practical inutility of such learning, and were full of suggestions for improving upon it. But these suggestions, to the best of our recollection of them, did not go to the root of the matter, and were mainly based on the assumption

that learning by rote was characterized by some sort of deficiency only, and not by a radical error in the kind of impression made upon the pupil. It was not distinctly stated, or commonly conceded (although often implied in phraseology), that the action of the child's mind was of a nature essentially distinct from that which it would be the object of a wise instructor to excite; and the cause of the error was mainly sought in teaching not carried far enough to be beneficial, or not continued sufficiently long to produce permanent results. We conceive that the recent development of nervous physiology entitles us to maintain that learning by rote is at once the effect and the evidence of operations limited to the sensorial ganglia; and that such operations have no tendency, however they may be complicated or prolonged, to excite those functions of the cerebrum which are the peculiar attributes of humanity.

Our brief remaining space must be devoted to an examination of the effects of sensational learning, both as it exists, *pure et simple*, in most schools for the poor, and also in the form, more or less modified, which may be found in other institutions.

Physiologically speaking, the effect of purely sensational learning will be to stimulate the nutrition and increase the vigour of the sensorial tract at the expense of neighbouring and related organs. As we have seen, the sensorium has a natural tendency to predominance in the encephalon; and this tendency will be increased in every way, absolutely by direct excitation, and relatively by neglect of the intellect and volition. The sensations by which the stimulus has been given will not be long remembered, being superseded by fresh ones arising out of events, as the apparatus of the gymnasium would be superseded by the instruments of actual conflict. With the exception of being perhaps able to read with labour, and to write with difficulty, the pupils must not be expected, six months after leaving school, to possess any traces of their "education" beyond an invigorated sensorium and a stunted intelligence.

The transitory nature of the so-called learning is abundantly shown by the reports of her Majesty's Inspectors. One of these gentlemen, with admirable naïveté, italicises the following question:—"To what purpose in after life is a boy taught, if the intervention of a school vacation is to be a sufficient excuse for entirely forgetting his instructions?"

Now, when it is remembered that present sensations are the source of the least exalted kinds of animal gratification, and that sensations, either present, or remembered, or conceived, when combined with a feeling of pleasure or pain, constitute the emotions which so powerfully influence human conduct, it must be admitted that the sensorium is at least the seat of develop-

ment of those passions and propensities which society, for its own good, is compelled to keep in check, and which every consideration of right teaches individuals to subdue. When, therefore, we reflect upon the operation of predominant emotions in producing, among other evils, chorea, hysteria, epilepsy, and insanity, or when we consider the aggregate of misery produced, especially among the lower orders, by the unbridled indulgence of various appetites, we cannot altogether concur in the propriety of a system of education which has a direct tendency to raise the source of these emotions and appetites to an undue and unnatural prominence in the organism.

As evidence of the stunted intelligence of children withdrawn from elementary schools, we have to offer the simple theory of the process, the testimony of H.M.'s Inspectors, and the results of personal observation.

Under the first of these three heads it is only necessary to point out the effect of habitual sensational activity in rendering the pupil content with sense perceptions. The *besoin de comprendre*, the love of knowledge inherent in all minds, will not survive the continual and energetic repression of a teacher, who says practically to the children—"You must learn this lesson, or work this sum by rule; but you must not take time enough to understand what you are doing." The class thus treated will not only cease to think about their tasks, but they will leave school prepared to act without thought in all the relations of life. Few of them, under any training, would be eminent in philosophy; but fewer still, perhaps, would have been left by nature the utterly unreasoning animals that they frequently become.

The testimony of her Majesty's Inspectors, as contained in their annual reports, will hardly admit of quotation within the limits of our space. It is apparent that these gentlemen endeavour to discover the best features of the system which they superintend; and their most damaging admissions are often obscured by an unconscious circumlocution arising from a constant balancing of the praiseworthy against the blameable. The educational blue book for 1855-6 we have already mentioned as containing more reference than many others to the real efficiency of schools; and having thus indicated a source from which abundant materials for the formation of a correct judgment may be drawn, we will content ourselves with the following very brief citations:—

The Rev. F. Watkins says:

"On all sides you hear of the little regard paid by young people to parental authority, of the great love of dress, and carelessness about running into debt, of pleasure-seeking at cost of time, money, and character, above all, of the increase of drunkenness, that fruitful

mother of all vices. It is impossible to hear all these constantly reiterated statements, and to be convinced of their general accuracy, without feeling that, whatever may have been earnestly and rightly attempted towards the education of the working classes, there is but little yet really done."

The Rev. W. J. Kennedy says :

"I think there is truth in the statement that those who leave our national schools deteriorate intellectually rather than improve."

Dr. Woodford says :

"Boys who were employed in extracting square and cube roots, and who were pretty successful in bringing out the right result . * * * not only could not express, but had no idea of what was meant by the term *root* in relation to that of square or cube."

The test of personal observation must always be difficult to apply, and liable to the fallacies which invalidate conclusions drawn from a limited number of instances. But, in our own experience, we have met with so many examples of what may be called habitual non-reflection in young people who had been, six months before, among the most glib and fluent pupils at a sensational school, that we fancy we can recognise a kind of stupidity thus induced, and that we can readily distinguish it from anything at all similar that is purely natural. The former variety bears a strong general resemblance to animal instincts, as they are sometimes displayed under circumstances which must obviously defeat their purposes (thus a captive beaver will construct an useless dam in his place of confinement), so as to prove to demonstration that the creatures exhibiting them have no conception of the objects which, in a state of nature, they blindly but unerringly attain. Our readers may easily note for themselves examples of conduct similarly aimless, or may hear of them from any lady who has ever attempted to train, as a household servant, a girl from the village school. The examples will mostly resolve themselves into this, that directions given are acted upon, like instinctive impulses, "prior to reflection." The particular cases in point are mostly trivial ; but we cannot abstain from placing upon record that a budding domestic, being told by her mistress to put wire gauze covers over various eatables on the shelves of a larder, piled all the covers, Ossa upon Pelion, over one dish, and left the remaining ones at the mercy of the flies of August. Unquestionably, great pains must have been bestowed upon her.

Apart from such consequences to the children, there are others, not unworthy of note, which affect the parents or the community. Educationists raise their voices and wail, because the attendance of the pupils is irregular, and their removal commonly premature.

In other words, the labouring classes do not cordially respond to the invitations which are held out to them for the benefit of their offspring. They use the schools for their own purposes only. They regard them as places of refuge for infants and young children, serving to take them out of the way of the busy housewife, and to shelter them from the perils of the street; but, in an overwhelming majority of cases, the teaching received enters scarcely at all into the account. It does not impart anything which untaught parents can themselves appreciate, neither does it develop the general intelligence in such a way as to excite their admiration or command their sympathy. When boyhood or girlhood is attained, the children are permitted to leave school, in some cases that they may indulge in the luxury of idleness, in some that they may respectably follow creditable employments, in some that their earnings may assist (with or without urgent need for such assistance) in the maintenance of the family. There are probably very few instances in which the departure is sincerely regretted either by the child or its parents.

We say "sincerely" because the school often represents a powerful interest which the parents think it necessary to conciliate, even at the expense of a kind of duplicity which too frequently enters into their daily life. It is not uncommon for a mother touchingly to deplore the necessity for her son's removal, and to tell the schoolmaster, (with a corner of her apron in her eye) that the employer of the father has insisted upon the services of the boy;—when, in reality, the work has been eagerly sought, and the employer prevailed upon to countenance the deception.

It is hardly necessary to advance any argument to prove the general indifference of the industrious poor with regard to schooling, except this, that they will make almost any sacrifice, undergo almost any privation, to obtain that which they really value. If they valued schooling, if they thought that one year more, or two years more, would be truly useful to their children, there are thousands who would cheerfully endure cold and hunger rather than allow the children to be deprived of the advantage. There have been many instances of such self-denial, exercised in furtherance of other laudable objects; but not one, within our observation, for the sake of school. We feel convinced, if elementary schools are ever raised out of their present dreary routine of sensational teaching, if they ever succeed in awakening the intelligence of a fair proportion of their pupils, that the eagerness of the poor for education will speedily keep pace with the liberality of the rich in providing it; and that the nation will have the satisfaction of being able to point out results, as well as to grumble over payments.

We turn from this tempting theme, this brief vision of a scholastic Utopia, in order to consider the processes and results of Dr. Grindall, the presiding genius of Blunderbore House for Young Gentlemen.

These processes and results are, upon the whole, what might be expected from a teacher who ignores the great truth that cultivation of mind is necessary to the assimilation of learning; and who imagines that the introduction of compressed facts will mechanically expand the intellect. Upon this last false principle Master Thompson, in this nineteenth century, and in the ninth year of his age, is forcibly and tyrannically inducted into various kinds of knowledge: in the hope that all the teaching and lecturing and cramming, all the scraps of science, bundles of facts, odds and ends of common things, Greek verbs, Latin verbs, German verbs, French verbs, Scripture history, ancient history, modern history, natural history, rules of syntax, rules of arithmetic, rules of algebra, and rules of conduct, the propositions of Euclid and the theory of ventilation, the rationale of catarrh and the law of storms, that all these several matters will eventually, like the talk of S. T. C., "converge in light;" and coherently illuminate a full-grown Thompson, possessed of sufficient ballast for his sails, sufficient parts for his attainments, and sufficient brains for the application of his learning.

The Young Gentlemen, it must be remembered, have not spent their pre-scholastic years in making dirt pies in a gutter. Had they done so, had the instructions of Dr. Grindall been the first that were ever afforded them, the normal elementary school result would have followed as a matter of course;—the sensational learning, the dense unreflecting stupidity. But young gentlemen, for the most part, have tender and loving mothers, whose pleasant task it has been to make every sense a door leading to the intelligence. The intellect, thus called into activity, can seldom be wholly crushed beneath instruction. Sometimes (as shoots of ivy will lift or rend a rock), it even springs into luxuriant growth, pushes away the cumbrous obstacles of so-called learning, finds for itself the aliment required for its support, and animates the pupils who are the pride of the school, who gain its honours, receive its rewards, support its reputation at the universities and in the world. Much more frequently, it is condemned to an etiolated and weak existence, as may be seen in the numerous boys in whom the desiderated convergence has not occurred; but whose minds are productive of chromatic aberration, fringing transmitted facts and arguments with blue, red, or yellow, according to variations of temperament or character. In these boys, after years of costly and pretentious teaching, one may observe such mental and general habits, and such a store of

really available information, as they might have gained at the humble commercial academy of a country town. Is it that they represent the proportion, whether large or small, of pupils who are so organized as to receive no commensurate benefit from the best kind of education, who are incorrigibly idle, or incurably dull, or, in fact, the failures of nature rather than of the preceptor? We think not. Nature, we believe, is seldom such a bungler. She is the *alma mater*;—Art the *injuncta noverca*.

We should be disposed, on the whole, to seek the rationale of the Blunderbore House failures rather in a partial and misdirected training of the intelligence, than in its complete suppression. The pupils mix intellectual and sensational acts, not in their proper relations with each other, but in a jumble. Comprehension is brought to bear upon everything that is easy; while a difficulty of any kind is committed to the safe keeping of the sense perceptions, and the explanation of it is only remembered. Hence arise a habit of resting upon imperfect knowledge, and a habit of loading the memory by the aid of faulty associations; and these habits, in their turn, are the sources of the lively superficial stupidity which is so common among the better classes. The sufferers from it form that great public to whom are addressed the Morisonian system of pathology and therapeutics, and the elaborately argued advertisements of Norton's Camomile Pills. Everything that follows "because" is to their minds an explanation; everything that has an antecedent is to their minds an effect. Their creed is that all questions lie in a nutshell; and, according to Professor Faraday, their shibboleth is "it stands to reason." On this ground they would placidly maintain against Owen the existence of the sea-serpent. For their especial behoof bubble companies are formed; and upon their weaknesses innumerable Barnums thrive. Their deficiency is chiefly this,—that having been permitted from childhood to do many things superficially and with inexactness, they have forfeited the power of arranging their ideas with precision, or of comparing them with caution. They can therefore scarcely be said to possess any assured convictions, or rooted principles of conduct; but, nevertheless, they are ready to decide in all controversies; and are "wiser in their own conceit than seven men who can render a reason."

The cause of such educational errors we should express in the single word—*empiricism*. For successive ages teachers had no guide but experience; and the results of this experience appeared to defy generalization. The almost self-evident proposition, that the training of the mind should be guided by an analysis of its powers, was brought into early disrepute by the conditions under which such analysis was attempted. The men engaged in it,

learned, patient, laborious, profound, reached the limit of discovery by the method of reflection long before the method of observation was disclosed to them. Too exclusively metaphysical, they wanted a link to connect them with the material world. Like the children of Israel, they were wandering in a wilderness before they entered the promised land. Their advanced messengers had not yet returned, bringing of the fruits that were hereafter to reward their labour. Foiled in their advance by a barrier that seemed impassable, they were tempted to waste their energies in the invention of technicalities and the multiplying of verbal distinctions. Under such circumstances the science and its professors were too broad a mark to escape the shafts of satire; and thus, even at the present day, there are scars to show the wounds which those shafts have made.

During the last few years, however, the dark portions of this much condemned pursuit have received unexpected illumination from the study of the nervous centres. The painstaking researches of Bell, Marshall Hall, and less conspicuous fellow-labourers, endowed with value and stamped with currency by the lofty generalizations of the living philosopher who has so long been *facile princeps* among all inquirers into the functions of the nervous system, have already produced a psychology that is available for practical purposes, and that promises to increase daily in importance. In the meanwhile education has spread enormously; but educators persist in traversing the broad old road. The larger the field for their efforts, the more conspicuous becomes the poverty of their results. At one time, learning by rote was the great obstacle; and they attacked, as the last difficulty in their path, what was but the first aspect of a Proteus. At present (with the scheme of National Education all but a confessed and palpable failure; with numerous individuals in all ranks displaying powers developed, late in life, by circumstances, but never suspected before; and with a waste of the national intellect that may possibly be equivalent to the daily loss of a century's progress), the office of preceptor is still confided to persons who have never bestowed a single thought upon the faculties or the mechanism of the mind, and who cannot distinguish between sensational and intellectual action, if the former be veiled by the smallest complexity. And, as a crowning absurdity, a reverend Inspector of Schools towers, like Milton's chaos, above the fray; and proposes a panacea, based upon an error that was exploded, sixty-seven years ago, by the pen of Dugald Stewart!

We must not conclude the present article without mentioning the kinds of reform that appear to be most urgently required; although we propose, upon an early occasion, to consider this portion of the subject in detail.

In elementary schools for the poor, there should perhaps be nothing attempted, except to give a capacity for self-education. For this purpose the mechanical difficulties of reading and writing should be thoroughly overcome, and the teacher should bear in mind that his pupils require from him the first stimulus to the intelligence. Instead of the little ones being left to pupils or monitors, they should be the especial charge of the master himself; and their first efforts to learn and understand should be promoted with the most assiduous care and the most untiring patience. The tracks of sensation and intellect diverge; and the child will follow that into which he is guided at the outset of his journey.

In the ordinary time allotted to schooling, the several divisions of the scheme of elementary instruction are mere *ignes fatui*, which it is hopeless to pursue. The children cannot learn Geography, or History, or half a dozen other matters. But by sacrificing these they might learn to read with facility and pleasure, to write, to work and comprehend a simple sum. They might also be made to feel the gratification inseparable from an exercise of the understanding; and, if they did so, the library would complete what the school was compelled to leave unfinished.

The schools for classes higher in the social scale could only be improved upon similar principles; but the home training of the pupils, and the longer time devoted to them, must always afford facilities for combining a good deal of instruction with the education. The recent middle class examinations show clearly that teachers have failed in the former as decidedly as they have in the latter: and this result need not excite surprise. For instruction without mental education must necessarily resemble the plum-pudding that was made in Paris; and for which everything was remembered, *except the cloth*.

Towards the carrying out of any improvement, however, the first step must be to demand from teachers either a knowledge of mental philosophy, or, at least, of a scholastic art founded upon the principles which mental philosophy would inculcate. We believe this demand must inevitably be made in process of time; but we feel also that it would be greatly promoted if the medical profession would recognise, and strive to impress, the distinct bearing of physiology upon the development of the mind, as well as upon that of the body.

The practical difficulties which it is easy to foresee, all resolve themselves, pretty clearly, into one. An inquiry after intelligent and intelligible teaching has not yet issued from the public. They are content with something else. Whenever this contentment ceases, the means of supply will spring out of the want. And until then we would urge, upon individual

parents, that they may accomplish much by encouraging, in their little ones, a spirit of curiosity and a habit of comprehension. Whether the fire of intellect shall blaze, or smoulder, will depend, in many cases, upon the manner in which it is kindled; and this kindling is among the things that can be done, most effectually, under the mild influences of Home.

ART. III.—THE METHOD AND STATISTICS OF SUICIDE.

It was formerly customary in this country to regard the northern portion of a churchyard as unhallowed, and to bury in it the bodies of suicides, of the executed and excommunicated, and of unbaptised infants. The more fortunate dead were interred in the southern, eastern, or western portions of the burial-ground, and headstones, or more pretentious monuments, and simple grave-mounds, freely heaped up from year to year by the careful hands of relatives or of the sexton, marked the position of each grave; but in the northern portion of the burial-ground, the grave-mounds, disregarded, were quickly hidden amidst a rank growth of weeds, and could scarcely be distinguished if sought for, or wasting beneath the wind and the rain, they were early destroyed altogether. At any time we might readily count the graves of the fortunate dead, but few traces of the graves of the unfortunate dead would ever be found.

Much in the same fashion as the bodies of suicides were once dealt with in churchyards have the statistics of suicides been treated in the mortality records of the kingdom. Buried without distinction, within the class of deaths from external causes, these records have been hidden from the sight of the observer, except at rare and irregular intervals, when (thanks to Dr. Farr) the Registrar-General has turned aside from the well-tended figures of the legitimately dead, and brought to light those which tell of the illegitimately dead. A recent instance of this kind is to be found in the last (the 19th) Annual Report of the Registrar-General. This report contains a tabular account of the suicides which have been committed in England and Wales during the five years 1852-56, the age and the sex of the individuals who have destroyed themselves, and the mode in which the destruction was effected, being shown. According to the Registrar-General's Tables, 1045 suicides were committed in 1852; 1031 in 1853; 1081 in 1854; 1076 in 1855; and 1182 in 1856; making a total number of 5415 suicides during the five years.

The number of suicides in the mortality returns made to the Registrar-General is, according to Dr. Farr, probably less by one-tenth than the number actually ascertained to have occurred.

In 1856, the suicides noted in the registers amounted to 1182, but the coroners' returns for that year, contained in Mr. Redgrave's Tables (*Judicial Statistics*, p. 11), make the number 1814, from which, however, Dr. Farr remarks, "a few should be deducted for the duplicate return." The difference between the number of suicides returned by the coroners and the number occurring in the registers of mortality, may be owing to obscurities in the verdicts.

Of the individuals who committed suicide during the period included in the Registrar-General's Tables, 3886 were males, and 1529 females, making an average annual mortality from this mode of death of 85.1 of the former sex, and 82.5 of the latter, in every 1,000,000 individuals living from ten years and upwards of each sex respectively.

In both sexes, suicide first occurs between the 10th and 15th years of age, and from this period the gross number of suicides in each sex increases until the decennium 45—55, when a maximum is reached; after which the number steadily declines until the decennium 85—95. Subsequent to the 95th year no suicides are recorded.

If the proportion of suicides be calculated upon every 1,000,000 individuals living of each sex at different periods of life from the age of ten years, the maximum number of suicides is found to have occurred among males within the decennium 55-65; and among females, within the decennium 65-75. In the male sex the decrement of the mortality from suicide was more gradual than the increment, the number of suicides in the three decenniums succeeding the maximum, being considerably in excess of the number occurring in the three decenniums immediately preceding it. In the female sex, the proportion of suicides which occurred between the 45th and 55th years (83.6) differed but slightly from the maximum (84.0) between the 65th and 75th years, and in the intermediate decennium, 55-65, the proportion was 80.2. The decrement of the number of suicides was, moreover, less regular than among males—the number occurring in the decennium immediately succeeding the maximum falling to 48.8, while in the terminal decennium 85-95, the proportion increased to 50.9.

It would seem then, from these returns, that the greatest tendency to suicide, in this country, is manifested in the male sex from the 55th to the 65th year, in the female sex from the 65th to the 75th year, and that in both sexes the tendency to suicide is greater during middle age and the decline of life than during the earlier periods of life.

The returns of suicides for 1888-89, contained in the Registrar-General's Third Annual Report, also indicate that the tendency

to suicide is greatest in the decline of life; the figures showing that, in proportion to every 100,000 individuals living at different ages, of both sexes, the maximum number of suicides occurred in the decennium 50-60, and that the proportion occurring in the three decenniums subsequent to the maximum exceeded that occurring in the three preceding it.

The following table shows the actual number of the suicides which happened at different periods of life, in each sex, during the years 1852-56, and the proportionate number to every 1,000,000 individuals living, of both the one sex and the other, in the same period,

DEATHS at different Ages returned as having occurred from Suicide, in England, during the Five Years 1852-56.

AGES AT DEATH.												
MALES.												
All Ages.	5-	10-	15-	25-	35-	45-	55-	65-	75-	85-	95 & upwds.	!
3886	—	19	848	547	726	910	778	410	127	9	—	12
Deaths to 1,000,000 Living at the different periods of Life.												
85.1	—	3.8	40.1	80.0	138.4	240.0	311.1	295.6	252.4	136.2	—	—
FEMALES.												
All Ages.	5-	10-	15-	25-	35-	45-	55-	65-	75-	85-	95 & upwds.	!
1529	—	14	278	244	272	336	219	185	28	5	—	3
Deaths to 1,000,000 Living at the different periods of Life.												
82.3	—	2.8	30.2	33.3	49.3	83.6	80.2	84.0	43.8	50.9	—	—

The most interesting portion of the Registrar-General's Tables, perhaps, consists in the curious and suggestive information they contain upon the method of suicide. The returns made under this head, although confessedly imperfect, are still the most comprehensive that have yet been published in reference to this country. The modes in which suicide was effected are arranged

in five classes. The *first* class contains the suicides connected with railways, the act of destruction having been effected by leaping from one of the carriages or from the engine of a train in motion, or by taking up a position in front of an approaching train and being run over. In this class ten instances, all males, are found. The *second* class contains suicides connected with mines, the individuals having cast themselves down the shafts. In this class are found 13 instances, nine males and four females, the former number being in the proportion of 0·23 per cent. of the total male suicides, and the latter number 0·26 per cent. of the total female, thus showing a slight excess among females in having recourse to this method of destruction. The *third* class contains the suicides effected by mechanical injuries, the individuals having destroyed themselves by leaping from windows, heights, or conveyances; by cutting the throat, by gun-shot wounds, or by wounds otherwise produced. In this class are found 1424 instances, 1128 males and 296 females, the former constituting 29·02 per cent. of the total male suicides and the latter 10·35 per cent. of the total female. The *fourth* class contains the suicides effected by chemical injuries, the individuals having destroyed themselves by fire or by poison. In this class are found 561 instances, 302 males and 259 females, the former constituting 7·77 per cent. of the total male suicides, the latter 16·93 of the total female. The *fifth* class contains suicides effected by suspension of the respiration, the individuals having destroyed themselves by drowning, hanging, or in some other manner causing cessation of breathing. In this class are found 3212 instances, 2285 males and 927 females, the former constituting 58·02 per cent. of the total male suicides, and the latter 60·62 per cent. of the total female. The method of suicide is not stated in 195 instances, 152 (3·91 per cent.) males, and 41 (2·81 per cent.) females.

Of the particular modes of effecting suicide among *males*, *hanging* is the commonest, this being the fashion in which death was caused in 1745 instances (44·00 per cent. of the total number), and if the number of suicides by *strangulation* (99) be added, the per centage would be raised to 47·45. Next in order of frequency is *cut-throat*, this being the mode in which life was destroyed in 810 instances (20·84 per cent.). *Drowning* stands third in the list and *poisoning* fourth, the former being the method of destruction in 434 instances (11·16 per cent.) the latter in 221 instances (5·68 per cent.).

Among *females*, *hanging* is also the most frequent method of suicide, this being the form of destruction had recourse to in 510 instances (38·85 per cent. of the total number), and the suicides by *strangulation* (28) being added, the per centage is raised to

35·18. *Drowning* has the second place in the order of frequency, this being the mode of death in 385 instances (25·17 per cent.). *Poisoning* stands third in order, and *cut-throat* fourth, there being 267 instances (16·80 per cent.) of suicide among females by the former method, and 240 (15·66 per cent.) by the latter.

While, therefore, in both sexes *hanging* is the commonest method of suicide, the female has recourse to it one-third less frequently than the male. On the other hand, *drowning* is very much more common among females than males. Suicide by *cut-throat* is not so frequent by one-third among the former sex as the latter, and while the former counts only a total number of two suicides from *gun-shot wounds*, the latter counts 215. If suicides from wounds the character of which is not defined be added to those arising from gun-shot wounds, a sub-class would be formed numbering 263 males, but only 12 females. In another form of suicide from mechanical injury the number of the male sex sinks below the female, for although the total number of suicides occasioned by leaping from a window or height was in the former sex 53 and in the latter 41, the per centage upon the total number of suicides in the different sexes was 1·36 males and 2·64 females.

The number of suicides by poisoning among females not only exceeded by more than one-third those among males from the same method, but the poisons made use of by the former sex were more varied in character than those used by the latter. The female sex had recourse most frequently to *opium and its preparations* as the agents of destruction. *Laudanum* was the poison used in 29·4 per cent. of the suicides by poisoning (in which the kind of poison used is stated) among females, and if the instances in which *opium* was used be added, the per centage is raised to 36·1 per cent. *Laudanum* was the poison used by 28·8 per cent. of the male suicides, and the instances of suicide by opium and morphia (there being one instance only in which the last mentioned drug was made use of) being added, the per centage is raised to 34·0. But among males *prussic acid* was used in the same proportion of suicides by poison as *laudanum* (28·8 per cent.) and the *essential oil of almonds* was the destructive agent made use of in 14·2 per cent., these poisons together forming a per centage of 43·1. Thus *prussic acid* in its ordinary form, or as it exists in the *essential oil of almonds*, was the poison most frequently used among males, *opium and its preparations* holding the second place in order of frequency. *Arsenic* and *oxalic acid* hold the second place in commonness of use among the poisons used by female suicides, the per centage of each poison being the same, 18·8; but the first-named poison, *arsenic*, stands third in the list of frequency among males, the per centage of its use in the

suicides by poison of that sex being 10·3. The per centage of suicides by prussic acid among females amounts only to 4·4, but that by the essential oil of almonds to 10·0, together forming a per centage of 14·4.

Ten different forms of poison are named as being made use of by male suicides and seventeen by female. Opium, in one form or other, was the poison made use of in 84·9 per cent. of the total number of suicides by poisoning in both sexes, and in which the kind of poison used is stated; prussic acid in its ordinary state, or as it exists in the essential oil of almonds, in 30·5 per cent.; arsenic in 14·1 per cent., and oxalic acid in 12·2 per cent.

TABLE of *Suicides by Poisoning in England during the five years 1852-56.*

Poison used.	Males.	Females.	Poison used.	Males.	Females.
Arsenic	24	34	Oxalic Acid	15	34
Mercury	2	4	Sulphuric Acid	8	7
Corrosive Sublimate	0	2	Nitric Acid	1	1
Opium	11	12	Muriatic Acid	0	2
Morphia	1	0	Camphor	1	0
Laudanum	67	53	Phosphorus	0	1
Nux Vomica	1	1	Improper medicine (<i>not</i>		
Strychnia	1	1	<i>stated what kind</i>)	0	1
Prussic Acid	67	8	<i>Not stated how or other-</i>		
Cyanide of Potassium	0	1	<i>wise than by the above</i>		
Essential Oil of Almonds	83	18	<i>causes</i>	68	77

If the method of suicide be examined in reference to the age at which the deed was committed, the following results are obtained :—The suicides connected with railways commence between the 15—25th years, and no instance is recorded after the 75th year, the greatest number (3) occurring between the 45—55th years. The suicides connected with mines commence between the 10—15th years, when one female suicide is recorded, and no instance is mentioned after the 75th year among males, and after the 55th among females. The greatest number of suicides perpetrated in this mode, contained in this class, occur between the 65—75th years among males, and between the 15—25th among females, the number of suicides from 45—55, and from 65—75, in the last-mentioned sex being equal. The suicides by mechanical injuries commence by one male suicide between the 10—15th years, and increase gradually until 35—45 among males, and 45—55 among females, and in each sex, after the maximum, the numbers decrease steadily until 85—95, after which period no case is recorded. The suicides connected with mechanical injuries com-

mence also between the 10—15th years, two female suicides occurring within that period. Among males the number increases until the period 45—55, after which it decreases, and no case is recorded after the 85th year. Among females the maximum number occurs between the 15—25th years; decreases from 25—35; again increases within the period from 35—45, and then decreases until 75—85, after which no case is recorded. The suicides connected with asphyxia commence also in the period 10—15, and in both sexes the number increases gradually from period to period, until a maximum is reached in 45—55, after which it decreases until 85—95, no instance occurring after that period.

This is the progress of the actual number of suicides by different methods in both sexes, according to age; but if the progress be regarded in proportion to every 1,000,000 individuals living at the different periods of life indicated, the maxima of suicides by mechanical and chemical injuries and suspension of respiration do not coincide with the maxima of the total number of suicides by the methods thus classed. According to the calculation named, which shows most correctly the period of greatest tendency to this or that form of suicide, the maxima in the classes named occur at the following periods of life:—Mechanical injuries—*males*, 55—65; *females*, 65—75. Chemical injuries, both sexes, 45—55. Suspension of respiration—*males*, 55—65; *females*, 65—75.

If we examine also, according to age, particular methods of suicide calculated upon the same proportion of living, it is found that, among *males*, the number of *cut-throats* increased from 15—25 to 65—75, and then decreased; *gun-shot* wounds were in greater proportion between 15—20 than 25—35. After 35 the proportion increased until 55—65, decreased in the next decennial period, again increasing from 75—85. *Poisoning* increased from period to period until 45—55, when it reached a maximum, decreased from 55—65, increased in the next decennium, and then again decreased. *Drowning* increased gradually to a maximum in 55—65, then steadily decreased. *Hanging* increased from period to period until it reached a maximum in 55—65, then decreased to the last period of life. Among *females*, *cut-throat* increased until 45—55, decreased in 55—65, attained a maximum in 65—75, decreased in the decennium following, and again increased in 85—95. *Poisoning* increased from 10—15 to 15—25, decreased in 25—35, increased to a maximum in 45—55, decreased again in 65—75, and again increased in 75—85. *Drowning* increased from 10—15 to 15—25, decreased at a slight rate until 35—45, increased in 45—55, but varied only fractionally in the three decennial periods, 45—55,

55—65, and 65—75, the maximum being in 55—65, decreased considerably in 75—85, and again increased in the last decennial period 85—95. *Hanging* increased from 10—15 to a maximum in 65—75, then decreased rapidly throughout the remaining periods. These results may be regarded as a measure of the tendency to the different methods of suicide named at the periods of life stated.

The average annual proportion of the different methods of suicide at various ages to 1,000,000 living of each sex, during the years 1852—56, is shown in the following table:—

TABLE showing the average Annual proportion to 1,000,000 living of the different methods of Suicide in England and Wales during the five years 1852—56.

	Sex	All Ages	10—	15—	25—	35—	45—	55—	65—	75—	85—	95—
Connected with Railways . .	M.	·2	—	·1	·3	·4	·6	·4	·7	—	—	—
Mines.	F.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Coal	M.	·2	—	·1	·1	—	·5	·4	·2	—	—	—
	F.	·1	·2	·2	—	—	·2	—	—	—	—	—
Copper, Tin, &c.	M.	—	—	—	—	·2	—	—	—	—	—	—
	F.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mechanical Injuries . . .	M.	25·7	·2	10·0	27·2	54·6	66·4	85·1	74·1	77·5	60·6	—
	F.	6·5	—	3·5	7·6	10·5	12·3	15·3	21·8	9·4	20·4	—
Chemical Injuries . . .	M.	6·9	—	4·4	9·6	14·0	18·9	14·8	16·5	9·9	—	—
	F.	5·6	·4	7·2	5·7	10·3	14·1	10·6	6·2	7·8	—	—
Asphyxia . . .	M.	52·1	3·6	25·5	42·8	69·2	153·4	210·4	202·1	165·0	75·8	—
	F.	20·1	2·2	12·3	20·0	28·5	51·0	53·8	66·0	26·6	30·5	—
Cut Throat . .	M.	18·5	—	3·4	19·4	40·3	53·2	62·9	59·9	50·5	45·4	—
	F.	5·2	—	2·5	6·1	9·2	14·8	13·4	17·2	6·3	10·2	—
Gunshot Wounds	M.	4·9	·2	6·0	5·9	7·9	8·7	15·6	6·9	13·6	—	—
	F.	—	—	—	—	·2	·3	—	—	—	—	—
Poisoning . .	M.	6·9	—	4·3	9·5	14·0	18·9	14·8	16·5	9·9	—	—
	F.	5·6	·4	7·2	5·6	10·1	14·1	10·6	6·2	7·8	—	—
Drowning . .	M.	9·9	·6	5·8	11·0	17·4	26·0	33·7	29·2	14·7	—	—
	F.	8·4	1·4	13·5	10·8	10·1	15·1	15·3	15·2	6·3	10·2	—
Hanging . . .	M.	39·8	2·6	18·3	30·0	49·8	130·0	167·7	159·0	147·2	75·6	—
	F.	11·1	·8	5·3	8·5	17·4	35·0	25·8	37·7	18·8	20·4	—

The foregoing statistics, although chiefly valuable as presenting data for comparison with future returns, which it is to be hoped will now be regularly forthcoming from the Registrar-General's office, afford the materials for several deductions of greater or less precision.

1. The annual average number of suicides occurring in England and Wales in every 100,000 of the population, in the five years 1852—56, was, according to the preceding statistics, 5·81; and the annual average proportion per cent. in the total amount of deaths from all causes, 0·26. The third and sixth Annual Reports of the Registrar-General contain the statistics of the mortality from suicide in England and Wales for the three years 1838—40, and the annual average mortality of those years was 6·2 per 100,000 population, or 0·28 per cent. of the deaths from all causes. The

average of the five years 1852—56, whether calculated upon the population or total mortality, was, therefore, less than those of the three years 1838—40. But if a more legitimate comparison of equal periods be adopted, and the average of the three years 1854—56 compared with that of 1838—39, the results are different; for in the first mentioned three years the annual average of suicides was 7·6 per 100,000 population, or ·34 per cent. of the deaths from all causes, being in excess of the annual average of 1838—40. A period of three years is not, however, sufficient to obviate the disturbances arising from the somewhat wide variations which appear to take place within short spaces of time in the number of deaths from suicide, hence no deduction can be safely drawn from the foregoing figures except in relation to the periods to which they refer. It may perhaps be surmised, the returns for 1838—40 being the only accessible returns for England and Wales previous to those for 1852—56, and consequently containing the only trustworthy data at our disposal, that no very satisfactory grounds exist for the opinion, not unfrequently entertained, that there has been a considerable increase in the mortality from suicide, in this kingdom, of late years. This surmise is strengthened somewhat by the consideration that the returns for 1852—56 exhibit, according to Dr. Farr, an improvement in precision and correctness as compared with those of 1838—40.

It would be well to ascertain, if it were practicable, the degree in which the ascertained number of suicides approximates to the actual number occurring in the kingdom. We already know that the total number of suicides contained in the Registrar-General's returns for 1856 was probably one-tenth below the number ascertained to have occurred by a coroner's inquest, and Dr. Marc d'Espine, in a work recently published (*Essai Analytique et Critique de Statistique Mortuaire Comparée*: 1858—p. 97), arguing from the acknowledged imperfections of the Registrar-General's returns for 1840, from the abhorrence of suicide in this country, and consequent supposed tendency of the friends of suicides to hush up the matter if practicable, and from the fact that the English returns for the year stated showed a proportion of suicides five times less than the annual average of the canton of Geneva, conceives that it is infinitely more probable that the number of suicides given in the Registrar-General's returns "constitute but a fifth part of the suicides which really take place in England annually." The annual average of suicides to the total mortality from all causes in the canton of Geneva during the thirteen years 1838—47, 1853—55, was 1·21 per cent.; in England during the year 1840, 0·25 per cent. "But if," writes Dr. M. d'Espine, "about 1 per cent. of deaths from suicide is wanting, in what other classes

of disease have the deaths been registered? One portion would be included among violent deaths, another would receive the names of divers affections. Let us suppose 0·40 per cent. already inscribed among violent deaths, and 0·60 per cent. scattered in the remainder of the nosological arrangement, it follows that in order to complete the per centage of the violent deaths to the total amount of deaths from all causes, it is necessary to add to it 0·60 per cent. of suicides entered fraudulently in the registers. This would raise the real proportion of violent deaths in England to 4 per cent. of the total mortality, a proportion nearly identical with ours (Geneva)."

The canton of Geneva may boast of having the most perfect mortality records in Europe. The smallness of the canton has favoured the institution of regulations respecting the registration of deaths, which enable the officers of health to verify the number of deaths and their causes. The records of death from suicide in the canton are, therefore, as perfect as it is, perhaps, possible for mortality records to be. The annual average of deaths from suicide to the mortality from all causes, during a period of 18 years was, as already stated, 1·21 per cent. In England the per centage was 0·25, in 1840; 0·28, 1838—40; 0·26, 1852—56; Prussia, 0·38 (1850—2); Bavaria, 0·175 (seven years); Belgium, 0·23 (ten years); France, 0·26 (1843; Paris, 1·40); and Sardinia, 0·04 (1827—38)—the proportion in this last-mentioned country being six times less than in France and Belgium, nine times less than in Prussia, and thirty times less than in the canton of Geneva! What is the source of the great variations observed in the preceding averages? Are they to be assigned to difference of race, of habits, or of modes of thought? Or, is the explanation to be sought for in imperfections of the mortality statistics of the different countries? The last question is the one which first demands attention, for it is necessary to ascertain the worth of our data before we proceed to reason upon them. Now, Dr. M. d'Espine asserts, from the internal evidence of the returns of the countries referred to, and from the avowals of the authorities making the returns, that they are all more imperfect than the returns for the canton of Geneva, and that they differ greatly in degree of perfection among themselves: consequently, they cannot rightly be used in comparison with the returns of the canton or with one another. Moreover, he expresses the opinion that the most probable cause of the great differences observed in the annual average of the mortality from suicide in the different countries, is the greater or less degree of imperfection of their statistics, and he remarks that—

"Good statistics, those subjected to a severe criticism of the signification and value of the figures they contain, lead us more

and more to recognise that facts concerning population, even in the most trifling details, are the expression of laws that scientific investigation may determine; that the variations caused by climates and races are also appreciable, but that these variations are maintained in much straiter limits than might be supposed from the very imperfect documents which statisticians have still to work upon; that, lastly, when great differences are found to exist between the results afforded by two countries upon one and the same question, there is less chance of deception, if the differences are attributed to an inequality in the exactness of the methods of inquiry made use of by the two countries, than in referring them to variations in facts, which might lead us to suppose that the documents were of the same value on both sides.

"I believe, then, that I may, from the whole of the data which I have given (concerning violent deaths), draw the following general conclusion:—In the majority of European States, except in case of war or revolution, 8 to 5 per cent. of the deaths will have for primary cause an exterior accident; and in every 10 violent deaths, from 2 to 4 will be occasioned by suicide, or the proportion of suicides in every 1000 deaths will be from 6 to 15. It is solely within these limits that it is necessary to seek the variations which result from races, climates, and physical and moral dispositions of populations."—(*Op. cit.* pp. 101—2.)

It may be questioned whether this conclusion is not somewhat premature, considering the scanty amount of trustworthy data at Dr. M. d'Espine's command.

The proportion of suicides which may be contained in the list of "found dead," or which may be entered in the table of violent deaths without being distinguished, or may escape the inquest of a coroner's jury in this country, we have no means of knowing, but we can scarcely conceive that it reaches the extent supposed by M. d'Espine. If, however, we are to regard the tables contained in the Registrar-General's last report as the commencement of a systematic publication of the mortality from suicide, we feel assured that in Dr. Farr's hands the statistics will, in due time, receive the highest degree of elaboration of which they are capable, and that the measure of their imperfections will be fully set forth, so that, at least, any serious errors of deduction may be avoided.

2. In England, the number of suicides occurring at different ages increases from the decennial period, 10—15, to a maximum in 45—55, after which the number declines until 85—95, no instance being recorded subsequent to the 95th year. In the canton of Geneva the number increases to a maximum in the period 20—30 (the mortality from suicide in that period being eight times greater than in the previous one). After the maximum a gradual decrease takes place until 80—90, in which period only one instance

of suicide is recorded for a space of 13 years. In Paris, according to Brierré de Boismont (*Du Suicide et de la Foie Suicide*: 1856. pp. 75—76), the maximum occurs in the period 20—30, after which there is a gradual decrease until the final period indicated, 90—91. In the departments of France the maximum is not attained until 40—50, this being, in fact, about the same period that it occurs in England, if allowance be made for certain variations in the arrangement of the decennial periods in the statistics of the two countries; and if the French data be compared with the proportion of population at different ages, it is found that the number of suicides among the aged is relatively higher than among persons who have not passed mid-life. This coincides also with the results of the English returns.

The great difference which exists between the period of life at which the largest number of suicides occurs in the canton of Geneva and in England is remarkable. While in the canton the maximum is attained at the 30th year, in England it is not reached until the 55th year. In the one country it occurs in early life; in the other, when life has begun to decline: on the one hand, when the struggle of life has been more than half fought; on the other, when it has barely commenced. How significant a comment upon the difference of social or moral character in the two countries! May it not be that with this early developed tendency to suicide, telling probably either of an imperfect development of the higher moral faculties in early life, or of the too prevalent existence of notions which foster the growth of self-destruction, there is a true excess of suicides in Geneva as compared with this country; and that the high relative figure in Dr. M. d'Espine's returns, is indicative of a truth which an improvement in the statistics of other countries may only partially modify.

In Paris, the maximum number of suicides is attained at the 30th year as in the canton of Geneva. The maximum of suicides in Paris coincides with the maximum of female but not of male suicides; the greatest number of the latter taking place in the period 30—40. The difference, however, between the periods 20—30 and 30—40 numbers only 5 among males; while among females it amounts to 89. Upon the excess of suicides in Paris, from 20 to 30 years of age, Boismont remarks: "If this result be always the same, it is necessary to conclude that young persons in the capital are more addicted to kill themselves; this disposition would then be due to *ennui* (*tædium vitæ, spleen*), so common at this age."—(*Op. cit.* p. 76.) Suicide is not a necessary consequence of *ennui*, and we must seek for the cause which determines the proclivity of the *ennuyé* in Paris to self-destruction, (supposing that *ennui*, in its gravest acceptation,

exists to the extent believed by M. Boismont). Is not this to be found in the conventional notions so prevalent among the youth of that city, of the fitness and legitimacy of suicide in the more serious, nay, indeed, in almost all the hitches of life? A feather will show the direction of the wind, and a waif of popular literature may indicate the tendency of thought among Parisian adolescents. In a little *brochure*, entitled, "*Paris-Médecin*," which has casually come under our notice while writing this article, and which forms one of a series headed "*Les Petits Paris*," (a series devoted to the oddities and characteristics of a Paris life), is represented the struggles of a young physician, and most shrewdly are the eccentricities and *dernier ressorts* of a medical life portrayed. The hero is depicted as seeking to form a practice in Paris. He has a scanty fortune, and placing his name upon the door of his apartments, with the addition, "*consultations de midi à quatre heures*," he awaits an influx of patients. Bright visions flit before his imagination—visions of what? Of the dress affected by the noted practitioners; of the Café de Paris; of hosts of parasitic admirers; of the Opera, *danseuses*, journalism, a carriage and pair, a grand house—in which he gives superb dinners—and, finally, of a town career so bright that an enterprising editor offers him 100,000 francs for his autobiography! But the awakening tells a different tale: no patients call upon him; his funds gradually diminish; difficulty follows difficulty; and, at length, having exhausted his means, he is compelled to vacate his rooms, and wander in the streets. Then "*à bout de patience et de résignation des idées de suicide me virent*." Aided by a friend, however, who happily comes across him before he has time to carry his suicidal notions into effect, he tries to obtain a living by practising various forms of quackery, or as the book significantly phrases it, *specialités*, but to no purpose. "*Il fallait vivre cependant, et j'étais à bout de ressources. Les idées de suicide s'offraient de nouveau à mon esprit . . .*" In the very nick of time, the medical secretaryship to a clairvoyant is offered to him, and accepted. This is followed in succession by practice at five sous a visit, gratuitous consultations (playing into the hand of another physician), and finally, book-making. After a bitter disappointment in his literary efforts, he becomes ill, and is sent to a hospital. Recovering, he is again cast upon his own exertions for a livelihood; but although he is impoverished, and sees no prospect of success before him, he indignantly refuses a fee offered to him by a professional robber, whose brother he had aided, and his conscience pricks him that he had not denounced the malefactor to justice—"*J'ai peut-être commis un acte de coupable faiblesse*." Then seeing that even homœopathy held out

no hope to him, and that the globule had lost nearly all its influence, again comes the refrain, "*Il ne me restait donc plus que le suicide. Je délibérais donc sur le genre de mort que j'allais choisir.*" At this crisis, the news reached him that his aunt ("*ingrat! et je n'y songeais plus!*") had died and left him fifty thousand francs, and thenceforward life flowed smoothly.

Whether the suicidal refrain in the sketch, of which the foregoing is a description, be regarded as a satire upon a tendency of thought prevalent among a class of young men, or as the expression of an ordinary sentiment on the part of the author, it tells a tale equally significant.

3. The number of suicides is invariably greater among males than females. Boismont states that male suicides are two-thirds more numerous than female in Paris, and he gives statistics showing that the same proportion exists throughout France. This is, also, about the relative proportion in England. The data used by Dr. M. d'Espine give, as the proportion of males, in every hundred suicides, in each of the following countries, the accompanying figures:—Prussia, 82; Bavaria, 75; England, 68; France 76; and Sardinia, 80.

4. The subjoined table presents at one view the comparative prevalence of the different methods of suicide in England and several continental countries:—

	England, 1853—66	France, 1836—43	Geneva, 13 years	Sardinia, 1849—62	Belgium, 1836—39	Saxony, 1830—34	Norway, 1836—46	Denmark, 1835—44
Hanging and Strangling	1	2	3	3	1	1	1	1
Cut throat and wounds not by firearms }	2	6	4	4	—	—	—	—
Drowning	3	1	2	2	2	3	2	2
Poisoning	4	7	6	6	—	—	—	—
Gun-shot wounds	5	3	1	1	3	2	3	3
Asphyxia by Carbonic Acid Gas	—	4	7	7	—	—	—	—
Fall from an elevated place . .	—	5	5	5	—	—	—	—

The foregoing figures must not be taken as absolute, as the position of the principal methods of suicide may vary in relation to each other in different periods. Thus from 1825 to 1834, *drowning* was the commonest mode of suicide in the canton of Geneva, but in the thirteen years 1838—47, 1853—55, gun-shot wounds stood first in order of frequency.

The three chief methods of suicide—hanging, drowning, and

* *Traité de Géographie et de Statistique Médicales.* Par J. Ch. M. Boudin, 1857, t. ii. p. 52.

wounds by various instruments—are those over which the least control can be exercised, and which can be most readily had recourse to. Facility of access to deleterious agencies has, however, a decided influence upon the method of suicide employed, as is shown by the high position which poisoning holds in the English returns as compared with those of France and Geneva. It has often been urged upon the attention of government and the public that the almost unrestricted sale of poisons in this country facilitates the perpetration of suicide, and every addition to our statistics strengthens this opinion. The bill at present before parliament for regulating the sale of poisons will, doubtless, have some effect in diminishing the number of suicides by poison; but the provisions of the bill only interpose slight checks to the sale of the poison most commonly used by suicides. Suicides by opium and its preparations form, however, but a small item in the mischief done by the ignorant use of that drug, and it may be doubted whether it be sound policy to exempt the most familiarly known, most frequently used, and the most mischievous of all the poisonous drugs, from the more stringent restrictions of the bill.

It has been objected to the argument derived from suicides against the free sale of poisons that, if they were not attainable, the persons who now have recourse to poison for self-destruction would adopt some other method of suicide, and hence that no advantage would be gained by restriction. This objection is entirely speculative; but it is a matter of experience that the method of destruction exercises an important influence in determining the act of suicide, and that many who would have recourse to poison, shrink from more violent means of death. It is not to be forgotten, that the suicides by poison only represent a portion of the cases in which poison was used with a suicidal intention.

ART. IV.—JUDICIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN FRANCE.

WE have often had occasion to admire the orderly form in which the scientific evidence in cases of disputed insanity is generally presented in France as contrasted with the somewhat disjointed fashion in which it is frequently, if not generally, elicited by a *viva voce* examination in our courts. All that we could wish to say on this subject is well illustrated by the report of a very interesting case published in a recent number of the *Annales Médico-Psychologiques*. The case in question is not only important in itself, but from the ample remarks which precede it, an Englishman gets without difficulty many interesting details, showing the course of practice in French courts, and the estimation in which

the legal administration of the country is held by French psychopathists. We make no apology to our readers, therefore, for transferring the case almost entire to our pages. The introductory remarks being addressed to a French public, we shall replace them by some observations on the French procedure.

The case is reported by Dr. Aubanel, the principal physician of the Lunatic Asylum at Marseilles, who was commissioned to examine the mental state of the prisoner by the Assize Court at Aix, before whom the accused was brought for trial. The order for this examination was made after the trial had proceeded to the point opening out a defence of insanity, which was disputed on the part of the prosecution. It would appear from Dr. Aubanel's remarks that this course is not unusual in the French tribunals. The Doctor had two such cases in the year 1857, and he makes the practice the basis of a long argument, the purport of which is that, in his opinion, the preliminary proceedings against prisoners, in whose defence insanity is set up, are in general too hastily brought to a conclusion by what we should term the full committal of the prisoner to take his trial. The Doctor would have the defence more carefully sifted and examined in the first instance by the magistrates taking the examination, who, he thinks, are better qualified to appreciate medical evidence than juries. He thinks that if this were done, many painful cases would be stopped in the preliminary stages by a proceeding which he terms *une ordonnance de non lieu*, and the effect of which we gather to be analogous to the ignoring of a bill of indictment by our grand jury. In his remarks, the Doctor passes over entirely as an every-day occurrence of no interest the point which, to an English reader, seems really the most important—viz., that the trial of a prisoner should be suspended on the motion of the prosecution, the prisoner committed, with all the evidence against him, to the medical officer of a lunatic asylum, he being ordered to report to the Court his opinion as to the prisoner's sanity. This, at first sight, seems to be a course of proceeding perfectly inadmissible in an English Court, and opposed to some important *principles* of our criminal law. It is so familiar, however, to French minds that Dr. Aubanel evidently sees nothing in it worthy of remark. We think it must be evident to every person who has considered the subject that the guilt or innocence of a prisoner, when insanity is the point on which it turns, is very frequently decided in our Courts upon evidence of a most meagre and unsatisfactory description, as complete, no doubt, as the circumstances preparatory to the trial may have permitted; but from the unfavourable nature of these circumstances for observations of the character required, and the scanty opportunity for such observations as may be actually pos-

sible, the result is often tinged with uncertainty and conflicting opinions to a very serious extent. This state of things may lead to one of two evils—the acquittal of the guilty, or the conviction of the innocent. Of course the latter is infinitely the more serious of the two, and considering the merciful leaning of our Courts towards prisoners, there is good ground to hope that this does not often occur. But the former is a source of scandal to justice, which should be diligently avoided. The comments of some of the provincial papers upon the acquittal of James Atkinson at the last York Assizes may be referred to, as showing the feelings excited by the acquittal of a person supposed to be guilty. The whole trial, also, is a good example of a case decided upon evidence which, though strong enough to justify the verdict recorded, was yet weak enough to leave many minds in a state of uncertainty, which one feels morally sure was quite unnecessary, and would not have been left by evidence founded upon observation under more favourable circumstances. The mode in which the difficulties arising from imperfect evidence here alluded to are surmounted by the French Courts, and the way taken by them to arrive at the best evidence on the subject, does not appear capable of much improvement. As soon as a case of sufficiently doubtful insanity is made to appear to the Court, instead of allowing it to be decided upon the result of hurried observation, productive only of doubt where certainty is often attainable—instead of this, the Court suspends the trial, in order that the evidence may be completed by observations made under the most favourable circumstances. The prisoner is committed to an asylum, and there placed in the charge of a medical officer—a Government servant, if possible—but, at any rate, one who is not already committed to an opinion on the case, and this referee is charged to observe and report. His report, in the first instance made in writing, is afterwards deposed to by him in the witness-box, as evidence upon the adjourned trial, and of course he is subject to cross-examination thereon, as any other witness would be. This we conceive might readily be made the basis of a valuable and perfectly practicable and easy improvement in the mode of conducting such trials, as that of Atkinson at York, in our courts. As a general rule, of course an application made by the prosecution in the middle of a trial for a postponement in order to get further evidence would not be listened to for a moment, and this out of regard to the liberty of the subject, because if such an application were granted, provision must be made to secure the appearance of the prisoner on the adjourned trial, which could only be done by keeping an untried man in prison an improper length of time, or holding him to bail,

which is equally objectionable. But this objection does not arise in the case of a prisoner pleading not guilty on the ground of insanity, because if the plea is admitted, it does not entitle him to be set at liberty; the judgment of the court upon such a finding would be that the prisoner be kept in strict custody in such place and in such manner as to the court should seem fit until her Majesty's pleasure should be known,* therefore the adjournment of the trial of such a case is no more than a provisional admission by the court of the prisoner's plea, to which no objection can be reasonably urged on his behalf. We do not, therefore, look upon this procedure as in the slightest degree contravening any principle of our criminal law. All that seems to be wanted, is to enable the court to do in a criminal case that which they can already do in a civil case, viz., "where they deem right for the purpose of justice to order an adjournment of the trial for such time and subject to such terms and conditions as to costs and otherwise as they may think fit."† Whether this would require an Act of Parliament, we do not pretend to say, but substantially it is a matter of practice and procedure, and does not involve any change in legal doctrine or principle. No one we think will read the following report of Dr. Aubanel without feeling convinced of the great advantage which the power to order an adjournment under such circumstances must be in the administration of justice. It would appear, however, that a degree of weight and importance is in some respects attached to these medical reports in France, which in England would only be given to the verdict of a jury. Here, the report could only be considered as evidence for the jury, and that subject to the cross-examination of the person making it. In France this seems to be the main but not the only use made of the report.

Dr. Aubanel tells us that upon his first report, which was to the effect that the prisoner was insane, the adjourned trial, which should have come on at the next assizes, was further postponed until the prisoner should be cured, on the ground that the law could not try a lunatic. The English law agrees with the French in refusing to try a lunatic, but it would not admit the proposition that the prisoner was a lunatic, except on the finding of a jury. In this country we should say that the prisoner ought to have been brought before the court at the time appointed, and upon its being suggested that he was then insane, the jury should have been sworn to try the question. The doctor's evidence would have been submitted to the jury, and upon their find-

* 39 and 40 Geo. 3, c. 94, s. 1.

† Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, s. 19.

ing a verdict that the prisoner was insane, the Court would order the postponement. But in France it would seem that the Court proceeds upon the Report, treating it for this purpose as equivalent to a verdict.

Dr. Aubanel is of opinion that, in cases where there is strong evidence that the insanity of a prisoner dates from a period anterior to the crime charged against him, his trial should not be postponed indefinitely. He raises the point mainly in the interest of the families of accused persons. "It is not indifferent," he says, "to families so heavily afflicted, whether they have amongst their members a lunatic or a criminal. Insanity is no dishonour, but crime leaves an indelible stain." After stating his argument with some warmth, he says:—

"In conclusion, I would ask, Can the law be right which, in such cases as I have referred to, delays indefinitely the trial of the accused? Is it right in any case to keep hanging over the head of an unfortunate man accused of crime, but upon scientific authority pronounced insane, and as such confined in an asylum, an order which, without being a condemnation, undoubtedly casts discredit both upon him and upon his family?"

We think the law is right, and should be sorry to see it altered. A mere charge ought to cast no discredit upon a man, unless he has made default when legally called upon to meet it. It would be a most serious thing for the law to countenance any other doctrine than that which is contained in the maxim, that every one must be taken as innocent until the contrary is proved. We think that in England the general feeling of society is in harmony with the law, and that no discredit would attach to a lunatic or his family on account of a criminal charge pending the postponement of his trial. If Dr. Aubanel's argument has any weight in France, it must arise from some confusion existing in the public mind between the nature of a charge and a conviction; and it is this, if anything, which requires correction, and not the law.

With respect to the Doctor's suggestion, that effect should be more frequently given to the plea of insanity on the preliminary inquiry before trial, it points out an important difference between the English and French law on the subject. In France, it appears, a trial by jury may be avoided if the magistrate is satisfied of the prisoner's insanity. An English grand jury is not at liberty to ignore a bill on the ground of the prisoner's insanity; and hence the defence must always be made, and we think rightly so, in solemn form. With these preliminary remarks, we now proceed to give the report of the case, as sketched by Dr. Aubanel.

In the Assize Court of the Bouches-du-Rhône.

CASE OF LOUIS R—.

The event under inquiry took place on the 21st June, 1857; the accused was brought before the Assizes at Aix, in the month of August in the same year, but the trial was adjourned to the next Assizes. The witnesses had been examined, the public prosecutor had stated his case, and the plea of insanity had been ably set up in defence. The trial was then interrupted by a motion of the procureur-général, who thought it his duty to claim the intervention of science, on account of the reliance by the defendant's counsel on the plea of insanity, and also because of the peculiar demeanour of the accused, who was, perhaps, suspected of simulating lunacy. The accused was admitted into the Asylum at Marseilles on the 20th August, 1857, and my examination terminated in November following, after three months' observation. This first probation was not deemed conclusive at law, and the procureur-général, in the exercise of his legitimate prerogative, wishing not to neglect any means for the elucidation of truth, resolved to have recourse to a further inquiry. It was then ordered by the President of the Assizes that the accused should be taken to the Asylum at Montpellier, there to be placed under the scrutiny of a Medical Commission, composed of Drs. Buisson and René, Professors of the Faculty of Medicine, and of Dr. Cavalier, principal physician of the establishment. He left for this destination on the 18th of December, and was kept there until nearly the middle of June, 1858. In the month of April or May the Commission made a long and carefully-considered Report, in which they adopted all my conclusions, and with me found the accused to have been insane prior to the event, while in the act of perpetration, and during his sojourn in the prisons and lunatic asylums. . . .

After this new and decisive inquiry, the accused was restored to the Asylum at Marseilles, which he entered for the second time on the 12th of June, 1858. The same day I was asked if it were possible for him, without inconvenience, to appear before the Assizes. I replied that his mental condition had undergone great improvement; that no inconvenience was to be apprehended; but that, as to his perfect cure, I could not give any decided opinion, feeling it necessary, with regard to this point, to submit him to a more prolonged observation. About a month later, the director of the asylum received a letter from the prefect, ordering his definitive committal, with instructions that, in case of his cure, he should be placed in the hands of justice. A most marked change for the better in the mental condition of the accused having taken place, I then deemed it my duty to notify

this circumstance to the authorities, and, under due reservations with regard to the future, to consider him for the time as cured, and in his name to demand his appearance before the Court. He asked me, in fact, every day, if the period for this had not arrived. He was transferred from that time to the prison at Aix, and was tried before the Assizes on the 23rd of August last.

I shall not attempt a report of the trial; no new fact was produced. The demeanour of the accused was very good, and, as well as his answers, justified the declaration I had made as to the improvement in his mental condition. In my deposition I had but to give a *résumé* of my Report, and to reply, by reference to facts, to a multitude of questions put to me by the president and by the advocate. Drs. René and Cavalier came forward, like myself, to testify their complete conviction as to the real and strongly-marked insanity of the accused. Professor René stated with great force in the commencement of his evidence:—"Called frequently as a professor of legal medicine to give evidence before the Assizes, it is rare that I am not a witness for the public prosecutor; but in this case, and in the presence of facts which I have observed and studied, I place myself, without hesitation, on the side of the defence."

The accusation was maintained with considerable energy. The medical reports were neither analysed nor discussed; it was thought they might be dispensed with; this case, it was said, might be decided by the simple light of common sense, without the prejudication of scientific opinion. Reference was made by the prosecutor to Socrates, whom some had wished to accuse of insanity; to Pascal, against whom the same charge was brought; to Papavoine, whose head justly fell upon the scaffold; to Jobard, condemned notwithstanding the declarations of physicians, &c. &c. I will not analyse the speech of the public prosecutor, nor reply to a multitude of his arguments, which would not bear scientific discussion. One only regrets that in such cases medical jurists cannot at once repel the singular assertions uttered in their hearing as to the science of mental diseases—a science which some lawyers think they understand as well as those who have made them the study of their lives. One is also especially annoyed, that these unjust attacks should be made against a science which has been deemed worthy of being consulted. It must be either true or false; if it is consulted, it is surely because it is true, and deserving of confidence. Why then should it be attacked as without foundation, if its conclusions do not agree with preconceived opinions? Why go out of the way to demonstrate that its doctrines are pernicious; that there is no occasion for anticipatory medical inquiries, however solemnly conducted; that, in fact,

simple common sense is all that is required in an affair of this nature ?

Two circumstances in this speech deserve special notice. The first is the construction put upon a letter of the prefect, who, seeing the improved condition of the accused, verified by the principal physician of the asylum, recalled the order for his definitive committal (*placement*) to the asylum until after it should have been decided at the Assizes whether the accused were really insane. "The jury, whatever its opinion, being incapable, according to law, of pronouncing the accused insane, it follows" said the advocate-general, in his address to the jury, "that if you acquit him he will at once be set at liberty, and will occasion fresh danger to society." This mode of viewing the question might, undoubtedly, have considerable weight with the jury! But the advocate-general could not be ignorant that in the case supposed, a most important duty would devolve upon the judicial authority—namely, that of notifying to the prefect the motives by which the jury were apparently actuated, and of causing him to feel, in regard for the public safety, the necessity for a further detention of the accused in an asylum. It is true, the man had been pronounced cured, but the cure was not confirmed; and I had reserved for further inquiry the determination to be ultimately taken as to setting him at liberty. This last question would properly fall within the jurisdiction of the administrative authority, and would be considered after the acquittal.

The other circumstance, which it is important to bring into prominent notice on account of the result of the trial, is the gist of the prosecution throughout. "The crime is *confessed*," said the advocate-general; "it was committed with *premeditation*; the accused knew what he was about to do; he took the *greatest precautions* to ensure success; he *knew* that he was about to do a bad deed; he acted thus under the influence of jealousy, and he wished to disembarass himself of a rival; he was never insane; he was not so especially *at the moment he perpetrated* the murderous act. He is therefore responsible for his actions, and he merits the punishment which the law inflicts upon criminals." Will it not be tacitly allowed that the consequence of a prosecution so formulated is at least a demand for condemnation to penal servitude (*travaux forcés*) for life? The question was, in fact, put to the jury according to the meaning of the public prosecutor, and, as will be seen, was answered in the negative as to the capital offence. A conviction was only obtained upon a subsidiary question of simple correctional police (*police correctionnelle*).

The defence was a very able refutation of the arguments of the public prosecutor; it turned principally upon a judicious and

eloquent analysis of various parts of the medical reports which were before the Court. But notwithstanding the ability displayed by M. Mistral, he did not achieve a complete victory; he could not avoid a *condamnation correctionnelle*, which he had not the least reason to expect. The incriminated act was admitted; the public prosecutor had maintained to the last, as we have seen, the accusation of premeditated murder; and one could only anticipate one of two things—either a capital conviction, commutable perhaps to forced labour for life, in consideration of extenuating circumstances; or a simple acquittal, in consequence of irresponsibility resulting from insanity.

To the great astonishment of all who had carefully followed the trial, it did not terminate in the adoption of either of these alternatives. The president, after his summing up, put the principal question, and the only one, I repeat, which could legitimately result from the case opened by the prosecution: "Is Louis — guilty of having attempted to murder Charles —, such attempt, manifested by partial execution, having only failed from circumstances independent of the will of its author? You will reply *Yes*," said he to the jury, "if you think that he acted in full possession of his faculties (*libre arbitre*); you will reply *No*, if you think, on the contrary, that he was insane at the moment of perpetrating the murder." But the president did not end here; and foreseeing, doubtless, that the reply might be negative, he conceived it to be his duty to put the two following subsidiary questions, viz.: "Is the said Louis — guilty of having wilfully assaulted and wounded Charles —? Did he premeditate the assault and wounding indicated by the last question?" The advocate for the defence, to whom these questions had never been suggested, had no opportunity of discussing them in his pleading. This is to be regretted, for had such been the case, he would have been able to point out their full signification. It is also to be remarked, that they were not raised by the public prosecutor, neither did he hint that they might be submitted to the jury. However, the jury replied negatively as to the question of premeditated murder, but affirmatively on the question of premeditated assault and wounding. The accused was consequently sentenced to thirteen months' imprisonment! The verdict of a jury is always to be respected as such; but admitting this, may we not ask how it can happen that a man confessing the incriminated act, and that he intended to commit murder, can be guilty only of assault and wounding? If his irresponsibility (*nonculpabilité*) were admitted as to the first, it follows, as a conclusion that ought to be obvious to everybody, that the verdict should have been the same on the subsidiary questions. We may respect the verdict as the result of a conscientious con-

viction ; but our scientific opinions being in no way modified by it, it goes to prove that the science of medical jurisprudence has still many difficulties to surmount, and that our unhappy lunatics are still ill understood by those who know not the science of observation which we profess. The rest may be judged of by perusing the Judicial Report, which is as follows :—

MEDICO-LEGAL REPORT.

A.—*History of the Case.*

About two o'clock in the morning of the 21st June, 1857, frightful cries were heard in the dormitory of the small ecclesiastical college at Aix, proceeding from an alcove where a student, called Charles, slept. The superintendents and one or two of the pupils hastened to the spot. They found the young Charles seated on his bed covered with blood, and holding in his hand a sword-stick which he had just drawn from his neck. This poor young man had not seen the murderer ; he had been struck while asleep, and he was awakened by a suffocating sensation as if he were being strangled. On being carefully examined, the wound appeared to commence on a level with the angle of the right jaw ; passing thence through the neck to the corresponding point on the left side, it penetrated the inside of the arm on the same side, and showed itself again in the external and posterior part of that member. Its length was 32 centimetres ($12\frac{1}{2}$ inches). No vital organ having been injured, the wound healed without difficulty in the course of a few days.

One of the tutors proceeding towards the cries, had met Louis, another pupil, on the staircase, who asked for a key, that he might go out to satisfy the calls of nature. Suspicion immediately fell on him ; but he was not to be found in the seminary, and had, in fact, made his escape by the garden. It appeared early in the morning that, after leaving, he had gone direct to the police-office, and had there declared himself the murderer, detailing at the same time all the circumstances.

B.—*Directions of the Order of Court.*

We, the Judge of the Imperial Court of Aix, President of the Assizes, considering—

1st. That the object of the order for inspection (*pourvoi*) is based on the necessity which exists for a scientific examination of the accused, with a view to the appreciation of his mental condition, and to determine whether he was of sane mind at the date of the crime ;

2nd. That it is important in the first instance to ascertain precisely the evidence for the defence, as well for the purpose of definitively fixing its limits, as that it may serve as data for the opinion of the *expert* who may be charged with the examination of the accused.

Commission Mr. Counsellor A—— to receive the evidence in question, and any other that he may deem necessary for the elucidation of truth.

We Order, 1st—that the depositions so taken, as well as the file of proceedings to the present time, shall be placed at the disposal of Dr. Aubanel, chief physician of the Lunatic Asylum at Marseilles. 2nd—that the accused, R——, shall also be placed in charge of the said Dr. Aubanel, until the next session. We commission the latter, he being previously sworn, to submit the accused to every proof calculated to determine whether he be of sane mind, and to report the nature of any alteration that may be remarked in the state of his intellectual faculties.

We charge him especially—

I. To report, 1st—whether within two or three months preceding the crime the accused was able to take cognisance of his actions; 2nd—whether he could appreciate their tendency; 3rd—whether he had the control of his will; 4th—whether the circumstances under which the crime was committed are sufficient to account for it, leaving out the supposition of insanity.

II. To state all the indications proper to guide the Court in coming to a conclusion on the question, whether at the moment of perpetrating the crime, Louis was, or was not, in a sane state of mind, and what is now his actual condition.

III. To report his observations and opinion on the above questions, in order that such report being testified may be ultimately proceeded upon according to law.

C.—Examination of the facts appearing upon the proceedings.

In order the better to appreciate these facts, they should be divided under four heads:—The first comprising those relating to the infancy and youth of the accused up to the time when he put on the robe of a priest; the second, those peculiar to the period of the last months preceding the event; the third treating of those which characterized the perpetration of the murder; and, lastly, the fourth, including those noted in the prison at Aix, between the event and his appearance before the Assizes.

1. *Antecedents of the Accused.*—Louis belonged to an honourable family, which had experienced great misfortunes. His mother, long a widow, had suffered great poverty, and could

not have brought up her children without the assistance of various charitable persons and establishments. His maternal grandfather was quite imbecile (*tout à fait fou*); according to Dr. d'Astros, he perpetually exhibited a gaiety of demeanour resembling that of drunkenness. One of his maternal uncles presented the same symptoms. One of his cousins threw herself into a well; and, although apparently a very sensible woman, she is subject to fits of melancholy, which dispose her to suicide.

When he was about three years old, the accused, according to the statements of his family, would appear to have been afflicted with a very serious illness of a cerebral nature, leaving him slightly deformed. At ten years of age he left his father's house, paid a visit to the Curé of Cabriés, went thence to Marseilles, and returned to Aix, without any discoverable motive for so doing. He declares now that he stole a twenty-franc piece from the Curé of Cabriés. He also accuses himself of a theft of about 100 francs, committed, when he was about ten years' old, at the house of a tradesman at Aix, where he was employed. He states that he laid out this money partly in the purchase of sweetmeats; but none of his family knew of these thefts at the time, and the persons stated to have been robbed look upon the thing as impossible.

His mother, wishing to devote him to the Church, deemed herself very fortunate in obtaining his gratuitous admission to the small seminary at Aix. He entered there, in the first instance, as a day-scholar, and afterwards as a boarder. He has been educated there from about his twelfth year; this year he took his place in the rhetoric class. Some persons who knew him, both before and after his admission to the seminary, always considered him of an odd, light-headed character. He was in the habit of making grimaces at passers-by, and mocking them. His conversation was inconsistent and childish. He would often yell and cry out frightfully during the night, and at such times his relatives would come and calm him, telling him not to be afraid. He has been known, something about two years ago, to shut himself up in his room, and there utter oaths, and imitate all the street cries. At other times he abandoned himself to motiveless transports, overturning articles of furniture in his way. One of the witnesses declared that his ideas were never consecutive, and that he always considered his organization imperfect.

His conduct in the seminary is stated to have been always excellent: he has never given occasion for the least reproach on the ground of immorality or irreligion; he was known to be sad, pensive, and melancholy, of great feebleness of character, exhibiting exaggerated scruples, appearing sometimes odd, often incon-

stant in his determinations; but he was very pious, very docile, and very submissive to authority; he was capable of giving good advice; he pronounced at need wise and enlightened counsel. There, as in the world, he was remarked for his infantine manners. Of excessive and even feminine sensibility, he was very grateful for kindness, showing it very warmly, and being at all times very loving and very caressing. He exhibited a strong desire to be loved and humoured. He had a heated and wandering imagination. Ideas and projects of the most opposite nature sometimes followed one another in his mind. His capacity for study was ordinary and satisfactory.

In consequence of the feebleness of his character, of his unreasonable scruples, and of his continual recourse to his superiors for advice as to many of his actions, it was only with much hesitation that he was invested with a priest's robes: he was postponed from one period to another; this troubled him, and rendered him very unhappy, judging from a letter written to him by one of his relations, who was a priest, in order to reassure him and encourage him to be patient. However, his piety and his general conduct leaving nothing to be desired, he was authorised to take the gown at Christmas, 1856.

Up to that period, no one in the seminary had remarked in him any certain indication of mental alienation. One of the witnesses states that his mind was not impaired, but that he always made himself remarkable in his recreations by the originality of his actions. He had a dreamy and preoccupied air. He sometimes quitted his friends rudely in the middle of a conversation. Another witness states that he was not insane, but that he committed acts of eccentricity.

2. *Facts observed after his investiture.*—Dr. d'Astros mentions having had him under his care for about six months, for a nervous convulsive disease, similar to epilepsy. Three months afterwards he had him under his care for a serious attack of erysipelas in the face and scalp. This was followed by a violent delirium, which gave way under the influence of profuse nasal hæmorrhage. He was cured of this illness in about twenty days; but since that period he has continued to suffer in the head, and to complain frequently of pain in the frontal region.

After this illness, it was observed that his ordinary scruples increased, and his sadness became greater. A great change took place in his conduct: he became neglectful in the performance of his religious duties; he was more distracted and taciturn; he conversed frequently during the time for study, and he appeared absorbed in some great preoccupation. He went frequently to lay open his griefs and troubles to the Superior. He confessed according to custom, but he did not communicate so often as

before. It was generally thought to be in consequence of excessive scruples that he did not communicate oftener.

On the 25th May, when he had to make a philosophical composition upon Jeouffroy, it was seen with great astonishment that his theme contained sentences full of exultation against the mysteries of religion. He was expostulated with on the subject, without, however, attaching any great importance to the singular ideas he had expressed. But, two days later, on the 27th, a letter of his was found in the dormitory, which strangely surprised his Superiors. This letter read as though written to an accomplice without, who was favourable to his designs. It is as follows :

"You guess why I write to you. You can send me by the bearer of this letter the weapon I have asked for. Take care that it is well sharpened, for it is important that I should succeed. I must not fail. I foresee the place where I shall meet the papistical wretch alone ; and, I assure you, he shall have it in real earnest. These monsters ! they made me swallow whatever they thought fit ; but I know it now, I hope, and I will only believe what I like ! I reckon, then, on your compliance. You know the day, the hour, and the place, when and where to expect me after the happy blow is struck. Take care to have the clothes and everything necessary for my flight.

"Ah ! I assure you, on my soul, I will give it him in earnest—the papist rascal—the tyrant ! and if the other papists do anything to stop me, I swear that they shall fall dead at my feet. I will say no more.—You know who is speaking to you.

"P.S.—I forgot to tell you to warn the good pastor, N——, that I will abjure wherever he wishes all the idle stories with which my mind has been filled."

On the address of the letter were the words—"You know where to take it . . . and the sooner the better."

The day after this letter fell into the hands of the Superiors, Louis disappeared, without its being known during the whole day what had become of him. He was sought for diligently, even in his mother's house ; but in the evening he was found squatted under a staircase, in a kind of wood-house, where he had passed twelve or fourteen hours without anything to eat. He only left this hole after long and pressing exhortations. It was considered on this occasion whether this unreasonable conduct was the result of a kind of shame and confusion on account of his having written the letter referred to, or whether it was simply from feebleness of mind. Whatever was the cause, however, it was from that time settled that he could no longer be a priest. But, inasmuch as he was pious and without means, and as he appeared to have a taste for a monastic life, he was advised to enter the community of the Brothers of St. Jean-de-Dieu, which he seemed heartily willing to when the vacations occurred at the end of the year.

It is important now to establish one fact, namely, the friendship which Louis had for some time conceived towards young Charles, he who had almost perished under his attack. Within a short period he had made various inquiries about this young man, and appeared much interested in him, asking if he stood well in his class, and saying freely amongst his comrades, that he was a fine boy, that he bore a good character, that he was very agreeable, and that it would give him great satisfaction to form a mutual attachment with him. He sought opportunities of being with him, of talking to him, and of telling him that he wished to become an intimate friend. He deprived himself sometimes of his luncheon in order that he might give it him. Charles looked upon all this as a weakness, and joked about it with his comrades. He did not attach any importance to it, and did not absolutely repulse the testimonies of affection of which he was the object. Sometimes at bedtime Louis entered the alcove where this young man slept, and talked a short time with him; once he tickled him in order to awake him, occasionally on leaving him he kissed him on the cheeks and even on the mouth. Latterly he wrote to him, almost daily, letters filled with exalted and affectionate sentiments, and expressions of ridiculous and exaggerated love. One day he pricked his finger in order to write some words with the blood which came from the wound; another day he sent him an image of St. John fishing for hearts with a line. He had inscribed on the image this legend: "O that I could thus take thee!"

Charles replied to none of these letters, which much vexed him. On his part Charles had no sympathy for Louis; his character did not please Charles in the least. However, he one day gave him a note which we shall speak of presently on account of the important bearing it seems to have had upon the ultimate intentions of the accused: but, before passing to a new class of facts, we take it as proved by the various depositions referred to that the accused was never considered by his comrades as guilty of any act of immorality. Charles does not deny the inexplicable attachment of which he was the object; but neither does he state that the accused ever made him any dishonest proposal, never did any lewd or immoral word issue out of the mouth of the accused, nor did he ever manifest towards Charles any gestures or actions denoting bad intentions. His affection was well known in the seminary; the Superior even was not ignorant of it; but although he expostulated as to its ridiculous extent, neither he nor any one else saw anything wrong in it; he was convinced that it covered nothing disgraceful, and that it was simply the result of a sensitive and affectionate character.

3. *Facts relative to the perpetration of the murder.*—On the morning of Saturday, the 20th June, the accused having obtained permission to go out, went to his mother's house, in order to get a sword-stick which he knew to be in one of the garrets. He got it, and returned to the seminary, carrying it under his gown without any one seeing it in his possession. He then hid it in his mattress. About two o'clock in the afternoon, he received a note from Charles, which the latter had sent through a mutual friend, saying, as he gave it, that it was a reply which would make Louis *bisquer*. This allegorical note enclosed two hearts intertwined, under which were the words, "One for evermore." Beside this was a third heart pierced by a sword, under which were the words, "This would be too much!" Towards the evening of the same day, Louis confided under promise of secrecy to one of his comrades a letter remarkable alike for the superscription on its envelope, and for its contents.

1st. *The Superscription.*—"If at noon you see me with the community doing as others, you are to return me this document. But if it should happen otherwise, you are to break the seal, and read it yourself, and to such other persons as you may think proper. But if I am here at noon, you are to return it to me, and I rely on your word."

2nd. *The Contents.*—"Do not believe me so guilty as people say. . . . No one knows my reasons for acting thus. . . . Ah! if he had fulfilled my hopes, how happy we should have been. . . . But I always thought so . . . this would have been too great a happiness for thee. Louis! . . . that which will console me in my fetters, will be the thought that no one will enjoy any more than myself that which I have loved with an unrequited passion. . . . But what matters it, I love thee, and nothing shall efface thy memory from my heart, thou, the victim of my love"

It was, as already stated, about two o'clock in the morning of the 21st June, a few hours after having written this letter, that Louis committed the murderous attempt before mentioned. After the perpetration of the murder, he fled from the seminary. On arriving, without either stockings or cravat, at the residence of the Commissary of Police, he made himself known, and how he had committed the murder.

"Two months ago," he said, "a homicidal idea took possession of my mind. I endeavoured several times to put it in execution, but various circumstances prevented me. It was upon one of my professors that I wished my blows to fall. Yesterday, for the first time, I conceived the project of immolating one of my comrades—he for whom I had the greatest affection in the world. I neither can nor will I tell you the motive which determined me. I took my precautions yesterday.

I had provided myself with a weapon in the morning, which I intended to have used upon one of my professors. I kept myself awake with difficulty during the night, and I struck my victim at two o'clock, while in a deep sleep. I lay down again; but the piercing cries of the wounded youth becoming insupportable, I rose, and came out feigning a call of nature, after having told the superintendent that I did not know whence the cries proceeded."

Several persons in the house had remarked a change in his behaviour following upon his illness, and had observed that his peculiarities had latterly increased. One of the superintendents declares that *he was no longer the same as usual*, without being able to appreciate the cause. Excepting these phenomena, no one in the establishment had considered him insane before the perpetration of the murder. His peculiarities were regarded as the result of a whimsical and ridiculous character. However, the Superior now considers this murder as "an incident" in the life of this young man. "It is," says he, "the result of a species of *homicidal monomania*, arising in a distaste of life produced by his sufferings, the misfortunes of his family, and the uncertainty as to his own future."

4. *Facts subsequent to the murder.*—On the 22nd June, during the first examination which he underwent before the *juge d'instruction*, he admitted, as he had already done before the Commissary of Police, all the circumstances of the murder.

"I sought," said he, "almost in these terms, to form an intimate friendship with Charles, because his appearance pleased me, and his character appeared to accord with mine. I endeavoured to make him understand my sentiments towards him by means of my conversation, gestures, general conduct, and sundry notes. I have written to him ten or a dozen times, perhaps. My letters contained various matter: I expressed my sentiments of friendship for him, and my desire to form an intimate acquaintance with him; but they contained no immoral thought—no bad expression. I had long had a project of killing one of my professors, but that of killing Charles only entered my mind in the afternoon of the 20th June. I cannot tell you the motive which determined me; that is my secret; but it was not that which you suppose. I confessed three days before, but I have not communicated since the *Ascension*. It is more especially since that period that the homicidal ideas have beset me. I understand quite well the responsibility which hangs over me. I do not believe I was insane (*fou*). I acted with premeditation, and I prepared myself to commit murder, although the weapon with which I provided myself was not intended in the first instance to be used against him whom I have wounded. My professors were not always quite just towards me. It was not in consequence of a distaste for life that I gave way to the act which I now regret; faith had not left me; I knew quite well that these homicidal projects were mortal sins, but, nevertheless, they continually came into my mind."

On the 25th June, during his second examination, he said that the letter found in the dormitory was his, and that he had thrown it down in the hope that it would cause his expulsion. The pretended interview with a Protestant minister was pure invention, as also the complicity which was implied with some one outside. He had not lost the wish to become a priest, but he considered himself unworthy of the sacred office—not on account of immoral conduct, but because of many weaknesses before which he had fallen, and of numerous infractions of the rules of his order, which made him think that he was too unsteady for the ecclesiastical state.

On the 26th June, during his third examination, he acknowledged the advances which he had continually made in order to gain Charles's affections, the visits which he made to his alcove in the evenings, and the caresses of which mention has been made; but he denied any immoral act or gesture, as also all lewd thoughts.

"I felt," said he, "an attachment for this young man which made me seek after his friendship without knowing why; it was a sentimental feeling, and nothing more. I did not desire or intend to express more than this in the letter which I wrote the evening before the event. I admit that the expressions there made use of may appear impassioned; but there are good passions as well as bad, and that which I felt was not bad, I assure you. I did not wish to kill him for fear that he might reveal our relations (*liaison*), considering that I had proposed nothing bad to him. Neither had I any thought of killing him in order to prevent him ruining himself; it was not in consequence of jealousy, caused by the receipt of his note—that was but an accidental cause, and not the true cause; as to the latter, I only know it, and I will not disclose it."

Lastly, on the 1st July, during his final examination, he declared that he had committed the two thefts when about ten years of age, which have been already referred to. He again repelled the imputation of any immoral ideas in connexion with his love for Charles: his caresses, he repeated, had nothing lewd in them; they were simply the testimony of a pure affection.

"I admit my crime," said he, "but I deny all the depraved ideas now imputed to me. The motive which induced me is my secret. As to my love, I also admit it; I loved the young man—I do still, and ever shall love him."

Dr. d'Astros, physician to the prison, having had occasion to see him professionally while he was in custody, observed that his conduct was very extraordinary. Sometimes he would walk off in the middle of a conversation, notwithstanding all attempts to retain him. He told the Doctor that something quite indefinable was passing in his head; that he did not feel quite master of himself;

and that, as he was left too much at liberty, he could not answer for what might happen. Dr. d'Astros considered him as affected with both suicidal and homicidal melancholy. He appeared to be tired of life, and said he should be very happy if some one would cut his head off.

The gaoler observed him to be sad and morose on the day of his imprisonment. In a short time he exhibited various eccentricities, such as saying that he was followed by a spectre; another day throwing dishes against the wall, breaking a water-bottle and other articles, and cutting shrubs in the garden. He called himself sometimes a cardinal, and superior to the archbishop. In speaking of his own case, he said, "They will kill me because I have killed my equal;" citing, in support of this, a passage of Scripture. His conversation in prison was sometimes very consistent and sensible; but at other times, when spoken to, he was incoherent, heaved deep sighs, or was silent. One day he walked about rapidly in the corridor, and only stopped when exhausted by fatigue and perspiration.

D.—*Direct Examination of the Accused.*

Louis is eighteen and a half years of age, rather thin than stout, and of average height. His air is that of a bashful man, and one unaccustomed to society. His physiognomy is timid and generally mild, but sometimes rather harsh (*dur*) when he frowns and appears to be preoccupied. The whole of his left side, but especially his mouth, is decidedly deformed. His eyes are deeply set in their orbits, his forehead low and undeveloped. At times slight chorea-like muscular contractions of his face may be observed. His skin is of a good colour; his temperament nervous-sanguine, with great nervous predominance. His sensitiveness (*sensibilité*) appears to be excessive: the slightest reproach torments, irritates, and exasperates him. He appears to be naturally disposed to exaggerate all his impressions. He is of a distrustful temper, and at present but little affected by tokens of affection offered to him. Believing himself to be deceived by all the world, he distrusts even the affectionate letters written to him by his relatives.

Within a few days after his admission into the asylum, he tore in pieces a blouse which he brought from the prison. About a month later, he also tore up a cravat and the facings of a vest belonging to the establishment. He had completely torn up this garment before the arrival of an attendant who would have prevented his continuing to do so. He was calm and without excitement at the time. On being interrogated as to this act, he replied, that he did it without any motive or object, and without being able to resist doing so, although he knew it was wrong.

He was seen several times to walk about with incredible speed and with a sort of exasperation, making gestures, raising his hands to heaven, muttering and appearing a prey to some irritation; but he generally appeared thoughtful, sad, and preoccupied. He had little communication with the other lunatics; he lived apart, being unwilling to mix with *madmen* or to talk with them. A peculiarity remarked in the seminary—namely, that his conversation was not always consistent; that he would abruptly leave one subject for another, and would walk away in the midst of a conversation—was several times verified in the asylum. He was alternately happy and miserable; at times laughing immoderately, or smiling in the midst of a serious conversation; at other times he appeared exceedingly dejected, and a prey to a profound melancholy.

The same day that he was admitted, he conjectured his position, and understood that he was with madmen, although in his department there were but a few patients, and they very quiet:—

“Why,” said he to me, some days after, “am I brought to a mad-house—to a place where everybody but yourself is insane, and speaks without reason? My reasoning, *clear* and *good*, should satisfy you that I am not mad. I have strange ideas and severe pains in my head, but I am not so mad as those who have sent me here. It is repugnant to me to wear linen which madmen have soiled with the perspiration of insanity and disease. I am placed here probably in order that I may suffer a few months longer; or, perhaps, by a refinement of cruelty, I am allowed to breathe the pure air in order to render me the more miserable by afterwards thrusting me into some horrible dungeon.”

Another time he said to me—

“How can I trust any one, since even my advocate has betrayed me, having dared to say that I was mad, and that there were several kinds of insanity? It is true I was for some time *over-excited, raised beyond myself*; but lost my reason, oh no! never!”

He complained, from the first interview I had with him, of suffering in his head. “These headaches,” said he, “commenced at the time I had the erysipelas; they give me horrible pains at intervals.” He almost always feels a kind of uneasy heaviness. He adds that he has invariably an indefinable sensation about his forehead. Very often these pains in the head rendered him incapable of working, reading, and doing his duties in class. He was obliged sometimes, at the seminary, to go and lie down in order to obtain relief. Under the influence of these sufferings, the most strange and extraordinary ideas came into his head, ideas which he never had before his erysipelas, that serious illness in his head which kept him in bed nearly a month. These ideas, on the other hand, seemed to aggravate his terrible headaches,

which he now endured almost continually. Sometimes he experienced, in addition, a sensation of great fatigue and general lassitude, general uneasiness and want of sleep. He told me that, in order to allay these sufferings, he needed to be allowed liberty to walk in the fields, and to breathe the pure air. He asked me earnestly to let him take some walks in the garden, thinking that the mere sight of trees and verdure would do him good; he even asked me to tie him up to one of the trees in the garden if I was afraid of his escaping. After about ten days' observation, I allowed him daily walks, and I ordered him warm baths. He was very grateful for this favour, thanking me profusely; and he assured me that he experienced both physical and moral relief from this treatment. Purgative pills were also administered occasionally, in order to overcome obstinate constipation.

Besides these physical sufferings, and those instances in which he tore his clothes, the intervals of exasperation which have been noticed, a few peculiarities of manner, and alternations of mirth and sadness, I have observed no other organic perturbation, nor any external manifestation of moral or intellectual disorder. All his functions worked well; his appetite was good and his pulse normal. His nervous system, however, was over-excited; he seemed to experience what are commonly called nervous contractions, twitchings, and restlessness. The muscular motions of the face seemed to partake of the same nature. This state, together with his habitual air of preoccupation, gave him occasionally a strangeness of physiognomy which can neither be described nor explained, but which struck me as proclaiming an abnormal and peculiar moral condition. In other respects he was calm and submissive. He conversed generally without incoherence of idea, without agitation, and without any apparent disturbance of his faculties. His memory was good, his recollections perfect. Reason, however, did not appear well developed, his judgment leaving much to be desired. His actions of common life were not disordered, but were generally those of perfect sanity. In a word, there did not exist in the accused that aggregation of symptoms visible to every eye, which alone constitutes madness in vulgar estimation. Nevertheless, persons in the habit of seeing him, without calling him insane, could not fail to see that there was something about him that was unusual and peculiar.

Interrogating him minutely in various interviews on his previous life, his most intimate thoughts, his habitual occupation, and on the singular ideas which, according to him, most frequently took possession of his mind, the following details were obtained in almost as many words.

"When very young, he had to undergo great trials; his family experienced one after another great sufferings and afflictions. His mind was early affected by them, and he became in consequence more thoughtful than other children, and averse to childish amusements. He was weary and unhappy when his playfellows were happy and contented; his mind was always depressed and sad. This was more especially the case during one or two years, when his family having lost the last remnant of their fortune, came to actual want and misery, and had to undergo in consequence great privations. At Christmas, last year, he was made happy by being authorized to take the gown, which gave him lively satisfaction. Notwithstanding his happiness, however, he was not without scruples; he asked himself, sometimes, if he was worthy of the robe with which he had been invested, and whether in that career the assistance of God would ever abandon him. His doubts in this matter were not to be wondered at, as he was always by nature very right in his dealings towards God.

"After his attack of erysipelas, strange ideas came into his head; he could only think of the most extraordinary things, dreaming now of immense riches, now of the supernatural power of becoming visible and invisible at will, now of changing his religion and now desiring to make himself celebrated by some great *éclat*. One day he took it into his head to sell himself to Satan; and in order that the devil might find nothing to prevent his fetching him, he laid aside everything about him that had been blessed by the Church. Another day, the idea of abjuration presented itself; he thought of becoming a Protestant, feeling no more for the time the same faith in his religion that until then had always animated him. It was under the influence of this idea that he wrote the letter found in the dormitory, and after which he hid himself in the wood closet under the staircase. Another motive partly induced this act: he wanted to do something *extraordinary*; it would be very *extraordinary*, he thought, for a young student to write and meditate such a wonderful thing. He did not know very well why he had hidden himself in such a hole, his head was in a state of *confusion and stupidity* that day, in a state too extraordinary to be described, he having remained all day lying upon very irregular pieces of wood without having felt the least physical want or desire to move.

"He always took pleasure in singularities; but latterly his ordinary taste for such things became exaggerated, he was pursued more and more by extravagant and unusual ideas. The extraordinary pleased him above everything; thus he was continually tempted to speak against religion, to speak ill of that which was going on well in the house, and to change his religion and become Protestant: he was also often beset with a desire to kill some one, and could not get rid of it. At other times he felt an inclination to commit suicide, to swallow poison or to allow himself to die of hunger. At intervals his predominating idea was to leave the world and to retire to the Chartreuse, or to embrace one order or another. Sometimes he was on the point of running away, to roam about the fields without knowing

where he should go. He declares that on the very day of the event, wearied by the attacks of these ideas and being tired of life, he swallowed some chemical substance which had been given to him by a comrade in the hope of poisoning himself; he took it in the morning and afternoon without succeeding to do himself any harm. In fine, thousands and millions of extravagant ideas successively possessed his mind—sometimes even that of putting on a cardinal's robe, or of clothing himself as a woman and walking about so disguised.

"Another notion, equally as extraordinary as the preceding, took possession of him about the same time—namely, that of his passionate attachment to Charles, one of his comrades. The manners and personal appearance of the latter pleased him and inspired him with sympathy. He felt towards this young man an irresistible transport, lying in wait for opportunities of seeing him and speaking to him, seeking to attract his good opinion, and showing on every occasion the desire to attach himself to him. He continues to love him, notwithstanding all that has happened; one thing that troubles him at the present time is the thought that he is detested, hated, and execrated by him whom he has so passionately loved. What is the reason of this love? He has been asked the question a million times, he was asked it at every turn, and he asks himself, but he cannot give any account of it or explain it. It was something that carried him away, something that constrained him involuntarily. It was a *very ardent and violent affection*, such an affection as no one ever before experienced. This affection mastered him as absolutely as did, at other times, the crowd of singular ideas which came so often into his mind.

"It has been supposed that this affection had in view an object at once frightful, infamous, and horrible: this is a mistake; such a thought never entered his mind, he could not have it, being ignorant that man was ever capable of such horrors, and having only learnt in prison the nature of the infamous act which was supposed to be the motive of his passion. He repelled with indignation accusations of this nature. 'My judges,' said he, 'seem to have regarded it as evident, as demonstrated; it is false, completely false.' In his interviews with Charles, he had never made use of an equivocal word; never had he suggested anything to be ashamed of, nor did he ever attempt anything like an indecent gesture. He wrote to him with passion, he sought his society, and he sometimes embraced him, but without any other object than that of a pure friendship, or, in other words, than treating him as an intimate friend and loving him as a brother. He asserts solemnly that, in truth, no lewd thought ever crossed his mind in connexion with his young comrade.

"These thousand extravagant ideas which entered his mind threw him into a frightful and horrible state. Sometimes they were so powerful and distressing, that he could not work, so great was the confusion into which they plunged his faculties. He had hideous dreams during the night: he awoke frequently, thinking he saw the devil, whom he had oftentimes invoked; believing he heard a noise approaching his bed; imagining that some one came to spy him during his sleep; hearing people speak, and even seeing people fly at the

moment of his awaking. All this agitated him, and made him very unhappy. It also troubled him very much to perceive that his piety grew weaker day by day: he experienced distractions in the exercises of religion which he had not known before; he was not even collected at the most solemn moment of the Mass; his faith was no longer profound; the most serious doubts assailed him, notwithstanding his unceasing efforts to drive them away. During the celebration of the Mass, such ideas would cause him to tremble, and he sometimes wished that the earth would open and swallow him up. He finished by no longer approaching the sacred table, partly on account of his absorbing pre-occupations, partly because of the change which his belief underwent at intervals, and lastly, because he believed himself unworthy, considering the homicidal ideas and other singular thoughts which continually occurred to him as incompatible with the holy sacrament. He repelled these ideas incessantly and unrelaxingly; but they reappeared without cessation, and, in so doing, plunged him in unheard-of suffering—sufferings beyond endurance.

“For some time after these ideas came to him, he found relief in confiding all his thoughts to his confessor, and obtaining from him the consolation that he needed. He returned to his duty more calm, less troubled, and better able to drive away the singular ideas which made him so unhappy. He also frequently consulted the Director of the Seminary, by whom he was very well received; he was equally confiding towards him, and received good advice concerning both the exaggerated scruples which tormented him, and his indefinable moral condition. This condition caused him at intervals such inquietude, that he does not know what he would have done to rid himself of the ideas which beset him. He prayed God to cause his torments to cease; he commended himself to the blessed Virgin; he invoked the intercession of divers saints; he performed several novenas; in a word, he had recourse to all the prescribed forms of religious supplication; but it was useless, he obtained but momentary relief; the same ideas returned with the same force, notwithstanding his prayers and the sage counsel which he received from his Superiors. His faith was more and more shaken; he asked himself sometimes in his affliction, why God thus abandoned him, and put him to such severe trials.

“After the scene caused by his letter against Papists, he was very much grieved to see that it would be impossible for him to follow the vocation which he believed he had for the sacred ministry. But the paternal advice which was given him on this occasion appeared to recall him to a better state. He understood it, thanked his Superiors for it; he was completely resigned to what was required of him, and he was satisfied with the proposition that he should enter the community of the Brothers of St. Jean-de-Dieu. This calm was unfortunately of short duration; he soon fell again into the same torments and perplexities; the strangest ideas again assailed him, but the idea of homicide predominated more than ever, but without his knowing against whom he should seek to put it in execution. He thought for some time of killing one of the professors at the seminary.

He had come to no determination when he went out on the morning of the 20th June to get the weapon which he hid in his bed ; he went out under the influence of general ideas of homicide, but without having determined to put them in force that day, and, above all, against his best friend. It was in the afternoon of this day that he received the allegorical note from Charles which he regarded as a sign of contempt, and feeling more unhappy than usual, and wounded in his affections, he conceived on a sudden the idea of killing him with the weapon he had at his command. From that time he had but this one thought ; he was possessed by it until the evening ; he wrote the passionate letter, acknowledging himself the author of the projected murder, and, without fear of the consequences which he was about to draw down upon himself, he thought only of his project until the fatal moment of its perpetration.

"The hurt which his feelings had received, doubtless, had something to do with his ultimate and dire determination ; but this motive was only secondary ; it would not have induced him to commit such a lamentable act without the dark preoccupations to which his mind had been subject, without those habitual ideas of homicide which made him so unhappy, and of which he could not rid himself. In truth, no ordinary motive would have sufficed to lead him to such a melancholy act ; he but obeyed, in fine, the wish to make himself remarkable—that desire for notoriety which left him no repose. He wished to kill his best friend, because such a murder would be more astounding than any other ; but in all probability he would one day have killed one of the professors, but for the note which fixed his ideas on Charles.

"The secret motive of which he spoke when examined, and which he refused to disclose, had in reality no existence ; he wished then, in speaking thus, to aggravate his situation, by inducing the belief of a real motive for the crime of which he was guilty ; but he was offended to find it supposed on account of this reticence that he was actuated by so infamous a motive as that of which he was accused. There was nothing in his love which he was ashamed to confess ; he had never concealed it, and he had no fear that his friend would accuse him of things which never entered his mind.

"This murder, which appeared so monstrous, was not an act of wickedness on his part. It was contrary to his whole character ; and that he should have been led to commit such a deed, was not only *most extraordinary*, it was *incomprehensible*. To hate evil, and to be *obliged* to do it, is a horrible thing ! Such a thing could only happen by the direct permission of God. Formerly he had been happy in the seminary ; he had good desires, his faith was fervent, his prayers were granted, and his felicity was at its height when, having been invested with the gown, he saw a bright prospect opening before him. Those about him in the seminary loved him, consoled him in his troubles, and gave him continual proofs of friendly interest. Why was this changed ? Why was his soul abandoned to the thousand singular ideas which had tormented and did still torment him ? It was a long time before he was able to explain it, but he now saw clearly that

God had given him up, that he wished to punish him, although he knew of nothing in himself that appeared to merit such chastisement. He no longer prayed, because God would not listen to him; he thought it useless to attend Mass, he had nothing to hope for in so doing; he wished to forget God, as he had been forgotten of him. Man had equally abandoned him; those whom he loved, hated him; the letters he received no longer expressed the truth, and the pledges of affection offered to him were false; even his relations did not love him. He would not receive visitors, because, in the first place, he had no real friends; and secondly, because they only gave him pain, by recalling a state of happiness which was his no longer: he had no further hope—heaven, earth, and hell had conspired against him.

“Since everybody believed him capable of meditating the infamy of which he was accused with regard to Charles, and since they persisted in this accusation, notwithstanding his denials, his protestations, and the absence of all proof, let them make haste to punish him and cause him to endure the most atrocious suffering; he would support them with courage, although he had merited death beneath the stroke of such an execration. He was guilty towards Charles, not for having loved him, but for having attempted his life. He could understand that for this he merited punishment. One of his dreams now was that he might die under the hand of him whom he had loved and did still love with so much ardour. ‘Yes, Charles, I love thee! yes, I love thee,’ said he in a letter, ‘but what matters it that thou lovest me not? There was a power within me which compelled me to do it, and I could not resist it. Even now I love thee, although thou hatest me, abhorrest me, and hast not forgiven me. Yes, I love thee in spite of myself. My ambition is that thou shouldst come and pierce my heart, and that I should die with the words “Charles is avenged.” But this would be a happiness too great for me; I cannot even hope for an end so sweet.’

“When he thought of his sufferings, and considered that God had not listened to him, and that it was by his permission that the homicidal ideas came into his mind, his feelings were something extraordinary—he experienced extreme excitement *and mental convulsions unspeakable*. All his nerves, all his body, said he, were put in motion. It was an excess of cruelty on the part of God, that he permitted persons to write to him, and to ask to see him. He wished to fill up the measure of his grief by permitting to be recalled to his memory pleasures which were lost to him for ever. God had placed him in such a state that, when any extravagance passed through his head, he must do it without the power of resistance. Was it not cruelty to have put him in such a state? He could not tell what his head was made of, it was always working. Occasionally he was tranquil, but at intervals he neither knew what he did, what he should do, or of what he thought. When he made gestures and contortions with his arms, it was because he was agitated by internal convulsions which led him to make such movements. Many a time he had an impulse to do wrong! He would do it if he could. Oh! how frightful was such a state! he would get rid of his reason if he could ever do so.”

Such is the statement of the accused, and such in substance are his thoughts, as I have been able to gather them, in the numerous interviews I have had with him. Having frequently led him over the same ground, I have always obtained the same answers. He has never varied his story, and he has always spoken to me with confidence, and appeared perfectly sincere and convinced of that which he related. The various letters which he wrote in the asylum expressed the same thoughts. It was observed that he rarely said his prayers before retiring to rest; he never asked to go to Mass; he went ultimately with the others, after I had expressed to him my astonishment at his conduct, but I was satisfied that he paid no attention. He looked about distractedly from one side to another, without following the service and assisting therein, without the least sign of feeling. He repeatedly said that God having been the cause of his misfortunes, and having completely abandoned him it was useless for him thenceforth to pray. He obstinately refused to speak to several persons who called to see him, saying that they only came to mock him and make him more unhappy. Everybody, even his own family, had devoted him to execration, and, therefore, why should they come to see him? His sisters wrote him letters full of affectionate consolation; but their kind words, he said, were feigned, adding constantly that they did not express the truth, and that he would not answer them. He wrote once to his relations, to ask for some shirts and an outer garment, beseeching them not to abandon him so far as to deny him what was absolutely necessary.

I endeavoured several times to combat his mode of viewing things, and to make him feel that his ideas were mistaken, that his relations had not abandoned him, and, above all, that it could not be supposed that cruelty could enter into any of God's dealings. He always listened to me with incredulity, placing no faith in my words, and appearing to distrust me, and to think that I was conniving with those who wished to deceive him. A lunatic in his division, who was able to give good advice on subjects of piety and morality, once said to me—"It is useless to give him good advice; he will not listen to it; he only attends to the dictates of his own imagination." I have exasperated him, and have seen a natural indignation depict itself on his countenance each time that, feigning for a moment to distrust him, I have appeared to doubt what he related, and to give some degree of credence to the infamous accusation against him. He has often said to me—"Nobody will believe me again. I am an object of horror to every one. What can I do, since God has decreed that all my protestations should be without effect? No one will ever make me admit what is not true, and confess that which has never entered my mind; neither

the galleys, torture, nor the scaffold shall ever force me to speak anything but the truth." He often pressed me to send him back to prison, where he should be worse treated, he knew, but where he should be nearer to his executioners, who had devoted him to infamy and execration. Why was he not condemned at first? It was, said he, that he might be made to endure torture. The next time he should be tried he determined not to reply to any question, considering it useless to attempt to justify himself. At other times, in moments of exasperation, he would say, on the contrary, that he would explain everything with the greatest frankness, that he would tell his judges what he thought of their cruelty, that he would even rush upon his advocate, and shut his mouth if he appeared to have any intention of defending him.

On the other hand, I have often seen him more composed in his ideas, and more disposed to listen to my advice—not, indeed, completely freed from his delusions, but apparently staggered in his conceptions, disposed to return to his religious belief, and regretting more than ever the loss of so much happiness. He said then that he had slept well, that his head gave him less pain, and that he felt greatly relieved. These favourable days increased considerably during the second month of his sojourn. I noticed, also, that his physical health improved; he became much stouter, and acquired an appearance of health that left nothing to be desired. At the same time, his mental improvement was not durable; he always returned very rapidly to his habitual restlessness.

Conclusions.

[After a full and careful examination, reported at length, of the preceding facts, Dr. Aubanal came to the following conclusions:—]

1st. The accused Louis was predisposed to insanity from birth; and also, as the consequence, of convulsive brain diseases which he suffered from as well in early life as in more recent time.

2nd. The peculiarities of his character always evinced the existence of this natural predisposition.

[The existence of a predisposition in the accused is proved by the mental peculiarities observed during his infancy, and, above all, during the period of his youth passed at the seminary. There, his piety was undoubted, and his general conduct excellent; but there was also remarked in him excessive feebleness of character, infantine manner, numerous oddities and changeableness of mind. The greatest scruples sprung up in his mind as to his religious duties; his imagination was easily excited first by one thing and then by another, without any fixed ideas; he showed an extravagant and even feminine sensibility, was easily impressed, sought to be loved and caressed as a child, and during the hours of recreation was in the

habit of committing eccentricities which were commonly remarked by his comrades. . . . These peculiarities, it is true, do not constitute mental disease. The accused was not yet insane, and no one would have considered him at this time as irresponsible for his actions, although exhibiting very little reflection and some want of judgment. Peculiarities of this kind, however, deserve some attention at the present time. Daily observation teaches us that such facts as these are generally the first moral and intellectual manifestations of folly in those who subsequently become insane. It is rare that one is unable to perceive in cases of congenital or early-acquired predisposition, originalities and eccentricities of various kinds, ardent imagination, weakness of character, imperfect judgment, and other phenomena calling forth general recognition of some serious imperfections in the persons so organised. They have *incomplete organisations*, as it is commonly said, and as one of the witnesses said in speaking of the accused. Individuals so characterised may continue in the same state for life, pursuing their business, living in society and even shining in the world by reason of the pre-eminence of certain faculties; but they are not the less imperfect beings who succumb to the first shock, and present but a feeble resistance to any morbid affection, whether moral or physical. . . . Such was the condition of the accused from his infancy up to the time when he was invested with the gown. He cannot be considered as insane, since his Superiors had finally decided that he might devote himself to the ecclesiastical state; but he was incontestably predisposed to insanity.]

3rd. The erysipelas, accompanied by delirium, from which he suffered in March 1857, was the determining cause of the mental derangement which befel him; the cephalalgia which followed was indicative of the morbid action which was then commencing.

4th. The malady announced itself, in the first place, by the exaggeration of his singularities, by changes in his habits, and by certain manifestations more or less unreasonable.

5th. It was next characterised by several dominant ideas; but an excessive desire for the extraordinary, a propensity to homicide, and an exaggerated affection for a young comrade were the most decided.

[One can understand up to a certain point the sympathy which may be developed between comrade and comrade, and the intimacy which may result from such an attachment; but a love so ardent and violent as that of the accused, and so characterised by himself—a love which absorbed all his thoughts, which prompted him to write such warmly affectionate letters, once even with the blood from a prick of his finger made voluntarily by himself—a love which continues to the present time with the same intensity,

and which he manifests still in the most ardent forms of expression, can only be explained as between man and man in two modes—either as the result of immorality or of a diseased mind.

An immoral desire of this nature, exhibiting itself, so to speak, without reserve before the eyes even of people in the house, is rarely seen but in the *bagnes* or prisons, or in persons of extraordinary perversity. It is then a brutal passion, manifesting itself without refinement or elevation of thought. This was not the case of the accused. He spoke to other pupils of his passion; he spoke of it in terms at once warm and exalted; he confided it even to his Superior. If he had been actuated by any bad thought, would he not have shown more reserve; and, above all, would he have taken a comrade as a confidant and go-between in his correspondence? I cannot believe in the young man's immorality; it is supported by no single fact; his own comrades, even he who so narrowly escaped death at his hands, testify in his favour on this point. And is it to be supposed that the Superior, who was aware of his lively sympathy, would not have sent him away if he had attributed to his passion for a moment such an infamous end?]

6th. His homicidal propensity became at last so strong, that after long resistance he was on the point of yielding to it; it was then that he was tempted to suicide, and that he armed himself with a sword to put his idea of murder into execution.

7th. His passion for the extraordinary, in combination with his homicidal propensity, prompted him to compass the death of his best friend. Other causes—as, for example, the note, contributed to fix the general idea of homicide upon Charles as its object, but they were not the sole or even fundamental causes of the attempted murder.

8th. These dominant ideas influencing the accused, amounted to a real monomania, which, regard being had to the nature of the different series of ideas, might be classed under several denominations, but which I should call homicidal, because this propensity seems to have been the most predominant, and because he ultimately obeyed it in the attempt to murder.

9th. This monomania, followed at intervals by other manifestations more or less indicative of a disordered mind, was not so isolated as its name imports. There were at times, in addition, unmistakable signs of a certain maniacal delirium announcing a general affection of all his faculties.

10th. This mental affection was characterised by numerous remissions. These remissions, which were well marked in the early stage of the disease, naturally tended to disappear as its development progressed.

11th. The disease really existed, although with intermissions or

remissions, during the two or three months which preceded the murder. The accused was then perfectly conscious as to the actions of his ordinary life; he was even still conscious as to the nature of the actions to which his dominant ideas were leading him; but his will grew weaker day by day under the domination of these ideas, and he had already committed several acts which show the loss of that faculty, and the existence of great cerebral disturbance.

12th. He was certainly able to appreciate, up to a certain point, the consequences of his actions; he knew perfectly well, for example, that in plunging the weapon into his friend he was about to kill him; but does not the absence of all criminal motive announce that in so doing he fatally obeyed the domination of a delirious idea?

13th. His free-will was profoundly affected, not only by the mastery his foolish conceptions had obtained over his mind, but also as the result of a more general derangement of his faculties.

14th. The circumstances under which the murder was committed are not sufficient to account for it, if viewed as a criminal act. There really does not exist any other fundamental motive for it than that of his monomania.

15th. The accused was not of sane mind for a long time before the murder; he was insane on the day and at the moment of perpetrating it, not forgetting that he premeditated it for ten or twelve hours before.

16th. In prison, and in the asylum, the disease evidenced, with remissions, the same characteristics, but the dominant ideas were not so strong. Some abatement resulted from treatment.

17th. An amelioration may be hoped for under a systematic and prolonged treatment of the disease, but it is doubtful whether it can be radically cured; and if cured, it is very doubtful whether a relapse must not sooner or later occur.

18th. The suggestion that the insanity of the accused is only simulated cannot be sustained; he has never simulated this malady, nor does he simulate at the present moment.

ART. V.—ON GENERAL PARALYSIS.

THE appearance of some recent memoirs, and the conclusion of a long-continued and interesting discussion on this important subject before the Medico-Psychological Society in Paris, occupying three entire sittings, seem to present a favourable opportunity for bringing before our readers the present state of our knowledge

and our prospects as regards a disease which has only of late years been recognised as a distinct nosological entity, and upon which we are still far from absolute certainty in reference to any point connected with its history, except its extreme gravity and its almost certainly fatal result.

A preliminary idea of the nature of the affection of which we speak may be obtained by a glance over the various names by which it has been known. It has been called General Paralysis of the Insane, Paralytic Insanity, Incomplete and Progressive Paralysis, from its symptoms and its connexion with mental disorder; from its usual pathological characteristics it has been termed Slow or Chronic Meningitis, General Cortical Cerebritis, Diffuse Chronic Peri-encephalic Meningitis, and Meningo-Cerebritis. It is a disease which may be briefly said to be characterised by disorder of the intellectual and volitional powers, not always, or even generally, in strict proportion one to the other. The mental affection is usually of the *expansive* character, attended by exaggerated notions of the wealth, position, or personal qualifications of the subject, terminating in dementia. The physical disorder consists in a progressive weakness and uncertainty of action of the voluntary muscular system generally, in the majority of cases beginning with the muscles of the tongue and those connected with articulation, so that stammering is very often the first symptom of the invasion of this affection. In a patient who has evinced any tendency to mental derangement, there can be few symptoms of more serious import than this—a tendency to stammer, or a difficulty of pronunciation of certain words; it may be apprehended with a great amount of certainty that general paralysis is imminent, and that death, soon or late, will follow as the almost necessary result, let the physical health have been up to that time ever so good.

It may be expected that very soon the tongue and the muscles of the face will act irregularly and tremulously; and that this feebleness and uncertainty of function will extend to the entire locomotive system, sometimes attacking first the inferior and sometimes the superior extremities. The term “general paralysis” is, however, in some measure deceptive, as not indicative of the absolute phenomena of the disease in its progress. It is not until the latest stages that the paralysis becomes truly general, and no voluntary power is left, nor any action even of the sphincters. But it is in so far “*general*” as that it is not hemiplegia, nor paraplegia, nor *local* paralysis, differing from all these essentially, inasmuch as *all the muscles of the body* are indiscriminately liable to be attacked, and sooner or later are so affected.

It is rather singular that a disease so well marked in its

phenomena, and so serious in its results, should only have attracted attention in so comparatively late a period of medical history. It is also more remarkable that although it was an English physician who first noticed it (John Haslam, in 1798), yet its systematic and scientific investigation has been left almost exclusively to our French brethren. Esquirol briefly commented upon it in 1816; Bayle first brought out a complete history of it as a meningitis in 1822; followed in 1826 by the admirable treatise on *The Paralysis of the Insane*, by Calmeil, a work which must always take classical rank amongst scientific investigations. Since this period many elaborate and excellent monographs have appeared in France, as well as countless shorter papers, making the natural history of this affection almost as complete as that of any well-known disease. This contrasts strongly with our own contributions to its literature: so far as we are aware, we have *no* separate work on the subject; and in systematic treatises on insanity, for the most part this is only mentioned in a passing way. Many of our hospitals for the insane simply refuse admission to patients affected with paralysis, as being incurable!

We have spoken of this as a highly important subject; and why? It is not numerically very prominent in the causes of death affecting our bills of mortality, although, perhaps, much more so than has hitherto been suspected; and yet there are reasons, and forcible ones, why it is deserving of much more attention than has as yet been accorded to it by English writers.

The physical causes of insanity are hitherto involved in great uncertainty. Some pathologists go so far as to assert that in a majority of cases of simple derangement of intellect, *no* morbid changes of the nervous centres can be detected, and that in a majority of the remainder such changes are too slight, too unimportant, and too undefined and unspecific to be considered as *causes*. Others aver that they have never examined the brain of a patient who has died insane, without detecting some morbid alteration of the brain or its membranes; and these authorities are certainly amongst those who have had opportunities, not by units or tens, but by hundreds of cases.* Again, others affirm

* Thus M. Ferrus, whose authority is unimpeachable, observes:—"I would say, without *any reserve*, that every time that I have opened the cranium of an insane person, I have *never* found the brain healthy, as compared with that of a man who had died without signs of intellectual disorder. I have *always* found thickening or adhesion of the membranes, hyperæmia, softening or induration of the grey or the white matter; just as I should say that I have never found in the normal condition the lungs and heart of a person who has been for a long time asthmatic. . . . Science is not yet sufficiently advanced for us to say, as regards the brain, that each alteration corresponds always to one and the same pathological phenomenon;

that the *visible* and *palpable* changes are certainly in many cases deficient, but would, doubtless, be revealed were our means of investigation by the microscope and by chemical analysis more perfect. And, in addition to all this variety of opinion, it has to be taken into account that whatever may have been the proximate cause of the mental affection, *certain additional physical changes* must have taken place in order to cause death; and there is the super-added difficulty of deciding what has dethroned reason, and what has destroyed life. In short, we are still ignorant of what may cause mental aberration, and what is its essential material element; nor have we as yet obtained any certain starting-point, any irrefragable data whereon to found a clearly inductive system of research.

Such data, if we are not mistaken, may be ultimately afforded us by the disease to which we purpose to devote a few pages. For, although general paralysis* appears clearly proved to occur frequently as an isolated disease, and apart from all mental derangement, yet it seems also to be the normal termination of a certain form of insanity, and to be otherwise closely allied to it, as will appear hereafter. Now, in examining the nervous centres of those dead from general paralysis we often, or at least occasionally, observe on a superficial inspection the same absence of morbid changes as in insanity in its least complicated forms; and yet a more minute and careful investigation almost invariably detects morbid appearances, as uniform in their essential nature and distribution, as defined and specific in their significance, and as correspondent with the foregone physiological phenomena, as any observed in pericarditis, peritonitis, or any of the recognised inflammatory affections. They certainly require special methods of research for their detection in many of the less marked cases; but when found they are such as only occur in this and allied affections, and as occur all but invariably in these. There being then a tolerably uniform connexion between one phase of mental disorder and a certain form of physical derangement, manifested by paralysis of a most marked and distinctive kind—one, in fact, which cannot well be confounded with any other,—and this paralysis being dependent upon, or at least almost inseparably connected with, a clearly-defined pathological process and morbid change,—we may, by an analysis of such considerations, obtain a glimpse of some possible point of departure for attaining a knowledge of the material changes which accompany (if not

but the case is the same as regards all the complex apparatus of organs, unless we reject the evidence of pathological anatomy. I do not think that the brain ought to be considered as placed in exceptional circumstances under these views."

* We adopt this designation only as the most convenient, and not from any conviction of its scientific merits; were it practicable in the present state of our knowledge, a pathological term would be preferable.

cause) psychical troubles. On these grounds we propose to investigate, carefully, the nature and phenomena of general paralysis; and in so doing we shall draw largely, where it seems expedient so to do, from the discussion above mentioned, in which MM. Parchappe, Pinel, Baillarger, Delasiauve, Ferrus, Belhomme, and Falret took a prominent part.

One of the principally contested points concerning this affection is, whether it is essentially connected or not with mental disorder, and what place it is entitled to occupy in a nosological classification. For it appears to occur sometimes entirely independent of mental affection; sometimes to supervene upon it; and sometimes to precede it by months, or perhaps years. In examining this question we shall follow the plan of M. Parchappe, and inquire into the causes, symptoms, seat, nature, and progress of the malady; as by so doing we shall attain a fuller comprehension of the subject than by any less systematic treatment. We consider it first as studied exclusively in connexion with mental disorder.

1. The *causes* of general paralysis are immediate and predisposing. The former are such in general as produce a prolonged over-excitement of the brain,—sensual excesses, especially the abuse of intoxicating drinks, over-feeding, sexual indulgence, and intellectual excesses accompanied by prolonged vigil. The predisposing causes may be considered to be such as belong to insanity and brain affections generally; the disease, moreover, attacks men much more frequently than women, and both chiefly between the ages of thirty and forty-five years.

2. The *symptoms* of general paralysis (of the insane) consist of an apyretic or non-febrile lesion of the intelligence, the sensibility, and voluntary motion. The intelligence is constantly affected from the commencement of the malady; sometimes only observed as a feebleness of memory or judgment; sometimes, and most frequently, as mania with the delirium of grandeur and power; sometimes as melancholia; and sometimes, again, as simple dementia from the outset, a condition into which all the previous forms have a tendency to merge as the disease makes progress. Whatever may be the original specific type of the mental affection, the faculties are observed to be enfeebled progressively, even during the excitement of the opening delirium; and this goes on until the last phase is characterised by the utter extinction of all intelligence.

The alteration of motility consists in progressive weakness of the voluntary movements, commencing by trembling of the muscles of the tongue and mouth, by a more or less marked difficulty in the pronunciation of words, and afterwards by hesitation in walking and uncertainty in standing, with trembling and

weakness of the hands and arms. The loss of muscular power extends often, and especially in the latter stages, to the sphincters of the bladder and the anus. When arrived at the extreme, the loss of power condemns the sufferer to absolute immobility and mutism.

The loss of sensibility has not been studied with the same amount of care and attention as has been bestowed on that of motion and intelligence. Yet it is ascertained that the general sensibility is notably diminished, and the special tact or touch greatly deteriorated. The sight and hearing partake, in some measure, in the general dulness of sense.

3. The *seat* of the malady is in the cortical layer of the cerebral hemispheres. (We here give M. Parchappe's opinion and words.) Pathological anatomy furnishes a *positive* proof of this, by the constancy of the existence, in this layer, of alterations characteristic of an inflammatory condition, amongst which is prominent a softening of the cortical substance; and a *negative* proof by the absence, in some cases, of every other alteration, and particularly of all alteration in the meninges.

The anatomical proof is confirmed by the physiological considerations which place the *seat* of the affected functions, the intelligence, the voluntary motion, and the sensibility in the cortical layer of the cerebrum.

"I feel it necessary (says M. Parchappe) to meet beforehand some objections that may be made to this opinion. It is necessary in the first place to remark, that an error of diagnosis during life is not very difficult. There are cases of mania with volubility and stammering, which may be confounded with general paralysis, and which may be mistaken by the most skilful observers. There are cases of simple dementia, arrived at the extreme, with mutism and immobility; and cases of various maladies of the encephalon, with feebleness or abolition of the intelligence, difficulty of articulation and progression and impossibility of standing, which may simulate the general paralysis of the insane. In such cases, we must abstain from pronouncing, during life, upon the existence of the disease in question, if we wish to avoid deceiving ourselves, and compromising science by facts which are only apparently contradictory. . . . In all the cases of true *paralytic insanity* (*folie paralytique vraie*) in which I have been able to pronounce an accurate diagnosis during life (and these have amounted to 322), I have constantly and without exception satisfied myself of the existence of inflammatory softening to a greater or less extent of the cortical matter of the cerebral hemispheres. . . . Had I always confined myself to the ordinary methods of investigation, I should often have overlooked the existence of this characteristic alteration. The meninges were healthy, and detached themselves freely from the surface of the hemispheres. The cerebral surface was not altered in colour; in consistence it appeared even increased. The brain cut in slices appeared perfectly sound. But the handle of the scalpel lightly inserted into the grey

matter would often indicate the existence of softening of the internal layer, by permitting that easy detachment or decortication which in the greater number of cases of softening is determined by simple traction of the membranes. . . . I believe that the cases of integrity of the cortical layer which have been brought forward are all explicable either by error of diagnosis during life, or by insufficiency in the methods of exploration after death."

The *nature* of these alterations, according to the same authority, is inflammatory. They have for their special characters, a tendency to extend simultaneously to the two hemispheres, especially to the anterior and middle lobes—to be associated almost constantly with inflammation of the meninges, and frequently with that of the grey matter of the cerebral ganglia, of the cerebellum and the spinal cord, with a granular alteration of the ventricular parietes and an induration of the white matter,—and finally, very frequently with atrophy of the convolutions.

M. Belhomme considers that the central ganglia of the brain are as much concerned in the pathological changes, as the cortical layer of the hemispheres. In seventeen observations, certain changes were constant,—viz., those involving the cortical layer, the tuber annulare, the cerebral peduncles, the walls of the third and fourth ventricles, and the medulla oblongata; all of which were either softened, or in some way pathologically altered: the membranes also were in all cases injected, thickened, and opaque. The other changes were:—

Adhesion of membranes to cerebrum	14 times.
Softening of medullary matter	12 "
Induration	5 "
Softening of the corpus callosum and septum lucidum	14 "
Softening of tubercula quadrigemina	18 "

From which observations it would appear to result that the degeneration of the brain in this disease is indeed general, and by no means confined to one part.

4. The *progress* of the development of this affection has certain characters which are special to it, as relating to the succession and connexion of the symptoms, and the termination of the disease.

Impairment of the memory and judgment is evident from the first, and continues always increasing until their entire abolition.

The alteration of motility only appears very sensibly after that of the intelligence. It may be absent at first, and continue so for some time, so as to cause doubts in the mind of even the most practised observers as to the nature of the malady for even some weeks. Most frequently it is manifested at first and chiefly in the articulation, and afterwards extends to the other voluntary

movements, especially those concerned in walking and standing : though it does sometimes happen that these latter functions are seriously affected, whilst the speech is but little altered. It is not infrequent for the paralysis to appear simultaneously in the speech and the locomotive apparatus. Occasionally it is more pronounced on one side, so as to simulate hemiplegia.

A very important point to notice is the effect upon the muscular striæ of the iris, which share in the general feebleness, and act unequally, so as to produce want of accordance between the pupils.

The alteration of the sensibility, at first not very marked, follows in its development the impairment of the intellectual faculties ; and it is only absolutely extinguished during the state of temporary congestion, or the state of permanent coma that precedes death.

In general, except in the congestive state, general paralysis is not accompanied by febrile symptoms. But this congestive state is one of the most characteristic symptoms of this malady ; very frequently a cerebral congestion marks its outbreak, and thus the subsequent mental and physical phenomena are attributed too hastily to apoplexy. Habitually this congestion reappears many times in the course of the disease ; and each time it leaves the patient with symptoms much aggravated.

These cerebral congestions are connected intimately with one of the most remarkable phenomena observed in general paralysis, *i. e.*, the almost complete remission of all the symptoms which occasionally is noticed. When these congestions do not reappear or are a long time between, the brain seems to become accustomed to its partially impaired condition, and to resume its functions almost normally—a state which continues until a new attack of congestion supervenes.

The softening of the cortical layer, and the other alterations of this substance and of the membranes, present during the first period, which may be called acute, all the characters assigned to the inflammatory condition, such as the rosy tint, hyperæmia, pointed injection, extravasations, morbid adhesions of the pia mater to the brain, and sometimes effusion between this membrane and the cerebral surface.

At a more advanced epoch, if death has not ensued during the congestive stage, we do not observe any hyperæmia. The cortical layer is then not only softened, but the convolutions are atrophied, and present a pale dirtyish grey or yellow colour ; the membranes are thickened and opaque, and serum is effused, occupying the space left by the receding convolutions.

In the general paralysis of the insane there is a profoundly

interesting connexion between the symptoms and the organic alterations, which deserves much and careful attention.

The disorder of the intelligence, under the form of mania or melancholia, coincides with the period during which the alterations of the cortical layer are only superficial or of small extent. The diminution of the intellectual faculties, as well as the paralysis of voluntary motion, seems connected most intimately with the depth and extent of the softening. The imperfection of articulation (Parchappe) is generally in relation with the extent and intensity to which the *anterior lobes* are affected.

Although this is a *general* affection of the cortical substance, it is not always and necessarily of the same intensity on both sides; and when there appears any hemiplegic tendency, it is generally observed that there is a greater amount of softening on the side of the brain opposite to that of the most affected limb.

One of the most special and distinctive, as well as most serious, characters of general paralysis is, that it *terminates constantly by death*. As we proceed, we may find some exceptions to this in the general paralysis occurring independent of mental disease; but most observers agree that when once general paralysis has appeared, *even slightly*, in an insane person, there may possibly be a remission of symptoms even for a considerable period, but there can be (or rather *has hitherto been*) no cure—death is imminent and certain, although at a very uncertain period. Perhaps the average duration may be from two to three years. It is very common before the close of life to observe gangrenous sloughs on all parts of the body that are exposed to pressure; the phenomena of life are merely vegetative for some time before dissolution.

M. Parchappe gives a very unhesitating opinion as to the nosological situation of this affection. He considers it essentially a species of mental unsoundness, and denominates it "*folie paralytique*," for the following reasons:—

"It does not appear possible to ignore or break the strong bonds of connexion between this disease and simple insanity.

"The determining and predisposing causes are analogous.

"The disease frequently commences by intellectual disturbance, without any trace of paralysis; and for days or weeks, the patient who is about to be affected by general paralysis presents no symptoms but those of insanity. The paralytic phenomena are sometimes only developed after the insanity has lasted a long time. The disease has the same seat as insanity, viz., the cortical layer of the cerebral hemispheres. And although simple insanity is not characterised by any well-defined morbid appearances, yet such alterations as are

frequently met with, and which some observers* even state to be always present, have the strongest analogy with those met with in general paralysis.

"Simple insanity may be considered to consist in a dynamic alteration of the nervous action merely. But this *dynamic* change becomes *plastic* in the last stage of dementia, by atrophy of the convolutions. And in my opinion, simple insanity, from being dynamic, becomes plastic, at the period when it becomes complicated with general paralysis.

"On the other hand, it does not appear easy to bring this disease under the head of inflammatory affections of the encephalon. It is *apyretic*: it is not marked at its outset by bilious vomitings, so habitual in meningitis, so frequent in encephalitis. It does not present the febrile and acute symptoms which characterise inflammations of the meninges, or the cerebral substance. True encephalitis is habitually *partial*, and occupies only one hemisphere; the paralysis is usually therefore of an hemiplegic order, and is often preceded and accompanied by contractions of the muscles. The inflammation also usually involves both grey and white matter.

"The progress, finally, of true encephalitis is essentially acute and rapid—it lasts only one or a few weeks, whilst general paralysis lasts months or years.

"Such are the reasons which have induced me to place general paralysis as to its nosological classification under the head of '*alienatio mentis*.'"

Such is a *résumé* of the opinions of M. Parchappe, one of the most constant and laborious investigators of this subject. There are, however, many points of controversy which, we think, will be brought forward most prominently and clearly by taking up the thread of the discussion above mentioned.

M. Delasiauve recognises the existence of the morbid changes above mentioned, but dissents from the conclusions. He views them as *consequences* of the progress of the disease, not as its *cause*. The disease *gives rise* to congestions, and the repeated congestions *produce* the softenings above described. In this he is equally opposed to the views of M. Parchappe, and to those of his much-regretted friend M. Bayle, who considered the essential nature of the disease to be chronic meningitis. He places the seat of the pathological process, whatever this may be, in the cerebral hemispheres, but does not consider it primarily inflammatory, but rather "*un de ces vices de nutrition dont le mystère, jusqu'à présent, n'a pas été éclairci.*" Acknowledging the congestions, he denies altogether their primitive *casual* influence, and considers them as produced by or subordinate to a secret pre-existing alteration (qy. dynamic?) in the brain, of which the specific influence is to trouble the circulation, and to produce *stasis* of the

* See the opinion of M. Ferrus above quoted.

blood in the encephalic vessels. He also considers that the remarkable intermissions so common in this disease are more easily explicable on this hypothesis than on that of a necessarily progressive organic change. He objects to the designation of "*folie paralytique*," as involving an hypothesis, and inclines more strongly to that of "*paralysie générale*." On the whole, his learned and thoughtful address was destructive rather than constructive.

M. Baillarger is of opinion that, under one general denomination, we have combined facts which are, at least apparently, very dissimilar. There are two principal groups which may be mentioned.

1. It is very common to see patients who have gradually fallen into *dementia* without presenting any of the symptoms of reaction or delirium, or in whom these have been extremely slight and subordinate. As this decay of the intelligence is established, we notice at first slight, and then more marked signs of paralysis; and shortly we have developed a paralytic dementia so marked, that none can mistake the phenomena.

2. By the side of this numerous group there is another which is yet more so, especially amongst men.

The patient begins by presenting the signs of an excitement more or less lively; he moves about perpetually, and cannot remain still for a moment. At the same time, he forms large projects, buys all manner of objects, gets angry when opposed, and cannot sleep. To this state succeeds a complete maniacal delirium, with predominance of ambitious ideas, and a special muscular agitation quite distinct from that of ordinary mania. At the same time, if we are in the habit of attentively observing such patients, we shall detect a *little hesitation in the pronunciation of certain words*.

Such are the two principal groups which are at present designated under one name, that of insane paralytics.

These symptoms are assuredly very much opposed. In the one case we see debility, inertia, and the slow extinction of the cerebral functions; in the other, force, violence, and an increase of physical and intellectual activity.

But, to reconcile these, it is said that one is the acute, the other the chronic state of the disease; that simple primitive dementia is rare, and, when it does occur, that the proper, legitimate, first, or excited stage is wanting; and thus the ambitious mania is but a period or a form of the general paralysis.

M. Baillarger doubts this interpretation and theory. The acute and chronic stages of a disease must present analogous symptoms and anatomical lesions:—only in the one case the progress will be rapid and acute, with phenomena of reaction;

in the other it will be slow, and the reaction wanting. Thus in acute and chronic pleurisy we find these conditions united. But is it so with the ambitious mania and paralytic dementia? Is the one the chronic form of the other? We have seen how different are the symptoms—muscular and intellectual excitement contrasted with dementia and incomplete paralysis.

In regard to the anatomical lesions, these are not less contrasted. In patients who have died during acute ambitious mania, there is almost constantly congestion of the hemispheres, with increase of weight; whilst in paralytic dementia there is always diminution of volume and weight of the hemispheres, and serous effusion, which every one now admits to be *not* a cause of compression of the brain, but as merely poured out to fill up the void left by the retreating atrophied convolutions. Thus the average weight of the brains of patients who had died in the acute form of ambitious mania was about one-eighth more than the average of healthy brains; whilst those of patients who had suffered from paralytic dementia were about one-sixth *below* the average weight. This is strictly analogous to the results of the observations of M. Parchappe on the brains of those who have died during *simple* mania and dementia. In the former he always found hyperæmia, turgescence, and augmentation of weight of the brain; and in the latter, atrophy, with diminution of weight. In the present case, however, the contrast is still more marked: there is a greater increase of weight in ambitious than in simple mania; there is a greater diminution of weight in general paralysis than in simple dementia.

From all this M. Baillarger concludes, that in ambitious mania there is as yet but a congestive and strongly hyperæmic condition of the brain; whilst in paralytic dementia there is atrophy, accompanied by lesions of the cerebral substance of a very grave character, of which the principal are a granular condition of the grey matter, a special induration of the white matter of the convolutions (*sic*), and a *tendency to isolation* of the two substances of the brain.

Reasoning by symptoms and anatomical lesions, we ought to separate these two affections; and yet there is a reason why one might appear to be a phase or stage of the other, that is, that in a great majority of cases the paralytic dementia does succeed fatally to the ambitious mania. Some writers give this as the invariable termination. M. Esquirol states that in mania and monomania, if any symptoms, *however slight*, of paralysis be observed, we may predict with certainty that dementia will succeed, and that death will speedily terminate the disease. M. Baillarger admits that, without doubt, the ambitious maniacs who fall into dementia with paralysis are much more numerous than those of simple mania so terminating; but he believes that this

is not the *absolutely necessary* termination. He adds that authors have related a few cases of recovery even after the patients had presented the gravest symptoms of paralysis; and that although these facts may be considered exceptional, they are doubtless of the highest significance. We must be content with the briefest abstract of a few of these cases.

"*Observation 1st.*—Mania for some months, with predominance of ambitious delirium; very marked symptoms of paralysis, with difficulty of walking and standing. *Stammering not present*, but some hesitation occasionally before a word. Formation of gangrenous sloughs, followed by recovery, which lasted twenty-five years.—(Related by M. Ferrus.)

"*Observation 2nd.*—M——, aged 41, had some insane relations, and became melancholic himself after some domestic trouble. He had some epileptic attacks; the speech became imperfect, and one arm weak. After his entry into the asylum, he was in continual agitation, and had the delirium of grandeur and riches fully developed. Pupils unequal, tongue furred, pulse accelerated. The sensibility became very much diminished, and the paralysis extended to the sphincters. He could not walk nor write his name: there appeared a great number of sloughs on the body, some apparently without cause, some where his agitation had bruised the skin. After attaining almost the lowest state of paralysis, he began to recover—as it is stated, not by means of therapeutic agency—and both his reason and his bodily powers returned. He was alive and well when this account was written, ten years afterwards.—(From the *American Journal of Medical Science.*)

"*Observation 3rd.*—General paralysis, apparently of the worst kind; symptoms of the last period. Acute oedema of one leg, with gangrene. Rapid recovery, which is known to have lasted six years.—(By M. Renaudin.)

"*Observation 4th.*—Acute mania, with tendency to ambitious ideas; feebleness of the memory; uncertain walk. Eruption of boils, with abundant suppuration. Embarrassment of speech; recovery. Duration of the malady, one year. Duration of the recovery, five years. Sudden death from cerebral hæmorrhage.

"The 5th case recovered after an abscess of the liver; the 6th after a purulent discharge from the ears; and the 8th after an amputation, followed by profuse suppuration."

In all these cases the paralysis was so far advanced as to be unmistakeable—the authorities from whom they are quoted are irrefragable. We must therefore admit the *possibility* of paralytic ambitious mania being cured, and therefore that it does not of *necessity* lapse into dementia. Death also sometimes takes place without the supervention of dementia. It is interesting to remark in how many of these cases of recovery the amendment seemed to date from the establishment of a suppurating surface, either spontaneous or artificial. Although the cases of true recovery are certainly rare, yet those of apparent restoration to a

state of health, for a time more or less prolonged, are very frequent; and these remissions are amongst the most surprising of the phenomena of this affection.

M. Baillarger concludes, that ambitious mania presents different symptoms and different anatomical lesions to those of general paralysis with dementia; that these two maladies have an existence isolated the one from the other; that we cannot regard them as acute and chronic forms of one and the same affection; and that they ought to be considered apart, as are mania and dementia in their simple forms; being still more contrasted than these, both symptomatically and pathologically. From the very important part assigned to cerebral congestion in this disease, he proposes that it should be known as *mania congestive*.

It appears also not impossible, nor altogether improbable, that inasmuch as a considerable proportion of these cases of remission are discharged from the hospitals, and otherwise lost sight of, some of them, at least, *may be* instances of permanent recovery, similar to those above related; especially in those cases of amendment which have dated from critical discharges, or purulent evacuations, natural or artificial. With this possibility, and with the certainty that in some cases of ambitious mania with paralysis recoveries have taken place, we may indulge still the hope that further progress in our knowledge of the treatment may be attained; and at all events, we should never cease our efforts on the hypothesis that these cases are irremediable. It must, however, be acknowledged, that all authors are agreed on one point, viz., that they have never met with a case of *paralytic dementia* that has terminated otherwise than fatally.

Dr. Arochambault, however, states that when he became attached to the "Charenton," he found there twelve or fifteen patients who had been in the establishment more than ten years, and who were stated, on their entry, to be affected with general paralysis; yet they only now presented very slight signs of the disorder. These and similar considerations would seem to indicate the necessity for a more guarded prognosis than is usually given in such cases.

We have hitherto considered general paralysis only as found united with mental disorder, and as inseparable from it, at some period of its history. There is, however, another aspect in which it may be viewed, of which the following is an outline drawn in great measure from an elaborate portrait by M. Pinel.

General paralysis is a special malady, characterised by lesion of motility, more or less extended, with a progressive tendency to become universal.

It exists either simply or complicated: in the first case, it is independent of every other affection, and there is no disorder of

the intelligence; in the second, it is frequently united with some form of mental derangement.

The malady designated "general paralysis of the insane," or *folie paralytique*, is only a complication of general paralysis with insanity.

General paralysis may continue sometimes, although rarely, until death, with this complication with mental disorder. It is accompanied often with a loss of memory, especially for recent events, which is different from dementia.

Ordinarily, insanity supervenes, after a period more or less extended, to complicate the motor lesions. Most frequently the motor lesion first appears; sometimes the two classes of phenomena are simultaneous in their outbreak; less frequently, the paralysis is secondary.

Simple or uncomplicated general paralysis is not seen in asylums for the insane, for obvious reasons. Hence has arisen the idea that it is always connected with mental affection.

It may precede, accompany, or follow mania, monomania, melancholia, and especially dementia. The expansive (ambitious) delirium, often considered as a constant sign of general paralysis, is not infrequently altogether absent. With regard to the symptoms, progress, remissions and causes, nothing further need be advanced than what has been above stated.

"Moderate local bleedings, at the outset only, and when there are signs of congestion—issues at the base of the brain—repeated vesications over the scalp—general affusions, and revulsives from the intestines and extremities, are the principal means to be used. The prognosis is most unfavourable; yet there are well-authenticated instances of recovery."

"I am convinced that general paralysis is not a disease essentially appertaining to the insane—that it is not a form of insanity—that it does not necessarily and fatally induce it—that it is an affection entirely independent of this latter, so long as the alteration which produces it does not extend to that portion of the molecular structure of the brain which presides over intelligence; and I believe that this portion of the brain may escape lesion during the whole period of life."
—(Pinel.)

It appears that although most cases are complicated with insanity at some period of the affection, and a considerable proportion of the remainder present a partial decay of the faculties, especially memory and judgment, still far short of dementia; yet certain of the authorities, amongst whom we find Rostan, Guislain, and Pinel, are convinced that there are cases of general paralysis of the most marked kind which from first to last show no affection whatever of the mind. M. Rostan even states that five out of six of the cases of general paralysis which he has

attended were not insane patients; and MM. Guislain and Pinel both agree that they have seen patients die of general paralysis who had never evinced the least disturbance or enfeeblement of the intellect. These authorities all agree, for the most part, that general paralysis most frequently induces ultimately some mental disturbance; but are of opinion that it does so, not from any original and essential connexion with insanity, but just as epilepsy, apoplexy, chorea, and convulsions act, without ever having been considered special forms of insanity.

The question of the essential nature of general paralysis has perhaps been complicated, more than by any other consideration, by that of the variety of manners in which it makes its first appearance. We will briefly sketch these on the plan of M. Falret, before attempting to give a concise statement of our own views on the whole subject.

General paralysis presents itself originally in four forms, two of which are marked by predominance of somatic disorder, and two by that of the mental phenomena. It is important to note this, because it has been perhaps too generally considered that the expansive delirium was essential to its diagnosis in the first instance. This is, in reality, its most frequent form, but by no means the only one. There is a fortuitous reason why this form has been stated to be the essential characteristic; and that is, that in the other modes of development, the appearance of the disease is so insidious, that its early periods have passed before the patient comes under special notice, or is placed in an asylum; but the ambitious or expansive delirium is so marked in its characters, that the subject is placed under surveillance at once; and so it happens that almost all the cases of general paralysis which are seen early bear this type.

1. The *paralytic variety*.—This is the most insidious of all the forms in which this fearful disease appears, and has perhaps given rise to more contest as to its nature than any other. For some time the only disorder appears, to the ordinary observer, to be one of the motor functions exclusively. The patient himself perceives that his actions become irregular, trembling, and wanting in precision. He lets fall objects which he holds in his hands, and cannot perform any acts which require delicacy of manipulation; writing, drawing, or playing on any instrument, becomes difficult. He stumbles against the slightest obstacle, and walks with a jerk: he is more readily fatigued than formerly, and all his motions lack co-ordination. All this, which comes on very slowly and almost imperceptibly, is accompanied from the outset by a peculiar hesitation and embarrassment of the articulation, or stammering. Ordinarily there is slight pain in the head, and dizziness—an unequal dilatation of the pupils, and

not unfrequently genital impotence, with occasional incontinence of urine.

During this period the patient is conscious of his failing strength, and troubles himself about it. He appears at first to enjoy the full exercise of his faculties; but although in some rare cases it is not possible to detect any intellectual weakness, in general the practised observer will recognise some indication of this. There is an undefined alteration of character or disposition—a mobility of temperament that scarcely admits of description—the performance of odd, bizarre acts that pass for eccentricity—a tendency to make mistakes in his usual employment—a slight weakness of memory for recent events—and, what is the most serious symptom of all, a combination of a marked hypochondriac tendency, with a general feeling and expression of satisfaction and pleasure, the sure forerunner to an outbreak of the expansive or ambitious maniacal delirium, which is not then long delayed.

2. *The congestive variety.*—In this form the physical symptoms again predominate over the psychical. The predominant character is one of transient and recurrent congestion of the brain, with or without loss of consciousness; ordinarily slight, though sometimes very severe, simulating apoplexy or epilepsy; and giving rise to the opinion that the subsequent paralysis has been caused by one of these affections. This form of congestion is distinguished from the ordinary apoplectic form, by leaving more serious and persistent traces in the moral and physical nature. The speech remains for a long time disordered, the movements of the limbs become difficult, and sometimes there is even incomplete hemiplegia, which diminishes and disappears slowly, to return perhaps after the next congestion. The intelligence is affected after each attack, as well as the motor powers; but if there be any considerable interval, both orders of phenomena partially disappear, and the patient is restored to a comparatively healthy condition—*apparently*. Immediately after the attack we may detect a considerable feebleness of memory and the other faculties; but in time the intellect appears to resume its activity. After several attacks, however, both the physical and intellectual nature is found to be unmistakeably deteriorated, and dementia, accompanied by various forms of delirium, supervenes. In short, like the last form, the malady assumes the ordinary aspect of “general paralysis of the insane.”

3. *Melancholic variety.*—In this form the psychical disorder first attracts attention. It is only in comparatively rare instances that the physician sees the first stage of the malady; but in inquiring into the history of paralytics, he will not unfrequently find that the first phenomenon that attracted attention was a state of marked moral and physical feebleness or depression, with

lowness of spirits, and incapacity, real or supposed, for any form of action ; presenting every appearance of hypochondriacal melancholia. Even at this period, there may sometimes be detected slight disorders of motility, as stammering or hesitation in speech, or feebleness and trembling of the limbs. But these symptoms are overlooked, the melancholia absorbing the whole attention. This melancholic period may be very short, or it may have lasted some time ; but in all cases that are paralytic it disappears gradually, to give place to the normal condition. But this is very transitory ; almost as soon as the signs of melancholia begin to disappear, the attentive observer may detect frequently the symptoms of an opposed condition. The patient experiences a sensation of exaggerated comfort—he was never so well in his life, body or mind ; he begins to be unnaturally active, moving incessantly ; he forms projects of which he would never have thought before—perhaps not absurd, not altogether out of accordance with his fortune or profession, but still quite opposed to his previous habits and tastes. He then either passes gradually into the true expansive delirium, or a fierce mania with predominance of ambitious ideas breaks out suddenly, after which his history is the same as that of the next variety.

4. *Expansive variety.*—This is the most frequent form of the *début* of general paralysis ; and from the marked character of the symptoms clearly requiring immediate attention, it is more frequently observed in its earlier stages than any of the others ; and on this account has been erroneously supposed absolutely essential to the character of general paralysis. Those paralytics who present themselves from the outset with the expansive form of delirium, have been ordinarily men of active minds and habits, enterprising, rash, and generally of irritable, violent character, with much generosity. The expansive delirium is an exaggeration of this character ; and so gradually does it sometimes sweep on, that the moment of actual outbreak is difficult of detection. The patient appears at first to be simply *more* active, *more* rash, *more* irritable, and by fits and starts more generous and lavish in his expenditure than before. By and bye all this passes clearly beyond the normal state. The subject is in perpetual motion, takes no rest, cannot sleep, feels an exaggerated sense of power and general *bien-être*, and conceives projects of the most stupendous character, that must be at once carried out, all of which, if not quite irrational, are opposed utterly to his previous habits and tastes. He adopts excesses which are not habitual to him, passes an irregular and disorderly life, and commits acts which greatly astonish his friends, such as undressing in society, sleeping in the fields and out of his own house, and perhaps committing petty thefts without any motive. He is

possessed of boundless wealth or power, with which he will perform the most unheard-of deeds. He will give away his property; and if he has none, he will profess to do so. He is endowed with supernatural attributes, he is God's vicegerent upon earth—he is some mighty potentate. Acting upon some of these convictions, he commits an offence against society, himself, or property, which demands his seclusion, when the true nature of the case is readily recognised.

These four forms in which the disease manifests itself are so diverse as to lead many to demand its separation into two or more distinct affections. But the diversity does not end here; the progress of the paralysis is marked by many varieties, the most obvious of which is the acute and the chronic form, the latter being by much the most frequent. Some subjects remain in a state of calm dementia for many years, or even until death; whilst others are in a constant state of maniacal agitation to the end. Some progress from bad to worse constantly; others present remarkable intermissions, and apparent temporary restorations to health. In some the special symptoms of paralysis are strongly marked during the whole course of the disease; whilst in others they are so slight during most of the period, as to lead to much doubt on the nature of the affection. The state of the intelligence is equally variable; in some presenting merely enfeeblement of the faculties, scarcely amounting to insanity—in others manifesting the most grotesque and violent delirious conceptions. In many cases the delirium is of the expansive order, treating of riches, grandeur, and power—in others this form is entirely wanting, and its place is assumed by a low melancholic or hypochondriacal derangement. Yet, with all these differences, the various forms of the affection present so many points of relation or identity, and all have so marked a tendency to pass into one well-defined condition, characterised by physical and moral feebleness and vacillation—symptoms *a* and *b* give place so promptly and frequently to symptoms *c* and *d*, and *vice versa*, that we can easily perceive the unity of the pathological process through all the diversities of external manifestation. Nor is this the only disease which is recognised as *one*, in spite of the greatest varieties in its progress. We need enter into no prolonged illustration, but merely mention *phthisis pulmonalis*; the most cursory glance over the phenomena and relations of which affection will show us greater diversities even than those met with in our present investigation, with an almost equally uniform termination in death.

We may now attempt to indicate what appears to ourselves to be the order of the phenomena and the relations of this interesting affection. Under the influence of certain causes, of such

a nature as to produce prolonged over-excitement of the brain, amongst which stand out in bold relief the abuse of intoxicating drinks and sexual excesses, acting especially upon constitutions hereditarily or otherwise predisposed to degenerative affections—under the influence (we say) of such determining and predisposing causes, the nervous energy is deteriorated and exhausted; and this result, at first *dynamic* merely, is succeeded, in accordance with the general law of all organs long *functionally* affected, by a change in the tissue itself. This change is anatomically betrayed in the earlier stages of the disease by signs of considerable congestion, attended by increased weight of the cerebrum; and in the later stages, by atrophy of the convolutions, with comparative anæmia and loss of weight. On both these we have a few remarks to offer.

We conceive that the first development of the congestion is chiefly statical, and is a result of the want of that peculiar organic nervous energy which exerts so remarkable an influence over the capillary circulation in all parts of the body; aided by the continual distension of the vessels during the functional excitement of the organ. At times this becomes active, owing to the effort made by the arterial system to relieve itself of the oppressive weight in front. This effort seems to be occasionally successful, and to be followed by relief; at other times it only aggravates the mischief. This congestion appears, though not primitively inflammatory, (and here we venture to differ from Bayle, Parchappe, and other great authorities,) to assume from time to time the form of a low chronic inflammatory action, which leaves its traces in thickening and opacity of the membranes, and certain other changes in the brain-substance itself, above described.

With regard to the atrophy and softening of the convolutions, and the effusion of serum on the surface of the brain and within the ventricles, we are not inclined to attribute them to inflammatory action in any degree, but rather to a defect of nutrition of the organ, sometimes primitive, and sometimes secondary to the obstruction to the circulation, coincident with the congestion previously mentioned—a degeneration of tissue which is met with very frequently in other organs without any evidence of previous inflammation. The serum seems by general consent to be recognised as merely poured out to supply the place of the retreating organ. It must be remarked that this degeneration chiefly affects the grey matter in which the dynamic force of the organ is generally supposed to reside.

Now it is necessary to inquire how far these views coincide with the symptoms during life, and what are the marks by which these pathological changes betray themselves in the course of their development.

The data both of physiology and pathology lead us to the conclusion, that although we are not yet able to point out the precise seat of the various functions of the brain, we must recognise a *different* seat for intelligence, volition, sensation, and voluntary motion. (We designedly separate between volition and voluntary motion, the functions being essentially distinct; it is not here the place to discuss this matter; but the fact as here stated is abundantly demonstrable, from the frequent phenomena of the contrast of the earnestness of the will, with the imperfection of muscular performance.) Although, then, the special character of this peculiar degeneration is to spread and attack indiscriminately the whole of the organ, but especially the grey matter; yet, judging from the phenomena of the disease, it appears not to expend its violence upon all parts equally at first; and according as the mal-nutrition or congestion affects first those layers or sections of the brain which preside over the different functions above mentioned, so the order of the phenomena is either somato-psychical, or psycho-somatic—either the intellectual disturbance precedes and predominates over that of the muscular system, or the symptoms of paralysis precede those of insanity; and thus also we have two distinct orders of symptoms, one connected with the physical, and the other with the moral nature—a somatic and a psychical general paralysis.

We believe that an attentive consideration of the phenomena of drunkenness will tend to throw much light upon the symptoms attendant upon the early or congestive stage, and likewise to illustrate and explain the striking varieties observed in the outbreak of this affection. There is the most accurate resemblance between these two, only that the one is transitory, whilst the other is progressive and permanent. There is probably the same congestion—there is the same characteristic stammering or difficulty in articulating certain words—the same weakness, uncertainty or trembling of the arms and legs, and general muscular system,—the same mental disturbance.

Now, according to the varying constitution of the subject, the excitement of intoxicating liquors appears first in various forms. One man will betray his intoxication merely by increased sententiousness, moroseness, pomposity, or irritability—in another the first symptom will be an expansive gaiety, and a manifestation of exaggerated universal philanthropy—another will be merely affected in his speech, the intelligence remaining intact—and again another will have his ideas so confused, and yet his consciousness so perfect, that he will not attempt conversation which he knows he cannot accomplish. In other cases it will be the locomotive system that is affected; the legs are unable to support the body, or to perform co-ordinate movements—or the hands are not com-

petent to accomplish those delicate manipulations to which they are accustomed.

Strictly analogous are the phenomena of the *début* of general paralysis—all probably due to one and the same cause, congestion affecting some portion or portions of the nervous tissue. In the majority of cases, the congestive stage corresponds with the expansive form of delirium, just as in intoxication the first result is most frequently excitement of mind and body; but in other cases it produces depression and melancholia, and in others again it affects primarily the muscular system only. In most instances all the phenomena, both of mind and body, occur at some period or other; but the order in which they occur is susceptible of every possible variation.

By these considerations it appears that we may explain all the varieties of the disease on rational principles, and also reconcile all the conflicting views which have been advanced as to its nature.

The degeneration of tissue may attack first that part of the nervous tissue which presides over voluntary motion; and the symptoms of paralysis will then be predominant, or even exclusively present. We shall then have the simple, uncomplicated general paralysis mentioned by Rostan, Pinel, and others.

It may first attack that part which is the seat of the intellect, whichever that may be; and only affecting very lightly and in a secondary manner the locomotive part, we shall have insanity in which paralysis only appears late as a complication.

When the disease attacks simultaneously the whole of the dynamic apparatus of the brain, the somatic and psychical phenomena appear at once, and we have the "*general paralysis of the insane*"—the form of disease which has been most studied, and to which attention was first directed, and through which the whole subject has been submitted to investigation.

Taking this view of the matter, we shall now proceed briefly to sketch the phenomena of the disease in its commencement, progress, and termination; and as it seems a matter of uncertainty whether it is most frequent for the paralysis or the insanity to appear earliest, we shall review the two orders of symptoms separately.

The phenomena of *uncomplicated* general paralysis are *somatic*: the tongue, the lips, the limbs, present the first signs of the malady. These signs are a hesitation or embarrassment in the pronunciation of certain words or letters, and sometimes an impossibility of articulation—a spasmodic trembling of the lips and tongue, and a kind of vermicular action of the latter—a feebleness and trembling of the hands—an uncertain gait, lacking co-ordination of movement in the legs; and a difficulty in preserving

the equilibrium—trailing of one or both feet—curvature of direction in walking, and involuntary flexion of the femoro-tibial articulation.

“When these symptoms (says Pinel) supervene after a cerebral congestion, with or without loss of consciousness; or when they manifest themselves slowly and gradually; when they are very perceptible one day, and disappear to recur the next; when to these phenomena are added augmentation of volume and clamminess of the tongue, roughness or feebleness of voice, amounting sometimes to aphonia, heaviness of the features, dulness of eye, insomnia, continual movement, dilatation of one pupil, flickering of the eyelids, and partial anæsthesia of the skin, &c. &c., we may affirm almost positively the existence of general paralysis.”

It is customary with authors to describe three stages in the progress of general paralysis; but there does not appear to be any practical benefit derivable from this course, and it is not by any means clearly ascertainable that there are three defined periods in the natural history of the affection, nor any marks by which one can be positively distinguished from the other. For instance, the loss of power in the sphincters and the formation of gangrenous sloughs may occur in what is considered the first stage; whilst retention of urine and most obstinate constipation may extend to the third or last stage. The second stage, as described, is sometimes marked by transitory excitement, by grinding of the teeth, strabismus, difficulty of swallowing and mastication, with enormous gluttony and general increase of the paralytic affection. The third stage is marked by ptosis, and dilated immoveable pupils; the eyes are fixed, the patient appears to hear nothing, and emits vague, confused sounds—sensibility is almost completely abolished. The fatal termination is frequently heralded by intractable diarrhœa, infiltration of the extremities, and gangrenous eschars upon the parts subjected to pressure. The bones necrose; and gangrene of the lungs and bloody tumours in the ears have been often noticed. Finally, the external surface becomes cadaverous, there is progressive emaciation, the mouth is loaded with sordes, the breath is fœtid, the respiration slow, the pulse feeble and intermittent, and death closes the scene.

After the full details that have been given above, it seems scarcely necessary to enter again into any history of the mental phenomena which accompany or supervene upon those of the physical order. The loss of memory for recent events is certainly the most characteristic symptom, and is almost invariably present, to some extent at least, even in those cases which are considered to be simple or uncomplicated. There is also very generally remarked an enfeeblement of the affective faculties—a growing

indifference to the claims of friendship or relationship. Whatever may be the form of mental derangement that first presents itself, there is one general tendency, which is to resolve itself into *dementia*, which sooner or later almost always supervenes, unless death takes place early in the course of the disease, which may occur from apoplexy, or other apparently accidental causes.

The diagnosis may be doubtful in the outset ; but very soon the hesitation of speech, the uncertain gait, and the loss of memory will make the nature of the disease certain. Delirium tremens may at first be occasionally mistaken for approaching general paralysis, but a few days will inevitably rectify this judgment. From all the varieties of spinal paralysis, this affection is distinguished by the embarrassment of speech and the lesion of intelligence, both which are entirely wanting in spinal disorders. The distinction from cerebral hæmorrhage is obvious. Two other points connected with diagnosis merit a very brief attention. It has been said that there are many patients presenting the delirium of riches and grandeur in asylums who never become paralytic. And this is true ; but an attentive observation will detect an important difference in the nature of the aberration. The true *expansive* delirium is *coherent*, granting the fundamental position ; and this is almost invariably connected with general paralysis ; whilst the mere maniac who calls himself a king, or emperor, or general, has nothing plausible in word or idea whereby to support his claims. This has been pointed out by M. Falret.

The second point is more interesting. M. Brierre de Boismont has shown that there are two divisions of general paralysis—one connected with, the other independent of, insanity. In the former class the muscular tissue preserves its irritability, as shown by local galvanism ; in the second class this is entirely lost, when the paralysis is perfect.

It is to be regretted that, whilst the natural history of this affection is so complete, nothing satisfactory can be said concerning its treatment. It is true that there are records of recoveries from the earlier or congestive stages, and even from conditions where the paralysis was so far advanced as to appear utterly hopeless. But in nearly all, if not all, of these cases, treatment seemed to be but little concerned in the result ; the efforts of nature alone appeared to be effective. A hint for future investigation seems to be afforded by the almost uniform occurrence of a copious purulent discharge from some part of the system previous to amendment ; but hitherto any attempts to imitate this process artificially have been unattended by success. One thing, however, these recoveries teach us, and that is, not to be in too great haste to relinquish our endeavours after a cure, nor to view as absolutely hopeless even the most unpromising cases.

We have given but few illustrative cases in this sketch, as from time to time many have appeared in this journal, and especially during the past year. The completion of this part, and the discussion of many other interesting points connected with general paralysis, must be deferred to some future opportunity.

ART. VI.—ON THE MORAL THERAPEUTICS OF LONDON.

CHAUCER, in a single sentence, pricked the core of all therapeutical science. In his Knight's Tale, he tells us, when the leech's efforts had proved unavailing for the relief of the dying Arcite, that—

“Certainly ther nature wol not werche,
Farewel physike.”

This, which is true of the therapeutics of the body, is also true of the therapeutics of the soul. Our ability to aid in each case is governed by the power we possess of rousing into action the laws which regulate our being if dormant, or restraining, controlling, or guiding them if errant. From this it would follow that a system of moral therapeutics will be effective in proportion as it is based upon a correct appreciation and knowledge of the laws which dominate our moral life. To examine these laws and trace them to their ultimate consequences is a function of the psychologist; and hence it happens that psychology should become the right-hand helper of morality, supporting it when drooping, aiding it when stumbling, recalling it when wandering, and lighting with a brighter light the rugged pathway along which it had long successfully struggled, guided by experience alone, when psychology and kindred sciences were still floundering in the mud. Has psychology probed so deeply the springs of our moral life, that henceforth it may aid in guiding us more surely along the strait paths of virtue? We believe that it has. It teaches us (if we read its lessons aright) that the foundation of our moral life rests in the depths of our intuitional consciousness; that man's soul, by virtue of its inherent properties, on contact with human life, spontaneously becomes conscious of the moral quality of human actions; that this primary, direct, and immediate knowledge supplies the material upon which the reason works, and evolves those great antithetical ideas which form the basis of all systems of morality—right and wrong, good and evil, virtue and vice. Further, it teaches us that the primary, intuitive knowledge of good and evil is common to all men, is generic;

that the subsequent evolution by aid of the reason is individual : that the one, the fundamental consciousness of right and wrong, is essentially the same in all individuals, among all races, and under all climes—is universal ; that the other, the logical development and construction of the primary notions, partakes of the character of the individual, and varies with this character.

The intuitive action of the soul underlies all intellectual action, supplying not only the groundwork of moral truth, but of all truth of a higher kind : this is indeed the focus, the vital centre of all intellectual action, and it matters not how wide the reason may have flown, how eccentric its flights may have been, sooner or later it has acknowledged the centre around which it revolves.

This doctrine rests the basis of moral truth upon self-experience, and it is consistent with experience. Moreover, it is consistent also with our physiological knowledge ; for in this intuitive action of the soul, what have we more than a manifestation of that general law which is witnessed in action throughout the whole of the organic kingdom, and beyond an expression of which our knowledge has not enabled us to pass—that the results of the specific action of an organism are due to the harmonious relation which exists between that organism and the influences which call its peculiar properties into operation ? We know the phenomena by which these results are made manifest ; we can trace a speciality of function to a speciality of organisation, and may surmise that the modifications of the one are correlative with modifications of the other ; but we cannot get further than the fact that there exists, potentially, in the organism that capacity of action which is manifested upon exposure to certain influences. And thus of the organism through which the conscious soul of man is manifested, we say that in it rest, potentially, those modes of action which become apparent on its impact with the outer life, and to the primary, direct, and spontaneous phenomena of which, in relation to the higher manifestations of intelligence, the term *intuitive* has been applied.

In the ordinary phenomena of intelligence the intuitive and reasoning portions of our knowledge are invariably blended together, but the one has no necessary relation of development to the other. The intuitive perception of moral truth may be as complete and clear in the uncultured as the cultured mind ; and, on the other hand, the logical powers may be developed to their highest degree, while the moral intuitions may be obscure and grovelling. No limit can be placed to the variable relationship of the one to the other which may be found in different individuals ; but whether we seek to ascertain the sources of these variations by observations alone, or by deduction from the known

laws of man's intellectual development, we learn that both the intuitive and reasoning faculties are inextricably linked with our physical being, and are liable to be obscured, or warped, or even extinguished, by changes going on within it. In truth, both the development of the one faculty and the other, and the causes of the modifications they undergo, are questions which come largely within the domain of pure physiology, and by this science we are taught that the degree of development is determined in a great measure by the physical and intellectual media in which we are placed; that the mind *grows* to the modes of action induced in it; that the inordinate development of any one faculty is accompanied by a corresponding degeneration of other faculties; that the aptitude to perception may be modified and obscured by transitory changes going on both within and without the body; that, in short, the mind reflects mainly the culture to which it has been submitted, except, as too often happens, it has been scarred by some hereditary flaw. The mind, indeed, is to the body what the flower is to the plant; and as by the careful and thoughtful tending of the gardener the petals of a corolla may be multiplied in number, increased in amplitude, and become tinted with richer and brighter colours, so may the mind, by proper nurture, become healthier in its intuitive capacity, and more gloriously habited in its thoughts: but in the one case, as the other, this is not to be effected in solitary individuals or in a single period; it is to be brought about through successive generations. In man this capacity of progressive intellectual development is the characteristic of his intuitional, and not of his reasoning faculty; for, as Morell has written—

“The laws and rules of formal logic are exactly the same *now* that they were in the time of Aristotle; and the application of these to any class of facts which may be known to each age, is made in every case in the same manner, and much about to the same degree. Here no *progress* is observable; the diversity of logical power in different ages is no greater than what may be found among individuals in the same era. But if we turn from the logical to the intuitional consciousness, here, instead of a fixed result, we find a perpetual motion, and regarding mankind *as a whole*, a constant progression. In one country, for instance, we find musical sensibility greatly in advance; in another, the perception of beauty through the eye (as was the case among the Greeks) has arrived at a high degree of perfection; in other instances, there is a peculiar awakening of the moral or of the religious consciousness: in a word, whenever we find our direct intentions coming into operation, *there* we find a kind of *vital development*, not confined to individual minds, but flowing generally through the consciousness of the mass. In this intuitional life, moreover, *progress* is as essential as in every other kind of vitality. Here stagnation indicates disease and decay; for so sure as man was created for an ultimate end—so sure as he

was intended to arrive at even higher attainments in everything great and good, must his pathway be perpetually upwards, and the whole sensibilities of his nature come more and more into harmony with the Divine nature, with the *life of God*."—(*Philosophy of Religion*, 1849, p. 56.)

Here, then, we may again take up the notion with which we at first started—that a system of moral therapeutics, to be effective, must be based upon a knowledge of the laws of man's moral life; and if the views which we have advanced be correct, it would follow that the system should aim at rousing into freer action and developing more completely our moral intuitions—the fountain-head of our moral life; and that whatever aided towards that end should have a fitting place in the *materia medendi* of the soul.

Let us now endeavour to ascertain if these views have anything in common with, and if they throw any light upon, the practice of morality.

In a recent number of this Journal (*No. XII. New Series*) we attempted to show the principal circumstances which co-operated in the production of and fostered the abnormal conditions of morality—the vice—existing in of the metropolis. We traced the influence of filthy and crowded dwellings; the absence of the means of cleanliness and decency; the indiscriminate herding together of the young of both sexes; ignorance; and the thousand-and-one sensual temptations of a metropolitan life: we showed how, by association (slight and indirect though it might be) and contiguity, the vices of one class radiated among other classes of the population; how the immorality of St. Giles's and Clerkenwell often bore its fruit in the nurseries of St. James's and Bloomsbury, and the conventional morality of Bloomsbury and St. James's formed a *quasi* justification for the overt villany of St. Giles's and Clerkenwell: moreover, we pointed out that crime and every other form of manifest vice was the scum thrown to the surface of a low grade of morality which deeply infected every class of society, and the foundation of which was chiefly laid in childhood.

But while we drew broadly the dark picture of the vice of this great city—a picture which might well dishearten the most sanguine moralist—we left almost untouched those lights which might be found glimmering, be it ever so fitfully, in the profoundest sloughs of vice. However debauched the mind—however overlaid with villany, or darkened by ignorance and sensuality—unless disease have preyed upon the delicate organ through which it is manifested, we invariably find it swayed by the deep intuitions of moral truth. Distorted though these may be, still they exist and govern the individual; and from the innermost recesses to the outermost verge of vice, we find that it is ruled by its own codes of right and wrong, good and evil.

And in this consists the great hope of the moralist, for it is the flickering of the smothered fire which he has to animate and fan into a pure flame—a mighty task, and one at which the wisest and best will often blench!

If we glance over the therapeutical means at our command by which this task may be effected, we find, foremost in place, religion (for the religion of Christianity includes its morality, and the one may not be dissociated from the other), the restraints of the law, and the education of the intellect. These are the three great moral therapeutical agents; the first applying directly to, and its effectiveness depending upon, man's intuitive knowledge of good and evil; the second and third acting indirectly. Around these three agents there are grouped, in addition, numberless charities, all tending to ameliorate the social condition of the population, and to raise the moral standard.

The metropolis is chequered with churches and places of worship; an army of police haunts its streets, to maintain order and suppress crime; schools dot every alley and every thoroughfare; vast hospitals and dispensaries open their doors widely to the impoverished sick and maimed; not a form of misery or degradation exists, but hands are found stretched out to aid it: food is offered to the hungry, clothing to the naked, shelter to the homeless; baths and washhouses, built in the midst of the foulest districts, afford the means of and an inducement to cleanliness; model lodging-houses exist and are increasing in number, refuges from the horrible courts and bye-ways which exist in our brick-and-mortar jungles: there are sanctuaries for the fallen, banks for the provident; asylums for the aged, the blind, the deaf-mute, and the lunatic: every religious congregation forms an independent source of benevolence, which is extended to the depraved, the sick, and the dying; while private charity moves at large in the, alas! illimitable field which spreads out for its exercise.

Here, then, it would seem that what psychology would lay down as the true method of moral therapeutics, the practice of morality has already attained; for we find in play at one and the same moment all those influences which could be required for removing morbid conditions of and more fully developing the moral faculties.

But we must not too hastily imagine that these agencies, although existing at the same period, are closely linked together in their operation. Almost every agency is isolated in its position, and its efforts are directed solely to its individual aim, the general results upon morality, from the combined effects of the different agencies, being indirect and commonly unforeseen. Indeed, the general moral benefits arising from them are another

illustration of those operations of man in society which have been well termed instinctive—operations in which apparently disconnected and often seemingly incoherent measures are found all tending to the production of certain general results not previously contemplated.

While, then, the highest teachings of psychological theory would point to the same practical results which have already been attained, however disconnectedly, by experience, it remains to be seen whether these results have been as effective in their application as theory would lead us to anticipate.

The data required for the complete answer to this important query, one which could only be dealt with thoroughly by a professed statist, we have not at our command. We have, however, a sufficiency of materials not only to show that the moral agencies we possess, rightly applied, are sufficient to achieve the object to which they are directed, but also to indicate the sources of their falling short of the point we desire. We might describe the vast moral advancement which has taken place within the metropolis during the last fifty years, and illustrate the effects produced by several of the most important moral agencies at different epochs, but we shall confine ourselves to a brief summary of a few of the results obtained by the late Mr. Fletcher in his elaborate examination of the moral statistics of the kingdom.—(*Journal of the Statistical Society*, vols. x., xi., xii.)

According to Mr. Fletcher, it would appear that the moral position of the two metropolitan counties (the moral character of which is governed almost entirely by the metropolis), in so far as this could be deduced from the statistical records accessible for 1839-44, was as follows :—

They possessed the greatest amount of education of any portion of the kingdom, and consequently the least amount of ignorance, this being 58.1 per cent. below the average of the kingdom; they showed the least amount of improvident marriages (62.5 per cent. below the average), the least amount of bastardy (48.5 below the average), an amount of pauperism which was 12.5 per cent. below the average, the highest amount of savings in banks (55.6 above the average), but an amount of criminal commitments which was 11.3 per cent. above the average. The proportion of bastardy must be cast aside altogether, as, from the facilities which exist in the metropolis for concealing the illegitimacy of births, the number of bastards entered in the registers of births are much below the actual number existing. The number of criminal commitments (the return which above all others most persons are inclined to regard as the safest statistical criterion of the moral state of a community), notwithstanding that it is above the average, shows, when fully examined, in the strongest light the influence of the moral agencies now at work in the advancement of the moral and social condition of the metropolis.

"One of the most important results of Mr. Fletcher's inquiries was to show that in the thirty years 1811-41, the number of annual commitments had trebled, while the population had scarcely more than doubled; the increase of crime being thus six times faster than that of population. This is to be accounted for by the fact that the increase in criminality which occurred during the several great social disturbances affecting labour in the period referred to was propagated to a greater or less extent in the intervals of disturbance, indicating that the moral deterioration which is so apt to take place in periods of great social suffering is not immediately recovered from when the cause of suffering is withdrawn, but infects, more or less, subsequent periods. In Middlesex, however, during 1811-1841, the increase of commitments was only *one-sixth* of the general increase, or 68·4 per cent. instead of 319·5. The influence of the metropolis was, moreover, felt in the neighbouring counties: the increase in Surrey being only 189·5; Kent, 253·9; Herts, 261·5; and Essex, 309·0: while the increase in Sussex was 489·1; Buckingham, 534·1; and Bedford, 669·0. Influences, therefore, antagonistic to the increase of crime must have been at work in the metropolis and its neighbourhood.

"But, again, the criminality of a large town may be divided into two portions—that which has its birthplace in it, and that which *migrates* to it, being tempted there from the country by the greater field for its exertions. The crime born where it happens is chiefly that of a serious character (offences against the person, and malicious offences against property); the crime affected by migration consists mainly of offences against the person without violence, assaults, and miscellaneous offences. The first class of crime is that which most truly represents the actual tendency of a community to criminality, and it is shown that the "*excess of the more heinous and brutal [crimes], and those which are least affected by migration of the depraved, is always on the side of the greater ignorance.*" The metropolis, however, holds an exceptional position to the rest of the kingdom; for while between 1842-44 and 1845-47 there had been an actual diminution of serious crime throughout the kingdom to the extent of 17·3 per cent., in the metropolis there had been an actual increase of 6·4 per cent. Forgery and offences against the currency are, also, always in excess in the metropolis. These exceptions do not, however, disturb the remarkably slow progress of crime in the metropolis, and they are due to its being the select haunt of some of the most depraved characters."

The favourable position which the metropolis holds in its general social and criminal statistics, according to this brief survey, is to be attributed in a great measure to the degree of education existing within it, and to its excellent police; for the statistics not only of the metropolis, but also of the whole kingdom, make manifest how intimately the moral and social condition of a community is bound up with the degree of education prevailing in it, and the efficiency of its police. With the explicable exception of the metropolis mentioned, serious crime is universally

in excess wherever ignorance is in excess; indeed, Mr. Neison goes further, and as the result of his examination of the statistics of crime in England, he concludes that—

“By adopting the test of education or instruction furnished by the marriage registers of the country, and . . . by so analysing the various districts and groups of counties that they differ in respect of education only, it is found that out of the twenty-two different combinations formed of the various districts in England and Wales, in every instance there is an excess of crime where there is the least education or instruction; and comparing the respective sections of each group of counties, it will be seen that there is an average excess of 25 per cent. of crime in the section of inferior education over that of higher education, and in some districts the excess is as much as 44 per cent.; that it is hence obvious that the very small amount of education, or rather instruction, implied by the test here adopted, has a powerful influence on the criminal calendar of the country.”—(*Contributions to Vital Statistics*, 2nd ed., 1857, p. 405.)

Of the influence of the police, it may be said that while in the three years from 1842-44 to 1854-57 (the only period of steady decline in the number of commitments in the thirty years' criminal returns examined by Mr. Fletcher), the decline of the gross number of commitments was 18·6 per cent. in the policed counties, it was only 8·7 in the west of England and Wales, the decline in the whole kingdom being 13·2 per cent.

Notwithstanding that this general beneficial influence may be conceded to the agencies mentioned (for we need not dwell further upon the general statistics of the question: the *individual* benefits arising from education and the restraints of the law cannot for a moment be doubted), and although it may be admitted that the overt morality as well as the general moral fervour of the kingdom are of a higher grade now than was the case fifty years ago, it is hardly to be doubted that the legitimate effects of the moral agents of every class now in operation are not so manifest among the population at large, when the conventional morality (a great step in advance, by the way) which veneers the surface of society is picked off, as might be hoped for and reasonably expected; and it would seem that, notwithstanding the apparent soundness of our moral therapeutics both in principles and practice, we are rather holding at bay than actually overcoming the flood of vice with which we have to contend. Whence comes this? We believe that this doubtful position of morality is entirely due to the fact that the development of our moral agencies has not kept pace with the increase of population and the prodigiously growing wealth, and even mental cultivation, of the nation; that while, on every hand, the temptations to moral perversity have been increasing in consequence of spreading luxury, and greater facilities for indulgence, both physical and intellectual, that careful tuition of the moral

faculties which should form the chief guard to perversion, and be the means of making increased wealth and a larger knowledge an increased benefit to our highest humanity, has not taken place to a like extent. The means of religious and moral tuition, and of education, have been wonderfully developed during the past fifty years; but has the development been in proportion to the requirements of the nation—has it not kept pace rather with the growing knowledge among the people of the absolute necessity of these means for the social and political welfare of the kingdom, and is not the development governed too much by notions of this kind than by notions of a higher and purer nature? Has not, indeed, a large portion of the comparatively recent great growth of religious and moral agencies been as much in luxury as in spirit? Not long ago, we listened to a homily addressed to a congregation of about five hundred souls, who were assembled in a splendid building that had cost 30,000*l.*, and which is a gem of architecture, although unfinished, and we were informed that 30,000*l.* more were required to complete it. Several priests officiated in the hour-and-a-half's service, a well-trained choir sang efficiently, and the prayers were, as Chaucer hath it,

“Entuned in the nose full swetely.”

We were told by the preacher, that the parish contained ten thousand souls; that there were only ten ministers to watch over these souls, one to every thousand: this was too great a task for one man, and aid was asked, in order that additional ministers might be obtained. Every class in the congregation was appealed to, and labourers were urged to subscribe their coppers. We were rather puzzled to know whether this was meant in good faith or not, and we began to wonder what the building, the massive communion service, the beautiful decorations, the expensive choir, and the superabundance of ministerial assistants had been organized for; and we could only escape improper thoughts by supposing that the value of the ten thousand souls had only been accidentally discovered after the building had been built, the ministers culled, and the choir grown; when, of course, the funds were exhausted.

The moral therapeutics of the metropolis, and of the kingdom generally, do not want the means of application, nor even system, but vitality. They live and they grow, but not commensurately with our wants; and a conviction of this is fastening rapidly and deeply upon the moralists of the metropolis, as witness the energy that is being infused into and the development that is occurring in the services of many religious societies: for example, the establishment of Sunday evening services at St. Paul's and at St. James's Hall, in addition to those at Exeter Hall and at the Abbey; and the institution of simple services in hired rooms, in the hearts of several of the most debased districts of the metro-

polis (St. George's in the East, Clare Market, &c.), by the clergy of the districts.

How greatly the moral agencies of the metropolis fall short of what is required, may be surmised from the following illustrations, quoted from the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Deficiency of Means of Spiritual Instruction and Places of Divine Worship in the Metropolis and elsewhere in the Kingdom (June, 1858):—

“Looking at the actual provision made in London, considered in the large and popular sense as *the metropolis*, it appears that the population being 2,362,236, and the sittings actually provided by all denominations being only 713,561, or 29·7 per cent, no fewer than 669,514, or not much less than half the whole number, are required to raise the sittings to 58 per cent of the population. It appears further that *Middlesex*, the county which may be considered the central seat of the civilisation, the enterprise, the wealth and power, as well as of the government of this great empire, is actually the very lowest of all the counties of England in the provision made for divine worship by all denominations.”—(p. iii.)

Education and police take naturally a primary position in all statistical estimations of moral agencies, as their effects may, with greater certainty than those of other agencies, be determined numerically; but while such evidence clearly shows that the prevalence of education is inconsistent with that of the graver forms of immorality, it also shows that those moral results do not arise from education which might have been hoped for. The same evidence, however, indicates that the cause of this is to be attributed to the imperfect and unsatisfactory character of much of the education prevailing in the country.

From Mr. Fletcher's figures we learn that, at the period to which they refer, the influence of education upon the criminal calendars was very markedly indicated by a general decrease in the number of commitments of individuals who could “*read and write well*,” but, at the same time, there was an increase in the numbers of those of an inferior grade of instruction. Moreover, the decline of absolute inability to read and write proceeded at double the rate among those brought to justice than among those who came to be married. The numbers of criminals of an inferior grade of instruction would necessarily increase with the extension of instruction; but the greater rate of decline of absolute ignorance among criminals than among those who marry is most decisive evidence against the influences associated with much of the instruction prevalent—against the *quality* of the instruction. Of the almost worthless character, whether as to the tuition of the mental or the moral faculties, of the education given in many of the day-schools for the operative classes, abundant illustrations may be found in

the Reports of the Government Inspectors of Schools printed from time to time in the Minutes of the Council of Education.

Education (in the ordinary sense of the term), *per se*, is only indirectly a moral agent, and much needless disappointment and doubt as to the effect of education upon the social character of a community has arisen from considering it as directly capable of maturing the moral faculties. This is a grave error. The training of the mental has no necessary relation to that of the moral faculties, and for the right development of the one as the other a specific tutoring is requisite. The great vice of the early training of the present day is, that amongst all classes of schools, high and low, the development of the moral powers is made subsidiary to that of the mental; that neither time nor trouble is spared in cultivating the latter, while the former are too commonly left to grow at hap-hazard, the character and direction of their growth being left to be framed by the example of those around; or once or twice a week, in addition to a scrap of prayer read in the school-room in the morning, a few dogmatical precepts are thrown into the mind and left to take their chance, the master taking no heed as to what kind of ground the seed may have been thrown on. Indeed, in our schools generally, we have no careful, thorough, and practical tuition of the moral as we have of the mental faculties. Need we wonder that many laugh at the moral influences of education altogether?

The beneficial effects of an efficient police force, such as now exists in the metropolis, needs little comment other than what we have already made. The salutary awe entertained of the police-constable by the vicious is a matter of familiar experience:—

“ ‘It ain’t no go, as it used to be,’ said a housebreaker to me. ‘How is that?’ said I. He replied (I omit some vulgarities), ‘Why, if you get inside a house quietly, don’t you see, jist as yer a coming out, there’s some policeman a waitin’ to ketch you in his arms; and they put such *lots* on at nights, so thick, it ain’t no use a trying.’ This young man attended my meetings, and appeared to have given up his habits of depredation. He told me lately, ‘Mr. Wandecum,’ said he, (few pronounce my name correctly,) ‘you may believe me or believe me not, but I see things werry differently to what I used to do. I’d rather live upon a penn’orth of bread a-day got honestly, than have lots of *grub* the other way—that I would: not but what there’s a deal to be made, perticularly by handkerchiefs, but you’re always in fear, yer conscience won’t let yer rest; every sound you hears, maybe on the passage or on the stairs, when you’re abed, anyhow, you starts up and thinks it’s some *peeler* (i.e. policeman) come to take yer! It’s a miserable life, that it is; there ain’t no luck in it. Please the Almighty, I’ve done with sich ways altogether, and mean to get my bread honestly.’ . . . ‘Lots of us turns honest now,’ said a pickpocket, ‘cause it’s no go.’”—(*Vanderkiste’s Notes and Narratives of a Sis*

Years' Mission, principally among the Dens of London, p. 12 and p. 28.)

Punishment was formerly the panacea of English law; but experience and increasing knowledge of the nature of vice have taught our judges and magistrates that punishment alone is not sufficient for the repression of vice. Several years ago, Lord Brougham wrote and spoke thus:—

“In reasoning upon the tendency of punishment, and the motive to offend, we have always committed one serious error. We have considered crimes as insulated, and we have regarded each offence as originating in an occasional gust of passion, or view of interest; we have argued as if all criminals were alike in their nature, and all spectacles of punishment, or exhortations to departure from wrong-doing, were addressed to the same minds. Now, nothing can be more certain than that the great majority of all offences committed in every civilised community are the result of immoral character, of gross ignorance, of bad habits; and that the graver sort are committed after a series of faults less aggravated in their character. It follows as a necessary consequence from this proposition, that when the example of penal infliction is addressed to the offender, its deterring effect is very much lessened, because it is addressed to a mind which evil habits have entirely perverted; and thus the guilty-disposed person is to be not merely deterred from doing one wrong act by the fear of punishment, but to be reclaimed from a course of thinking, feeling, and acting into which he had fallen. . . . The effect of punishment in deterring by example is exceedingly feeble upon the whole, and prodigiously overrated in all systems of criminal jurisprudence, as well by philosophers who speculate upon the construction of codes, as by lawgivers who trust to statutes for a protection against offences.”—(*On the Influence of Simply Penal Legislation*—Works, vol. viii.)

At the present time, consistently with the views which have been long advocated by Lord Brougham and others, and which have gradually grown up in society, the Bench acknowledges that the law has another and a higher office than the punishment of the criminal, to wit, his reformation; and hence the majority of our great prisons have become moral schools, in which, in addition to punishment, both physical and mental agencies are put into play, by which the criminal may be more surely reclaimed. Now, also, it is becoming well understood and practised that the child who has been bred in criminal habits must not be punished, but *taught*.

We are too apt to forget that our prisons deal mainly with matured and not nascent crime. If we turn to Col. Jebb's last Report on the Discipline of Convict Prisons (1858, p. 106), we find he estimates that from 70 to 75 per cent. of the discharged convicts do not relapse into crime. From this it follows (as we endeavoured also to show from other sources, in the paper already referred to “On the Moral Pathology of

London"), that the majority of the convicts in our prisons are new cases. The lesson is obvious, that the substratum of vice from which crime springs—nascent crime, indeed,—can only be dealt with successfully outside the prison walls.

Religion, "the life-essence of society," as Carlyle hath it, is the chiefest agent contained in the *materia medendi* of the soul; for while directly and immediately appealing to that intuitive consciousness of the Infinite which each individual possesses, and directing that consciousness to the true knowledge of the God-head, at the same time it rouses into activity the power of moral truth that lies in us, and wings those noble aspirations which stretch beyond time and death. It is the mighty power—a power powerful as appealing from the divine light without us to the divine light within us—which the simple truths of Christianity possess in rousing directly and immediately into fuller play the depths of our religious and moral consciousness, which constitutes the great, the divine force of the Christian religion; but in proportion as these truths are overlaid, hidden, or frittered away by formalism—in proportion as religion is lost in theology—in proportion as the art is merged in the science—in proportion will living Christianity decline. Theology, the logical construction of religious belief, is necessary to the progress and to the perpetuation of true religion; but if theology be suffered to outgrow or to be substituted for the simple primary truths of Christianity—if the product of our own reason be elevated above the precepts of divine teaching, both the practice and the teaching of religion must become sapless, and we shall have a shadow where we thought to find a substance. We write thus, not because we underrate theology, but because we believe the simple primary truths of the Christian religion, common to every Christian sect, to be of higher practical value than any sectional dogmas, however logical they may be.

Consider for a moment the psychical condition of a large number of the metropolitan population. Their minds scarcely admit any other thoughts than those which relate to their daily bread, and their reasons are rarely developed beyond the point requisite to compass their livelihood.

Of what signification to them is a brilliant service (choral responses, theological disquisition, anthem, and so forth)? It is either regarded as a bitter mockery, or a somewhat tiresome scenic show, as a very brief acquaintance with the class in question is sufficient to make evident. People of this stamp can only be roused to religious thought by the direct preaching of the simplest truths of Christianity, aided by those benevolent exertions which make the chief boast of Christianity. Nay, more, to effect good among the lower classes of the metropolis, it is as requisite to understand

their habits of thought and forms of expression, as it is for the foreign missionary to study the language and manners of the people among whom he may be cast; and it must not be forgotten that by the lower class of the metropolitan population Christianity is always judged by its doings. A costermonger, addressing Mr. Mayhew, said:—

“I think the city missionaries have done good. But I am satisfied that if the costers had to profess themselves of some religion to-morrow, they would all become Roman Catholics, every one of them. This is the reason.—London costers live very often in the same courts and streets as the poor Irish; and if the Irish are sick, be sure there comes to them the Priest, the Sisters of Charity—they *are* good women—and some other ladies. Many a man that’s not a Catholic has rotted and died without any good person near him.”—(*London Labour and London Poor*, vol. i. p. 21.)

Again, it may be asked, how great a portion of the vice which exists among all ranks of the educated portion of the population arises from their being taught a mere form of religious belief, the feelings and emotions which vivify that belief being suffered to lie dormant?

The spirit which animates our city missionaries wants infusing more largely among ministers of all denominations. It is not sufficient that the truths of Christianity be uttered from the pulpit. Here is an indication, from the Twenty-second Annual Report of the London City Mission (1857), of what one man may do, actuated by a spirit like that which impelled St. Francis:—

“If the Committee were disposed to refer to missionaries who have been extraordinarily blessed with particular classes of the community, they might perhaps give as an illustration a missionary often called by the name of the Thieves’ Missionary, from the usefulness which has attended his efforts with that class, and to whom they are more disposed to allude, as no reference has been made by them to his work for several years past, although it has been remarkable. Since his attention, of late years, as a missionary of the society, has been directed especially to the criminal class, up to the end of March last, he has received visits from 2,625 ruined young men, and from 1,876 ruined young women; and these have paid him in all 84,493 visits. Of these outcasts, 118 have been restored by his instrumentality to their own homes; 158 have been sent to asylums; for 250 employment has been obtained; 74 have been sent abroad to commence a new life in a new sphere; and 40 have been received by Christian ministers as communicants: 576 persons improperly living together have, moreover, by his efforts alone, been married, to each couple a Bible having been presented on marriage by the liberality of Lord Shaftesbury. And in evidence that this great work has not slackened in its importance or results, it may be stated that, during the last

year alone, 253 outcast young men and 205 outcast young women were visitors at his abode, who paid to him 9,386 visits. Of these outcasts, 26 were persuaded to marry; 14 were restored by him to their homes; 24 were sent to asylums and reformatories; for 50 work was found; 7 became communicants; and 4 were induced to give up crime, and enter workhouses; while of 5 who died, he was enabled to entertain pleasing hopes. Of the large number of outcast visitors to his house first referred to, 2,319 had been in prison, and the number of their imprisonments had been 9,840; while of those who had not been in prison, more than three-fourths were criminals, and the rest were reduced to a state of vagrancy and filth: 652 of them were under fifteen years of age, and about 4 out of every five of those thus young were brought to the missionary by their parents, which afforded a valuable opportunity, which was not lost, of giving Christian counsel to the parents as well as to the children. In this very bad and low district, there is but one woman now known to be fallen. Very different was its condition in this respect on his appointment to it."—(p. 26.)

As a fuller illustration of the beneficial influence exercised upon the outcast by the one energetic individual referred to in the preceding paragraph, we quote the following from the Twenty-third Annual Report of the Mission:—

"Very soon after one of the missionaries was placed in a district in Whitechapel, he was brought into contact with a considerable number of fallen women. He tried to rescue them from their lost and ruined condition by getting them into the various institutions formed for that purpose in the metropolis, and succeeded in many instances. But he soon found that there was some preliminary place wanted, where hopeful cases might be placed until an opening could be obtained for them into an asylum, without sending them back to their former companions or to a lodging-house, where the good impressions made were so liable to be erased. This was the more necessary, as the Committees of the asylums met but once a week, or, as with the Magdalen, once a month, and even then admission was often impracticable to obtain. In the spring of 1855 it was determined to commence in connexion with the Rescue Society. A small house of four rooms was taken, at which lived a motherly woman, the missionary's first convert. In a year and a half's time, a larger house became necessary, to which the Institution was removed, and where it still is. The part the missionary took in this was—(1), in pointing out the necessity of such an institution being formed; (2), in bringing his local superintendent, the Rev. Mr. Champneys, into contact with the Rescue Society; (3), in assisting in the formation of the Home; (4), in since advising with the matron on every case admitted, she acting under his direction in all she has done in this respect; and (5), in visiting regularly the inmates, imparting religious instruction to them, and counselling with them as to their future course. The matter has required much time and also much experience of the class, neither of which he could have

had but as a city missionary. During the three years that this 'White-chapel Probationary Refuge,' as it is named, has been opened, there have been received into it as many as 257 women, of whom 65 have been sent to asylums, 87 have been placed in service, 60 have been restored to their friends, and but 22 have left the Home of their own accord, leaving 20 there still, and 3 at present in hospitals. How most truly encouraging are these figures, when attentively considered, as results, by the Divine blessing, from the efforts of a single missionary, in so short a period of time!"

In the example furnished by this missionary, we see the best hope of making a salutary impression upon the mass of prostitution existing in the metropolis, and much might be effected by the co-operation of married *women* of mature age in the work. Those who best know the prostitute will acknowledge that her feelings are most readily accessible by an earnest, thoughtful, kind-hearted woman; and both Parent-Duchatelet (*De la Prostitution dans la Ville de Paris*) and Forgier (*Des Classes Dangereuses*) testify to the great influence exercised upon the prostitutes of Paris by the Sisters of Charity. Parent-Duchatelet writes:—

"In order to govern prostitutes, to instruct them morally, and to inspire them with certain sentiments of modesty and good conduct, it is necessary to have recourse to women who either are or have been married. The appellation of married woman, and particularly that of mother of a family, inspires these girls with a peculiar respect, and induces them to submit without murmur to all that may be exacted from them."—(*Op. cit.*, ed. 1st, p. 213.)

We have been recently told of a lady in one of the large provincial towns who has devoted herself to the task of reclaiming the fallen. After many months of unwearied assiduity and never-failing temper, she has overcome the main difficulties to be met with in attempts to gain admission to the residences of these unfortunate women. Taunts, the vilest language, and even slight violence, were alike unheeded. She often got access to the sick, and then her motherly care and attention at last had its effects; and it would be difficult to estimate the good which she is now doing, and the influence she has established among some of the least restrained of the class.*

But, to return once more to the city missionaries, we cannot

* In the article on the Moral Pathology of London (see *Id.*, No. XII., New Series) we were, by a misprint in the "Judicial Statistics," led into an error concerning the number of prostitutes and known thieves proceeded against in the metropolis in 1857. The number of prostitutes was 9,020, and not 5,911; the number of known thieves was 4,468, and not 10,647. The number of prostitutes known to the police in 1857 was 8,600; and the difference in the number proceeded against from that of known prostitutes arises from the fact that many of these women are often under arrest several times in the year.

refrain from quoting two other illustrations, from the Mission's Twenty-third Report, of the mode in which they do their duties :—

“ Another subject, somewhat allied to this (prostitution), has been much of late before the public in the daily journals, and that is the night houses of the metropolis, by which is meant coffee-shops which are kept open throughout the night, professedly for the accommodation of persons requiring refreshment and shelter at such a time. To these, also, the attention of the Mission had been previously directed, and a missionary was specially appointed for their visitation nearly a year since. He leaves his abode about midnight, and continues at his work till the ordinary hours of rising. It scarcely need be said that these houses are the resort almost exclusively of fallen women, and of dissipated and gay, or of destitute and homeless men of irregular habits. In 10½ months, during which the missionary has been at work, he has spent 796 hours in missionary efforts within the walls of these houses, and has distributed there 7,145 religious tracts, chiefly in envelopes. Paragraphs of the Divine Word have been read or repeated there 2,336 times. It is supposed that there are about 250 such houses. Of these 152 are regularly visited by him, and 635 visits have been paid to them. A larger number could easily have been visited by him, but he has already his hands quite full. . . .

“ The public-house missionaries, again, have a difficult class of labour, from the character and habits of those visited, and the places in which their work is carried on. Yet one of these, newly appointed this year for the parish of St. Pancras, reports, that in that one parish of the metropolis, 11 miles in circumference, and with 190,000 inhabitants, he has been enabled to visit consecutively every one of the 520 public-houses and coffee-shops therein, without one single exception. And the missionary to the public-houses in the almost equally large parish of Marylebone, who has been longer at his work than the other, reports that this year 18,542 persons have heard the Gospel from his lips within the walls of the public-houses; 1,189 hours have been spent by him this year in such houses; 54 Bibles have been distributed by these, and 21,560 religious tracts. Portions of Scripture have been read or repeated by heart there, on 1,349 occasions; and from such places, 30 adults have been induced to attend public worship, and 45 children to attend schools; 4 fallen females have also been placed in asylums, 2 restored to their homes, and 1 otherwise rescued. One of the fallen ones benefited had attempted self-destruction, and some others were spirit-broken with remorse and care. Of 9 destitute and criminal girls placed by him in reformatories, one was only 13 years of age, but had been apprehended three times for theft, and had been tried at the Old Bailey for picking a lady's pocket. She is now doing well; and this missionary, looking back on his past career of some years' duration as a missionary, adds, ‘ It has now been my happiness to benefit *several hundreds* of the fallen class.’ ”

Let us add another extract from the Report :—

“ For the preservation of order and property, London has its 7,000 police, at an expense last year (1857) of 444,212*l*. But as yet its

religious police of city missionaries are but 350, and its income 32,230*l*."

We dare not do more than make a brief allusion to the tempting subject of the Ragged School Union, with its 377 Day and Sunday schools, and 44,540 scholars, according to the last Report (1858). That admirable offshoot of the schools, the Shoe-black Brigade, is now a familiar feature of our streets. Two examples from the Report will show in what manner the schools are working.

One school, since its establishment, has saved twenty-one lads from crime, and started them fairly in life. One of these lads, at sea, thus writes to the schoolmaster :—

"I hope you will tell all the boys I advise them to go to sea, for it will make men of them, for I know it has done so with me. I found the Bible and the books you gave me very useful at sea; I am very thankful to you for them, and for all the trouble and pains you took with me when I was at the school. I will, if possible, come to see you, as I should like so very much to see the school again.

"H—— G——."

The following incident is told of the Marylebone-court School for boys under ten years of age, and for girls and infants :—

"One afternoon during the autumn the schoolmistress was taken so seriously and suddenly ill that she was obliged to be at once removed, whilst the school and its contents were left to the 'tender and unrestrained mercies' of the children and neighbours. Not only did the schoolmistress meet with the greatest and kindest sympathy from the neighbours gathered around her by the alarm given of her illness, but on her return to the school, after an absence of some days, she found to her extreme gratification a most unexpected testimony to the moral influence she had exercised, in the fact that not a single article had been touched during her absence, although books, work, slates, and even *money* (left in an open drawer) had been within their power. Less than two years ago, it is confidently felt that this anecdote could not have been given."

We are, perhaps, too apt to believe that our moral therapeutics are mostly applicable to and required among the lower classes of the metropolitan population. The different classes of a community, like that which exists in the metropolis, interlace at so many points, and are so dependent the one upon the other, that no advancement or retrogression can take place in any one class but its effects will be made manifest in the other classes. Thus it happens that every movement made for the benefit of a class is dependent for success in no small degree upon the attitude assumed towards it by the various sections of those classes which are more immediately related to that intended to be benefited. Now,

it may be laid down as an axiom that the moral improvement of the lower class is governed by that which takes place in the middle and higher classes; but the moral responsibility of the latter in respect to the former consequent upon this relationship, is yet far from being sufficiently appreciated.

We know that ruinous and filthy houses, in which every room is a separate dwelling-house, breed and propagate vice; that certain courts and alleys are notorious as the haunts of villany and immorality. Has the landlord no responsibility in this matter? Mr. Mayhew tells us of one man who owns nearly a dozen brothels, and who is a member of a strict Baptist Church and the son of a deceased minister!—(*London Labour and London Poor*, vol. i. p. 31.)

Mr. Godwin describes the houses in a court in Clerkenwell as being so dilapidated that few would suppose that they were inhabited, yet the rooms were let at exorbitant rents, and in one of the houses two of the rooms accommodated at night twenty-five persons:—

“The houses in this court belong to a gentleman at Notting-hill, by whom they are let to a chimney-sweeper, who lives on the spot, and then sublets them.”—(*London Shadows: a Glance at the “Homes” of the Thousands*, 1854, p. 12.)

Mr. Hill, the Recorder of Birmingham, writes:—

“I look forward with great confidence to the time when an owner who knowingly, or by gross negligence, permits his houses to be occupied for the purpose of carrying on any traffic obnoxious to the laws of his country, will be held himself responsible, and, by fines and other visitations, taught, through his own selfish interests, a due regard to the interests of the public.”—(*Suggestions for the Repression of Crime*, 1857, p. 68.)

We know that a main source of crime, pauperism, and vice is intemperance. Have the educated classes no responsibility in this matter—so far, at least, as example is concerned? Are spirit-dealers and the brewers wholly innocent in the matter? Have the electors and their representatives done their duty? Here is a comparatively recent example of one of the inexplicable eccentricities of our licensing system. A young man was brought before the Lord Mayor, in August last, charged with committing a robbery. In the course of the examination the following conversation took place:—

“The Lord Mayor.—Was there nobody at the public-house at the time who can identify the prisoner?”

“Watkins (660).—My lord, I went there, but they would not know anything about the matter. The house is a very bad one, frequented by none but thieves and card and skittle sharpers.

“The Lord Mayor.—I thought the licence had been taken away.

"Watkins.—*So it has, my lord. It is now only licensed as a beer-shop, and it is worse than it was when licensed as a public-house.*"—(*Morning Post*, August 27.)

In the intimate relationship which exists between the master and servant, the employer and workman, is that relationship bounded merely by £ *s. d.* on the one side, and service engaged for on the other? Is no higher responsibility involved in the relation? Is it not a reproach on the wealthiest commercial kingdom in the world that so few Akroyds and Prices exist among its employers of labour?

How few of the wealthier classes reflect (to bring charity to its most commercial bearing) with how little cost and trouble to themselves they might be the means of diffusing incalculable benefits among those less fortunate in pelf who surround them! Witness the example set by the Honourable Societies of the Temple in throwing open their gardens to the public during the evenings throughout the finer portions of the year. So remarkable is the testimony of the Temple Gardener, contained in two letters to the *Times*, to the effect exercised upon the children of the lower classes by the privilege of admission to the gardens, that we shall quote them in full, in the hopes that the lesson may not be altogether lost in the approaching summer:—

To the Editor of The Times.

Sir,—I read in the columns of *The Times* last week several letters soliciting the favour of the authorities of Gray's-inn and Lincoln's-inn fields being open for an hour or two in the hot summer evenings to the working classes' children in the crowded courts and alleys of the surrounding neighbourhood (I wish they would) for the benefit of the poor, and also to ease us a little of the overwhelming numbers that nightly visit the Temple-gardens. We have too many to be comfortable, and keep the grass alive, this hot, dry season. Still, I don't wish for one moment to interfere with what does not concern me. I only wish to record my practical experience of the class I would grant the boon to, and also show the injury done; and this is founded on upwards of twenty-six years' observation.

This evening I counted no less than 7,000 pass through the gates from six till a little after eight; and when the garden was cleared at twenty minutes past eight, not a flower or even a leaf that I could find was injured. Of course we have several persons to walk round and keep order; and I must here beg leave to acknowledge the usefulness and efficiency of the City Police. I was rather grieved to read the letter of a correspondent in Lincoln's-inn-fields making use of such strong terms towards the working classes, as I find they don't deserve it; for this reason—I find the poorer the children are, the better they behave in the Temple-gardens. The well-clothed, well-fed, and educated youths I am often obliged to keep out, as they only

come here for what they term a lark with the girls. They jump on their backs; the girls then take off their caps, and away they run after them to kiss, knock down the little children or any one else in the way; and if spoken to they give a fair share of abuse, and say they will report you for insolence.

Now, I tell these youths to go to the parks and practise their games. These are my greatest trouble to manage here.

Now for the tagrag and bobtail; these I manage remarkably well. They present themselves at the gate:—"Please, sir, can I go in? I have cleaned my shoes." He holds up his leg to prove his case. Another stretches forth his hand—"May I go in? I have washed my hands." Another—"Sir, let me in, please; I have washed my face." And with an innocent, wistful look he throws back or takes off his cap to show he is washed clean. The girls practise the same thing, by saying their frocks and stockings are washed and mended on purpose to get passed into the Temple-gardens. Now, see the good this does the poor children. They get well washed once a day, whereas, perhaps, they would not for a week. They walk round the gardens, and admire the beauties of Nature. It must improve their domestic habits, and also their minds, in seeing flowers instead of filth and every other nuisance that is brought under their notice in the public streets. These are the best behaved in the garden; and I prefer admitting them to the high-spirited, well-clothed, and well-fed young persons, for the above reason: to them it is a grand treat, and they are afraid to do wrong, in case they do not get admitted again. Any person doubting what I have stated, let them come to the garden-gate any fine evening, and judge for themselves. I wish they would turn Old Smithfield Market into a playground; it would greatly relieve these gardens.—Your obedient servant,

Sunday Night, July 12, 1858.

SAMUEL BROOME.

To The Editor of The Times.

Sir,—We have now closed these gardens for the season from the public, to enable me to restore the overtrodden lawn for their reception another year, by sowing fresh seed to make a fresh turf for next spring, which operation I find little difficulty in doing with proper management; but the principal object I have in asking your permission to insert this letter is this,—to show the good behaviour of the working classes, and the benefits resulting from throwing open to them in the hot summer evenings places of this description. I have made a very moderate calculation of the numbers that have taken advantage of this boon, the majority being young children, averaging from two to ten years of age,—210,000. The only damage done to the flowers out of this number all the season was one stock pulled up by a child that strayed from its mother, although there are standing in the garden walks 200 pots of plants, and not a branch or leaf has been destroyed (although on Sunday evenings I have seen the ground so overcrowded with the public, that the dust and steam could be seen to rise like a mist above their heads). The character generally given

to the British public is, that they are so very destructive to private property if allowed to be admitted for innocent recreation or exercise for the benefit of their health. This I beg most respectfully to deny, in these gardens, and feel proud to defend my class against those our accusers. The admittance of them into these gardens gives a good deal of inconvenience to benchers and members of the Inn, as they cannot take a quiet walk in the hot summer evenings if they feel so disposed; but I rarely hear a single murmur or complaint from them. On the contrary, some of them will say, "Gardener, this is a lovely sight to see these poor creatures." "How they seem to enjoy our treat!" "I like to see it." "What a pity there are not more such places for them!" "I hope they don't pluck the flowers." "No, sir, they are very well behaved."

There is another feature connected with these gardens that may be mentioned—that is, I cultivate a great number of chrysanthemums, finding they are the best town flower to grow in smoke. This excites immense interest in the working class; they walk round and watch every operation I perform like a cat does the mouse, ask me questions, and beg cuttings of what I have to spare. Others buy them at nurseries, and those who are favoured with a sunny spot take unremitted attention in growing them. This, they tell me, keeps them for hours out of a public-house, from spending their hard earnings, and pouring down their throat that which robs their brain and makes a wretched home. Therefore, I consider the good done by admitting the public unlimited. It is the means of teaching them how to cultivate, as well as of improving their domestic habits, and makes a happy home, creates an innocent rivalry with their neighbours, gives food for the brain, health to the body, and Heaven to the soul to hundreds of the industrious class, for there are no less than nine shows this autumn, and all through seeing the plants in the two Temple-gardens that my kind-hearted masters liberally permit. This working class are happy souls. I could spend all my days among them.

I am your obedient and obliged servant, SAMUEL BROOME.
Temple Gardens, Sept. 8.

Until there be a more sensitive appreciation of the moral responsibilities of the middle and higher classes to the lower class, we shall hope in vain for that marked moral improvement in the latter that we desire. There exists a large amount of ignorance, it is to be feared, among the middle and higher classes of the social and moral conditions of the lower class, and the dispersion of this ignorance must form one of the most important steps in the general moral advancement of the metropolis and the kingdom.

But we may not enter into fuller detail respecting the various moral agencies which exist in the metropolis. We have endeavoured to deal with the spirit rather than with the particulars of its moral therapeutics. Much as the practice of morality may fall short of what it might be, still there is a life in it which, properly nourished, is capable of achieving the highest notions

of the moralist and the greatest good of the community. They who have watched the growth, in recent years, of the various efforts which are being made for the moral reformation of the metropolis, cannot fail to have been struck with the gradually increasing energy which is being infused into the different means made use of. This great and cheering sign is not, however, manifested in the metropolis alone, but it is witnessed also throughout the whole kingdom, concerning which the masterly pen of Montalembert has written :—

“ . . . I hail again with joy the most significant and most consoling symptom of the actual state of England—I mean the persevering ardour of the flower of the British nation in the pursuit of social and administrative reforms; of amelioration in the state of the prisons, and that of unhealthy habitations; in spreading popular, professional, agricultural, and domestic education; in the augmentation of the resources set apart for public worship; in the simplification of civil and criminal procedure; in toiling, in every way, for the moral and material wellbeing of the working classes, not by the humiliating tutelage of uncontrolled power, but by the generous combination of free agency and of every spontaneous sacrifice.” — (*Un Debat sur l'Inde au Parlement Anglais.*)

ART. VII.—STATISTICS OF INSANITY.

1. FRANCE.

M. LEGOYT, who is at the head of the French Bureau of General Statistics, published, a few months ago, a volume of statistics relative to establishments for the insane in France. The following analysis of this work, from the pen of M. Brierre de Boismont, presents a comprehensive summary of the lunacy statistics of France, and is extracted from the last number of the *Annales d'Hygiène Publique*. We have omitted that portion of M. Boismont's analysis which refers to expenditure and deficiencies in asylum accommodation,—

Notwithstanding the efforts made by the French administration to obtain the most complete information respecting the insane under treatment, exact data are still wanting. Idiots and cretins were not distinguished in the returns until the year 1858; and there is an excess of at least 300 per annum in the figures indicative of the total number of insane, in consequence of duplicate returns. Both these sources of error will, in future, be removed.

On the 31st December, 1853, the number of lunatic establishments amounted to 111. Of these 65 were public and 46 private. One of the public asylums belongs to the State (Charenton), 37 to the departments, 1 to the communes, and 26 are ancient religious houses or foundations, or divisions of a civil hospital (*hospices ou quartiers d'hospices*). Among

these 111 establishments, 11 are devoted specially to males, 17 to females, and 83 receive both sexes. Twenty-five departments have still no establishments specially set apart for the insane

In 1835, the number of insane under treatment was ascertained for the first time. Since this period, the figures have increased year by year with one exception, in 1850, during which year a decrease occurred in consequence of the mortality from cholera in 1849. The number of insane in the different asylums on the 1st of January in each year from 1835 to 1854, inclusive, was as follows:—

1835—10,539	1845—17,089
1836—11,091	1846—18,013
1837—11,429	1847—19,023
1838—11,892	1848—19,570
1839—12,577	1849—20,231
1840—13,283	1850—20,061
1841—13,887	1851—21,253
1842—15,280	1852—22,495
1843—15,796	1853—23,795
1844—16,255	1854—24,524

According to this table, it would appear that the population of asylums, from the 1st January, 1835, to the 1st January, 1854, has more than doubled. It has increased in nineteen years 13,985, that is, about 1·33 per cent.

From 1842 to 1854 the number of male lunatics was 9,314; of female, 10,177. At the first glance we might be tempted to conclude from this difference that women had a peculiar predisposition to insanity; but as the females under treatment in asylums are more numerous than the men, the excess is dependent upon the sojourn of the latter being less than that of the former, and upon the mortality being greater among males than females.

The 23,795 insane existing in the asylums on the 1st January, 1853, were thus distributed: in the asylums of the State, the departments, and the communes, 10,839; in the *quartiers des hospices*, 7,233; in private asylums, 5,733. This gives for the first, 45·55 per cent.; for the second, 30·36; and for the last, 24·09.

On investigating the relation of the number of insane under treatment to the total population of France, at five quinquennial periods, the following results are obtained:—

1836—33,540,910 population,	11,091 insane;	1 in every 3,024 individuals.
1841—34,240,178	13,887	1 " 2,465 "
1846—35,400,486	18,013	1 " 1,965 "
1851—36,783,170	21,353	1 " 1,676 "

From these figures we ascertain that, in relation to population, the number of insane under treatment has augmented considerably; for while the increase of the population from 1836 to 1851 has been 6·68 per cent., the increase of the insane has been 92·52 per cent., or nearly fourteen times as much.

But the number of insane under treatment in asylums is not an exact representation of the real number which exist; there are, indeed, many more of these unfortunates that are to be found under treatment. During the enumeration of the population in 1851, it was

ascertained that 24,438 individuals deprived of reason were living in private dwelling-houses; and if this number be added to the population of the asylums in that year, we obtain a total of 44,970 insane, that is, 1·25 in every 1,000 inhabitants, or 1 in 796. When the last census was taken in England, it was found that one-half of the demented individuals in that country were deprived, also, of the aid that they required, and contributed to augment the contingent of mental alienation. It is to be remarked that the departments (25 in number) which contain the greatest amount of insane in private dwellings, are those in which no asylums exist.

From 1842 to 1853, with the exception of 1849 (the cholera year), there was an excess of admissions into the asylums, as compared with the united discharges and deaths, the excess amounting to an annual mean of 766. If this proportion of admissions continue, it will be requisite every year to provide new asylums capable of accommodating the mean excess named, or to enlarge to the requisite extent the asylums already existing. The actual number of individuals received into establishments devoted to the insane, during the period named, was 94,169; 52,871 were dismissed, and 32,099 died. These figures give the annual means of 7,847 admissions, 4,406 discharges and 2,675 deaths; or 11 admissions to 10 discharges and deaths.

Of 1,000 admissions, 538 were males, and 467 females; of 1,000 discharges, before or after cure, 535 were males, and 465 females; and of 1,000 deaths, 541 were males, and 409 females: consequently, the admissions being equal, there die in lunatic asylums many more men than women; and, on the other hand, the sojourn of the latter is notably longer than that of the men. This is, as has already been said, the explanation of the numerical predominance of the female sex in the actual population of asylums.

The mean annual number of admissions, discharges, and deaths, in each of the different classes of asylums from 1844-52 inclusive, was as follows:—(1) In asylums appertaining to the State, the departments, or the communes, 5,717 (admissions, 3,138; discharges, 15,551; deaths, 1,068): (2) In hospital establishments, 6,049 (admissions, 3,066; discharges, 1,937; deaths, 1,046): (3) In *maisons de santé*, 3,274 (admissions, 1,752; discharges, 956; deaths, 566).

The continuous increase witnessed in the number of insane under treatment is equally remarked in the number of annual admissions: thus the figure which in 1835 was 3,947, arose in 1853 to 9,081. During this period of nineteen years, the total number of admissions was 128,542. In 1852, the total number of admissions was greatest; if it be compared with 1835, it will be found that the admissions have nearly trebled in eighteen years.

Without prejudging the question of the influence upon this increase of the number of asylums, of their enlargement, of the ameliorations which they have undergone, or of the action of civilisation upon the development of insanity, M. Legoyt presents some facts which appear to him not without interest in the solution of the problem.

He observes that, if we divide the nineteen years comprised

between 1835 and 1853 into four periods of from three to five years each, we shall find that the mean number of annual admissions has been as follows :—

For the 1st period (1835—1838)	4,378
" 2nd " (1839—1843)	6,061
" 3rd " (1844—1848)	7,510
" 4th " (1849—1853)	8,635

The mean increase from period to period, as deducted from these figures, is as follows :—

From the 1st to the 2nd period 38·44 per cent., or 9·61 per cent. per annum.

 " 2nd " 3rd " 23·91 " 4·78 "

 " 3rd " 4th " 14·97 " 2·99 "

From this table it would appear that since 1835 the increase of admissions gradually diminishes, in such a manner that the time may be foreseen when, all things being equal, the annual number of admissions will become stationary. It may also be remarked, that if civilisation, in raising the level of general comfort, has a tendency in divers ways to excite suffering, it neutralises by degrees the deadly consequences of misery upon the public health. The increasing number of admissions can be explained by considerations every way foreign from physiological reasons: the creation of new asylums, the amelioration of the internal *régime* of these establishments, the extension of moral treatment, the reputation of physicians, the diminution of the prejudices respecting insanity, the moderate charges of the establishments, the rapidity of communications, and the gratuitous charge of indigent lunatics! It must also be mentioned, that lately abuses have affected the admissions, in consequence of the municipal authorities and even families imposing upon the departments, under the pretext of mental derangement, the charge of a great number of paupers. We shall not discuss these points, but confine ourselves to the remark that everywhere where the human brain is without cessation kept in action, there we are sure to see the number of insane predominate: it is thus that in France, in England, in the United States, where the physiological causes are excessively multiplied, the number of insane is considerable, while in Italy and in Spain the proportion is much less: it is also small in Turkey and in Asia. As to the predominance of moral causes above physical, we consider it incontestable; but it is necessary to know that the cause may be hid with infinite care, and that it is not in mere passing relations we shall obtain such avowals as these:—"I have failed in my duties to my spouse;" "I have committed perjury;" "I have seduced the sister of an intimate friend, and he has perished before my eyes," &c., &c. Even M. Legoyt admits that there are thousands of fools who are not treated as such, and I would add that many are carefully hidden. Lastly, the alliances between relatives, and between insane individuals, tend without ceasing to propagate the malady. M. Legoyt says that it has been demonstrated that, during the great social crisis of 1848, there was a diminution in the number of admissions. We answer that many of these unhappy individuals fell victims to their exaltation; others fled the country; and the prisons received a large number. It has been a matter of observation, during many years, that a notable

quantity of victims to political crises have entered into lunatic establishments. Moreover, it would be necessary to count those who, conceived under the influence of great disturbances, subsequently became insane.

On comparing the annual admissions with the population, we wrote that, during this period of 12 years, there has been in the department of the Seine 1 admission in every 516 inhabitants, while the proportion for the whole of France has been 1 in 4,144. This result is explained by the exceptional state of the city of Paris, which obliges the authorities to sequester every individual deprived of reason; by the just celebrity of many establishments for the insane; and by the facilities afforded to families for having their insane treated there in absolute secrecy.

The relation of the sexes ought to be examined with care. It would appear from M. Legoyt's documents, that the admissions of men have exceeded those of women in a proportion which averages more than 14 per cent. Now, it is necessary not to lose sight of the fact that there are more women than men in the total population; hence there is a certain degree of probability that man is more predisposed to insanity than woman. According to the enumeration of 1851, and the annual mean of admissions during the quinquennial period 1849-53, it would appear that, for the whole of France, there were 8,864 individuals of the male sex to every male admission, and 4,478 of the female sex for every female admission.

The admission into an asylum may be carried into effect either by the families of lunatics, or by the administration, which intervenes officially. Of the 9,081 patients cured in all the establishments in 1858, 2,609 were placed under charge by their friends, and 6,472 by the administration: thus more than two-thirds of the admissions were exacted for the public security. In the Parisian asylums, the proportion of cases sent by the administration is nearly 80 per cent.

In respect of age, from the fiftieth to the sixtieth year, females are attacked more frequently than males; in 1,000 cases of each sex, the number of instances within the period named being 134 males and 167 females. This result appears to indicate the influence of the critical time. As to the mean age of admission, it is 40 years and 5 months. One of the most remarkable facts made manifest by the returns respecting the civil condition, is the large number of unmarried people among lunatics in asylums; the percentage, of both sexes combined, upon the total number of insane under charge, being 61.80; while in the population at large, above the age of fifteen, the unmarried form only 36.74 per cent. This apparent predisposition to insanity among the unmarried has been attributed to the absence of those joys and cares which belong to a family, and to the terrible trials of adversity suffered alone. Without denying these reasons, M. Legoyt, however, thinks that it is necessary also to take into consideration the isolated state of the unmarried lunatic, which renders it necessary that he should be promptly conducted to an asylum.

In regard to professions, M. Legoyt has shown that, in proportion to their numbers, artists, in 1858, numbered eight times more insane than proprietors and landlords; Jesuits, seven times more; eccle-

siastics and physicians, five times more ; professions and men of letters, four times. For these five categories of the population combined, there were 205 individuals for one lunatic under treatment ; whilst for the entire population, 1,294 inhabitants are found for one lunatic. Soldiers and sailors must be put aside altogether, because, being sent without exception, by authority, to a special establishment, there cannot be a comparison established between them and other classes of the population, of which a great number are never placed in asylums. This result confirms the opinions generally entertained, that the professions which exact continual brain-work contain a greater number of insane than others. After trades come domestics or journeymen, the manual or mechanical professions. The proportion of insane belonging to the category of domestics and of journeymen exceeds the half of the general mean : it is also in this class that the greatest number of unmarried persons is found.

The degree of instruction among the insane has been the object of examination ; but as there are no data respecting the amount of instruction existing among the entire population, the results have no relative value. Considering, however, the statistics in a general point of view, it is evident that that portion of the population of which the instruction is superior to that which has rudimentary instruction merely, furnishes a considerable contingent to the number of insane treated, since it forms nearly a twelfth. This proportion is nearly equal to that of the liberal professions.

Of 2,883 lunatics, in 1858, hereditary predisposition is stated to have existed in 1,410 men and 1,470 women. Of 1,000 lunatics, the cause of insanity was said to be physical in 572, and moral in 428. We have already remarked upon the necessity of living in intimacy with the insane in order to obtain a correct knowledge on this subject, and that the inexact information obtained in asylums, both public and private, reduces very much the value of the figures referring to heritage and other causes. There are also other objections in regard to the physical causes, because it is evident that drunkenness, bereavement, and misery have a double meaning. The man who, for example, drinks, to stupify his grief and becomes insane, at first acts under the influence of a moral cause. Accidental suppression of menses (150) and puerperal insanity (150), in a great number of cases, arise from moral impressions.

Among moral causes, the most frequent is grief arising from the loss of money : 899 cases of insanity are attributed to this cause, which is, by comparison with the total figure of moral causes, a proportion of more than 12 per cent. Afterwards comes religious exaltation (1,894), love (792), violent emotions (698), pride (600), the loss of a loved one (510), disappointed ambition (495), jealousy (442), political events (308), excess of intellectual work (156), *simple* imprisonment (154), nostalgia (48), isolation and solitude (41), change of life (32), association with and assiduous attention upon the insane (16), *cellular* imprisonment (4).

When the admissions are arranged according to seasons, it is seen that the months of summer and of autumn are those which are most charged. For both sexes, and for the female sex, the maximum of

admissions takes place in July; for the male sex, in November. This difference is indicated now for the first time.

An interesting point for study is the duration of insanity at the time of reception into an asylum. Of 14,963 insane respecting whom information was furnished, in 1853, it is noted that nearly half the number had been suffering more than two years. If this return be exact,—and we believe, from our own experience, that it is so,—we need not be surprised at the number of insane who cumber our asylums. The English returns direct attention every year to this sad result—the result of ignorance, cupidity, and indifference.

Idiots and cretins were distinguished for the first time in the statistical returns for 1853. In that year the number of idiots is stated to have been 2,654, of cretins only 45. We may remark concerning this last figure that it must be very far from being correct, for it is not in relation with the great number of existing cretins, of whom it has been estimated 3,000 exist in the department of the Basses-Alpes alone.

Insanity has been considered one of the maladies which offers the greatest number of relapses. Of the 32,876 insane which form the object of this examination, the relapses amount to 1,685, being a proportion of 49 in every 1,000 insane. It will be acknowledged that this proportion is much less than that which occurs in many other affections, and particularly in rheumatism.

Of the 32,876 insane returns in 1853, comprehending the 23,795 in the asylums on the 1st of January in that year, and the 9,081 received during the year, 12,972 came from towns, 14,536 from the country, and of 5,368 the residence was unknown. Now, as the population of the towns is to that of the country as 1 to 3, it follows that the urban insane are much more numerous than the rural. This result has been attributed to the development of luxury, extreme covetousness, agitations, excesses, disorders of all kinds, industrial crises, and the miseries that they lead to. M. Legoyt, however, would attribute it to differences in administrative measures. Thus, while in towns the insane are most commonly placed in confinement as dangerous, in the country the inoffensive are left to the charge of their families; from which it follows that the towns ought to show a marked numerical superiority of insane under treatment as compared with the country. This opinion is supported by the results of the census of 1851, which show 1,856 insane in 3,632 cities and chief towns of *arrondissements*, and 22,577 in the communes. But it is to be observed that researches made with care by the directors of asylums demonstrate the predominance of the number of insane in towns in relation to the amount of population. There is, also, another fact which belongs to this question, that is the excess in number of suicides occurring in towns as compared with the country, and we know the intimate relation which exists between suicide and folly.

It is difficult to appreciate rightly the results afforded by the returns of cures, because the figures vary singularly according as establishments receive patients curable or incurable, as at Bethlehem or Hanwell. In France the asylums admit indiscriminately all cases, and the proportion of chronic cases is enormous. Some asylums make their

returns solely upon curable cases, whilst others take the total number of admissions. To obtain an exact number of cures, it would be necessary to put aside paralytics, epileptics, demented, chronic cases, idiots, cretins, *caput mortuum* of which the lot is fixed in advance, and to hold count only of recent cases of mania and monomania, the sole which have a chance. In 1853, of 4,872 cases discharged, 2,771 were cured and 2,101 not cured. Relatively to the duration of treatment in the cases cured, 86 per cent., or more than one-third, were cured within the first three months of treatment; 25 per cent., or one-fourth, after six months' treatment; 11 per cent., or about one-tenth, in from six to nine months; 8 per cent. in from nine to twelve months. This gives, consequently, 80 per cent. of cures within the first year, and 20 per cent. only in subsequent years. The mean duration of the cures was nine months, fifteen days; and the mean age of the individuals cured, thirty-seven years, two months, for both sexes.

During the period of twelve years comprised between 1842 and 1853, there died 82,099 individuals in lunatic asylums, or an annual average of 2,675. Of this proportion, 17,390 were men, and 14,709 women.

If the mortality be compared in public and private asylums, we obtain the following results:—

Departmental Asylums	1 death in 7·90, or 12·66 per cent.
In Hospital Establishments ...	6·45, „ 15·60 „
In <i>Maisons de Santé</i>	8·10, „ 12·35 „

Under the denomination *maisons de santé* are included establishments which receive as many as 100 insane, of whom the greatest part might also be placed in the *hospices*: be this as it may, the mortality in the *quartiers d'hospices* is the most considerable. This is to be attributed to these establishments being old constructions, badly situated in the middle of towns, and not fitted for the purpose to which they are devoted. In 1853 sixteen accidental deaths and seventeen suicides occurred. This last figure is not surprising, if we reflect on the frequency of suicidal mania. We may add even, that it is providential, when we know how fixed the resolutions of the suicidal insane are. Esquirol tells us that when a lunatic wishes to kill himself, he does it in spite of precautions: this is also our conviction.

All those who have the direction of public or private asylums know the large proportion of deaths during the first month of admission. According to M. Legoyt, it reaches 108 per cent., or more than a tenth of the whole mortality; and he asks if, independently of the states of debility stated by some alienists as to the cause of mortality, the sudden change of regime, and the violent emotion occasioned by this hasty sequestration, may not have an unfavourable influence? We are astonished that emotion should be assigned as a cause, because for thirty years that we have been constantly in contact with the insane, and that we have observed them with particular care, we have never seen emotion occasion a grave accident. The immense majority of the insane have not a knowledge of their state; they are generally egoists; many without doubt, regret their liberty, beg for it, and make attempts to

* It is not stated how these results were obtained.—ED.

escape; but they are rarely attacked with nostalgia, and when this does occur, the dismissal takes place nearly always immediately. The mortality of the first month, then, must be attributed to other causes, and these are those which we have noted and which our *confrères* have noted also. A great number of cases kept a long time at home are placed in asylums only when they become noisy or refuse every attention: this happens often with general paralytics; and this state corresponds always to a period of aggravation or of fatal termination. Acute and grave cases, such as acute delirium, with obstinate refusal to take food, from fear of being poisoned by enemies, terminates also unfortunately in a few days, when the aid of art is insufficient. Many insane, treated at home, from some motive or other are sent into an asylum to die there. Lastly, it frequently happens that sick are sent to asylums who are suffering from the delirium of typhoid and ataxic fevers, encephalitis, pneumonia, &c., and who expire a few hours after admission, or at the end of two or three days. This rapid enumeration, which does not comprehend every case, gives a satisfactory scientific explanation of the elevated figure of the mortality in the first month.

The seasons have upon the mortality of the insane the same influence that they have upon the mortality of the total population of France.

2. IRELAND.

The Appendix to the Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry into the State of the Lunatic Asylums, and other institutions for the custody and treatment of the Insane in Ireland, contains a series of statistical tables relative to the district asylums, from which several interesting particulars may be obtained respecting the recoveries, mortality, and character of the cases received into those institutions. In our last number we gave an account of the nature and tendency of the Commissioners' Report; we now propose to lay before our readers a few of the principal results which may be gathered from the Appendix.

In our previous notice of the Report, we gave a summary of the general statistics contained in it, but we may quote here the following statement of the Commissioners:—"The Census Commissioners (1851) and the Inspectors of Lunatics in their last Report have given returns of the total number of insane in Ireland in 1851 and 1857 respectively. The returns of the inspectors are not given for the same date in the several institutions, and they contain, moreover, the number of persons simply 'epileptics' at large and in the workhouses; and as these are exclusive of the 'lunatics' and 'idiots' in those returns, they may be omitted from the total of the insane. The Census Returns give the number of insane in Ireland on the 31st March, 1851, at 9,980, of whom 4,635 were at large. The Inspectors of Lunatics, in their last Report (if we exclude epileptics at large and in workhouses, for those in asylums must be supposed to be insane), fix the number at 11,452, of whom 5,441 are at large. A comparison of these returns, made at an interval of between five and six years, and obtained through the same sources of information, shows a considerable increase in the amount of insanity in Ireland."—*Report*, p. 2.

During the five years 1852—56, 6,197 cases (3,240 males and 2,948 females) were admitted into the district asylums, and the daily average of patients during the period was 3,467. The total *discharges* amounted to 3,715 (1,936 males, 1,779 females), the *recoveries* being 2,435 (1,237 males, 1,298 females), and the *non-recoveries* 1,280 (699 males, 581 females). The total *mortality* was 1,363 (722 males and 641 females). If the proportion of recoveries and deaths be calculated upon the admissions, it is found that the average ratio of the former during the five years was 39·2 per cent., of the latter 10·5 per cent.; but if the more correct calculation suggested by Dr. Farr be made, the proportions being calculated upon the mean of the admissions, discharges and deaths—this mean giving the nearest approximation to the number of cases treated—the following results, *per cent.*, are obtained:—*Recoveries*, males 21·9, females 21·2, total 43·1: *Deaths*, males 12·8, females 10·3, total 22·7.

The distribution of the deaths in the different months was as follows :

January	125	July	57
February	106	August	107
March	147	September	76
April	125	October	124
May	127	November	101
June	116	December	106

From these figures it would appear that the maximum mortality was in spring, the minimum in summer.

The accompanying figures show the proportion *per cent.* of *recoveries* within different periods of time:—

	Males.	Females.	Total.
Less than three months	15·1	13·4	28·2
More than three months and less than six months	11·9	12·8	22·7
More than six months and less than one year	11·5	11·6	23·5
More than one year and less than two years,	6·2	5·3	11·6
More than two years and less than three	2·4	2·4	5·3
More than three years and less than four	1·3	0·9	2·9
More than four years and less than five			12·3
More than five years and less than six			9·0
More than six years and less than seven			4·9
More than seven years and less than eight			3·2
More than eight years and less than nine			2·4
More than nine years and less than ten			4·5
More than ten years			0·8

Thus, more than one-fourth of the recoveries took place within three months after admission into an asylum; one-half within the six months; and three-fourths within twelve months.

Of the admissions during the five years 22·0 per cent. (11·9 males, 10·3 females) had been in an asylum once before; 2·5 per cent. (1·1 males, and 1·4 females) had been twice before; and 1·1 per cent. (0·9 males, 0·8 females) had been thrice.

The form of mental disease and special tendencies, as well as the probable curability and incurability of the patients in the different asylums on the 1st January, 1857, is shown in the subsequent summary.

The figures show the per-centage upon the total number of patients, namely 3,284 (1,949 males, and 1,875 females).

	Males.	Females.	Total.
Mania, Acute	13·4	13·1	13·2
„ Ordinary	14·7	13·9	14·3
„ Chronic	31·1	26·9	29·0
Moral Insanity	4·2	3·6	3·9
Melancholia, (whether or not attended with delusions or occasional excitement)	9·3	14·9	12·1
Congenital idiocy	3·1	1·4	2·3
Congenital imbecility	2·9	3·0	2·9
Other forms of mental disease :—			
Dementia	21·0	27·7	21·9
Epileptics	8·7	4·8	6·7
Dangerous to others	12·6	10·1	11·1
Suicidal	3·6	2·9	3·2
Of dirty habits	12·9	13·2	13·1
Received from gaols :—			
Dangerous lunatics	23·7	14·2	19·0
Criminal lunatics	1·6	0·3	0·9

The probability of *recovery* among the whole of these cases was as follows :—

Probably curable	28·5	32·6	30·5
Probably incurable	71·4	67·3	69·4

The per-centage of patients paid for by their friends was, males 2·0, females 1·0, total 1·5.

The assigned *causes* of the mental disorder in the cases admitted into the district asylums during the five years 1852—56 may be divided into two classes, the *physical* and the *moral*. In the *first class* there may be enumerated, of those cases in which a cause is distinctly specified, 722 males and 707 females; in the *second class* may be summed up 262 males, and 461 females. The principal physical causes mentioned and the number of cases in which they are supposed to have been effective, are as follows :—

	Males.	Females.
Heritage	360	333
Epilepsy	81	44
Intemperance and dissipation	40	60
Mechanical injuries	63	17
Injuries of the head	28	4
Fever	31	52
Child-birth	—	58
Cold, excessive work, and destitution	18	10

The principal moral causes named are :—

Grief	47	85
Fright	30	46
Grief and fright	30	46

Total from these motions	107	177
Loss of property	60	40
Jealousy and love	30	45
Disappointment	19	41
Death of a member of the family, or of friends	10	44
Death and emigration of a relative or friend	4	32
Domestic trials	16	19

The *occupation* of the lunatic prior to his insanity is mentioned in 3,794 instances, of which the accompanying list gives a brief summary :

Labourers	1445
Servants	523
Agricultural pursuits, farming, gardening, &c., (farmers, 372)	507
Handicraftsmen	427
Tradesmen	239
Dress and bonnet-makers, and needlewomen	168
Policemen, soldiers, excisemen, and pensioners	151
Professions	124
Clerks	72
Shipwrights, sailors, boatmen, and fishermen	44
Paupers	29
Gentry	19
Engaged about horses	18
Prostitute	1

The data are not given by which the relative proportion of these figures to the average number of individuals living in each of the specified classes of occupation, could be ascertained for the period in question.

The value of the statistics furnished by the district asylums is in several respects much diminished from the want of a comprehensive system of registration common to all the asylums. But this is a defect which is far from being peculiar to the Irish asylums.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE LAW OF LUNACY.*

It was our intention to have discussed at a considerable length this important subject, but as the matter in all its details is at this moment under the consideration of a committee of the House of Commons, and witnesses are in the course of examination, we have thought it would be in better taste, and more consistent with the public good, to defer the publication of our remarks until the committee have completed their labours, and drawn up their report for the legislative consideration of Parliament. We cannot, however, refrain from directing the attention of our body to several valuable pamphlets that have appeared on this subject within the last few weeks. They should all be attentively read and diligently studied by every person interested in a right solution of the many difficult and important medical and social questions discussed in their pages. We would particularly refer our readers to the able essay of Dr. Seymour. Nothing can proceed from this accomplished physician's pen that is not entitled to the most

* (1). "A Letter to the Earl of Shaftesbury on the Laws which regulate Private Lunatic Asylums," by Ed. J. Seymour, M.D., F.R.S., &c. pp. 59, Longman: 1859.

(2). "Plea for the Insane Poor," by John Millar. H. Renshaw: 1859.

(3). "Suggestions for the Amendment of the Laws relating to Private Lunatic Asylums," by G. Ed. T. Conolly, Barrister-at-law. Shaw and Sons: 1859.

(4). "What shall we do with our Lunatics?" by Edward Eccles, F.R.C.S. J. Churchill: 1859.

(5). "On some Points in the Legal Provisions for the Poor," by J. T. Arlidge, M.B. and A.B. London: 1859.

careful and respectful attention. Dr. Seymour was for many years one of the Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy, and, therefore, he speaks as an authority on all subjects connected with the medical and domestic treatment of the insane. Many of his suggestions, as embodied in the pamphlet before us, are worthy of earnest attention. The pamphlet is written with great care, and embraces a full consideration of nearly all the points of interest connected with the subject of Lunacy Law. We beg our readers to procure the essay, and to read its interesting pages, and judge for themselves of their great merits. We again repeat that it would be ill-judged for us to quote passages from Dr. Seymour's Essay, or from any of the pamphlets alluded to, whilst the matter is still *sub judice*. We would, however, particularly call attention to the remarks of Mr. Conolly, who has evidently devoted much time and attention to the subject, as well as to the three remaining pamphlets referred to at the bottom of the page. The Committee appointed by the House of Commons has commenced its labours, and several witnesses have already been examined. The whole subject at the conclusion of the inquiry will be fully discussed in these pages.

MURDEROUS ASSAULT ON THE VISITING PHYSICIAN IN THE MARYBORO' LUNATIC ASYLUM.

"We copy the following report of this very serious occurrence from the local paper (*The Leinster Express*); up to the moment we write it has not been followed by any alarming consequences. The nature and amount of the injury has not been overstated, but rather the contrary. Until a strict and searching inquiry be made as to the cause of this and other outrages in this Asylum, we must refrain from more particular comment:—

"An occurrence which might have produced disastrous consequences took place in this institution on last Monday. A female patient, named Margaret Kelly, complaining of a headache, was permitted to remain in her sleeping-room, where she dressed herself, putting on a cloak over her clothes; on Dr. Jacob paying her a visit, accompanied by the nurse and matron (the latter remaining outside the door), he observed that the patient, who, on his entrance, had been reclining over the bedclothes, rose slowly to a standing position on the bed without making any manifestation of anger or violence. Dr. Jacob was about retiring from the room, suspecting the woman to have some evil intent, when she drew from under her cloak a stone nearly 8lbs. weight, wrapped in a cloth, which she swung around, and struck him in the head, breaking in his hat, and inflicting a wound of nearly two inches in length. Dr. Jacob then withdrew from the room when the patient struck the nurse, causing a wound in her head also; the doctor immediately returned to the nurse's assistance, when the patient was secured. Were it not that this gentleman wore a very strong hat, the probability is that his life would have been sacrificed; happily the injury has not been so severe as to prevent him from attending his duty with caution. It has been directed by a board, at the suggestion of the inspectors, that Margaret Kelly will be brought to trial with a view to make her amenable to the criminal law; and eventually to place her in the Asylum for Criminal Lunatics at Dundrum, as she has expressed a fixed determination to take the life of Dr. Jacob and the nurse. An investigation

is to take place before the next board, to ascertain how it was that the woman was allowed to be in possession of so deadly a weapon.”*

At a meeting of three members of the Board of Governors since held to transact other business, it was resolved—“That in accordance with the suggestion of the inspectors, the Sessional Crown Solicitor be instructed to take legal proceedings in the case of Margaret Kelly, and that the manager do furnish him a copy of this resolution.” It was also resolved—“That in consequence of the atrocious attempt made on the life of Dr. Jacob, the Board feel it to be their duty to express their determination to visit with the severest penalty in their power any neglect of an officer or nurse which might lead to the repetition of such an outrage.” So far the three Governors. The clerk of the Lunatic Asylum’s office, in Dublin, writes to Dr. Jacob :—“That with regard to taking means to guard against a like occurrence in future, he has to state that increased vigilance on the part of the attendants, and a rigid adherence to the Privy Council’s rules, seem to the Inspectors to be the most effectual way of preventing such acts, and they have accordingly caused a communication to be addressed to the Resident Physician with that object.” The Resident Physician is “the Manager” referred to in the resolution of the Governors, and the following is the communication addressed to him by the Inspectors—“They have to request that you will caution the attendants to be particular in the observance of the rules, and in examining the patients when they come in from the grounds, to ascertain if they have secreted stones or other dangerous weapons.” And so the matter rests as far as the authorities are concerned; but is it so to rest? For several years the internal discipline and management of this Asylum has been the cause of complaint, and has been repeatedly brought under the consideration of the Governors, the Inspectors, the Chief and Under Secretaries at the Castle, and even of the Lord Lieutenant and Privy Council, without any adequate inquiry or examination being instituted as to the charges preferred or the irregularities alleged. The Commissioners who lately presented a report on the Lunatic Asylums of Ireland were intimately acquainted with all the particulars of these complaints and charges, yet did they refuse to enter into any inquiry as to their truth, or as to the grounds upon which such serious allegations were publicly and officially made. There is now before Parliament a bill founded on that report, and referred to a select committee of the House of Commons, and it now remains to be seen whether or not the working of the present law, as illustrated by the proceedings in this case, is to be really brought to light. A searching investigation as to this really unintelligible matter would probably afford a clue to guide political investigators of Irish affairs as to the nature and source of a certain description of influence, which is often found operating in the production of results of this description; and might, perhaps, suggest speculations in political philosophy not hitherto entertained.—*Dublin Med. Press.*

* It occurs to us that it would be farcical to institute legal proceedings in a case like this. If the culprit is a dangerous lunatic, let her be removed to a place of safety and security, to *Dundrum* Asylum if they please; but it would be a mockery of justice to place her at the bar of a criminal court with the view of ascertaining her responsibility for the grave and serious offence she has committed.—*EDITOR.*

THE JOURNAL

OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE

AND

MENTAL PATHOLOGY.

JULY 1, 1859.

ART. I.—SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS.*

FROM the vagueness and uncertainty of the meaning attached to the term *metaphysics* by various writers, and especially in popular estimation, it has been too frequently held as synonymous with all that is incomprehensible and unpractical; as something, the ultimate result of which could but be to bewilder and mislead. In some of the recognised acceptations of the term, perhaps this view may not be altogether unfounded. "With the Germans, metaphysics is a science purely speculative, which soars beyond the bounds of experience. The objects of this science are supersensual ideas, unattainable by experience; and the difficulty of defining the word lies in the circumstance that the very knowledge of the ideas sought requires some proficiency in the study. Hence to one altogether unacquainted with speculative philosophy, it is almost impossible to explain the meaning of the word 'metaphysics' as used in this sense. The very possibility of a science beyond experience has been denied by a great number of philosophers; and many works called metaphysical should rather be termed inquiries into the possibility of metaphysics."† With such definitions, such objects and aims of a so-called science, we can see that the celebrated *mot* of one of our Gallic neighbours was no less true than witty:—*Quand celui qui écoute n'entend rien, et celui qui parle n'entend plus, c'est metaphysique.*

But metaphysics in our English acceptance is a very different matter, and is synonymous with Philosophy proper—the science of Mind, in its phenomena and its laws. In this sense it becomes a real, practical, comprehensible, and important science;—in-

* *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic.* By Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Edited by the Rev. R. L. Mansel, B.D., and John Veitch, M.A. Vols. I. and II. *Metaphysics.* William Blackwood and Sons. 1859.

† *Penny Cyclopædia*, art. "Metaphysics."

much as all science is only such under conditions dependent upon the laws of mind ; for " however great, and infinite, and various may be the universe and its contents,—these are known to us, not as they exist, but as our mind is capable of knowing them ; *quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*" (vol. i. p. 61).* In this aspect, we propose to follow Sir William Hamilton in his investigations, commencing as he does with the advantages of Philosophy—always bearing in mind that this is used synonymously with metaphysics, in the sequel.

The advantages of the cultivation of Philosophy are to be considered in two aspects, absolute and relative—absolute, in so far as it is immediately conducive to the mental improvement of the cultivator—relative, in proportion as its study is necessary for the prosecution of other branches of knowledge. Although our author confines his remarks altogether to the former, or absolute benefits of philosophy ; and declines to enter " for the present " upon the question of how " its study is of importance to the Lawyer, the Physician, and above all to the Theologian ; "† we must add a few words upon this, as it will explain fully why we consider it of importance to analyse with care this extensive work on so abstruse a subject as metaphysics. Mind has its laws—as certain, if not yet as definable as those of matter. Under certain conditions, inherent and external, it acts so as to produce certain results. The elements of calculation are more numerous and complex than those which appertain to physical laws—so complex as to produce results so varied, that the possibility of law is lost sight of, or questioned, in many minds. The law, however, exists ; and the conditions being the same, the results will uniformly follow. It is manifestly, then, of the greatest importance to us to recognise and investigate these laws, in order that we may duly understand those departures from them which constitute the pathological phenomena of mind. It has often appeared to us, that it is owing to the want of this systematic comparison, that so many hitherto insoluble difficulties have been found in the way of the recognition of the more slight and obscure morbid phenomena connected with mental aberrations. When we have no fixed standard of comparison, departure from it is not easy to be defined. But if the laws of association, of memory, of will, &c. &c., be ever normally ascertained, and their conditions fully investigated, as we believe it may yet be possible to accomplish, we shall only require to bring to this test any mental phenomena that may be in question ; and their accordance with, or departure

* The quotations, otherwise unacknowledged except by page marks, are always from the work under notice.

† Sir William never fully exhausted his own divisions of Philosophy ; whilst some branches are treated at great length, others, amongst which is Ontology, or Metaphysics proper, are only very incidentally discussed.

from, clearly defined laws will be signalised,—not as readily as the perturbations of planetary motion, because of the greater complexity of the elements—but as truly, in proportion as we may have been able to form a perfect and unexceptionable standard. Thus we may test the efficiency of an organ of sense, by comparing it with a received standard; most persons see that a cherry is red, and the leaves of the tree green. If we present a cherry and a leaf to one who recognises no difference between them, save that of form, we know that the organ of sight, or its brain connexion, is in an abnormal condition. The chirp of a cricket is inaudible to some ears, which in other respects seem perfect; and at the other end of the scale some very deep musical notes are too grave to be heard by some ears, which exercise all their other functions perfectly. Knowing that the law is that these sounds are audible to the normal ear, we conclude that these ears are abnormal. The conditions here are simple, and easy of investigation; when we have to decide upon compound mental phenomena the difficulties become great. Whether a sufficiently defined standard of mental action can ever be attained, which will enable us to say with certainty that any mind not thus acting (within certain limits) is abnormal, we cannot decide. One thing is certain, that such a desirable consummation (and most desirable it is) can only be arrived at by an earnest search after, and accumulation of, whatever mental laws can be developed from any source; and the study of metaphysics is the one most essentially directed towards this end. Such are a few of the relative advantages of Philosophy, regarded as in connexion with our special ends—distant as yet, and difficult; but *not proved to be unattainable*.

The absolute advantages of the philosophy of mind are further subdivided by our author into the Subjective and the Objective utility;—the first, as it cultivates the mind, or “knowing subject,” by calling its faculties into exercise;—the second, as it furnishes the mind with a certain complement of truths or objects of knowledge. The principal illustration of the *subjective* value of mental cultivation is derived from this consideration, that “*man is an end unto himself*,” and that the utility of a science is not to be calculated solely, or even chiefly, by the amount of money or bread which it will enable a man to earn; in other words, not by the extent to which it will make man an instrument, a means to another end; but by the extent to which it will make him individually perfect and happy. “It is manifest, indeed, that man, in so far as he is a mean for the glory of God, must be an end unto himself; for it is only in the accomplishment of his own perfection, that as a creature he can manifest the glory of his Creator” (p. 5). The training which recognises man as an

end to himself and as a mean to some other end is different; the one is called Liberal, the other Professional education. The sciences concerned in the latter are called by the Germans *Brodwissenschaften*, or "Bread and Butter Sciences" (p. 6). "Even admitting then that the study of mind is of no immediate advantage in preparing the student for many of the subordinate parts in the mechanism of society; its utility cannot, on that account, be called in question, unless it be asserted, that 'man liveth by bread alone,' and has no higher destination than that of the calling by which he earns his subsistence." Human perfection and human happiness must coincide; and this perfection can only be accomplished by means of mental cultivation; and such studies as contribute to the perfection of the individual man as an end, and not as a mean to other ends, must be as truly considered "useful" studies, as those which enable man to earn his daily bread.

The objective utility of Philosophy depends upon manifold considerations. A knowledge of the human mind is "confessedly the highest and most interesting of all studies;" it is Philosophy *par excellence*. "On earth (says Phavorinus) there is nothing great but man; in man, there is nothing great but mind." Chilon asks of the oracle what is of all things the best?—"To know thyself" is the response. "The proper study of mankind is man," says our great Pope.

"But though mind, considered in itself, be the noblest object of speculation which the created universe presents to the curiosity of man, it is under a certain relation that I would now attempt to illustrate its dignity when viewed as the object through which, and through which alone, our unassisted reason can ascend to the knowledge of a God. The Deity is not an object of immediate contemplation; as existing, and in himself, he is beyond our reach; we can know him only mediately through his works, and are only warranted in assuming his existence as a certain kind of cause necessary to account for a certain state of things, of whose reality our faculties are supposed to inform us. The affirmation of a God being thus a regressive inference, from the existence of a special class of effects to the existence of a special character of cause, it is evident that the whole argument hinges on the fact,—Does a state of things really exist such as is only possible through the agency of a Divine Cause? For if it can be shown that such a state of things does not really exist, then our inference to the kind of cause requisite to account for it is necessarily null" (p. 25—6).

The author then proceeds fully to demonstrate that Theology is wholly dependent upon Psychology; because upon this depends the proof of the moral nature of man; and with this stands or falls the proof of the existence of a Deity. The argument concerning the superiority of the study of metaphysics over that of physics is summed up in the striking language of Jacobi:—

"*Nature conceals God*; for through her whole domain Nature reveals only fate, only an indissoluble chain of mere efficient causes without beginning and without end, excluding, with equal necessity, both providence and chance. An independent agency, a free original commencement within her sphere and proceeding from her powers, is absolutely impossible. Working without will, she takes counsel neither of the good nor the beautiful; creating nothing, she casts up from her dark abyss only eternal transformations of herself, unconsciously and without an end; furthering with the same ceaseless industry decline and increase, death and life—never producing what alone is of God, and what supposes liberty, the virtuous, the immortal.

"*Man reveals God*; for Man by his intelligence rises above nature, and in virtue of this intelligence is conscious of himself as a power not only independent of, but opposed to, nature, and capable of resisting, conquering, and controlling her. As Man has a living faith in this power, superior to nature, which dwells in him; so he has a belief in God, a feeling, an experience of his existence. As he does not believe in the power, so does he not believe in God; he sees, he experiences nought in existence but nature,—necessity,—fate" (*Von den Göttlichen Dingen*).

What is philosophy? Literally, a love of wisdom—a term apparently originated by Pythagoras, who, when asked by Leon what art he had chiefly studied, replied that he professed no art, and was simply a *philosopher*. He further stated, that whilst some men are in pursuit of honours, and others of riches, there are a few who, indifferent to all else, devote themselves to an inquiry into the nature of things. These are the students of wisdom, or philosophers. Socrates was probably the first to bring the name into common use. The definitions that have been given of philosophy are very numerous. The science of things human and divine, and of the causes in which they are contained; the science of effects by their causes; the science of sufficient reasons; the science of things possible, inasmuch as they are possible (Wolf); the science of things, evidently deduced from first principles (Descartes); the science of truths, sensible and abstract (Condillac); the application of reason to its legitimate objects; the science of the relation of all knowledge to the necessary ends of human reason (Kant); the science of the original form of the ego, or mental self (Krug), &c. &c., for an enumeration of which we refer to Lect. III., p. 50.

To define philosophy in general more clearly, our author divides knowledge into two kinds, empirical or historical, and philosophical. The former tells us that such and such things are, or have been; the latter tells us *how* and *why* they are. Civil history is an example of the former, natural history of the latter. Historical knowledge is the *γνώσις ὅτι ἔστι*; philosophical knowledge is the *γνώσις διότι ἔστι*, *cur res sit*, and may be termed knowledge of the cause, scientific, or rational knowledge. Philo-

sophy is not content with a phenomenon, but inquires its *cause*. This cause, then, in turn becomes a phenomenon, and a source of discontent, until its cause is investigated. Philosophy thereby comes to be recognised as a search after first causes; and necessarily tends, not towards a plurality of ultimate or first causes, but towards one alone. This—the Creator—it can never reach as an object of immediate knowledge;

“But as the convergence towards unity in the ascending series is manifest, in so far as that series is within our view, and as it is even impossible for the mind to suppose the convergence not continuous and complete, it follows—unless all analogy be rejected,—unless our intelligence be declared a lie—that we must, philosophically, believe in that ultimate or primary unity which, in our present existence, we are not destined in itself to apprehend” (p. 60).

All the sciences are branches of philosophy; but, as has been before observed, because “man is the measure of the universe,” and the mind is man, the science of the human mind is philosophy proper, philosophy *par excellence*. And thus philosophy in general is equivalent to a knowledge of things by their causes; whilst in its stricter and more defined meaning, it is confined to the sciences which constitute, or hold immediately of, the science of mind.

Lecture IV. treats of the *causes* of philosophy, of which we must be content with a brief enumeration. They are of two classes—essential, as contained in man's very capacity for knowledge; complementary and assistant, as resulting from certain feelings with which he is endowed. The first class comprises the innate tendency to search after causes; and as a necessary corollary to this, the search after unity. This latter is the guiding principle in philosophy, and all systems bear more or less the traces of it. This love of unity is a source of error, as in too hasty and extensive generalisations. The second class includes chiefly Wonder, which, combined with certain intellectual tendencies, becomes Curiosity, and is the chief accessory incentive to Philosophy.

The Fifth Lecture treats upon the dispositions with which philosophy ought to be studied. The first important point noticed is the renunciation of prejudice, from early teaching, from social errors, and from the influence of custom; and the influence of man on man in times of tranquillity and of convulsion is sketched. The author considers that men are the offspring of the times—not the times of the men. Had not the public mind been ripe for the changes, the fate of Luther and Zwingli in the sixteenth century would have been the same as that of Huss and Jerome of Prague, in the fifteenth.

“Woe to the revolutionist who is not himself a creature of the revolution! If he anticipate, he is lost; for it requires, what no individual

can supply, a long and powerful counter-sympathy in a nation to untwine the ties of custom which bind a people to the established and the old" (p. 88).

These passages on the force of opinion and example are most interesting and suggestive; but we must not dwell upon them. The second practical condition of the pursuit of philosophy is the subjugation of the passions, especially sloth and pride. Bacon observes that "the eye of human intellect is not dry, but receives a suffusion from the will and from the affections, so that it may be almost said to engender any science it pleases. For what a man wishes to be true, that he prefers believing."

The *method* of philosophy is next discussed, and it is shown that there is and can be but one true method, that of *analysis*, including *synthesis*; for these are clearly demonstrated to be one, and indivisible. The one necessary condition of philosophy, or its possibility, is the decomposition of effects into their constituent causes; every effect being nothing more than the sum or complement of all the partial causes. A neutral salt, for example, is an effect compounded of three proximate causes—viz., an acid, an alkali, and the force which brought these two into the requisite approximation. The decomposition into causes is analysis; but "analysis without a subsequent synthesis is incomplete; it is a mean cut off from its end. Synthesis without a previous analysis is baseless; for synthesis receives from analysis the elements which it recomposes. Each is the relative and correlative of the other." Thus the two constitute only a single method, and the only possible one, of philosophy. Induction is shown to be synthetic in character; for the general principle includes many more facts than those analyzed, from which it was derived. All induction postulates the uniformity of nature's laws. The author concludes that the purity and equilibrium of these two elements (synthesis and analysis) constitute the perfection of philosophy, and that its aberrations have been all so many violations of the laws of this one method.

In Lecture VII. we find it stated that "the whole of philosophy is the answer to three questions: 1st. What are the facts or phenomena to be observed? 2nd. What are the laws which regulate these facts, or under which these phenomena appear? 3rd. What are the real results, not immediately manifested, which these facts or phenomena warrant us in drawing?"

With regard to the mind, the answer to the first question gives us the phenomenology of mind, empirical psychology, or the inductive philosophy of mind. These phenomena relate to three orders of mental development. (1.) Those of our cognitive faculties, or faculties of knowledge; (2) those of our feelings, or of pleasure and pain; and (3) those of our conative powers, or the phenomena of will and desire.

In like manner the answer to the second question gives us the Nomology of mind, under the same three divisions;—that of the cognitive faculties being represented by logic;—that of the feelings by what is called the æsthetic;—whilst the nomology of the conative powers involves Moral and Political Philosophy.

The solution of the third question gives us Ontology, or Metaphysics Proper—otherwise called Inferential Psychology;—it includes the *à priori* arguments for the Being of God, the Immortality of the Soul, &c.

The following is a tabular view of the distribution of Philosophy as here proposed:—

MIND or Conscience affords	FACTS — Phænomenology, Empirical Psychology.	{ Cognitions. Feelings. Conative Powers (Will and Desire).
	LAWS—Nomology, Rational Psychology . .	{ Cognitions—Logic. Feelings—Æsthetic. Conative Powers—Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy.
	RESULTS — Ontology, Inferential Psychology	{ Being of God. Immortality of the Soul, &c.

It is with the first of these departments, the Phænomenology of Mind, or Empirical Psychology, that we are at present solely concerned.

Definition.—Psychology is the science conversant about the phenomena or modifications, or states, of the mind, or *Conscious-Subject*, or *Soul*, or *Spirit*, or *Self*, or *Ego* (p. 129).

The *conscious-subject* is the mind, the individual, that which knows,—as distinguished from all else that can be known as an object of contemplation. But

“Mind and matter, as known or knowable, are only two different series of phenomena or qualities; mind and matter, as unknown and unknowable, are the two substances in which these two different series of phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere. The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are compelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena; and the distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming incompatibility of the two series of phenomena to coinhere in one.”

Our knowledge, therefore, whether of mind or matter, is all relative and phenomenal; of existence absolute, and in itself positive, we know nothing;—all that we know objectively is a collection of properties affecting our own consciousness; this latter is undefinable and insusceptible of analysis.

The number of the properties of existent things is not of *necessity* the same as the number of our powers of apprehension. Beyond these, we know and can assert the reality of no existence; but we are not warranted in denying such existence.

"The universe may be conceived as a polygon of a thousand sides, or facets; and each one of these may be conceived as representing one special mode of existence. Now of these thousand sides or modes, all may be equally essential; but three or four only may be turned towards us, or be *analogous to our organs*. One side or facet of the universe, as holding a relation to the organ of sight, is the mode of luminous or visible existence; another, as proportional to the organ of hearing, is the mode of sonorous or audible existence, and so on. But if every eye to see, if every ear to hear, were annihilated, the modes of existence to which these organs now stand in relation,—that which could be seen, and that which could be heard, would still remain; and if the intelligences reduced to the three senses of touch, smell, and taste, were then to assert the impossibility of any modes of being except those to which these three senses were analogous, the proceeding would not be more unwarrantable than if we now ventured to deny the possible reality of other modes of material existence than those to the perception of which our five senses are accommodated."

The inhabitant of Saturn is represented in Voltaire's "*Micromegas*" as recognising 300 essential properties of matter, having 72 senses, and living 15,000 years; and yet complaining bitterly of the pitiful boundaries of time, space, and perception with which he is hedged in. *Micromegas* himself, from the Dog-Star, has very nearly 1000 senses, with life 700 times longer than the other, and the elementary properties of matter proportionately more numerous; yet is no nearer to personal or philosophical contentment.

But however multiplied might be our powers or faculties, still our knowledge of mind and matter would be merely relative—a recognition of phenomena only: of existence itself we could still know nothing.

Another limit to our knowledge is this—that the very properties of existence are not known to us in their native purity, but are modified by our organs of perception and other circumstances. All our knowledge is a sum made up of several elements, and the great business of philosophy is to analyse and discriminate these elements, and to determine whence these contributions have been derived. Thus in seeing an object, we see it through a medium, in the first place, atmospheric or otherwise; and next through our organs of vision. How much of the object actually pictured to the mind then depends upon the real object itself,—how much upon the external medium,—and how much upon the organ of sense, forms a very abstruse question. Certainly nothing can be much more different, than the vibrations of light through the various tissues of the eye and the picture which they collectively

form in the mind; or the motions of the various parts of the auditory apparatus, and the concert of sweet sounds into which the mind interprets them.

Definitions of terms.—**SUBJECT** is used to denote the unknown basis underlying the various phenomena or properties of which external or internal sense makes us aware; and in this sense is synonymous with *substance* in its philosophical acceptation. But in the modern philosophy *subject* is generally used to signify the basis of the various mental phenomena or operations. *Substance* is “a term for the substratum we are obliged to think to all that we variously denominate a *mode*, a *state*, a *quality*, an *attribute*, a *property*, an *accident*, a *phenomenon*, an *appearance*, &c.” (p. 150). The two latter terms are used referring to a thing, *as known*; all the former are employed in reference to a substance, *as existing*. *Mode* is the manner of the existence of a thing, as a piece of wax may be round or square, or solid or fluid,—none of these being essential; *modes*, therefore, are variable states. *State* is nearly synonymous with *mode*, “but of a meaning more extensive, as not exclusively limited to the mutable and contingent.” (p. 150).

Qualities are essential, and accidental. The essential are “those aptitudes, those manners of existence and action, which it cannot lose without ceasing to be;” as for instance in man, sense and intelligence; in body, dimensions; in God, eternity, omniscience, omnipotence, &c. The accidental are those which bodies may have at one time and not at another, as “the whiteness of a wall, the fineness of the weather;” or those which they always have, but might lose without ceasing to be; as the periodic movement of the planets. *Attribute* is properly convertible with *quality*, but is conventionally limited to qualities of a higher application,—as we speak of the qualities of matter, but of the attributes of intelligence.

Property is generally convertible with quality; *accident* is “an abbreviation for accidental or contingent quality.”

Phenomenon is “that which appears,” and is thus properly synonymous with *appearance*, but is used to express the same thing in more strict and philosophical sense.

We must give our author's account of **MIND** *in extenso*.

“In regard to the etymology of this term, it is obscure and doubtful; perhaps, indeed, none of the attempts to trace it to its origin are successful. It seems to hold an analogy with the Latin *mens*, and both are probably derived from the same common root. This root, which is lost in the European languages of Scytho-Indian origin, is probably preserved in the Sanscrit *mena*, to *know* or *understand*. The Greek *νοῦς*, *intelligence*, is, in like manner, derived from a verb of precisely the same meaning (*νοέω*). The word *mind* is of a more limited

signification than the term *soul*. In Greek philosophy, the term $\psi\chi\eta$, *soul*, comprehends, besides the sensitive and rational principle in man, the principle of organic life, both in the animal and vegetable kingdoms; and in Christian theology it is likewise used, in contrast to $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$, or *spirit*, in a vaguer and more extensive signification.

"Since Descartes limited psychology to the domain of consciousness, the term mind has been rigidly employed for the self-knowing principle alone. Mind therefore, is to be understood as the subject of the various internal phenomena of which we are conscious, or that *subject* of which consciousness is the general phenomenon. Consciousness is, in fact, to the mind, what extension is to matter or body. Though both are phenomena, yet both are essential qualities; for we can neither conceive mind without consciousness, nor body without extension. Mind can only be defined *a posteriori*,—that is, only from its manifestations. What it is in itself, that is, apart from its manifestations, we, philosophically, know nothing; and accordingly, what we mean by mind is simply that which *perceives, thinks, feels, wills, desires, &c.*" (p. 156, Lect. IX.).

Conscious-subject.—The act of consciousness is of the most elementary character, and evades description; but that is not required, as it is the one essential condition of all knowledge. But this consciousness is only a phenomenon, and presupposes a subject in which it inheres—a something that is conscious;—this is the *conscious-subject*,—"a brief, but comprehensive definition of mind itself."

Object is that about which the conscious-subject is conversant—that which is known—the *materia circa quam*, as *subject* is the *materia in qua*. And as *subjective* is that which proceeds from, or belongs to, the thinking subject, so *objective* is that which proceeds from, or belongs to, the object known. The *subject* is the I, the Ego, the mind; the object is everything else, including body, organs, actions, and manifestations. For the mind contains the man, not the man the mind. "Thou art the soul," says Hierocles, "but the body is thine." And Cicero—"Mens cujusque est quisque, non ea figura quæ digito demonstrari potest." The thoughts also are objective in so far as they are objects of consciousness and reflection, though subjective in origin—this is *subjective objectivity*.

Hypothesis is a provisional judgment of the mind, by which phenomena not as yet explicable are referred to some cause or class to which we imagine they may possibly belong, until we can permanently classify and prove their position; in obedience to the longing of the mind after unity. Hypothesis is only allowable on two conditions; the first involving the actual existence of the phenomena to be accounted for; the second, the impossibility of accounting for them except by an hypothesis. An hypothesis is good in proportion as it involves nothing

contradictory or discordant with known facts—as it explains satisfactorily the facts—and as it is independent of subsidiary hypotheses. *Theory* is a vague term, indicating a practical evolution intellectually of an hypothesis, but opposed actually to practice, by being merely intellectual and not active.

We must pass over without notice the definitions of *Power, Faculty, Capacity, Disposition, Habit, Act, Operation, Energy, Functions, &c.*; their philosophical acceptation does not differ materially from the ordinary and conventional one.

Proceeding to the actual distribution of the mental phenomena, we find that consciousness is their one essential element; but that they are divisible into three grand classes, Knowing, Feeling, and Willing. Thus—

“I see a picture;—first of all, I am conscious of perceiving a certain complement of colours and figures—I recognise what the object is. This is the phenomenon of cognition or knowledge. But this is not the only phenomenon of which I may be here conscious. I may experience certain affections in the contemplation of this object. If the picture be a masterpiece, the gratification will be unalloyed; but if it be an unequal production, I shall be conscious, perhaps, of enjoyment, but of enjoyment alloyed with dissatisfaction. This is the phenomenon of feeling—or of Pleasure and Pain. But these two phenomena do not yet exhaust all of which I may be conscious on the occasion. I may desire to see the picture long,—to see it often,—to make it my own, and perhaps I may will, resolve, or determine to do so. This is the complex phenomenon of Will and Desire” (p. 184).

Will, desire, and aversion, presuppose knowledge and feeling, therefore the logical order of the mental phenomena is—first, Knowledge; second, Feeling; and third, Will and Desire (Conation).

Consciousness, as has been observed, is the one necessary condition of all these. It cannot be defined, yet the act in the aggregate admits of philosophical analysis, and contains as its elements—1st, A recognising or knowing subject; 2nd, A recognised and known modification; and 3rd, A recognition or knowledge by the subject of the modification. Consciousness and knowledge therefore mutually involve each other;—logically, that is; for it will become afterwards a matter for discussion whether in actuality they are always co-extensive—i.e. whether consciousness be always present with knowledge, and knowledge with consciousness.

Consciousness may be said to be “the recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts or affections.” On this all are agreed; but as to its special conditions some are generally admitted, and some are subjects of controversy. Of those generally admitted, these are the chief;—actual knowledge—*immediate* (as distinguished from *mediate*) knowledge—discrimination—judgment—

and memory. For the development of these, we must refer the reader to Lecture XI., as we must hasten on with our analysis.

"The first contested position which I am to maintain is, that our consciousness is coextensive with our knowledge. But this assertion, that we have no knowledge of which we are not conscious, is tantamount to the other, that consciousness is coextensive with our cognitive faculties,—and that this again is convertible with the assertion, that consciousness is not a special faculty, but that our special faculties of knowledge are only modifications of consciousness. The question, therefore, may thus be stated—Is consciousness the genus under which our several faculties of knowledge are contained as species,—or, is consciousness itself a special faculty co-ordinate with, and not comprehending, these?" (p. 207).

Sir William answers the former question in the affirmative, and exposes at some length the errors of former writers on this subject. He also propounds as a fundamental axiom, that there can be no consciousness of a cognitive act, without a consciousness of its object; and that "it is palpably impossible that we can be conscious of an act without being conscious of the object to which that act is relative" (p. 212). He shows that imagination is a direct consciousness of certain ideas in the mind; and memory is also a direct consciousness of a condition of mind remaining from past impressions of events: it is not, as Reid represented, "an immediate knowledge of the past," but in philosophical propriety it is not a knowledge of the past at all, but a knowledge of the present, and a belief in the past.

We are here only concerned to give an exposition of our author's views, and not a critique; we may, however, remark that many of these positions admit of much dispute; and some are not altogether congruous with the subsequently evolved ideas.

Sir William proceeds to discuss Reid's views as to the perception of external objects. All philosophers, he says, before Reid, allowed to the mind no immediate knowledge of the external world. They conceded to it only a representative or mediate knowledge of external things, derived from the modifications produced by them in its own state. Reid's boldest stroke in philosophy was to assert that the mind had a direct and immediate recognition of external things themselves; but he then appeared

"to have been startled by his own boldness, and instead of carrying his principle fairly to its issue, by according to consciousness, on his doctrine, that knowledge of the external world as existing, which, in the doctrine of the philosophers, it obtained of the external world as represented; he inconsistently stopped short, split immediate knowledge into two parts, and bestowed the knowledge of material qualities on perception alone, allowing that of mental modifications to remain exclusively with consciousness. Be this, however, as it may, the

exemption of the objects of perception from the sphere of consciousness can be easily shown to be self-contradictory" (p. 224).

The author then proceeds to argue that we are directly conscious of external objects, and that the contrary view involves a general absurdity ; because—

"An act of perception is an act of knowledge ; what we perceive, that we know. Now, if in perception there be an external reality known, but of which external reality we are, on Reid's hypothesis, not conscious, then there is an object known of which we are not conscious ; but as we know only inasmuch as we know that we know,—in other words, inasmuch as we are conscious that we know,—we cannot know an object without being conscious of that object as known ; consequently, we cannot perceive an object without being conscious of that object as perceived."

This is a statement both in matter and manner much too important to be passed over without comment. In this part of the course Sir William strongly asserts the doctrine of our immediate consciousness of the external world. Now, if this means anything, it means that the evidence we have of external things is the same in kind as that which we have of our own minds ; plainly, as it appears to us, inconsistent with the previous views promulged concerning the influence of media and organs upon the objects of knowledge. The image of a tree painted upon the retina, after the rays of light have been many times refracted in the atmosphere, and in passing through the various humours of the eye, affords the same *kind* of evidence to the mind of its existence, as an emotion or a desire in the mind itself. Surely this cannot be ; if so, we must be said on the same general principles to be directly conscious of Saturn's ring, and the satellites of Herschel. Certainly we may *arbitrarily call* this kind of knowledge *consciousness* ; but in so doing we must make consciousness include the results of all manner of perception and investigation, and ignore the special meaning of the term altogether—a proceeding which would obscure all metaphysical reasoning to the very uttermost, and render exactitude of terminology an unattainable desideratum. A second objection that we have to this view is derived from an after part of the course, where the author broadly asserts that the evidences of consciousness, and the phenomena revealed to it, are essentially and without appeal true. If we receive these two dicta, we as pathologists shall be compelled to recognise the reality of spectral illusions, the truth of dreams, and the veritable existence of all manner of fanciful phenomena ; for all these are essentially manifestations of consciousness ; but of this more anon.

We have alluded to the manner of this statement. In it Reid is falsely and sophistically represented. Reid never asserted that

we perceived a thing of which we were not conscious; but only that perception was *the* faculty in operation, with regard to the external world; accompanied, as he elsewhere states all the mental faculties, especially perception, to be, by consciousness; without which the whole argument would be too futile for even a child to indulge in. We dwell particularly upon this, because we think that almost the only fault of these excellent lectures is the tendency to prove that Reid was wrong in everything: that Stewart and Brown have mistaken and misrepresented him; and that he has mistaken and misrepresented everybody else.

Sir William so plainly states our *consciousness* of external objects, that he speaks of being "conscious of the ink-stand" (p. 228), as a more proper phrase than "being conscious of the perception of the ink-stand." He admits the strangeness of the sound, but avers that very slight consideration will show its correctness.

Reflection and attention are then shown on the same principles to be general phenomena of consciousness. The argument is too elaborate and involved for abstraction. We refer to Lect. XIII. One point incidentally introduced in it we must notice in passing, viz., that Sir William upholds, against the opinion of Stewart and others, that the mind is capable of attending to more than one object at once. Stewart, and the philosophers of his school, hold that the attention can only be directed to one object at one time, and explain all the phenomena that appear to prove the reverse, by the theory of the rapid transition of thought. Even in listening to harmonies, this theory is maintained. Thus Stewart writes:—

"It is commonly understood, I believe, that in a concert of music, a good ear can attend to the parts of the music separately, or can attend to them all at once, and feel the full effect of the harmony. If the doctrine, however, which I have endeavoured to establish be admitted, it will follow that in the latter case the mind is constantly varying its attention from one part of the music to the other, and that its operations are so rapid as to give us no perception of the intervals of time."

Stewart holds the same theory with regard to sight; and that everything that is seen or heard is only seen or heard by a rapid succession of the *minimum visibile* and *minimum audibile* through the mind. This appears in contradiction to all reason, and indeed appears to be *à priori* theory run mad. Sir William Hamilton very properly controverts this, and his reasoning is forcible. As to music, he says:—

"This example appears to amount to a reduction of his opinion to the impossible. What are the facts in this example? In a musical concert we have a multitude of different instruments and voices emitting

at once an infinity of different sounds. These all reach the ear at the same indivisible moment in which they perish, and consequently, if heard at all, much more if their mutual relation or harmony be perceived, they must be all heard simultaneously. This is evident. For if the mind can attend to each minimum of sound only successively, it consequently requires a minimum of time in which it is exclusively occupied with each minimum of sound. Now, in this minimum of time, there coexist with it, and with it perish, many minima, which, *ex hypothesi*, are not perceived, are not heard, as not attended to. In a concert, therefore, on this doctrine, a small number of sounds only could be perceived, and above this petty maximum, all sounds would be to the ear as zero. But what is the fact? No concert, however numerous its instruments, has yet been found to have reached, far less to have surpassed, the capacity of mind and its organ" (p. 243).

The phenomena of sight are similarly investigated, but at too great length to admit of abstraction. Much of this reasoning and counter-reasoning might have been spared to metaphysicians, if they had but considered that psychology must be an empirical science, one of observation and experience; and that to attempt to set aside the plain testimony of all experience by abstract *à priori* argument upon the supposed incapacity of a simple element, like mind, to be in two states at one time, or any other incomprehensible formula, is not philosophy, but a darkening of counsel by words without knowledge. Our author considers it fully demonstrated that the mind can embrace more than one object at the same time, and inquires how many? By Charles Bonnet the mind is allowed to have a distinct notion of six objects at once; Abraham Tucker allows only four; Destutt Tracy allows six. Sir William agrees with this opinion, and gives some not very conclusive illustrations. A valuable analytic attention can only be given to one object at a time in ordinary cases; and the more diffused the attention, the less will be the practical result.

To proceed, Attention (*auct. loquent.*) is consciousness applied to an act of will or desire under a particular law. "This law, which we call the law of limitation, is, that the intension of our knowledge is in the inverse ratio of its extension; in other words, that the fewer objects we consider at once, the clearer and more distinct will be our knowledge of them." Attention is not always and essentially a voluntary act. We are frequently determined to an act of attention, as to many other acts, independently of our free and deliberate volition. Nor is attention always controllable; it cannot always be commanded, nor can it always be withdrawn. If we are occupied intently, a clock may strike, or we may be spoken to, without the attention being aroused; but we cannot *intentionally and with will* remain in this state of unconsciousness. We may close our eyes or shut

our ears, but we cannot, with our organs unobstructed, wholly refuse attention at will. Attention is of three degrees or kinds. The first, a mere vital and *irresistible* act; the second, an act determined by desire, which, though voluntary, may be resisted by our will; the third, an act determined by a deliberate volition. This last is the most valuable, and in its highest degree stamps the mind of the greatest efficiency and power. It is difficult at the commencement, but admits of almost indefinite cultivation. Sir William quotes a number of high authorities to prove the pre-eminent excellence of the faculty of voluntary attention, and more than hints that genius is nothing more than a high development of the faculty. He remarks that the difference between an ordinary mind and the mind of a Newton, consists principally in this, that the one is capable of a more continuous attention than the other; that a Newton is able without fatigue to connect inference with inference in one long series towards a determinate end; while the man of inferior capacity is soon obliged to let fall the thread which he had begun to spin. Bacon also places all men of equal *attention* on one level, recognising nothing as due to genius. Helvetius goes so far as to say that genius is indeed nothing but a continued attention (*une attention suivie*). Buffon also speaks of it as a protracted patience. "In the exact sciences, at least (says Cuvier), it is the patience of a sound intellect, when invincible, which truly constitutes genius." Lord Chesterfield acknowledges that the power of applying an attention, steady and undissipated, to a single object, is the sure mark of a superior genius.

This faculty has been manifested more or less by all whose names are associated with the progress of the intellectual sciences, and often has a tendency to degenerate into a habit akin to disease. The most characteristic illustrations are found amongst names which have made the world's mental history. Archimedes was, at the taking of Syracuse, so absorbed in a geometrical problem, that he merely exclaimed to the soldier who was about to kill him, *Noli turbare circulos meos*. Newton's absence of mind is well known: he frequently forgot to dine, and it is said he on one occasion used a lady's finger as a tobacco-stopper. It is said that Joseph Scaliger was so engrossed in the study of Homer during the massacre of St. Bartholomew, that he was only aware of his own escape from it on the next day. Carneades had to be fed by his maid-servant, to prevent him from starving. Cardan was wont, on a journey, to forget both his way and his object, and could not be roused from his thought to answer any questions. Alcibiades relates of Socrates that he once stood a whole day and night, until the breaking of the second morning, with a fixed gaze, engrossed with the consideration of a weighty

subject; "and thus (he continues) Socrates is ever wont to do when his mind is occupied with inquiries in which there are difficulties to be overcome. He then never interrupts his meditation, and forgets to eat and drink and sleep—everything, in short, until his inquiry has reached its termination, or, at least, until he has seen some light in it." The mathematician Vieta was sometimes so absorbed in meditation, "that he seemed for hours more like a dead person than a living, and was then wholly unconscious of everything going on around him." The great Budæus forgot his wedding-day, and was found deep in his Commentary, when sought up by the party.

The forgetfulness of time is a very common event during abstraction; of this the instance already given of Socrates is almost equalled by that of a modern astronomer (quoted by Dr. Moore), who passed the entire night observing some celestial phenomenon; and being accosted by some of his family in the morning, he said—"it must be thus; I will go to bed before it is late."

Perhaps the insensibility to pain is the most remarkable of all the phenomena connected with abstraction. Pinel relates of a priest that in a fit of mental absence, he was unconscious of the pain of burning; the same is stated of the Italian poet Marini. Cardan relates something analogous concerning himself.

Malebranche does not hesitate to call attention to the "*force of intellect*;" but in these extreme developments it becomes a disease which is not unlikely ultimately to destroy the intellect entirely.

In Lecture XV., Sir William supports the dogma that the testimony of consciousness is the criterion of all knowledge, and that this criterion is unerring (p. 266); and, as we have before observed, the reception of this idea would lead us to strange conclusions. It will be remembered that the author considers that we are immediately conscious of the external world; he now further states (p. 283) that "the absolute and universal veracity of consciousness must be maintained." How does this accord with the phenomena of dreaming, of illusions and hallucinations of the senses? All these involve acts of consciousness; and indeed, at p. 269, it is stated that *every* mental phenomenon must be considered a fact of consciousness. It may be answered that these are fanciful; but this is no philosophical answer. Sir William says that if we doubt one datum of consciousness, we must doubt all; because we have no criterion of truth but consciousness, and we must not reject consciousness on the authority of consciousness (*vide* Lect. XV. *passim*). He certainly gives certain limiting laws "under which consciousness may be applied to the consideration of its own phenomena"

(p. 268) ; but we cannot see that they exclude the force of our objection. These laws are—1st. That no fact be assumed as a fact of consciousness but what is ultimate and simple—the law of Parcimony ; 2nd. That the whole facts of consciousness be taken without reserve or hesitation, whether given as constituent or regulative data—the law of Integrity ; 3rd. That nothing but the facts of consciousness be taken, or if inferences of reasoning be admitted, that these at least be recognised as legitimate only as deduced from, and in subordination to, the immediate data of consciousness, and every position rejected as illegitimate which is contradictory of these—the law of Harmony.

That there may be no room to doubt his meaning, Sir William clearly distinguishes between the testimony of consciousness as a *fact*, and as an *evidence*. “In the case of a common witness, we cannot doubt the fact of his personal reality, nor the fact of his testimony as emitted ; but we can always doubt the truth of what his testimony avers” (p. 271). It is in this latter sense that he contends for the full and unquestionable credibility of consciousness. Unless we have grievously misunderstood his argument, this appears to us one of the most startling mistakes ever made in philosophy ; and the most singular part of the matter is this—that these obvious objections are never once alluded to.

Lecture XVI. treats of the various hypotheses to account for the phenomenon of dual consciousness—*i. e.*, the consciousness of a Me and a Not Me—a *self*, and a something external to self ; and analyses the different theories of the identity of, or distinction between, matter and mind. Perhaps to all these, the remark may be appropriate, that Sir William applies to a part only—*viz.*, that “the mutual polemic of these systems is like the warfare of shadows ; as the heroes in Valhalla, they hew each other in pieces, only in a twinkling to be reunited, and again to amuse themselves in other bloodless and indecisive contests.”

All natural systems of philosophy, *i. e.*, all systems that are not transcendently incomprehensible, recognise two distinct, and in some measure opposed, orders of existence—those of mind and matter, or body. But these have a constant intercourse, and perpetual mutual reactions. How is this accomplished ? How can the immaterial act upon the material ? How, above all, can matter affect that which is immaterial—spirit or mind ? This is a profound difficulty, one against which the wings of speculation have been broken again and again—one hitherto unsolved, most probably insoluble, by human reason. It will not appear less obscure if we briefly pass in review a few of the most famous theories that have been invented, to give an appearance of explanation to this great mystery.

The first in order which we shall notice is called the "system of Assistance or Occasional Causes," belonging to Descartes, Malebranche, and the Cartesians generally. It sets out with setting forth the apparent impossibility of any actual communication between a spiritual and a material substance, and hypothesizes the perpetual immediate interposition of the Divine assistance. As the world was originally created by his will, so it owes its continuance from moment to moment only to the unremitted perseverance of the same volition :—

"God is thus the necessary cause of every modification of body, and of every modification of mind, and his efficiency is sufficient to afford an explanation of the union and intercourse of extended and unextended substances. External objects determine certain movements in our bodily organs of sense, and these movements are by the nerves and animal spirits propagated to the brain. The brain does not act immediately and really upon the soul; the soul has no direct cognizance of any modification of the brain; this is impossible. It is God himself, who, when movements are determined in the brain, produces analogous modifications in the conscious mind. The body is not, therefore, the real cause of the mental modifications; nor the mind the real cause of the bodily movements. The organic changes, and the mental determinations, are nothing but simple conditions, and not real causes; in short they are occasions, or occasional causes."*

This hypothesis did not satisfy Leibnitz, and he proposed instead that of Pre-established Harmony. According to this view, in brief, the mental and the physical world may be compared to two pieces of Divine mechanism, each entirely independent of the other, but so adjusted and regulated that the emotions, desires, and cognitions of the one always correspond chronologically to certain appropriate actions of the other. So, when I will to move my arm, the will has no action upon the limb, but the action takes place, because its time had arrived in the mechanism, as the time for willing it had arrived in the mind; and when a misfortune produces grief apparently, the one has no real causative connexion with the other; but the two occur in succession because it was so arranged in the two systems from the beginning. Probably this was never regarded as anything more, even by the author, than an example of ingenuity. Any serious refutation of it is equally needless and impracticable.

The third hypothesis is a very feeble one—that of a Plastic Medium between soul and body—something that is neither one nor the other, but can hold intercourse with both. This merely adds a third element of difficulty to the already sufficiently irreconcilable two.

* Laromiguière, "*Leçons de Philosophie*," tom. ii. p. 255—6.

The fourth theory is that of Physical Influence, but is only a statement of facts, that external objects *do* affect our senses, and produce changes which the soul perceives and acts upon accordingly; there is no attempt at explanation of the *modus in quo* of the "mysterious union of an extended and an unextended substance." In the words of Pascal, "Man is to himself the mightiest prodigy of nature; for he is unable to conceive what is body, still less what is mind, but least of all is he able to conceive how a body can be united to a mind; yet this is his proper being." And when all is said, we have to conclude that *magna immo maxima pars sapientiæ est, quædam æquo animo nescire velle*.

In Lecture XVII. the important question is discussed, Is the mind always consciously active? Not, of course, Have we always a memory of our consciousness? for that would at once be decided in the negative; also, from the consideration, Sir William Hamilton excludes states of coma, &c., about which experiment will tell us nothing. The question refers chiefly to states of sleep and somnambulism, and is this, Is the mind, so far as we can make it matter of observation, always in a state of conscious activity? It has, for the most part, been discussed theoretically, in reference to the active nature of mind. Sir William attempts to prove it by analogical observation. Plato and Aristotle, and their schools, for the most part believed in the continual energy of intellect. Cicero says, *Nunquam animus cogitatione et motu vacuus esse potest*; and St. Augustin in like manner, *Ad quid menti preceptum est, ut se ipsam cognoscat, nisi ut semper vivat, et semper sit in actu*. Descartes made the essence, the very existence of the soul, to consist in actual thought. Locke seems to have been the first to oppose these views.

"I confess myself (says he) to have one of those dull souls that doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas; nor can conceive it any more necessary for the soul always to think than for the body always to move; the perception of ideas being (as I conceive) to the soul, what motion is to the body; not its essence, but one of its operations."

Locke's opinion is good and philosophical. His illustrations, however, are not so apt, nor so free from vulnerable points, as might be wished; for he seems to think it improbable "that the soul in a sleeping man should be this moment busy a-thinking, and the next moment, in a waking man, not remember, nor be able to recollect, one jot of all those thoughts;" yet, that such is a very frequent case, is most indisputable, witness many of the phenomena of sudden waking, of somnambulism, &c. Sir William inclines to the view that the mind is always active; and that when it appears not to have been so, it is owing to the break

in the train of thought, and forgetfulness of the ideas. He supports the opinion very ably by arguing from the well-known phenomena of forgetting dreams, and from the double life in an habitual somnambulist, where all that has passed in one state is totally forgotten in the other, but remembered again on the resumption of that condition. By analogy, he concludes that this same oblivion accounts for all apparent cessations of thought. But surely this is a too hasty induction. It must remain, after all, a matter for observation; for to reason *à priori* from some supposed essential property of mind, is begging the whole question at issue. A person is asleep, and on waking is not conscious of having had any ideas during his sleep; it is not sufficient to tell him that he must have had ideas, *because* he and others have on previous occasions had them and forgotten them. We incline to the opinion of Locke, not only as most in accordance with common experience, but as appearing to us most philosophical; also for another reason stated in a note.*

The question discussed in the Eighteenth Lecture is one of a highly interesting and important character. It is, Whether the mind is ever unconsciously modified? *i. e.*, whether it exerts energies, and is the subject of modifications, of neither of which it is conscious. Sir William decides it in the affirmative; though we, fully agreeing with him, can scarcely see how he reconciles this with his previous elaborate proof in Lect. XII., that our "consciousness is always co-extensive with our knowledge." In the investigation three degrees of mental latency are recognised. First: we know a science or language, not merely at the time that we make a temporary use of it, but inasmuch as we can apply it when or how we will; and thus the knowledge is at times latent.

"The second degree of latency exists when the mind contains certain systems of knowledge, or certain habits of action, which it is wholly unconscious of possessing in its ordinary state, but which are revealed to consciousness in certain extraordinary exaltations of its powers. The evidence on this point shows that the mind frequently contains whole systems of knowledge, which, though in our normal state they have faded into absolute oblivion, may, in certain abnormal states, as madness, febrile delirium, somnambulism, catalepsy, &c., flash out into luminous consciousness, and even throw into the shade of unconsciousness those other systems by which they had, for a long period, been eclipsed and even extinguished" (p. 340).

* The writer has a very distinct remembrance of his *first dream*, and that when he was at an age in some measure to reason upon it. So striking was the effect of the phenomenon upon his mind, and so astonished was he at the new world of thought opened to him, that it would be extremely difficult to convince him that the same had been occurring to him in all sleep ever since he was born, only that he had forgotten it. Why forget all the former, and remember this one so vividly? for the dream itself was of the most trivial and unconnected character.

The cases adduced in illustration of this, are those well-known instances, with which practical psychologists are so familiar, of languages being spoken in delirium and allied states, which in the healthy state the patient knew nothing of; but which, on investigation, have proved to have been heard at an early period of life, and apparently totally forgotten. Perhaps the most remarkable is that related by Coleridge in his *Biographia Literaria*. It is of a young woman, who, being seized with a nervous fever, in its course talked incessantly in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. With great difficulty, tracing back her past life, it was discovered that many years before, when a child, she had lived with an old Protestant pastor, who was in the habit of walking up and down his kitchen, reading aloud out of his favourite authors. Of course, until this was known, the phenomenon was accounted a diabolic one, as she was what the people called a heretic.

The third degree of latency involves the whole pith and disputed matter of the question. Are there, in ordinary, mental modifications, *i. e.*, mental activities and passivities, of which we are unconscious, but which manifest their existence by effects of which we are conscious? Sir William not only answers this affirmatively, but does "not hesitate to maintain, that what we are conscious of is constructed out of what we are not conscious of—that our whole knowledge, in fact, is made up of the unknown and the uncognisable." (p. 348). This is curiously and ingeniously illustrated at great length; first, from the phenomena of perception. In sight we recognise a *minimum visibile*, which is the smallest expanse that can be seen, *i. e.*, which can consciously affect us.

"This being understood, it is plain that if we divide this *minimum visibile* into two parts, neither half can, by itself, be an object of vision, or visual consciousness. They are, severally and apart, to consciousness as zero. But it is evident that each half must, by itself, have produced in us a certain modification, real though unperceived; for as the perceived whole is nothing but the union of the unperceived halves, so the perception,—the perceived affection itself of which we are conscious,—is only the sum of two modifications, each of which severally eludes our consciousness" (p. 350).

The same mode of reasoning applied to the other senses seems to prove that all the knowledge which we acquire through our external senses, is made up of an infinity of incognisables or unknowables.

The illustration from the law of Association of Ideas is also striking. A, B, and C, are three thoughts—A and C do not immediately suggest each other, but each is associated with B, so that A suggests B, and B suggests C. But it may happen that thought C immediately follows A; how is this anomaly to

be explained? By the principle of latent modification;—A suggests C, not immediately, but through B;—but as B, like the half of the minimum visible, or minimum audible, does not rise into consciousness, so we are apt to consider it as non-existent. Again, if a number of billiard balls be placed in a row, touching each other, and if a ball be made to strike in the line of the row, the ball at one end of the series, the motion is transmitted through the intermediate balls, to the one at the opposite end of the series, and this alone is impelled onwards, all the rest remaining where they were. Sir William gives one of his own personal experiences on this matter of association.

"Thinking of Ben Lomond, this thought was immediately followed by the thought of the Prussian system of education. Now, conceivable connexion between these two ideas in themselves, there was none. A little reflection, however, explained the anomaly. On my last visit to the mountain, I had met upon its summit a German gentleman, and though I had no consciousness of the intermediate and unawakened links between Ben Lomond and the Prussian schools, they were undoubtedly these,—the German—Germany,—Prussia,—and these media being admitted the connexion between the extremes was manifested" (p. 353).

Another class of unconscious modifications are the operations resulting from our acquired Dexterities and Habits.

"To explain these, three theories have been advanced. The first regards them as merely mechanical or automatic, and thus denying to the mind all active or voluntary intervention, consequently removes them beyond the sphere of consciousness. The second again, allows to each several motion a separate act of conscious volition; while the third, which I would maintain, holds a medium between these, constitutes the mind the agent, accords to it a conscious volition over the series, but denies to it a consciousness and deliberate volition in regard to each separate movement in the series which it determines" (p. 356).

To explain all these phenomena Stewart hypothecates consciousness without memory, a theory which Sir William controverts with great ingenuity and philosophical acumen, principally on the ground that consciousness and memory are always in the direct ratio of each other. This is true, but still not quite accordant with the author's views as expressed a few lectures before on the forgetting of dreams, &c. But viewed as a stern philosophical unity, these lectures must be acknowledged to present many of these inconsistencies.

From these general phenomena of consciousness follow as corollaries three facts—Self-Existence,—Mental Unity,—and Mental Identity;—points upon which we cannot at present enlarge. The Nineteenth Lecture concludes with a few remarks on the difficulties and facilities of psychological investigation,

which we will briefly enumerate. The difficulties arise from 1st. the conscious mind being at once the observing subject, and the object observed; 2nd. from the want of mutual co-operation, inasmuch as mental analysis requires solitude rather than society; 3rd. from the fact that no fact of consciousness can be taken at second hand, but must be personally observed; 4th. that the phenomena of consciousness can only be studied through memory, as they cannot be arrested during observation; 5th. that the phenomena of the mental world are presented only in succession, and not side by side, as those of the external world; 6th. that they naturally blend with each other, and are presented in complexity; 7th and lastly, that the acts of reflection are not accompanied with the frequent and varied sentiment of pleasure, which we experience from the impression of external things. The facilities of philosophical study are also peculiar, and depend upon the simplicity of the requirements for the pursuit, the phenomena and all the means of investigation being always within reach.

This completes the analysis of the *general* phenomena of consciousness, contained in the first volume. The next treats upon the special manifestations of consciousness, in Perception, Memory, Association, Imagination, Judgment, Reasoning, &c. The consideration of these must be deferred to another opportunity.

ART. II.—PAUPER LUNACY.

ACCORDING to returns contained in the "Further Report" of the Commissioners in Lunacy, published in 1847, and in their Eleventh Report, the number of LUNATICS and IDIOTS chargeable to parishes, throughout England and Wales, amounted on the 1st of January 1847 to EIGHTEEN THOUSAND and SIXTY-FIVE, and on the 1st of January 1857 to TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED and NINETY-THREE.

Moreover, according to returns contained in the 12th Report of the Commissioners, it would appear that on the 1st of January, 1857, the number of pauper lunatics (idiots being also included under the term) cared for in public and private asylums amounted to 16,657; and on the 1st of January 1858, to 17,572. At the latter date there was accommodation for 16,231 lunatics in public asylums; and new asylums and additions to existing asylums, since completed or now in progress, will raise the accommodation to 21,048.

Further, from a recently published supplement to the 12th Report we learn that the number of lunatics in workhouses amounted on the 1st of January 1857 to 6800; on the 1st of January 1858 to 7555; and on the 1st of July in the same year to 7666.

These figures merit considerable attention, for they show a very great and even startling increase in the amount of pauper lunacy in the decennial period 1847-57; a persistence of that increase since 1857; and an amount of asylum accommodation, existing and prospective, barely sufficient to meet pressing wants, and totally inadequate for future wants, or, indeed, for the present proper care and treatment (in the most restricted sense) of our pauper lunatics.

The returns for 1847-57 represent solely an increase in amount of *pauper* lunatics, and it does not follow that there has been a proportionate increase of lunacy, or, indeed, any increase at all, among those classes of the population from which pauper lunatics are principally derived. For, since 1847, a vast impetus has been given to the care and treatment of lunatics, by the efforts of the Lunacy Commission, which at the date mentioned had barely got into effective operation; by the erection of public asylums for the reception of lunatics; and by the compulsory activity of parochial authorities in searching for and bringing to light cases of lunacy which ought to be under care. Hence we may infer that one cause of the increase of pauper lunatics has been the greater care devoted to lunatics, in consequence of which many cases hitherto unheeded have been brought to our knowledge; and that, in so far as this cause is operative, the increase does not represent an absolute increase of lunacy among the impoverished classes. The Chairman of the Lunacy Commission, the Right Honourable the Earl of Shaftesbury, in his examination before the recent Parliamentary Commission on Lunatics, seemed to imply that the entire increase of pauper lunatics might be attributed to the cause mentioned. In answer to a question respecting the great apparent increase in the number of lunatics generally, he answered—

“I am satisfied that it was not a positive increase in the actual number of lunatics in proportion to the population. Of course, as the population increases, there must be a certain increase in the number of lunatics, but the lunatics did not, in that time, increase in the ratio of population, but the appearance was owing to the provision having been made for them, and the greater activity of all the authorities to look them up in all directions, and to bring them to the face of day and place them in the receptacles prepared for them; and, I think, I cannot give a better proof of that than this, that when the activity began and all these cases were brought to light, they were found to be not recent cases but they were old-established chronic cases, of very long standing indeed; and it was a very sad thing when Hanwell was extended, and also when Colney Hatch was opened, which we had hoped would be for the reception of recent and curable cases, it was almost instantly filled with old and chronic cases, to the exclusion of the recent and curable cases that might have been brought there, and many of them returned in a state of health to the duties of life.”—
(Query 49, *Report of the Select Committee on Lunatics*, p. 7.)

In reply to a question if it were his opinion that there had not been an increase of lunacy in the country, his Lordship said, after stating that there was a great difference of opinion upon the point, on account of the imperfection of the data previous to the year 1845 :—

“I will state my opinion, which is pretty well borne out by my brother Commissioners and a good many others, that the increase of lunacy is certainly unquestionable, but it is not by any means in the ratio of the increase of the population. If the population is increasing, it would be certainly supposed that the number of lunatics would be increased; and if it has increased, say, for example, at the rate of 20 per cent., there has not been the same ratio of increase, that is, of 20 per cent.”—(Query 51, p. 7.)

Again in his answer to a subsequent query, his Lordship said :—

“With regard to the progress of insanity among the pauper classes, I repeat that I do not believe that it is by any means in proportion to the increase of population.”—(Query 59, p. 9.)

Mr. Gaskell, one of the medical Commissioners in Lunacy, in his evidence before the Select Committee, stated, in answer to the question—

“In your opinion does insanity increase; you say that you have brought many cases to light, but does insanity increase more than in proportion to the population?—It increases more than in proportion to the population; but I am inclined to think that that increase is not attributable to an increase in the number of cases of insanity so much as to the increase in their longevity. There is no doubt that, in many of our asylums where the annual mortality was perhaps 12, 14, or 15 per cent. formerly, it is now reduced 10 per cent., but that in a population of 500, 600, or 1000 in a very few years causes an enormous increase to the actual number.”—(Query 1435, p. 138.)

If we assume that the increase of pauper lunacy has depended mainly upon the greater care and provision for lunatics, we must also assume that, notwithstanding the period over which that care has prevailed, we have not yet exhausted the number of hitherto unrecognised cases requiring care among the classes of the population from which pauper lunatics are chiefly derived, since the increase of pauper lunatics, between the 1st of January 1857 and the 1st January 1858, in public and private asylums and work-houses amounted to 1670. This being the case it is certainly of considerable importance that we should have some more definite knowledge, than we as yet possess, of the unexhausted substratum of lunacy which these figures indicate. Moreover, if we assume with Mr. Gaskell that a greater duration of life among lunatics in asylums has been operative in swelling the amount of pauper lunacy, we have still no measure of the degree in which this cause has affected the increase. A more prolonged life, and

the greater care given to the welfare of lunatics have doubtless contributed in no small degree, and it may be altogether, to occasion the augmentation of pauper lunatics during the ten years 1847-57; but the influence of both these causes can be accurately determined, and we submit that the question is much too important to be left in its present vague and unsatisfactory state.

Again, the Earl of Shaftesbury's opinion that although there is an increase of lunacy among the pauper classes, still that increase is not by any means in proportion to that of the population, cannot be received without considerable hesitation, gratifying though the opinion may be. Until the influence of those causes to which we have referred as affecting the apparent increase of lunacy is determined, we are not in a position to estimate the absolute increase or not from the returns on which such an estimate must at present be based.

The published returns of the Commissioners in Lunacy show that the number of pauper lunatics and idiots, during the ten years 1847-57, increased at the rate of *four per cent per annum*—the increase of *idiots* being at the rate of three per cent; that of *lunatics* at five per cent. The rate of increase of population is 1·220 per cent per annum. These figures show, at the least, an absolute increase of pauperism from lunacy and idiocy (the chief immediate practical question) at a rate that would double the existing amount of pauper lunacy and idiocy in *twenty-five years*. If we need any other evidence of the importance of obtaining some positive knowledge as to the cause or causes of this great rate of increase, we need but turn to the figures showing the present and prospective public asylum accommodation. This is sufficient for 21,048 lunatics, and on the 1st of January 1858, the number of pauper lunatics detained in both public and private asylums amounted to 17,572, being an increase on the previous year of 915 cases. If this rate of increase were to continue, and if the whole of the remaining public asylum accommodation were devoted entirely to pauper lunatics, in about *five years* every asylum would be filled, and we should still lack space for our lunatics. The amount of accommodation in private asylums for pauper lunatics may be regarded as having reached its maximum, for the tendency of legislation is to provide for all pauper lunatics in public asylums, while the number of private asylums is slightly decreasing (*Report of Select Committee*, Qs. 108 and 118); and if it be conceded, as is maintained by many, that the 2467 pauper lunatics contained in private asylums (1st January 1858), and the 7666 lunatics housed in workhouses should be transferred to asylums (and the need which exists for the transference of lunatics in workhouses can scarcely be doubted, as will be presently seen) it will be perceived that with regard to our asylum accommodation we are pretty nigh at a dead-lock.

With these facts staring us in the face the necessity for an accurate knowledge of the amount of insanity in England can hardly be doubted, and the nigh approach of another census year at once points to the best means by which this knowledge can be attained.

In the Census of 1851, inquiry was directed, so far as Insanity was concerned, only to the number of lunatics in asylums and workhouses. The rapidly increasing magnitude of the subject of lunacy will, we trust, induce the Government in 1861 to direct that means shall be taken to ascertain the total number of lunatics, idiots, and imbeciles existing in the kingdom; as well as the circumstances under which they are placed as regards comfort or indigence: and we must earnestly urge the consideration of this important and, we think, indispensable investigation upon all persons who are interested in obtaining effective provision for the care and treatment of lunatics (and who is not?)

The data which would be derived from a systematic authoritative inquiry into the amount of insanity would form the basis for a true knowledge of the progression of mental unsoundness in the kingdom. The same data would, also, serve as a measure by which we might estimate the probable asylum accommodation required, and thus enable us to set a limit to the vast expenditure which is being undergone for the care of lunatics, as well as to judge more clearly of the means most requisite, in addition to existing means, for that purpose.

But we conceive that a specific inquiry is required, not only into the amount of insanity in the kingdom and the circumstances under which it is placed, but also into the causes which foster lunacy among the pauper classes. Little is known positively on this subject. We know tolerably well the efficient causes, physical and moral, productive of lunacy in different classes of the population, but of the modes in which those causes are maintained in activity among the impoverished classes our knowledge is comparatively slight. The nature of the cases chiefly present in our public asylums would, apart from any other consideration, point to the propriety of an inquiry such as we speak of. These institutions, in consequence of the great and increasing accumulation of chronic cases of lunacy in them, answer but very imperfectly the principal object for which they were originally designed. Indeed, several of the largest asylums have become, from this cause, little better than houses of detention for the chronic and incurably insane. Sir Alexander Spearman, one of the visitors of the Hanwell Asylum, in his evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, said, respecting that asylum—

“There are numerous epileptic and paralytic patients, run-away patients, elderly and infirm patients, refractory patients, others in the infirmary, and quiet patients spread throughout the wards. . . .

Of acute cases there are few; of those requiring active medical treatment not many. . . . There are few curable patients. I asked Dr. Begley, yesterday, 'How many patients have you now under your charge who, you think, are in a state to be cured?' His answer was, 'I make a distinction always between the "possible" and the "probable." I think there may be 30 out of the 400 who may "possibly" be cured; but I do not think that there are more than 15 or 18 who will "probably" be cured.' *Mr. Tite.* Those are males?—Yes. The female patients are very much of the same character as those I have described; the epileptic and the paralytic, the refractory and some few run-away; many elderly and infirm, and some in the infirmary. I asked Dr. Sankey, the medical officer on the female side, the same question, and he told me he did not think that there were 10. I then said, 'If I am asked the question by the Committee to-morrow shall I be within bounds if I say that probably there are not more than 20?' He said, 'I think that there will not be more than 10, and you will be perfectly safe in saying that there are not more than 20 [that is, in about 600 patients].'"—(Queries 2858, 2859, pp. 237, 238.)

Mr. Cottrell, the Chairman of the Committee of Visitors to the Colney Hatch Asylum, said, respecting the patients in that asylum, in his evidence before the Select Committee:—

"— (. . . As at Hanwell the proportion at Colney Hatch supposed to be susceptible of cure is very much the same) it must be remembered that we are an asylum rather than a hospital. We are a hospital only in occasional instances; an asylum always."—(Query 2946, p. 245.)

This state of things which is more or less common to all public asylums, is mainly due to the fact that the cases sent to them either are chronic when at first received, or they have at least passed beyond the stage which is most amenable to treatment. Two causes of delay in sending patients to asylums are patent: (1) a prior detention of the patient for a longer or shorter period in a workhouse; (2) the active dislike of sending friends or relatives to a *madhouse*, which is still prevalent among a large section of the population—a relic, in no small degree, of the just fear once entertained regarding institutions for the insane.

By the operation of these causes, the flood of chronic cases which inundated our public asylums when first opened, is kept up, and they are rapidly becoming more and more inoperative as curative establishments; and thus it happens that our best conceived plans hitherto have not touched the core of the evil to remedy which they were devised, and that at the best they are merely palliative.

Thanks to a recent inquiry, by the Commissioners in Lunacy, into the condition of lunatics in workhouses, the results of which inquiry have been made known in a Supplement to the Commissioners' Twelfth Report, we are enabled to judge with tolerable

accuracy of the influence exerted by the detention of lunatics in these institutions, not only in clogging our asylums with chronic and incurable cases, but also in fostering pauper lunacy; and no better illustration could be given than the facts elicited by this inquiry of the practical importance of a full examination into the causes chiefly concerned in the maintenance of lunacy among the poor.

Let it be remembered, however, that pauperism is only one, and that the most immediately perceived, result of the prevalence of insanity among the impoverished classes of a population. Another, and more remote, but not less important consequence of insanity among these classes (as in all classes), is the influence which it exercises as a source of physical and moral deterioration. The transmission of special forms of insanity in their entirety from parents to children may be the chief, but it is not the sole fact of moment in the heritage of unsound mind; for in the offspring of the insane there is frequently recognised a deviation from healthy mental action, which, while it would not be denominated insanity, differs from it, perhaps, only in degree, and is not less important from its bearing upon the moral integrity of the subject. There may be a slight degree of imbecility, unusual susceptibility to emotions, impaired volition, or a perverted condition of the moral faculties. Just, indeed, as a child may inherit one or more lineaments of a parent, and these be more or less distinctly characteristic, so he may also inherit one or more phases of mental unsoundness, and these be manifested in a greater or less degree. Nor is this all; for it is found that the slighter derived deviations from a sound mental condition are apt in succeeding generations to be transformed into unmitigated insanity—exactly as in the hereditary transmission of physical defects it not uncommonly happens that they are but slightly manifested or not at all in one generation, while they reappear in full in a succeeding one. Of the physical degeneration connected with idiocy and imbecility we need say nothing.

When we find a combination of circumstances existing which give rise to a constant reproduction, by hereditary transmission, of unsoundness of mind, we may rest assured that we have there an important source of the physical and moral degradation of a people. We can mark clearly the beginning of the evil, but we cannot point out where it terminates.

Certain facts recorded by the Commissioners in Lunacy, in the Supplementary Report referred to, show that circumstances do exist which lead to the perpetuation of lunacy among the poorer classes of our population by hereditary transmission; which thus give rise to pauperism on the one hand, and to deterioration of the population both physically and morally on the other; and

which point most clearly to the necessity for further inquiry into the fostering causes of lunacy among the poor.

We are told that cases like the following, in connexion with our workhouses, are not of unfrequent occurrence:—

“In the Newark Workhouse, among other instances, two females were met with during the past year, who, although classed as of weak mind, were in the habit of discharging themselves, and after a short absence returning in the family way. Each of them had three illegitimate children in the house; and it became the duty of the Visiting Commissioner strongly to urge upon the guardians the necessity of exercising the powers vested in them of absolutely refusing to allow these women again to quit the house. This, however, the guardians did not feel themselves justified in doing; and at a subsequent visit, in November last, one of these females had again been permitted to leave. In the Walsall workhouse we found an idiotic female who had had four illegitimate children; and in the Monmouth workhouse, two imbecile paupers, each of whom had had three illegitimate children, and one of whom was again pregnant. In the Tamworth workhouse there were two idiotic females, of whom each had a child.

“In addition to these cases, moreover, it is right to state that a far more painful instance of the evil of allowing inmates of weak mind to leave the house, and go out into the world unprotected, lately came under our notice in the Martley workhouse in Worcestershire. A female who had for some time been classed as of weak mind, was struck off the list in 1856, and was allowed to leave the house for the purpose of saving expense to the parish by earning something by hop-picking. This woman had previously had two illegitimate children by paupers in the house, one of whom had died; the other (a girl about 10 years of age), she took with her, on quitting the house, to her mother's home. When there, she and her daughter slept in the same room with her father-in-law and her mother, and in the same bed with two of her brothers. The result of this indecency was, that she returned to the workhouse in the family way, and was delivered of a child, the father of which she distinctly stated to be one of her brothers, but which of them she was unable to specify. This woman, though able to perform some useful work, was decidedly of weak mind; and there can be no doubt that, under the circumstances, the guardians were justified in detaining her in the workhouse, and that they ought not to have sanctioned her quitting it. Assuredly it would have been right to place her in the class of persons of weak mind on her return to the workhouse; but this was not done; and she only accidentally came under the notice of a member of this Board, to whom the foregoing particulars of her case were communicated. When it is remembered that the offspring of these weakminded females but too frequently inherit and communicate to their own children the imbecility of their mothers, the importance of more stringent regulations will at once be apparent. At a visit to the Calne workhouse, a few years ago, a member of this Commission saw three paupers, the grandmother, the mother, and the daughter, all imbecile, one or two, indeed, verging on idiotcy; and we

have been assured that the same transmitted defect of intellect has been observed in the fourth generation."—(*Supplement to Twelfth Report*, pp. 15, 16.)

If the occasional inmates of workhouses furnish examples of this character, what may we expect to find among out-door pauper and indigent imbeciles? The question may be answered, in part, in regard to Scotland, for the Scotch Commissioners in Lunacy have instituted a special inquiry into the condition of out-door pauper and of indigent imbeciles and lunatics in that country; and they report of one county alone, that, of 349 single patients visited—

"One hundred and thirteen were females above seventeen years of age. Of these, 22 were in circumstances affording adequate protection to their chastity. Of the remaining 91, 15 were known to have given birth to illegitimate children, and 5 to have borne more than one child. Of the 15 mothers, 3 are known to have been illegitimate, and 12 are at present paupers; of their children, 6 are known to be idiots. There are, besides, in the county, 3 other idiots who are known to be the offspring of insane or imbecile mothers, who are dead or have disappeared."—(*First Report of the General Board of Commissioners in Lunacy for Scotland*, p. xi.)

In the *Appendix* to the same Report, the following, among other examples, are recorded:—

"(1.) M. H., a female; cannot tell her age. Congenital imbecility, a beggar, cottage, bedding, &c. dirty and squalid. Lives with two daughters and one granddaughter, all of whom are illegitimate, and, with the exception of the last, of weak mind. 1s. a week, rent paid, and a cart of coals.

"(2.) L. H., a female, daughter of the above, aged 30. Congenital idiot; ineducable. A beggar; condition wretched; lives with her mother in a miserable room. Has an illegitimate child, aged 5. No allowance from parish. . . .

"R. R., a male, aged 12. Imbecility; but of what degree could not be accurately ascertained, as the boy was not at home when sought, and his grandfather could not give the necessary information. Cottage small, squalid, and miserable, with two beds for six occupants. R. R. has two cousins in a state of imbecility. His mother was idiotic, wandered about the country, and bore three illegitimate children. R. R. receives 1s. 6d. per week.

"(1.) A. F., a female, aged 51. Imbecile; speaks; walks; deformed; affectionate, though at times she is cross and needs humouring; industrious; knits. In average bodily health. Tolerably well clothed. Had an illegitimate child, who is alive, and is said to help her a little. Sleeps alone, and has a good bed.

"(2.) R. F., a male, aged 38. Said to be idiotic; to speak imperfectly; to be much weaker in the mind than his sister (the case preceding); to be honest and sober; to be able to go messages; to be noisy and troublesome at times; not to sleep well to have a repulsive

look, causing terror to those who do not know him ; to be unsettled ; to gain little ; to be strong and able-bodied ; to be cleanly in habits ; to need help in dressing. Sleeps alone in a bed close to that of his imbecile sister, and no one else being in the room with them. Both live with their mother, a widow. There are seven inmates and four beds. Allowance, 39s. quarterly for the two.

"(3.) M. F., a female, aged 16. Idiot, squints, slavers ; oscillates ; does not speak ; does not walk ; needs help in dressing ; harmless ; not in robust health. Tolerably well clothed. Lives with grand-parents. Said to have been practically deserted by her father, who was reported to me as a drunkard. I do not believe that her grand-parents, who are paupers, have anything to live on but the parochial allowance, so that she, too, is virtually a pauper ; but, as she is not reported as such, the Board have no jurisdiction in the case.

"This girl is a niece of the two preceding lunatics. In this family we find an imbecile daughter, with an illegitimate child ; an idiot son ; a married son, who is a drunkard, and has an idiot daughter ; a sane daughter, with an illegitimate child ; and a sane son with the same—illustrating the close connexion between intellectual and moral insanity."—(p. 195-196.)

That an inquiry into the condition of indigent and out-door pauper imbeciles and lunatics in England would make known a condition of things in reference to illegitimacy similar to that ascertained to exist in Scotland, the examples already quoted from the Supplementary Report of the English Commissioners in Lunacy renders only too probable ; and in regard to Scotland it may be safely averred, that the insufficient protection of indigent and pauper female imbeciles and lunatics, and the illegitimacy arising therefrom, constitute a most formidable source of evil, active alike in the perpetuation of pauper lunacy, and in deteriorating both physically and morally a large section of the population. To what extent like circumstances may bring about similar results in England has still to be ascertained, and we insist upon the necessity of inquiry to determine this ; for if we have here a powerful source of lunacy and its train of evils, we have likewise at our command, in so far as paupers are concerned, the means by which this source may be stopped almost altogether.

"Heretofore, in Scotland," saith Hect. Boëthius [who wrote three hundred years ago, be it borne in mind], "*if any were visited with the falling sickness, madness, gout, leprosie, or any such dangerous disease, which was likely to be propagated from the father to the son, he was instantly gelded ; a woman kept from all company of men ; and if by chance, having some such disease, she were found to be with child, she, with her brood, were buried alive ; and this was done for the common good, lest the whole nation should be injured or corrupted. A severe doom, you will say, and not to be used amongst Christians, yet*

more to be looked into than it is. For now, by our too much facility in this kind, in giving way for all to marry that will, too much liberty and indulgence in tolerating all sorts, there is a vast confusion of hereditary diseases, no family secure, no man almost free from some grievous infirmity or other. When no choice is had, but still the eldest must marry, as so many stallions of the race; or, if rich, be they fools or dizzards, lame or maimed, unable, intemperate, dissolute, exhaust through riot, (as he said) *jure hæreditario sapere jubentur*; they must be wise and able by inheritance; it comes to pass that our generation is corrupt; we have many weak persons, both in body and mind; many feral diseases raging amongst us, crazed families, *parentes peremptores*; our fathers bad; and we are like to be worse."—(*Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy*, Pt. I., Sec. II., Mem. 1. Subs. 6.)

We, fortunately, lost long ago the barbarism which characterized the remedies devised by the ancient Scots, but at the same time we well nigh lost all active regard of the principle which prompted the remedies attributed to them. They acted according to the light which they had; we have not acted according to the light which we have. Both humanity and policy point to the necessity for adopting such precautions, in regard to pauper lunatics and imbeciles, that they should neither beget, nor have begotten upon them, children; and we have the means justly at our disposal, by the exercise of a proper restraint and care, to ensure this. The Commissioners in Lunacy remark:—

"The absolute necessity of extending greater protection to idiotic and weak-minded women has uniformly been recommended by us. But although our efforts to inculcate the importance of due care in this respect has produced a certain amount of benefit, we find, from repeated examples, that the subject has not received the full consideration it deserves."—(*Supplementary Report*, p. 15.)

The condition of the insane in workhouses is a subject almost as grave as that we have just noticed; for from the Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy it would appear that our workhouses, in so far as lunatics are concerned, are little better than *hot-beds* in which pauper lunacy is fostered and matured. This is a serious charge, but it is supported by weighty evidence. In the course of 1857-1858, the Commissioners visited and inspected the whole of the workhouses (655 in number) in England and Wales, and this visitation has disclosed that, in the majority of instances, the lunatics detained in them are confined in unsuitable apartments; that they are deprived of all exercise; that they are badly fed and badly clothed; that they have no proper attendance either medical or general; that they are subjected to harsh mechanical restraint when violent; and that, as a consequence of this entire absence of necessary care and treatment, recent cases of lunacy

(which are frequently confined in workhouses in defiance of the law) are matured and confirmed, this being, as the Commissioners state, "*one of the most fertile causes of the increase of lunatic paupers throughout the country. It is this that mainly tends to fill our county asylums with hopeless chronic cases, and is most directly responsible for the heavy and permanent burdens upon the parish rates.*"—(p. 84.)

The cases chiefly met with in workhouses consist of persons suffering from chronic dementia, and from melancholia, of epileptics, idiots, and imbeciles. But during late years cases of acute insanity have been frequently met with, especially in the larger houses.

Both the management and the internal economy of workhouses are, however, inconsistent with a due care of almost every grade of lunatics; and even when the lunatics are confined in special wards, the evils are rather augmented than diminished. A reduced diet, task labour, and confinement within the narrow limits of the workhouse are thought to be necessary, as well to test the actual wants of those applying for admission as to check abuse and imposition as far as possible; but a scanty diet and restricted exercise not only tend to increase the mortality of the insane, but to prolong and confirm the disease. The rules in force for the government of workhouses are devised to check disorderly conduct among ordinary paupers, but they are too commonly applied to the imbecile and those of unsound mind:—

"Any increase of excitement, or outbreak of violence, occurring in the cases of such patients, instead of being regarded as a manifestation of diseased action requiring medical or soothing treatment, has subjected the individual to punishment, and in several instances led to his imprisonment in a gaol."—(p. 7.)

Of separate lunatic wards connected with workhouses, the Commissioners say:—

"Some have existed for a considerable time, and others are of recent construction. In some of the wards attached to the old workhouses, the rooms are crowded, the ventilation imperfect, the yards small and surrounded by high walls; and in the majority of instances the bed-rooms are used also as day-rooms. In these rooms the patients are indiscriminately mixed together; and there is no opportunity for classification. There is no separation where the association is injurious; and no association where such would be beneficial. In fact, patients of all varieties of character, the weak, the infirm, the quiet, the agitated, the violent and vociferous, the dirty and epileptic, are all mingled together, and the excitement or noise of one or more injures and disturbs the others. The restless are often confined to bed to prevent annoyance to the other patients, and the infirm are thus disposed of for the want of suitable seats. Their condition when visited in the daytime is obviously bad, and at night must be infinitely worse.

Even in workhouses where the wards are so constructed as to provide day-rooms, these are often gloomy, much too small in size, and destitute of ordinary comforts; while the furniture is so poor and insufficient, that in some instances, there being no tables whatever, the patients are compelled to take their meals upon their knees. Other cases to be hereafter mentioned will indeed show that it is reserved for lunatic wards of this description, and now happily for them only, to continue to exhibit some portion of that disregard of humanity and decency which at one time was a prevailing characteristic in the treatment of insanity.

“Occasionally, indeed, in those workhouses where lunatic wards are of recent construction, the accommodation for patients is better; but they all want the continued superintendence of a resident medical officer and the assistance of a sufficient staff of properly qualified attendants, and they are greatly deficient in reference to diet, exercise, occupation, and general arrangements. For the most part, the rooms are gloomy and prison-like, and considerable expense has been repeatedly incurred in formidable contrivances to prevent escape or accident, which any proper system of nursing and attendance would have rendered quite unnecessary.”

There is no proper supervision medical or otherwise, neither is there any record kept of treatment or restraint; and there is no efficient or authoritative visitation of the lunatic wards by the visiting justices, and the visits of the Commissioners in Lunacy are almost useless, except as enabling them to detect the evil that exists at the time of the visit, and which, after all, they have no power to remove.

The detention of a lunatic in a workhouse rests entirely upon the caprice of the parochial authorities, for he is confined without either medical certificate or magistrate's order, and consequently without that protection which is extended to the lunatic in public and private asylums. Certainly his detention in a workhouse at all is in a great measure illegal, but the law is inoperative, from various causes, as we shall see presently.

In sending a lunatic from a workhouse to an asylum, unmanageableness would appear to be the principal criterion adopted by the parochial authorities as to its advisability. The Commissioners state that:—

“An impression frequently prevails that if a patient be quiet there is no necessity for his removal to an asylum; and, urged by considerations of economy, guardians constantly act upon this impression. It is an error pregnant with the most serious evils. Those who suffer most are often the least complaining. In a very recent case of semi-starvation at the Bath Union, when the frauds and thefts of some of the attendants had, for a considerable time, systematically deprived the patients of a full half of their ordinary allowance of food, the only complaint made was by the wan and wasted looks of the inmates. The melancholic and taciturn especially, when (as is often the case)

their physical condition is enfeebled by long privation, remain quietly suffering until their malady becomes confirmed and incurable. Placed in gloomy and comfortless rooms, deprived of free exercise in the open air, and wanting substantial nutriment sufficient to promote restoration, they pass their lives in a moody, listless, unhealthy, inactive state, which is fatal to their chance of ultimate recovery.

"For cases like these a workhouse is the most unfit, and the asylum the most proper place; and the error of considering manifestations of violence, excitement, or dangerous propensities, as the only or principal reasons for removing a patient from a workhouse to an asylum, cannot be too widely denounced.

"The chronic and less hopeful patients, in like manner, who have become insensible to their ordinary wants, and inattentive to the calls of nature, are most unfortunately situated when detained in a workhouse. Little or nothing being done to revive a sense of decency by vigilant attention and judicious care, they sink into deplorable discomfort, and exhibit the lowest state of mental and bodily degradation."

To illustrate some of the foregoing points more particularly—

The importance of a good nutritious diet in the treatment of the insane need not be insisted on. The Commissioners speak of the evil consequences which have resulted from the scanty diet of workhouses when it has been necessary, on account of overcrowding, to remove chronic cases to workhouses from asylums, a marked deterioration in their condition following, and at times harmless patients have been rendered so irritable and violent as to render it necessary to replace them in an asylum. As examples of the character and variations of workhouse dietaries, the Commissioners state that:—

"While the diet of the insane in the Brighton workhouse is very substantial and liberal, the diet given to the same class in the Hailsham Workhouse (in the same county) contains but one spare meat dinner during each week, the proportion of meat allowed being only 4 oz. for men and 2½ oz. for women; while bread and cheese, without beer, constitutes the dinners on four other days, and pudding on the remaining two. At the Freebridge Lynn workhouse, Norfolk, meat is allowed only once a week, bacon once, and bread and cheese constitutes the dinner for the remaining five days: yet, in the King's Lynn workhouse, in the same county, meat is allowed for dinner during three days, suet pudding twice, and good soup or rice milk twice. In many other workhouses, meat is only given to the insane once a week, and even then in a very small and insufficient quantity. In the West Fife workhouse, within a few miles of Brighton, the allowance is only three ounces of meat during the whole week for each inmate. In the Amesbury workhouse, the inmates are restricted to bacon twice a week (four ounces for men, and three ounces for women), pudding twice, and a very weak soup twice. It is at the same time right to add that in some workhouses the diet is on a more liberal scale, meat being allowed three or four days a week, and soup of fair quality on

other days. In a very small number of houses a meat dinner is given every day."

As to medical treatment we are told, as an example of its total inadequacy, that at the Leicester Union the medical officer visits the lunatic wards once a quarter.

The attendants are paupers, not unfrequently old and feeble people, to whom are entrusted means of restraint, and who in return for their labour receive occasionally some trifling gratuity, such as an allowance of beer or spirituous liquors, or an increase of diet.

"1. In the Stepney Union, at Wapping, the nurse is a pauper receiving no pay, but having extra food, and two pints of beer daily. The matron said that she was kind towards the patients (30 in number); but her manner certainly did not indicate kindness. Inquiries being made as to the diet, she could not (although she asserted she knew 'all about it') tell the amount of food at any meal. After repeated mistakes in giving the names of the patients, she insisted that she went 'entirely by her list.' On the list being produced, it was found that she could not read (November, 1857).

"2. In the St. Alban's workhouse, the nurse having the care of the insane females was herself decidedly of unsound mind. She was allowed half a pint of beer daily, and no other remuneration for her services. As she was of weak intellect and very excitable, the Visiting Commissioner strongly urged the necessity of the guardians engaging a competent paid attendant (30th December, 1857). This suggestion, however, it was found at the last visit, had not been attended to.

"3. In the St. Martin's workhouse, a violent lunatic was entrusted to the supervision of an old pauper, 70 years of age ('the keeper of Ward F.'). The patient appears to have been placed in a room, in which were a poker and other dangerous articles; and on being relieved from some restraint which had been imposed upon him, he struck the feeble old pauper on his head until he died (July, 1857).

"Without giving further instances, we may confidently state, that, as a general rule, the attendance and nursing in workhouses are totally inadequate."

Concerning the accommodation for lunatics the Commissioners state that—

"In many instances the crowding is excessive; the ventilation of the rooms imperfect; and the furniture, even of the poorest description, scanty and insufficient. The deficiency of tables, and of seats for the helpless and feeble, is almost constantly observed; and the want of such suitable seats frequently renders it necessary to keep patients always in bed. Even articles of furniture indispensable to order, decency, and cleanly habits, are often most sparingly supplied, or altogether wanting. In the Blackburn workhouse, we found the small day-rooms on the male side incumbered with large iron guards and heavy restraint chairs; and in one room on the women's side, used both as a bed and day-room, the beds were until recently so close as almost to touch each

other, and a large portion of one apartment containing beds was boarded off as a privy. In addition to similar discreditable arrangements, the patients have frequently no means of bathing, and very scanty means are provided for washing their persons. A tub frequently supplies the place of chamber utensils in the dormitories; and we have ascertained that in some cases the vessels which are used as urinals in the night time serve for the patients to wash, or be washed in, in the morning. It rarely happens, indeed, that patients in workhouses have any proper means of washing themselves near their bedrooms; a trough or sink, common to all, being for the most part substituted for basins. Occasionally, the patients wash out of doors at the pump, or in tubs or bowls placed, whatever the season, in an outhouse, or an open shed."

The clothing is wanting in warmth, and the bedding is too often dirty and insufficient, while in some workhouses the most objectionable practices exist with regard to the night arrangements for the lunatics. At the Huddersfield workhouse, for instance—

"The evils arising from the detention of insane patients in a workhouse have been made manifest to a frightful extent, owing to the shamefully defective accommodation provided in that Union. It will be seen from the subjoined reports that no less than one-third of the inmates are insane or idiotic; that many of them are dirty in their habits, and placed to sleep together sometimes even in a perfect state of nudity. The bedding is stated to be both scanty and filthy, and the floors of the dormitories to be saturated with urine.

"There being no bath-room, lavatory, washhouse, or laundry on the premises, a small room on the ground floor is used for these purposes, and also as a kitchen, a brewhouse, and a bakehouse. Over the room serving these seven distinct objects, are the dormitories appropriated to the sick; the atmosphere of which is both over-heated and contaminated by noxious emanations escaping from below; and also from the wet clothing occasionally hung up to dry around the bed-ridden patients.

"Those idiotic or insane inmates not bodily disabled are crowded together and confined in a very limited space, they are associated with most abandoned characters, secluded in the *dead-house*, and are so circumstanced in other respects, both during day and night, as to aggravate their mental infirmities, and lead to a deplorable state of degradation."*

Restraint chairs, chains, handcuffs, leg locks, muffs, straps, and strait-waistcoats are in frequent use, and are applied by the attendants without the sanction, and probably without the knowledge of the medical officer or master of the workhouse. We read of lunatics chained to benches, and strapped to their beds at night

* Mr. Farnall, the Inspector of the Poor in the Metropolitan district, in his evidence before the recent Parliamentary Committee on Lunatics, stated that he had heard that the Huddersfield guardians had "come to a vote to build a new workhouse, but not a sufficient one; we have no power to order them to do it."—(See Report. Query 1609.)

in the Dewsbury workhouse, "and the only reason assigned for this treatment was, that some would run away, and others get out of bed." In the Bury workhouse the Visiting Commissioner found two lunatics strapped to the bedsteads, and one with his hands secured in a leather muff, while iron staples, shackles, chains, and cord were found in one of the men's wards, "all evidently intended to be employed for the purpose of fastening down violent patients." At the Llanelly workhouse a female lunatic was found most ingeniously, but most cruelly, fastened to a bedstead, upon which it was customary to restrain her for periods varying from a few days to a week.

"The patient was undoubtedly a dangerous lunatic, and the Visiting Commissioner recommended that she should be at once removed to an asylum. The guardians, however, persisted in an attempt to justify their proceedings, and to prove her harmless; and they obstinately refused to remove her according to recommendation."—(p. 26.)

Three females were found in bed, restrained by strait-jackets, in the workhouse of St. George the Martyr, Southwark. These unfortunates were thus restrained day and night, and had been so for some time previously.

Several examples are given of the insufficiency of the space connected with workhouses for the proper exercise of patients. Thus—

"In the Clerkenwell workhouse the lunatic wards are nearly at the top of the house, rendering it impracticable for infirm patients to gain the small yard below, which is long and narrow, and bounded on each side of its length by high buildings. This small yard is nevertheless the only place allotted for exercise to the 511 paupers in the house (November, 1857). . . . In the Bolton workhouse the greater portion of the paupers (343 in number) are crowded together in such a way as to deprive them of all comfort. The yard for the two lunatic wards is quite useless for the purpose of exercise, being scarcely larger than a good-sized room (March, 1855)."—(p. 28.)

We need not comment on the irritating and injurious influence, or on the misery inflicted upon lunatics, by confining them within doors or within a limited area; but an example of one of the parochial methods of dealing with irritated and irritable lunatics deserves quotation.—

"At a visit to the Downham workhouse, the case of a male prisoner then in Swaffham Gaol was brought under notice. He had been recently an inmate of the workhouse, and was classed as of unsound mind, yet had been permitted repeatedly to discharge himself. Upon his last quitting the workhouse, he was soon afterwards sent to gaol for six months for an indecent assault upon a female. He had previously been three times in the County Lunatic Asylum, and was there described as dangerous to others. Whilst in the workhouse he was thought scarcely responsible for his actions, yet had been com-

mitted to gaol on fourteen occasions for refractory conduct. The Governor thought he was not a proper subject for punishment in prison, in which opinion the Visiting Commissioner concurred. The attention of the Visiting Justices being drawn to the case, they agreed that it was not right to subject the man to punishment; but as the surgeon declined to certify his insanity, they suggested that the matter should be referred to the Secretary of State, which was done. On the ground, however, of the medical officer of the gaol still declining to certify, the Secretary of State did not feel justified in interfering in the case."

The congregation and detention of lunatics in workhouses is, doubtless, due in part to the insufficiency of asylum accommodation; but the chief evil arising out of the detention, the impediment cast in the way of an early and proper treatment of many cases of insanity in asylums, arises mainly from an evasion of the law.

In providing for the erection of county and borough asylums, the law directed that all pauper lunatics should be placed there at the outset of their malady; and it imposed certain duties, requisite for the effective carrying out of this wise provision, upon parochial authorities. These duties are, however, continually neglected or evaded, particularly in the more populous districts; and the principal object of the asylum as a curative establishment, and the welfare of the patient are, in consequence, sacrificed.

"The law directs that every pauper deemed to be lunatic, and proper to be sent to an asylum, shall be taken before a justice, who, upon being satisfied that he is a fit person to be taken charge of and detained, shall order his removal to the County Asylum. But instead of this course being adopted, it is now almost universally the custom to remove the patient in the first instance to the Union Workhouse; where, if he appears to be quiet and harmless, he is suffered to remain.

"Instead of causing the patient to be dealt with as directed by the 67th and 68th sections of the Lunatic Asylums Act, 1853, and immediate steps to be taken for his direct removal to the asylum, workhouses have been to a great extent made use of primarily as places for the reception, and (in many instances) for the detention, of recent cases of insanity.

"The workhouse is thus illegally made to supply the place of a lunatic establishment, and the asylum, with its attendant comforts and means of cure, which the law has provided for the insane poor, is altogether disregarded; or it comes into operation only when the patient, by long neglect, has become almost hopelessly incurable."

The phraseology of the Acts relative to the detention of lunatics in workhouses admits, however, of ready evasion of their provisions, and do not, indeed, apply to a large and most important class of lunatics; and until this defectiveness of the Acts be

removed, we see little hope of escape from many of the troubles connected with the removal of patients to asylums. The 45th section of the Act 4 and 5 Will. IV. c. 76, provides that "every person wilfully detaining in any workhouse any dangerous lunatic, insane person, or idiot, for more than fourteen days, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanour;" and Article 101 of the General Consolidation Order of the Poor-Law Board directs "that no pauper of unsound mind who may be dangerous, or who may have been reported as such by the medical officer, or who may require habitual or frequent restraint," shall be retained in a workhouse for more than fourteen days. These provisions, it is clear, are not applicable in the slightest degree to unsoundness of the mind unaccompanied by violence.

We have already pointed out the influence exercised by the detention of lunatics in workhouses in fostering pauper lunacy, and in filling our asylums with chronic cases; and, on the other hand, it may be understood how the diminution of the curative power of the asylums from this cause reacts upon the workhouses, and tends to keep up and increase the accumulation of lunatics there. This reaction of the one class of institutions upon the other; the consequent impairment of the most beneficial effects of the asylums; and the augmentation both in workhouses and asylums of matured and confirmed lunatics, might be supposed to be a sufficient argument against the folly of those parochial authorities, who conceive that they practise a true economy by detaining their insane in workhouses. But, in addition, the Commissioners express the opinion that the difference of cost between the maintenance of a lunatic in an asylum and in a workhouse is not so great as is ordinarily conceived, for—

"In the mode of apportioning the cost of a pauper in a workhouse, several items are excluded from the maintenance account which, in asylums, appear to render that account considerable. In the former case, food and clothing are generally the main items of outlay; whilst in the other all salaries, and many articles entitled 'necessaries,' are included. These latter expenses in parishes are passed over to the Union fund, and paid from a different source. The ostensible cost, therefore, of the patient's 'maintenance' in a workhouse does not represent the same expenses as his maintenance account in an asylum.

"In addition to this, it is also to be observed that the inmates of workhouses consist, in a great measure, of children and aged persons, who are maintained at a small cost. Therefore, when an average of the entire outlay is struck, and an equal charge made for every occupant, whether expensive or otherwise, the actual cost of the insane patient (which far exceeds that of the rest) does not appear."

To remove the evils connected with the detention of lunatics in workhouses the Commissioners offer certain suggestions. The

first of these is based upon an opinion of the entire unfitness of workhouses, from their character and management, for the proper care of lunatics—an opinion concerning which little doubt can be entertained. They suggest that inexpensive buildings should be erected in connexion with, or at a convenient distance from existing asylums, for the reception of chronic, idiotic, and harmless cases. These auxiliary asylums need not cost half the expense in building and management of our ordinary asylums, and they would serve the purpose of relieving workhouses entirely, and asylums mainly, of their chronic cases, and leave the latter free to develop fully their capacities as hospitals.

Some such plan must ultimately become necessary, as it is very evident that our present system of asylum accommodation cannot continue much longer without coming to a deadlock. But we insist upon the importance of ascertaining fully the amount and character of the evil we have to contend with before any plan of additional asylum accommodation is carried out on a large scale; because, from what we have already said, it is evident that it is not sufficient to base future modifications of our plans for the care and treatment of lunatics on the existing pauper lunacy in our workhouses and private asylums (for the Commissioners have pointed out the fitness of removing the pauper inmates of private asylums as well as the lunatics in workhouses). There can be little doubt that as full an inquiry into the condition of pauper and indigent lunatics, idiots, and imbeciles outside the walls of asylums and workhouses, as that which has taken place into the condition of lunatics within workhouses, would lead to as valuable results.

The further suggestions of the Commissioners are well calculated to improve the state of lunatics in workhouses, so far as that is susceptible of improvement, until such a period as a scheme may be devised and carried out which will close those buildings altogether to lunatics except for very temporary purposes. They say :—

“We think it essential that Visiting Justices of Asylums should be invested with full power, by themselves or their medical officers, to visit workhouses, and to order the removal of insane inmates therefrom to asylums at their discretion. They should also be empowered, upon the report of the Commissioners, to order the removal into the asylum of pauper patients boarded with strangers.

“No lunatic or alleged lunatic to be received into or detained in a workhouse, unless he shall have been duly taken before a justice or officiating clergyman, and adjudged by him as not proper to be sent to an asylum.

“In any case, however, wherein an order for a lunatic's reception into an asylum shall be made by a justice or officiating clergyman, it

shall be competent to him, if, for special reasons to be set forth in his order, he shall deem it expedient, to direct that such lunatic be taken, *pro tempore*, to the workhouse, and there detained for such limited period, not exceeding two clear days, as may be necessary, pending arrangements for his removal to the asylum.

"A list of all inmates of unsound mind to be kept by the medical officer of a workhouse, and left accessible to the Visiting Commissioner.

"The medical officer to specify, in such list, the forms of mental disorder, and to indicate the patients whom he may deem curable, or otherwise likely to benefit by, or in other respects proper for, removal to an asylum.

"The Visiting Commissioner, and the Poor-Law Inspector, to be empowered to order and direct the relieving officer to take any insane inmate before a justice, under the provisions of the 67th Section of the Lunatic Asylums Act, 1853.

"In all cases of inmates of unsound mind temporarily detained in workhouses, the medical officer to be invested with full powers as respects classification, diet, employment, and medical and moral treatment, and otherwise."

In the preceding article we have endeavoured to show from the statistics of pauper lunacy, and the Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy on the condition, character, and treatment of lunatics in workhouses, the necessity which exists for a full inquiry into the amount and fostering causes of lunacy among the poor and indigent classes of the population, and while doing this we have examined the Report at a sufficient length we trust to aid in the immediate object at which it aims. The approaching Census, we have pointed out, would be the best, perhaps the only means, of ascertaining accurately the amount of lunacy among the poor and indigent classes, this inquiry constituting a portion of an inquiry into the entire amount of insanity in the kingdom—a desideratum in social as well as medical science; while a specific inquiry would be needed into the fostering causes of insanity among the poor. Whether this latter inquiry would be consistent with the onerous duties of the Commissioners in Lunacy, or would require for its carrying out a special Commission we cannot say; but we would again urge the importance and necessity of both the investigations we have indicated.

ART. III.—PRINCIPLES OF EARLY MENTAL EDUCATION.

In the last number of this journal, in an article on the artificial production of stupidity in schools, we sought to call the attention of our readers to the possibility that harm, rather than good, may

frequently result from the powerful educational influences of the present day:—when those influences are either undesirable in their nature, or misdirected in their application.

Our argument was mainly intended to show, in the first place, that the variations witnessed among adults, in point of mental capacity, are far too considerable to be explained by differences in original conformation; and, secondly, that the tendency of the encephalon to automatic action may be regarded as the chief source of practical errors in the art of teaching.

We return to this subject, at the risk of being thought to expound a truism, because we are deeply impressed with its importance to the community. We believe that education can never be successfully and economically conducted, as regards the masses, until it is based upon sound physiology; and that empirical teaching, however, or from whatever cause, it may occasionally develop the powers of individuals, must always be wholly insufficient to afford secure foundation for a national system. The facts and arguments by which these propositions are supported, are of a kind to appeal with peculiar force to the members of the medical body; and hence our brethren, or at least those among them who have been led to reflect at all upon educational questions, are enabled to be in advance of, and are called upon to lead, the opinions of the general public. Outside the pale of the profession, it is still a matter of novelty, and even of wonder, that physiology should furnish rules for the preservation of bodily health; and that the wholesale violation of these rules should be followed by commensurate calamities. Official personages, from the departments of the War Office to a country board of guardians, from the country board of guardians to a village Dogberry, are almost unanimous in endeavouring to believe that the laws of vital action, as enunciated by medical authority, are only the crotchets of the individual doctor who may give them utterance; and that they may be disregarded without guilt, or forgotten without punishment. It is conceivable that the public mind may once have been in a similar position, relatively to the forces that govern inert matter; that architects may have striven to build in spite of gravitation; or shipwrights to defy the conditions of buoyancy. It is conceivable that, a century hence, a verdict of insanity would screen a martinet who might reproduce Crimean disasters, or await a constable who had connived at his neighbour's cesspool. But, in the present state of public enlightenment, it has yet to be realized that physical and vital forces are modes of the same agency, producing their effects, under known conditions, with equal and with unerring certainty. Still less is it generally known or admitted that the various actions which are called intellectual can be referred, each

to its proper organ in the nervous centres, each to definite circumstances modifying the course of the impression in which it had its origin. On this, and on many other subjects, there is, we think, a tendency to credit intelligent persons with a larger amount of scientific information than they usually possess; and to expect from them more just opinions than they have ever been enabled to form. The editor of a provincial newspaper did us the honour to criticize in his columns our article on the production of stupidity; and to select our physiological heresies for special animadversion. We argued, he said, as if from a tripartite division of the central nervous system, and referred to a brain proper, a sensorium, and a spinal centre; whereas it was well-known that the central nervous system can be divided into *two* parts only,—the CORTICAL and the MEDULLARY! We transfer this exquisite *morceau* to our pages, not only because it is the most ludicrous blunder that ever was couched in language, but because it furnishes a clue to the value of popular notions upon all kindred subjects. If such be the ignorance of those who write our newspapers, how much knowledge may we expect from those who read them? The only possible answer must lead to the inference that the elements of physiology are not sufficiently comprehended by the public to be of general utility in guiding conduct or habits, even where bodily health alone is concerned; and, as our knowledge of the functions of the nervous system is not only somewhat intricate in itself, but is, moreover, among the latest triumphs of research, so, in this department, more conspicuously than in any other, it is the duty of the physician to diffuse abroad that light which, by reason of his elevated scientific position, falls first across his path:—when as yet its source has not risen high enough to dispel the clouds and mists which obscure the lower portions of the track, or to illuminate the gloomy caverns which are the lurking-places of prejudice and error.

There is, perhaps, no pursuit known among men that has occupied a larger share of time, employed a larger amount of skill, or been watched with a more absorbing interest, from the beginning of history to the present day, than the work of educating the young. Ambitious teachers, seeking their own fame through the reputation of their pupils; parents, noting the progress of their offspring with the most aspiring or the most affectionate solicitude; philosophers, bent upon discovering in what degree the intellectual development of the human race could be modified or controlled by cultivation; all alike have devoted their best talents, stimulated by their most ardent desires, to the solution of the great problem that surrounds the earlier years of life. It is not too much to say that all alike have failed. They

have failed not only in obtaining any uniformity of result, not only in every attempt to define the limits of their own powers, but even in establishing upon satisfactory evidence that they possess, as regards the faculties of the mind, any powers whatever. The same household, the same school, the same college, may send forth the senior wrangler and the wooden spoon ; leaving it an open question whether the difference depended on conformation or on training ; and a still more open question whether the positions of the two men might not be reversed in after life. With regard to children, there is probably no professed teacher who would hesitate to promise that he would do what was best for each pupil entrusted to his charge ; but there are very few who would attempt to predict what the results of that best would be. There is, apparently, no measure by which to ascertain the natural type upon which each brain is formed ; and, consequently, no standard by which to estimate the effects of cultivation.

There is, it need hardly be said, an abundance of education, in the sense in which the word is used by Paley ; namely, to express every preparation that is made in our youth for the sequel of our lives. The nature of this preparation has varied, and will vary, with the fluctuations of fashion and circumstance ; but we may always learn from it that, several years being given to the task, and average capacity to the pupil, any desired attainments may be secured with tolerable certainty.

This much being granted, there remains the remarkable fact that the power to confer attainments is not the result of any direct control over the faculties of the mind. Of two boys at a public school, who had spent the whole period of youth in making verses, it might be found that the exercise, in one case, had served to call into activity the highest powers of the intellect ; in the other, the exercise itself having still been tolerably well performed, these powers might be in comparative abeyance. The old explanation of this would be, that the brain of the latter pupil was sterile ground ; but the case is too common for the explanation to be a sound one. In such instances, lamentably frequent even in the best schools, there is usually a certain relation between the length of time given to teaching, and the duration of the acquirements which result from it. Descending a step lower in the social scale, to classes who can neither command the best schools for their children, nor retain them for a very prolonged period under tuition, it may be observed that mental cultivation among the pupils becomes more exceptional ; and also that their attainments are less permanent ; while on reaching the level of elementary schools under inspection, or the lower depth of those, for pupils of the same rank, that are not under inspection, we find mental cultivation only in rare and

solitary instances, and attainments so fleeting that they can scarcely be said to have any duration at all.

If this view be correct, and we entertain it as the result of careful and repeated inquiry, a doubt naturally occurs as to whether the schools devoted to the education of the lower middle, and labouring classes, serve, nationally speaking, any useful purpose. Persons now living have witnessed a great change in their character and management; but has this produced any concurrent change in their efficiency? The late Dr. Nott, tutor to the Princess Charlotte, used to relate that the "dame" of his native village taught her pupils to call every word of more than three syllables "*Nebuchadnezzar*;" while the certificated masters of the present day profess to pay especial attention to punctuation, meaning, and proper emphasis. But go into any elementary school, and subject the reading of the pupils to a real test, and there will not be found, we apprehend, one school in a hundred in which the advance on the *Nebuchadnezzar* system will be sufficiently important to deserve record, or to influence in the slightest degree the power of the pupils to read, or their pleasure in reading. Certain prepared passages may be pronounced aloud from an open book, in such a manner as to convey their sense; but unprepared passages, even of simple words, if they afford a single opportunity to blunder, will seldom indeed see the opportunity lost. As a rule, the eye and mind of the reader do not precede his voice; than which there can be no clearer proof that the meaning of the matter read is not taken into account. Ludicrous mistakes between words of somewhat similar sound but diverse sense, such as saying "mutton" for "motion," are of continual occurrence. Here the fault is in the eye, or rather in the optic ganglia of the sensorium, and the intelligence does not correct it, because not at all employed or concerned in the operation. We recently heard an error of an analogous kind, on the occasion of the admission of some youths into a benefit society. They were required to repeat after the secretary a prescribed formula, containing a promise, if they saw any other member committing a fault, "gently to apprise him of it, as becometh a brother of this order." They all said, "gently to praise him for it." They had all recently been pupils at what is called a "good" elementary school, and they were all alike incapable of ascending to the height of an intentional paraphrase. It is difficult, however, or hardly possible, to ascertain the presence or the lack of general improvement in the art of reading, because the materials for comparison do not exist. Of course, more children are taught to read now than formerly; many more relatively to the population as well as absolutely; but the question is, whether they are so taught as to derive any advantage, any really useful and available

knowledge, from the teaching? "It must be strange," writes Mr. Dickens, "to shuffle through the streets, unfamiliar with the shapes, and in utter darkness as to the meaning, of those mysterious symbols, so abundant over the shops, and at the corners of the streets, and on the doors, and in the windows! To see people read, and to see people write, and to see the postmen deliver letters, and not to have the least idea of all that language, to be, to every scrap of it, stone blind and dumb!" This is a striking picture; but is the condition of the man to whom every long word is Nebuchadnezzar, and in whose mouth the sound Nebuchadnezzar represents no idea, really much in advance of what the novelist describes? Is the sensational knowledge of an artificial connexion between certain symbols and certain sounds,—a knowledge not only unconnected with the intelligence, but almost antagonistic to it, a sufficient end to be gained by the annual expenditure of nearly a million sterling, by the constant labour of Privy Councillors, inspectors, teachers, children? The so-called "reading" is often the only attainment afforded by the elementary school that is discoverable a few months after the removal of the pupils; and any one who will be at the trouble of inquiring, may soon be satisfied as to its precise value.

Litera scripta manet. In the art of writing, the works of the past and of the present are alike open to our observation; and it is not difficult to ascertain how much improvement (as regards the results of teaching, not the number of people taught) has been produced by educational grants and Minutes in Council. We have before us two letters, written, with an interval of nearly a century between them, by persons in humble life, whose families were tenants upon the same estate, in an agricultural county. There is a great difference in the subjects of which they treat; the first having reference to a dispute about possession of a garden, and the second being from a young soldier, describing his experiences of recent Indian warfare. But the extracts we give will suffice to show that the teaching of former times is not greatly surpassed by that of the present day, in so far at least as the power of the pupils to write intelligibly is concerned.

The correspondent in the eighteenth century writes:—

"I shoud be a blight to your Onear wud writ to the Weddear ———
 Con sorning the Gardon for she ont Let me Gardeney. * * * * * I
 Shoud Be Glad if I Ded now wen that man oud be to ——— a bout the
 Repears most Be Don soun for Spreng oul Draw a Long * * * * *
 Ples to Let me now wot Day Hegh oul be thear Be Caus I Lev at a
 destenc I mit not be thear els with out I now the de of his coming
 * * * * * Ples to zend me ancear Dey Reckley and if you zend a leter
 to the Wedear I can com to hor."

The Indian soldier writes:—

"— wee march fus marches til wee joind head Quarters of our Army on the 18 small body of the Enemy advanced on our head Quarters the com in con tack with each uther the fout about 3 hours wee was not soon anaf for the fit wee was on day to Leat. We could hear the begg Guns the fout verre hard for the tim it Leas * * * * wee was forcs to fit her an thear all nit we was faust to keep sheften our pesshen for our Enemy keep letten oup blu Lits all the night that the could see as clar as Day for 3 mils rown soon as the see us the fir of all their beeg Guns at us than wee was fus to shef our pesshen agen our Deer Commerats was Lien ded all rown us * * * * our Enemy mead thar retreat wen the seed the British infintary and cavalry commin ful charg fess to fess the mead thar retreat the did not lik to see the Bennett glezsen in their fess * * * * our tilleary wos fus to fier blaink their ball Aminshen was Don for to mak the Enemy think the plenty * * * * I ward my sheart 2 months with thout washin when i took him of for to wash him her falld in peasses than i went with thout shert," &c., &c., &c.

The young soldier's letter is of considerable length; and, in many passages, displays considerable descriptive power. Our extracts from it show errors of precisely the same character as those in the letter written nearly a hundred years before. In both cases they are the errors of men not much accustomed to write, and not in the habit of reading; but who endeavoured to find means of expressing their ideas upon paper. We may safely conclude that writing was a laborious task to them both, only undertaken under the pressure of a strong motive; and also that reading was certainly not among their pleasures. Had it been so, they would have been as familiar with the sight as they were with the sound of the words they wished to use; and could not have fallen into ludicrous mistakes through trusting to their ears for guidance. The effect of such guidance is conspicuously manifest, in the first letter, in "Dey Reckley;" and, in the second, in "Commerats" and "Bennet." In a descriptive passage, not cited above, the writer states that his regiment did great "exqushn:" an attempt to set down what was colloquially familiar to him. In both letters, dim memories of words once seen in print, appear to obscure the simple phoneticism that is the manifest ruling principle; and of this the correct spelling of "head Quarters" (words often before the eyes of the soldier) furnishes a good example. On the whole we think it is fair to conclude that the comparatively modern school, equally with the comparatively ancient one, had failed to confer the power of reading,—of reading unconsciously, that is, the mind being occupied about the ideas or information conveyed by the composition, and not

upon the mere deciphering of the words themselves. If children are taught to *read*, in the proper acceptation of the term, they will inevitably like reading, will become engrossed by it, and will seize eagerly upon all books within their reach. If they are only taught to *decipher*, they will find the labour irksome; and, when freed from restraint, will seldom or never practise it. In the former case they become so well acquainted with the appearance of words that it would not be possible for them to commit very grave errors in spelling; while, in the latter, the unaided ear may lead them astray through all possible permutations of the alphabet.

We have selected these two acquirements, reading and writing, as the subjects of the present article, not only because they are common to all schemes of education, nor entirely because the plan upon which they are taught will often, we believe, determine the character of mind of the learner, but in some measure because the actions performed are sufficiently simple to be easily analysed and tested, and referred to the organs concerned in producing them. Reading and writing *may be* so taught as to stimulate the intellectual faculties, and to keep the sensorium in its duly subordinate position. They often *are* taught (not only in the humble dame school, where writing is the Ultima Thule of the educational chart, but) even by those whose province it is to instruct the budding minds of hereditary legislators, in a manner that stimulates, or even morbidly excites, the sensorium alone, while it leaves the intellect torpid and unexercised. *Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte*; and a habit of sensational learning, acquired in the nursery, may be strong enough to baffle the best efforts of a teacher: the apparent progress of the pupil being, in reality, only a constantly increasing divergence from the path along which he ought to travel.

The specimens of correspondence that we have already laid before our readers are taken from the letters of persons in the rank of peasants. To show that the errors they committed are not peculiar to any class, either of schools or learners, we have yet another example of the epistolary art. The original was written by a young gentleman in the seventeenth year of his age, one nearly related to the possessor of an earldom, not labouring under any discoverable natural deficiency, and who had enjoyed all the advantages commonly attendant upon his social station. The occasion was the arrival of the writer at a fresh school, the master of which requires, from each pupil, upon joining, a letter that may serve as a test of his capacity, and as a starting point from which to estimate his progress. We need only observe further that the explanatory foot notes are not conjectural; but that they rest, in every instance, upon the authority of the author.

— Schol,
Januaryn 24th, 185—.

Dear Sire,—The last week I spent the hollidays starern Eukerler^a and history the first to or three reans^b, And the other part of the hollidays I spent in shouting^c and driving.

At —^d I youst too learn history goriska^e a leate of latan^f and dronge^g and comperchin^h and earifme reafsmeticⁱ somtines tables in the morning before becface in Sunday we use to go to church ones in the day then we yuesd to have diner at harepast one then from 3 to 4 we used to easemen^j and read ore seat dawn till^k oding^l nothin at ole if we liked then we used to have teed at five then after we used to take wake^m a noure and harf then when we came we used to have svavⁿ in one of the roomes.

I reamin dear Siere
Your aheadint puple

The last few weeks, it may be observed, have placed before the public evidence from which we may infer that bad spelling is the rule, rather than the exception, among the rising generation in the upper section of the middle classes. We have ourselves met with many flagrant examples of it, but tried to encourage the hope that such cases were in reality unusual, and that their coincidence under our observation was accidental. The Civil Service Commissioners, however, have been told that a fault so trivial must interpose no obstacle to success at the pass examination for certain much-coveted appointments in the Government service; and my Lord Malmesbury is reported to have affirmed that bad spelling, although ungraceful and unbecoming, is not a proof of ignorance. It is, therefore, possible that the pigeon-holes of the Foreign Office, if they could be ransacked by profane inquirers, might furnish curiosities before which our humble illustrations of the hetero-graphic art would lose their piquancy and interest—specimens of hardy and exuberant cacography, now, alas! for ever hidden from the light of day—

“ Full many a gem of purest ray serene
The dark unfathomed caves of ocean bear.
Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
And waste its sweetness on the desert air.”

In spite, however, of the high authority of my Lord Malmesbury, we see no reason to doubt that incorrect spelling is clearly a proof

^a Studying Euclid.

^b Reigns.

^c Shooting.

^d This blank was filled, in the original, by the name of a distinguished educational establishment: one that we should fear to mention, save with bated breath.

^e Geography.

^f A little Latin.

^g Drawing.

^h Composition.

ⁱ Arithmetic. The letters in Italics show the primary conception, and were erased by the author.

^j Assemblée.

^k 7, understood.

^l Or doing.

^m A walk.

ⁿ Service—i. e. Divine Service.

of ignorance—ignorance of books, that is, in the manner we have already pointed out. There may possibly be exceptions. There may possibly—we will not say certainly or probably—be persons so organized that the forms of familiar words make no impression upon their consciousness; but all ordinary individuals, who are accustomed to read, learn to know words by sight, and would see an error in spelling, just as they would see errors in a picture inaccurately copied from an original that was well known to them. If boys or men are accustomed to read, they will, we repeat, be able to spell; and, *vice versa*, if they cannot spell, it will be a fair inference that they are not accustomed to read. Moreover, there is a love of knowledge, inherent in all minds, that will induce the vast majority of people to read, to the very extent of their opportunities, upon subjects congenial to their respective tastes—unless the task of mere deciphering be so irksome and laborious as to outweigh the pleasure obtainable from the passages deciphered, or unless the inherent love of knowledge has been quenched at its source. We apprehend that both these contingencies are constantly occurring results of existing methods of teaching—methods opposed to the physiological laws which govern the action of the mind and nervous centres, and not less absurd, in relation to the ends proposed for attainment, than the attempts that have been made, from time to time, to act in defiance of the physical laws that control the universe. Even these physical laws, long as they have formed part of the stock of human knowledge, are often forgotten, or disregarded, until they vindicate their supremacy; and speculators will doubtless again be found, as they have been found aforetime, ready to expend their thoughts and capital upon cumbrous machines for aerial navigation, or to support impostors who profess to walk upon water by the aid of buoyant shoes. It cannot, therefore, be made matter of wonder, either that would-be educators are frequently ignorant of the principles upon which repose their chances of success, or that they often fail ignominiously in the task that with so much presumption they attempt. We think, however, that for the future such failures should be exhibited in a constantly decreasing ratio. We think it is the bounden duty of the medical profession to bring the principles which should regulate mental training prominently before the notice of the public, and to strive for their embodiment in precepts that may be rendered familiar to the humblest instructor. As a single effort in this direction, we purpose to inquire what physiological functions are involved in the reception of elementary teaching; how far the methods commonly prevalent are in harmony with those functions; and, where the harmony is wanting, by what means it can be ensured.

It may be stated, *in limine*, that the act of reading is of a somewhat complex character. It is performed by means of visual sensations, excited by certain symbols or words, which sensations may be the subjects either of volitional or of automatic attention, and may be associated either sensationally with the sounds, or intellectually with the ideas, that commonly belong to them. The first impression, however, is not necessarily visual, but may, as in the blind, be communicated through the organ of touch; and the association of the symbols with perceived or remembered sound, although general, is not essential, being absent in cases of deaf mutism, and in the many instances of persons who have acquired by the eye a book knowledge of some foreign language. It is commonly supposed that the visual organ must analyze each word into its component parts or letters, and that adult readers are constantly deciphering the page in this way, although habit may render them unconscious of the operation, and able to perform it with great rapidity. With this view we can by no means coincide, believing that all words, not of extraordinary length, are perceived as distinct objects, without any necessity for analysis, just as a friend is recognised at a distance, not by any observed combination of several peculiarities, but by the *tout ensemble* with which we are acquainted. Indeed, to those who read daily, common words are more familiar objects than detached letters; and it is a well-known fact that persons, who are doubtful about a question of spelling, will often write down both the alternatives that suggest themselves, so as to see, by comparison, what arrangement will produce the accustomed appearance of the desiderated word. Here, instead of the letters leading to the word, the word leads to the letters; and it would not be difficult to adduce many other illustrations of the same general principle.

We may regard every word, then, as being an object of visual sensation, associated either with a sound or with an idea, or with both. There is, probably, nothing to prevent the action of the cerebrum from taking place simultaneously with that of the sensorium, in immediate response to the impression; but it is impossible not to perceive that, in many kinds of reading, the cerebrum remains entirely quiescent, and the visual sensation is associated with a sound only. Physiologically speaking, the impression does not *pass on* to the cerebrum, but is reflected through the sensorium, and is exhausted in the production of articulate language. Such was the case in the school described by Dr. Nott, where, when the children *saw* a long word, they *said* Nebuchadnezzar; and such is the case, probably, in many much more pretentious establishments. We were once shown a copy of a

sermon, printed, towards the end of the last century, in a country town in the west of England, and containing a very curious error. The frequently-recurring word *Almighty* had been abbreviated in the MS. thus—A^{ly}; the abbreviation was mistaken for A^{ty}, and the word was set up and printed, page after page, *Attorney*. It is clear that the compositor had not employed his mind about his work, and that his actions were consensual only.

The physiological causes which determine the reflection of the visual impression through the sensorium may be sought either in that organ itself, or in the cerebrum, and may be stated somewhat as follows :—

The sensorium may be unusually active, from :

- a. Natural vigour and acuteness.
- β. Artificial excitation.

The cerebrum may be torpid, from :

- a. Natural hebetude.
- β. Neglect, or want of stimulation.
- γ. Temporary exhaustion, by exercise, of the power of volitional attention.
- δ. Preoccupation by a train of thought.

With reference to these several conditions it may be observed that, while all impressions received by any of the senses appear to act as natural stimulants to the sensorium, and to call it into spontaneous or instinctive activity, they have not all the same tendency to pass on to the cerebrum. The proper excitants of the latter are probably the perceptions which, although of course communicated through the senses, have their origin in the distinctly intellectual operations of another individual; so that the mere visible symbols on a page, or the mechanical teaching of a master whose mind is not in his work, are sights or sounds addressed to the sensational instrument, and hardly at all to the intelligence. The frequent repetition of such sights and sounds, in obedience to the ordinary law of nutrition, must increase the energy of the organ they excite; and must depress, or relatively diminish, that of the organ they leave quiescent: from whence it follows that the brain of a child may soon grow into a settled habit of sensational action. The cerebrum, too, like every other apparatus that is subservient to the will, becomes fatigued, especially in its immature condition, much more speedily than the centres of automatic action; and hence it may frequently happen that the first portion of a lesson is understood; while the rest, failing to excite the wearied brain, is remembered through the sensorium as a matter of sights and sounds:—that is to say, of mere symbols, as distinguished from the ideas that the symbols were intended to convey. Pre-occupation by a train of thought, or what is called “absence of mind,” is a condition not at all un-

common in connexion with the emotions of childhood ; and it may exist, in a degree sufficient to impair the receptivity of the intellect, without at all diminishing the keenness of the senses. Such abstraction, as a result of volitional mental effort, is only witnessed in adult age ; but a child may be intently thinking about the expected pleasure, or the dreaded discovery, of the morrow, without in any way losing his power to "learn" a lesson, and to repeat its sounds correctly.

From such considerations it would appear not difficult to frame the principles that should regulate all endeavours to instruct the young. The use of the sensorium is indispensable ; but its abuse has to be guarded against : while the cerebrum requires to be trained to the gradual exercise of its powers. In order to fulfil these indications it is manifest that mere symbols should not be multiplied unnecessarily ; and that time and attention should not be given to the attainment of proficiency in repeating sounds, or copying signs, to which no meaning can be attached. As soon as a written symbol is pointed out, and associated with a sound, the greatest care should be taken to connect the combined sensational impression with an idea, and to make the idea the leading feature in the combination : so that the sensorium may be used throughout as a feeder of the intelligence, but never encouraged to act as an independent organ. Lastly, if only one word had been learned, the first sign of weariness should conclude the lesson. The only healthful stimulus to application, in the case of a young child, is the pleasure that attends on the exercise of a new power ; and this pleasure cannot strive against weariness, by whatever cause it may be induced.

Let us now take a common primer, and see how these principles are reduced to practice. A child is first taught to know, by sight and sound, the twenty-six letters of the alphabet, in their forms as capitals ; these forms being generally obscured and complicated by pictorial illustrations. A highly coloured ox occupies the middle of O ; and a flock of zebras form a pleasing background to Z. The next step is to connect the same sounds with the visible forms of small letters ; and, when this task is accomplished to the satisfaction of the teacher, the pupil may expect to be advanced to such combinations as the following :

ab.	ba.	ad.	da.
eb.	be.	ed.	de.
ib.	bi.	id.	di.
ob.	bo.	od.	do.
ub.	bu.	ud.	du.

Before reaching za, ze, zi, zo, zu, it is obvious that many pages have to be wearily conned, that much time and patience must be expended, that frequent rewards or punishments will be required

as antidotes to lethargy. In process of time, the learner is considered to be perfect in this portion of his training, is allowed to enter another circle, and finds there,—let us say :

ban.	nab.
ben.	neb.
bin.	nib.
bon.	nob.
bun.	nub.

And so on, through many similar arrangements, before he is brought face to face with real words of one syllable.

The whole course of the proceedings here faintly shadowed forth is, it need hardly be said, in direct opposition to the physiological principles we have endeavoured to lay down. From great A to zuz (if that combination be found in primers), the performance must be purely sensational (there being no ideas in any way related to the sights and sounds concerned) ; and a source of utter weariness to the pupil, as it is, unquestionably, to the teacher. In the first place the names of the letters have no relation to the sounds which these letters represent when joined ; and, therefore, the power to repeat the alphabet, and to recognise the symbols composing it, are not in any degree steps towards the acquirement of the power of reading. The names of A and D being given, it would be impossible to excogitate from them the pronunciation of “*ad* ;” so that the great and small alphabets consist simply of twenty-six aural and fifty-two visual sensations, with which no intellectual ideas can, during childhood, be associated, and in the “learning” of which no intellectual activity can ever be displayed. Pretty pictures make the matter ten times worse ; first, by complicating the visible symbol ; secondly, by giving rise to ideas that have no proper connexion with the matter in hand. In the mind of a child who is still learning the alphabet, there can be no right conception of the value of the initial letter of a word ; and, consequently, no conception of the relation which the sign A bears, either to the sound of “*archer*,” or to the picture of a gentleman in green, having a bow in his hand. Either the child accepts the connexion as a matter of fact, and remembers, without reflection, the three sensations presented to him ; or else he forms some erroneous idea of the reason why they should be associated together. Furthermore, it is unquestionably true, as a general principle, that a butcher will often be the possessor of a “*great dog* ;” but there is no sufficient reason why this fact in social science should be impressed upon the mind of young England in immediate sequence to the name and outline of the letter B. The reason of the case, indeed, is entirely opposed to such a procedure ; because the proper aim of the teacher would be to avoid placing before the child any sight

or sound which cannot be immediately connected with an intelligible idea: that is to say, any which is devoid of meaning, or any of which the meaning is above the grasp of infantile comprehension. The primer, so far as we have followed it, departs from this aim systematically; and presents to the learner page after page of vocal and visual combinations which exercise the sensorium alone, and exercise it the more actively, the more they are coloured, illustrated, and multiplied. During the whole process of hearing, seeing, imitating, and recognising them, the cerebrum cannot, in the nature of things, ever be brought into play; and hence, so far as we have gone, we find provision made to produce sensational activity, and to insure intellectual torpor.

When the reading lesson, properly so called, does at last begin, and the pupil is allowed to attempt real words of one syllable instead of sham ones, there are two points especially worthy of remark. In the first place much of what has been already learned must be forgotten or neglected; and, in the second, the methods in common use yield a prodigious number of merely aural impressions, without any corresponding ideas to be associated with them. For example, when the young reader meets with the verb *do*, he must blot out of his recollection that he has been taught, on a former page, to pronounce *do* as it is pronounced in the gamut; and a similar difficulty will meet him at almost every turn. In the *ba*, *be*, *bi*, *bo*, *bu*, combinations it is usual to give each vowel its natural or nominal sound; while, in actual words, the five vowels have, between them, as many as twenty-nine sounds, all of frequent occurrence. The supplementary or mute letters, too, of many words, will be sources of confusion to the learner; the *y*, for instance, in *bay*, or *day*, not changing the sound already given to *ba* and *da*: while an early lesson will be sure to contain something about a sheep, and to spell its bleat by the letters *Ba*. From all this it follows that a knowledge of the names of the letters, and a knowledge of *ba*, *be*, &c., are not only useless, but positively hurtful and misleading, and continual sources of errors that require to be rectified by precept.

The multiplication of sensational impressions, without ideas to counterbalance them, depends chiefly upon the custom of making children spell words before they utter them. In saying *d*, *o*, *g*, *dog*, the pupil has to reproduce four sensations for one intellectual idea; while the sounds *d*, *o*, *g*, do not in any way lead to, or produce, the sound *dog*; so that the right order of succession among the four has to be remembered by the aid of the sensorium.

We have now, we think, succeeded in showing that the method of teaching a child to read, as usually practised, might not unfairly be described as a series of contrivances for promoting sensational, at the expense of intellectual, activity; or, in other

words, for leading the pupil to neglect everything that he ought to do, and to do everything that he ought to avoid. As far as the art itself is concerned, there can be little question that the results obtained are as bad as bad can be. Most persons could count upon their fingers all the good readers among their acquaintance; and the performance of children is seldom other than a torture, to any one capable of understanding the meaning of written composition. It is trite to remark that ministers of religion fail, not unfrequently, in giving expression to the dignity and pathos of Holy Scripture; and it may be feared that they fail occasionally, even in giving expression to the evident meaning. It has been justly observed that an explanation of these familiar facts must be to be found, either in the surpassing difficulty of the art of reading, or in the exceeding faultiness of the principles on which it is taught; and it is hardly necessary for us to point out that there is a vast preponderance of evidence in favour of the latter solution of the difficulty. Our purpose is rather to maintain that the mischief done by bad methods of teaching is not limited to the production of bad readers; but extends, more or less, to every mental operation of the persons influenced. We think that such methods give a distinct impulse to sensational action at a period of life when the encephalon is being moulded to the manner of activity which will become habitual to it; and that the powers of the cerebrum will be passively diminished, in proportion as those of the sensorium are actively increased. In the present state of knowledge, we have no measure of the extent to which the natural balance between the various functions of the encephalon may be disturbed by educational influences; but we have reason to suppose that this extent is very considerable. Such influences are, in fact, or at least soon become, habits of mind in the children subjected to them; and it is impossible to doubt that a habit of attending to mere sights and sounds, and a habit of neglecting meaning, would have the strongest tendency to weaken the volition and the judgment, and to place them under the control of the centres of automatic action.

Our readers are entitled to ask, in what way these evils can be obviated; and, as far as method is concerned, the reply is easy. Mr. Baker, of Doncaster, has written, and Mr. Herbert, of Nottingham, has lectured, on the facility with which children learn to read, when the alphabet, and the unmeaning combinations of two letters, are altogether omitted from the scheme of instruction. The last named gentleman advises that the pupil should be shown printed words, in ordinary type, should be made to look attentively at each word as a whole, and to repeat it correctly after the teacher. He advises, also, that the daily lesson

should not exceed ten minutes in duration; and he has found that, in this way, a child may be taught to read well, that is to say, with comprehension, good pronunciation, and proper emphasis, in a period varying from five to sixty hours; and, therefore, at the rate of ten minutes *per diem*, spread over the same number of weeks. The time most commonly required is from eight to ten weeks; and the sixty were occupied in a solitary instance. Mr. Herbert speaks of some of his pupils who, at the age of ten or twelve years, reading and writing well, and having acquired considerable proficiency in various branches of knowledge, had never learned the alphabet, and were unable to repeat it; and, as a practical question, he adduces evidence that is quite conclusive with regard to the excellence of the method that he recommends. The point of view, however, from which we are desirous to regard all methods of elementary teaching, has reference to their probable effect upon the mind and the nervous centres. It is evident, we apprehend, that the plan described by Mr. Herbert—the plan of making a word, instead of a letter, the unit of the system of reading, may be employed in such a manner as to remove all tendency to undue sensorial exaltation. In the first place, the words selected for the lesson should be those which represent ideas to the mind of the individual pupil, and should therefore be varied, in order to suit local or personal circumstances. There is, probably, no child, young enough to be learning to read, who attaches any distinct idea to “archer” or “zebra;” but any child, from five years old and upwards, will have distinct ideas of the meaning of the names of many domestic animals, many articles of dress, furniture, and household use, many trees, plants, and flowers, and also of the meaning of many verbs, adjectives, pronouns, and conjunctions. This knowledge, we conceive, should be utilized in the early reading lessons; and every word pointed out as an object of visual attention should already, by virtue of its sound, be an exponent of positive knowledge. When this is the case, the sensorial impression will pass on, and excite cerebral activity; or, if it should fail to do so spontaneously, the teacher may produce the desired effect by the aid of suggestion. In a farm-house, for instance, if the sentence “I see a cow,” were taken for the first lesson, each word would strike home to the mind, would call up familiar ideas, and would initiate a source of pleasure in the power to recognise the symbols by which these ideas are suggested on a printed page. The pupil would pass at once from the sound “cow” to the thing itself—the mental conception of the living and familiar animal; and the printed word would at once become a representative of the animal, and not merely of the sound. But if the sentence were, “I see a zebra,” no such process could take

place; and the recollection of the sound "zebra," in connexion with the visual symbol, would be all that the child could possibly accomplish. In the latter case, there would be a mere sensational action—a linking together of two sensations in the memory; but, in the former, the sensations would not only be linked together, but would, moreover, be crowned or completed by a distinct conception of the thing signified. It follows that this completion of the act of consciousness will soon become habitual to the learner; and that when, after a time, words representing unknown ideas are introduced into the lesson, these ideas will be sought for by the mind, and an intelligent curiosity will be excited with regard to them. The early word-lessons having always appealed to actual knowledge, the pupil will feel that there is something to be known in connexion with any word that may be strange to him; and hence the sensational impression will always pass on, and excite cerebral activity, either for the contemplation of old ideas, or for the search after new ones. On the contrary, when the first words taught are not understood, it is perfectly natural for the growing brain to remember them without any curiosity, and to fall into the mode of action which it is thus permitted to commence.

As far as very early efforts at learning are concerned, we do not place much confidence in any endeavours, on the part of the teacher, to explain that which the child does not already understand. Such explanations are prone to miss the precise point of difficulty to the pupil, or they are diffuse, or tedious, or in some way wearisome; and, in either case, they fail to arrest the attention, or to rouse the intelligence. For a time varying with differences in respect of natural capacity, we think that occasions for explanation should be avoided, and that the pupil should read only about what he does understand, until the habit of understanding what he reads is established. Then, here and there, but at first sparsely, words and sentences, conveying new ideas, may be introduced. The names of unfamiliar objects will serve this purpose; and the more thoroughly, the more resemblance there is between the objects and others with which the child is acquainted; or, in other words, the smaller the effort of attention and comprehension that is at first required to be made. While the process is still going on, the child's circle of knowledge may constantly be enlarged by means of oral teaching, and by guiding his powers of observation; and that which is gained on one day in this manner, may be made the subject of a reading lesson on the next. The error to be avoided is making the reading lesson itself the vehicle of novelty; for whereas, in oral teaching, only the double association between sound and meaning has to be formed, in reading about new matter the association

should be triple in order to be of value. But the exigency of the teacher always demands that two elements out of the three, viz., the appearance, and the sound of the words, should be remembered with more or less of accuracy; and it often happens that this demand monopolizes the available nervous force to provide for sensorial activity, and leaves the most important element of the three, the meaning, wholly unattended to. It is manifest, we think, that the appreciation of a new idea must be less easy than the recollection of an old one; and also that the more difficult the third element in the association is made, the more likely it is to be neglected.

We have already referred, incidentally, to the pleasure which attends the exercise of a new faculty, and to the propriety of making this pleasure a stimulus to exertion. No period of human life displays a more exultant happiness than that in which the infant first discovers his power to walk; and it is impossible to doubt that the early functional activity of the cerebrum is in itself a source of no small gratification. But precisely as the infant becomes wearied, seeks support after a few tottering steps, and would fall if the support were withheld, so the first mental exertion must be adapted to the limits of his strength, and will cease to be pleasurable when those limits are exceeded. On this account we are disposed to consider that Mr. Herbert's rule concerning the duration of each lesson is most valuable and important. In many instances, perhaps, the cerebrum would bear a longer period of application; but in all, whenever its freshness was impaired, sensational learning would take the place of intellectual; and it might often happen that a teacher would fail to recognise the change. In order to avoid all risk, it is certainly the best plan to fix upon a time that shall never be exceeded; and to make this time so short that the learners may practise, in reading, the old-fashioned rule in dietetics, and rise from table with an appetite for more.

Before leaving the subject of the connexion that should exist between instruction and pleasure, we must refer, as briefly as possible, to the practice of those who strive to combine instruction with amusement, in order to point out that, in most cases, the amusement is afforded by a variety and multiplication of sensory impressions, surrounding the idea sought to be conveyed. The picture alphabet may be taken as a type of this class of teaching; and the objections which we have urged against the picture alphabet, apply with increased force to further developments of the system from which it sprung. The object of the teacher should be to produce concentration of mind in the pupil; and amusement, as the etymology of the word implies, tends only to scatter and disturb the thoughts. The two things are, in fact,

diametrically opposed to each other ; and, as the result of endeavours to combine them, the attention must be given to each by turns. Where, however, the demand made by the lesson upon the faculties of the pupil is neither too great nor too protracted, the need for amusement does not arise ; and, under less favourable circumstances, no amount of sensational distraction will restore the tired brain so effectually as a period of complete repose.

We have not left ourselves space to refer to the writing lessons, other than in the most cursory manner. We think they should be governed by the same physiological principles which we have endeavoured to enunciate, and that the pupils should commence by trying to copy words, the meaning of which they understand. We are acquainted with two children whose lessons have yet to begin, but who can write on a slate, in a clear, legible hand, the name and address of every member of the family to which they belong. They have acquired this power simply by having old envelopes given to them as playthings ; and either of them, the eldest being under six years old, can tell at a glance to whom any letter left at the house is addressed, and can also recognise the handwriting of any correspondent from whom letters arrive frequently. They have therefore learned to write a limited number of words, but each of those words, instead of being merely a hieroglyphic to be copied, is equivalent to an idea ; and the children feel an intelligent pleasure in being able to write down something that represents, to themselves and others, actual and definite knowledge. Moreover, they cannot write these words without cerebration, without recalling their knowledge ; and, as long as their copies are enlarged on the same principle, the same result will follow, and purely sensational action will be avoided. A child, however, may fill reams of paper with great A, or with "pot-hooks and hangers," or even with sentences, such as "Governments exercise authority," without his mind being exercised, even in the smallest degree, upon his work.

There can, perhaps, be no greater absurdity than the common practice of causing children to commence their writing lessons in large text, and with capital letters : the cramped position of the tiny hand not allowing sufficient play for the distance which the pen ought to traverse ; so that the down-strokes are shaky and feeble, the fingers are tired almost immediately, and the task is rendered unnecessarily irksome. This, however, is a matter of detail that affects only the quality of the performance as a work of art ; and that is, therefore, somewhat beyond the limits of our present subject. We desire only to show in what way elementary teaching may be made to develop, rather than to repress, the higher faculties of the intelligence.

It is, perhaps, desirable that we should guard ourselves, in so

many words, against the supposition that the foregoing observations are intended to apply to children, however young, who have once mastered the mechanical difficulties of reading, and are able to peruse books with interest and pleasure. We have been speaking solely with reference to the very commencement of the task of instruction; and under an assured belief that the manner in which such commencement is made, will often determine the predominant character of the mental operations through the whole of life. When a child has made sufficient progress to read by himself, the manner in which he has been taught will be conspicuous among the circumstances that determine the degree of pleasure he feels in reading, and the nature of the encephalic action that written symbols excite; and hence, we conceive, the mode of teaching increases in importance, in proportion as other stimulants to mental activity are absent. Among the educated classes, such stimulants are supplied by various circumstances; and teaching, being only one influence among many, modifies the intellectual character in a degree that, while still highly important, may be called comparatively slight. It is among the poor, or rather among the children of the unintelligent and untaught, that the first systematic instruction is the absolute commencement of mental education either for good or evil, and that the choice between sensational and intellectual activity in the pupil rests, almost solely, with the teacher. We need not point out the responsibility which such a power of choice imposes, not so much, perhaps, upon the individual master of any particular school, as upon those in high authority, whose humble instrument he is, and under whose guidance his work in life is carried out. We wish we could hope that our professional brethren generally would regard this work from the point of view that they are able and privileged to reach, and would do justice to the wisdom of the system that combines nine subjects in a scheme of elementary instruction, but makes no provision to secure the intellectual receptivity of those who are fated to be taught. As far as secular knowledge is concerned, such justice would induce us to mourn over wasted energies, and to calculate useless cost; but would permit us the consolation of believing that the losses sustained would be felt only during Time. It is our national duty, however, to teach our children a higher and a better learning; and, in order that we may do so, first to cultivate their minds for its reception. If this cultivation be neglected, while sectarian bigots profanely wrangle; or if it be omitted, in order to facilitate a sensational acquaintance with creeds and formularies, the resulting losses may indeed be felt during Time, but they will only be fully realized in Eternity.

ART. IV.—PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN LUNACY.*

THE proceedings of the recent Select Committee on Lunatics were brought to a summary conclusion by the dissolution of Parliament; and the Committee have reported that, having regard to this event, as well as in consequence of the inquiry not being complete, "they do not feel themselves in a position to offer any definite opinion on the questions referred to them; and they have therefore agreed to report the evidence taken."

We should gladly, under these circumstances, have deferred any consideration of the subjects submitted to the Committee until the termination of the inquiry; but as the most important portion of the evidence already given is of an official character, we do not feel at liberty to postpone its consideration indefinitely.

We enter upon our task, however, with reluctance, since at the very outset we are compelled to give attention to certain opinions calculated to promote much unprofitable recrimination, and to impede effective legislation for the better care of lunatics. These opinions would not, indeed, have merited notice if it had not so happened that they proceeded principally from the Chairman of the Lunacy Commission, the Right Hon. the Earl of Shaftesbury, and that they influenced several of his suggestions respecting future lunacy legislation. It is to be noted, also, that these opinions are to be regarded as being entertained, in some measure, by the whole of the Commissioners in Lunacy, for, in his answer to query 5, his Lordship says—

"I would state to the Committee, as well as I can, the present condition of things, and then point out certain amendments which I think might be applied to the existing defects. . . . Having done that, I should then ask the permission of the Committee to go more widely into the subject, and to point out to them what is the result of my long experience, and the result of the experience of my brother Commissioners, as to the real method of the treatment and cure of lunacy, because we are convinced that it stands at present upon a very vicious principle; and I should wish to indicate to the Committee, and to point out what I consider to be the true and permanent principle which cannot fail of conferring very great benefits upon that enormous class of helpless beings" (p. 1).

It is fortunate, however, for the critic who does not wish to be thrust more than is absolutely necessary beyond the bounds of the subject-proper which he has to discuss, when the author of objectionable and irrelevant opinions himself furnishes the most conclusive answers to those opinions; and this is what Lord

* "Report from the Select Committee on Lunatics." Blue Book. Ordered to be Printed, 11th April, 1859.

Shaftesbury has done in respect to the opinions expressed by him to which we object.

His Lordship was asked, in reference to the medical certificate of insanity (qy. 192)—

“Do you think that there is anything now in the form of the certificate, or what is required to be inserted in it, which creates any unnecessary obstacle in the way of placing persons under that restraint which they clearly ought to be placed under?”

To this he replied :—

“None beyond this, that the certificate declares that the person ought to be taken charge of, and be placed in a lunatic asylum. That at once fixes the taint of insanity upon a family; and we have done all that we could to mitigate the effect. The form used to be, that such and such a person was ‘a proper person to be confined;’ that was considered painful, and this was substituted, ‘to be taken charge of, and placed under medical treatment.’ One of the great difficulties arises from this, that you must, in seeking for a certificate, apply, generally speaking, to the medical men in the neighbourhood. Now the knowledge of lunacy among medical men is extremely limited indeed; it has never yet been made the subject of study generally. Of course there are some who have attained to a very great degree of science and knowledge, and there are most eminent names in England at present; but people assume that because a man is a medical man, he must have a knowledge of lunacy; and they therefore apply to him for his opinion; but the fact is, that a medical man has no more knowledge of lunacy than any other human being; unless he has made it his especial study; it is a specialty, and as much requires minute study as anything else. For my own part, I do not hesitate to say, from very long experience, putting aside all its complications with bodily disorder, the mere judgment of the fact whether a man is in a state of unsound mind, and incapable of managing his own affairs, and going about the world, requires no professional knowledge; *my firm belief is, that a sensible layman, conversant with the world and with mankind, can give not only as good an opinion, but a better opinion than all the medical men put together; I am fully convinced of it*” (p. 23).

It is certainly a somewhat novel notion that the necessity of having to obtain a medical certificate creates an “unnecessary obstacle in the way of placing persons under that restraint, which they clearly ought to be placed under.” This is scarcely consistent with his Lordship’s answer to the 885th query: “In your Lordship’s experience, have you not observed that there is a greater tendency amongst medical men to observe the symptoms of insanity than amongst other people?—*No doubt of it.*” (p. 96.) Certainly one of the objects most apparent in the recent attempted legislation for lunatics was to check the supposed evils arising out of this assumed tendency. But we notice this point only cursorily, for

it is with the latter portion of his Lordship's answer to the 192nd query that we are, at present, more particularly concerned.

It is not necessary for us to dilate upon the trite axiom that our knowledge of a thing is commonly proportionate to our acquaintance with it; neither is it needful for us to defend the public against the charge of hasty judgment in deeming that the person who has been specifically trained to mark deviations from sound health, whether of body or mind, as is the medical man, is relatively better able than he who has not been so taught to judge of unsoundness whether of body or mind, and to profit by experience. Indeed, his Lordship himself has clearly laid down the prime reason which induces the public to look upon the medical man as the best judge of insanity, for in speaking of the fitness of *examiners* in lunacy being medical men, he remarked, "*because the medical man is the only person in the neighbourhood of these asylums who is likely to have given any attention to the matter.*" (qy. 837, p. 94.) That there may be medical men who, notwithstanding the preliminary training mentioned, have profited so little by it as to render their opinion, when their abilities are put to a practical test, of no greater value than the opinion of a man who has had no previous tuition in the method of observing disease, we do not deny; but this is beside the question, yet we may say here, that we fully agree with a hope expressed by his Lordship (qy. 195), that larger opportunities for the study of mental affections will be afforded to medical students in our public asylums, and that these affections will become a more prominent branch of medical study than they now are: but the throwing open of public asylums to medical students is the first step that is requisite. Further, we shall not quibble with the somewhat vague use of the terms "lunacy" and "unsound mind" in the answer, but confine ourselves to a few additional quotations from his Lordship's evidence, bearing upon the opinion that, "the mere judgment of the fact whether a man is in a state of unsound mind, and incapable of managing his own affairs, and going about the world, requires no professional knowledge; a sensible layman, conversant with the world and mankind, can give not only as good, but a better opinion than all the medical men put together; I am fully convinced of it."

In his answer to query 638, his Lordship, referring to the impediments which occasionally occur in removing pauper lunatics to asylums, said—

"The parish authorities have been desirous to send a patient to the workhouse [*? asylum*], but sometimes the medical man will not certify; and in several instances they have gone before the magistrates, *who know little or nothing about it*, and they have said 'This person appears to be much too tranquil to be sent to a lunatic

asylum; I will not sign an order.' *And there is the evil of being obliged to take them before persons who know nothing about the matter*" (p. 72).

Again, Mr. Tite having asked (qy. 846), "Would your Lordship approve of a pauper lunatic being taken before a magistrate that he might see the case?" the reply was—

"The honourable member means, I suppose, private lunatics. I think nothing could be worse than that; there would be a degree of publicity about it that would be most painful, to go before a magistrate, and to have the matter determined by him, whether the patient should or not be put under medical treatment. *In 99 cases out of 100 the magistrate knows little or nothing about the matter.* A case occurred the other day, of a poor man, who was taken before a magistrate, and he refused to certify, because the man was not in an infuriated state. 'A quiet person like him,' he said, 'ought not to be put in an asylum; take him back.' He was in a low, desponding state; and if he had been sent to a curative asylum he might have been cured and restored to society" (p. 95).

If we now turn to query 838, we shall find that his Lordship entertains as little respect for the opinion of a clergyman on a case of lunacy as for that of a magistrate. His Lordship was questioned concerning the propriety of having "medical examiners" to countersign and confirm the medical certificates which authorize the reception of a patient into an asylum, and thus afford an additional protection against unjust confinement. As the answers to queries 836 and 837 have an immediate bearing upon our present topic, and upon the answer to the 838th query; and as one reason advanced for selecting a medical man as an examiner, if such an officer should be appointed, is curious, we shall quote the answers to the 836th and 837th queries as well as the answer to the 838th.

"836. If this duty were imposed upon the Commissioners, would it not be performed by the medical Commissioners?—No; it might be done by them, but there again comes in the objection which I so strongly entertain, and I protest against bringing the medical profession so forward that they only are to be the judges of insanity.

"837. Does not that apply to the clauses of this Bill, that require that the examiners shall be medical examiners?—Yes; *because the medical man is the only person in the neighbourhood of these asylums who is likely to have given any attention to the matter.* You could not impose upon the magistrates or the resident gentry such a duty, but it must be put upon a person who is generally resident, *who will take a fee for his duty, and a medical man is almost the only person to do it.*

"838. *Mr. Whitbread.*] Could not you attain this object by insisting by law upon some religious care of the patients by some chaplain who could equally form a judgment?—*I should have more distrust of the religious gentleman than I should have of the medical man; and I say*

that with the deepest respect for the ministers of religion. The difficulty of it would be incalculable if you were to throw the duty on the parochial clergy in the neighbourhood, who are already over-burdened" (p. 94).

Now, in his reply to the 194th query, his Lordship says, "*It is clear that the value of the certificate [of insanity] must depend upon the experience of the people who sign it.*" (p. 28.) But in a subsequent portion of his Lordship's examination we read as follows:—

"867. Clause 15 [of the Bill introduced by Mr. Walpole 'to amend the Law concerning the Care and Treatment of Lunatics'] is, that 'certain persons are not to sign certificates for the reception of patients.' That is where they are the proprietors of any licensed house?—Yes.

"868. I believe your Lordship considers that a very important clause?—Yes; although I believe very great objection will be taken to it by the medical men.

"869. Your Lordship approves of that clause?—Yes.

"870. That clause will prevent their playing into each others' hands?—Yes;" &c. (p. 97).

Thus the only section of medical men who have, with few exceptions, an opportunity of becoming thoroughly experienced in insanity, and of bringing that experience to bear upon the public good, are at once swept aside, and the signature of those important documents, the medical certificates of insanity, left entirely to that portion of the profession least practically acquainted with the subject. For it must be remembered that the medical officers of public asylums are debarred from private practice entirely.

If, then, we sum up his Lordship's opinions on the first obnoxious point that has demanded our attention, we find (1) an assertion of the comparative worthlessness of the opinion of most medical men on cases of lunacy; (2), an expression of "firm belief" that the opinion of a sensible layman on such cases is of greater value than that of a medical man; (3), an assertion that the opinion of a magistrate is valueless from his knowing nothing whatever about the matter; (4), another assertion that the opinion of a clergyman is even of less value than that of a medical man; (5), a statement that an opinion depends for its value on the experience of the person giving it; and to crown all, (6), an approval of a suggestion by which the bulk of the most experienced practitioners in lunacy in the kingdom would be debarred from uttering an opinion at all in the form in which a medical opinion on lunacy is of the greatest importance, to wit, when expressed in a certificate of insanity.

We shall not attempt to reconcile these apparent contradictions, but add, as a pendant, an answer which would seem to imply,

that his Lordship is disposed to look with confidence upon the opinion of a *lawyer* alone in cases of lunacy.

Mr. Monckton Milnes asked—"Is there any advantage in these medical examiners being medical men; why not lawyers?" To which his Lordship responded, "*I would not object to that if we could find a person in the neighbourhood who, being resident, would take a fee for it.*" (p. 96). Mr. Milnes must have been in a somewhat waggish mood, and disposed to pleasantry, when he asked if there would be any advantage in the *medical* examiners being *medical* men, and then suggested *lawyers*!!

The second obnoxious point that we have to deal with is as follows:—

"His Lordship feels strongly that the whole system of private asylums is utterly abominable and indefensible." (Qy. 101, p. 14.) On this question he explains himself more fully in his answer to query 494—

"It is the result of very long experience in these matters, that a large proportion of the difficulties in legislation, and almost all the complications that we have to contend with, or to obviate, arise from the principle on which these licensed houses are founded. The licensed houses are founded upon the principle of profit to the proprietor, and the consequence is, that any speculator who undertakes them having a view to profit is always eager to obtain patients, and unwilling to discharge them; and he has moreover the largest motive to stint them in every possible way during the time they are under his care. Now, this must be borne in mind, I do not intend to cast any reflection upon the medical profession. I know that when I have urged arguments of this kind, I have been told that I have entertained most undue suspicions of that great profession. I have no suspicion of them as medical men; but my suspicions are of the medical men only when they are proprietors of lunatic asylums, into which lunatics are taken for profit" (p. 54).

Again, his Lordship states further, in his answer to query 504—

"I know that there are some asylums extremely well conducted; I know that nothing can be more attentive, more minute, or more conscientious than the care that some of these proprietors take, but we have no security; they are here to-day, and they may be gone to-morrow. True, there are some very good men; and perhaps we might be content with what we have, and not endeavour to effect any alteration; but the licence by the death of one proprietor may pass into the hands of another, and he might act upon totally different principles: and you have ever to contend with that vicious principle of profit. Now, if you read our Acts of Parliament, it will be seen that half of the provisions are made to enable the Commissioners to fight against the selfishness of persons who open these asylums. After perpetual anxiety and trouble, we may manage to get an asylum into a

decent condition; and while we are in the presence of this vicious principle, we keep it down. We direct certain things to be done in a house, and very often there is an appearance of their being done; but when we turn our backs, that principle which we have curbed by our presence recommences its active operations; and we cannot have any security whatever that justice will be done to the patients, because we cannot dog the thing day by day, or hour by hour, and know that every condition is fulfilled. Where a proprietor is unprincipled, see what advantages he has, and what power he has over his patient. It is in vain to trust to the case-book; for, as I read in a letter from a medical man the other day, he says that the case-books can be and are very frequently 'cooked.' When a certain diet, for instance, is prescribed, what security is there that that diet is given? We know that a certain course of medicine is necessary; but what security is there that that course of medicine is undergone by the patient? And it is therefore in their power to retard the cure of the patients indefinitely, and the temptation is inordinately great; and it is more than human nature can ordinarily stand. There are some cases in which the patients are paying from 400*l.* to 500*l.* and 600*l.* a year; and the loss of one or two of those patients would be a dead loss—a loss of the most serious kind—and one that would fall very heavily upon the condition of an establishment; for the proprietor is by no means secure that another patient, able to pay an equal amount, will come to take the place of the one he has lost. I remember one instance, not very long ago, where a patient was paying no less than 1200*l.* a year; and I am certain that the expense of that patient in the house was not 300*l.* a year; so that was 900*l.* a year clear profit to the medical man. You sometimes see it paraded that such and such a patient has the benefit of a carriage. I do not much believe it. It sometimes happens that they get a drive when the doctor has taken his drive; but as to the permanent use of a carriage, I am sure that very rarely happens. But in that case, where 1200*l.* a year is paid, I say that there is the strongest temptation to retain that patient. It is not necessary to be under such influences, that the medical man should be a person of actually dishonest intentions; but when there is temptation such as that, can the Committee not imagine all the self-delusions that a man would practise, and the disaffection with which he would look upon any returning symptom of health? how he would consider that the matter required further consideration, and so retard the period of the discharge, if it ever took place? I am certain that the temptation is so great, that few people could resist it. I do not believe that any person could, in fact, resist it. *I am certain that I could not resist it; and therefore I feel very strongly that some control or check must be put upon the present system*" (p. 56).

Of course, the frank statement of his Lordship, that if he were similarly circumstanced to the proprietor of a private asylum, he could not resist the temptation of making as great a profit as possible out of his patients, without regard to their welfare, at once puts a stop to serious argument upon his assertions;

but we must demur to the conclusion that, *because* he unfortunately could not resist temptation, and might not be (as Sir Erskine Perry phrased it in a subsequent question respecting proprietors of asylums) "actuated by the ordinary motives which actuate human conduct, viz., to succeed with his patient, and thereby give evidence of his skill and ability," therefore it was necessary to have additional legislative control over the present system of private asylums. We may, however, add, that we should have a greater confidence in his Lordship's probity under temptation than he himself seems to entertain; for even admitting that (as his Lordship would soften the matter) a man may slide almost unintentionally into wrong, the act is, after all, one of rank and indefensible dishonesty, and one that could not suggest itself for a moment to a pure-minded, honourable, and Christian man. The Earl of Shaftesbury, we believe, greatly under-estimated his own moral powers of resistance when he made this statement.

As to the positive statements made in the answer we have just quoted, but few remarks are requisite. How does it happen that so serious a matter as the falsification of case-books is mentioned by the Chairman of the Commission in Lunacy upon the vague authority of an unnamed medical man? The Commissioners have the power, and it is their peculiar duty, to institute inquiries into charges of this kind. Why was no inquiry made into the charge paraded by his Lordship, or if made, why were not the results laid before the Committee, and not a vague and, in the mode in which it was put, unwarrantable charge? Again, of the case mentioned by his Lordship as paying 1200*l.* a year, he says,—*"I am certain that the expense of that patient in the house was not 300*l.* a year; so that was 900*l.* a year clear profit to the medical man."* But in his answer to query 914, his Lordship states, doubtless speaking of the same case, *"I have in my mind an instance where a lady paid 1200*l.* a year to the proprietor of an asylum, and I am quite sure, when we visited her, the sum expended upon her did not amount to 400*l.*, leaving a clear 700*l.* or 800*l.* a year profit."* (p. 100.) These statements might be very well left to tell their own tale, but we will add that, as the Commissioners must know, when payments of unusual magnitude are made for the care of patients, they usually represent the magnitude of the responsibility involved in the case, and of this responsibility and its money-value the friends of the patient may be conceived to be the best judges. Moreover, the Commissioners have no difficulty in obtaining the fullest information respecting the treatment and care of private patients; and Lord Shaftesbury might, if he had wished it, have obtained the minutest knowledge of the *cost* (apart from all estimates for pro-

fessional emolument) of the case he referred to, and thus have ascertained how ridiculously erroneous his own estimates are. It is no explanation of the course his Lordship took, that he could not place any confidence in returns made to him by interested parties; for it is evident that his own statements are simply guesses.

Now, we protest against opinions and statements such as those we have quoted from the evidence of Lord Shaftesbury being obtruded into the midst of a grave and important inquiry. That they are unsupported by any evidence worthy of consideration, and that they are calculated to impede effective legislation for the better care and treatment of lunatics, by the substitution of *surmises*, and of partial and unguarded statements of facts for carefully ascertained data, thus leading public opinion astray, is evident. And if mere suspicions of any class of men are to take the place of serious argument, where shall we draw a limit to the exercise of this double-edged and indefensible method of reasoning, if reasoning it may be termed?

We have but to turn to another portion of the evidence given before the Committee, to ascertain to what it would tend.

Mr. Bolden, the honorary solicitor to the Alleged Lunatics Society, being asked, respecting asserted wilfully inaccurate copies of medical certificates of Lunacy—

“Have you any copy of that kind, or can you produce any certificate which was so inaccurately copied, that if the original had been taken by itself it would not have justified the reception of a patient, but if taken with the copy it was so altered as to justify that reception?” He replied, “I cannot. The only certificates that you can ever see are the copies that are obtained from the Commissioners in Lunacy, and *those copies the Commissioners take care are quite sufficient to justify the detention.*” (Qy. 2674, p. 222.)

Again, Admiral Saumarez, the chairman of the Alleged Lunatics Society, being asked, in reference to the power possessed by the Commissioners of granting permission to visit patients in private asylums,—“Do you mean that any person who wished to visit a patient within the metropolitan district would not have full opportunity of going to any of the Commissioners and ascertaining from them whether such a visit might be reasonably allowed or not?” replied, “Yes; *but they are not altogether an independent party, and it would be almost a charge against their surveillance to suppose that any individual is confined improperly without their knowledge in an asylum, and therefore I would give the public some further protection than the Commissioners in Lunacy. I do not think the Commissioners in Lunacy are fit and proper persons to have that power, because, as I have already stated, they are interested parties.*” (Qy. 2785, p. 231.)

Let us now give attention to the more important portions of Lord Shaftesbury's evidence, avoiding as far as practicable the sequences of the opinions we have quoted, and premising that a considerable part of the evidence consists of full details of the duties of the Commissioners in Lunacy, the mode in which they are carried out, and the enactments under which they are performed.

One of the first points of general interest upon which his Lordship was questioned was, the source of the great increase in the number of *known* lunatics which had taken place between 1845 and 1858. Did this increase arise from an actual increase in the number of lunatics in the kingdom, or was it apparent only, and dependent upon the greater provision made for, and the greater care given to lunatics, during the period named, in consequence of which many previously unknown and unrecognised cases were brought to light? His Lordship is inclined to answer in the affirmative; but, in addition, he expresses the opinions that, (1) as regards the pauper classes, while he believes that there is an actual increase of insanity among them due to increase of population, yet that that increase is not "by any means in proportion to the increase of population;" and (2) that as regards "persons a degree above pauperism," and "the classes beginning with the trading classes and persons keeping small huckster's shops, and rising to the highest vocations in life," he cannot "but hazard the opinion," to use his own expression, "although I dare say many will differ from me, that if there is not an actual increase of insanity, there is developed a very considerable tendency towards it." (Qs. 49, 51, 59.)

Mr. Gaskell, one of the Medical Commissioners in Lunacy, is inclined to attribute the increase in known lunacy to the prolongation of the life of lunatics in our asylums, in which "the annual mortality was perhaps 12, 14, or 15 per cent. formerly," but "it is now reduced to 10 per cent." (Qs. 14, 36.)

There can be little doubt that the causes assigned by Lord Shaftesbury and Mr. Gaskell have contributed greatly to the increase of known lunacy in the kingdom, but we are still left in the dark as to the extent to which these causes have influenced the increase, and until this be determined we cannot, with our present data, decide upon the increase or not of insanity, either among the population at large, or among any section of the population. Hence Lord Shaftesbury's speculations upon the rate of increase of insanity among paupers, and the state of insanity among the classes of the population above pauperism, are entirely hypothetical. His Lordship is, however, thoroughly aware of the doubtfulness of his opinion upon the increase of lunacy in the country, for he says—"I am almost afraid of giving an opinion, as it may

be the commencement of the most awful controversy, for there is a great difference of opinion on that point, because all the data preceding the year 1845 are so very indistinct, and even subsequently to that, they are so few, and so mixed up with all those old chronic cases, that it is difficult to say what has been the increase." (Qy. 51.) Under these circumstances we deeply regret that his Lordship did not content himself with pointing out to the Committee the defective state of our present statistics of insanity, the impossibility of determining the important question of the increase of insanity or not until the defects had been removed, and what was wanting for the removal of the defects.

The approach of the Census of 1861 at once directs attention to the only method by which an accurate knowledge of the amount of insanity, and an accurate basis for the calculation of its progress in the kingdom, can be obtained, and we had hoped to have heard this urged to the Committee, and to have witnessed his Lordship's influence, and that of the Commission in Lunacy, brought to bear in bringing about the sole possible mode of obtaining proper data for solving a much debated and exceedingly important question—a question, indeed, of growing importance, both scientifically and practically.

In a subsequent part of his examination, Lord Shaftesbury expressed the opinion, when speaking of the untrustworthy character of the records we possess relative to the mortality and recoveries of the insane as a means of comparison concerning the character and results of different asylums, that—

"It would be very desirable if we could have proper statistics on insanity drawn up and put upon a good footing. It would require great trouble and expense; but I think it would be worth the trouble and expense, if it could be put into the hands of some competent persons; and I have no doubt that some most remarkable results would be brought out. In our department we have got a great deal too much to do; the Commissioners are constantly at work, and the clerks too." (Qy. 263.)

This is so far well. But we do not want remarkable results; we want the ordinary A B C results of insanity statistics which we do not yet possess. We do not want, moreover, a huge, expensive inquiry into existing statistics; that would be of little or no value. We want a scheme of insanity statistics which might form a portion of the ordinary returns, and govern many of the returns, to the Commissioners; which would take its proper place in the legitimate working of the Commission; and which for the future would furnish us with trustworthy and regular information. Such a scheme would have to emanate from a qualified worker in statistics; it is quite practicable, and might be put in operation without extraordinary difficulty; and it would doubtless require

little other expense, for its regular carrying out, than would be involved in an additional clerk to the Commission. Let a scheme of this kind be developed, and let us obtain a basis of knowledge respecting the insanity of the whole kingdom in the next Census, and we may look forward to the probability of being able, at a comparatively early period, to avoid the slough of vagueness into which every one is plunged who ventures to meddle with insanity statistics.

The want of reliable data reduces also, very considerably, the value of his Lordship's opinions on the causes of insanity. He attributes "one-half and perhaps more" (Qy. 51) of the cases of insanity among the poorer classes to intemperance, and quotes several medical authorities in support of the opinion that intemperance is a powerful cause of insanity. He also seeks to explain the assumed decreasing rate of insanity among the poor, by further assuming a decrease of intemperate habits; but it will be early enough to discuss this point when the prior assumption is proved to be worthy of credence. It is also unnecessary to seek with his Lordship, in the excitable state of society among the classes above pauperism, a cause of an increased tendency to, or actual increase of, insanity, until the one or the other is shown to exist. As to other causes of insanity, general or special, we must quote from the evidence.

61. *Sir George Grey.*—After deducting 50 per cent. of the cases which are attributable to drunkenness, is there any other one prominent cause by which to account for the insanity of any large proportion of the other 50 per cent. ?—There is sometimes a strong hereditary predisposition; a good many come from accidents and blows upon the head.

62. You cannot indicate any one cause to account for any large proportion of the other 50 per cent. ?—No.

63. I presume they would be attributable to a great variety of causes ?—Yes, but I do not remember any one cause of equal importance to that of intoxication.

64. *Chairman.*—What is the predominant cause among the richer class of lunatics ?—It appears to be a disordered imagination, hereditary predisposition, the pursuit of money, disappointed ambition, or great losses in trade, and sometimes you will find it from over-work.

65. *Mr. Tite.* And from religious excitement ?—No. Am I to understand the Honourable Member to ask whether religion is the cause of madness ?

66. *Mr. Tite.* Yes; enthusiasm ?—

67. *Chairman.* Have you any tabular statement that will show the different causes of insanity, and the proportions of the cases arising from those causes ?—We have papers; we have a full account of all the patients, and a full account of the causes, so far as we can ascertain, of their madness.

68. Are these accounts analysed and arranged ?—No; but we could furnish them to the Committee.

69. *Mr. Tite.* My question did not mean religious excitement in

the ordinary sense of the word, but different classes appear to me more divided upon religion than they were; has that, in your opinion, led to insanity?—That is one of the most important questions that can be put, and I am very glad that the Honourable Member has put that question, because I think there are two or three observations to be made upon it, which may tend to remove a good deal of misunderstanding upon the subject. I, of course, should have very great diffidence in speaking upon this question, if it were purely a medical question; but it is a moral question, and therefore any non-professional person, any layman who gives his mind and heart to this subject, has as much right to speak upon it as all the physicians put together; and I do not hesitate to say, as the result of my experience, that I have never seen a case, and I have never heard of a case, in which a person has gone mad caused by the influence of religion; and when I say by the influence of religion, I mean the true Gospel spirit of true Christianity. I do not mean that a person may not have been turned aside by some strange notion, that some ignorant timid person having taken up some obscure and mysterious point of religion, and looking at it constantly and exclusively, may not have become disordered in his reason; but religion, taken as the pure Gospel, I will never believe has had the slightest effect in producing any aberration of reason whatever.

Now we are prepared to go with his Lordship hand and heart in any raid he is desirous to make upon intemperance, but we are not disposed to lay aside prudence in so doing. If the statistics of insanity would aid us in scotching (we do not hope to kill) the evil, we should gladly avail ourselves of them, but still decline to rush so hastily with them to the front as to leave our flank and rear entirely exposed. We are inclined to attribute a very important place to intemperance as a determining cause of insanity, but if we were to elevate it above hereditary influence, or to give it the prominent position which Lord Shaftesbury does, and make it the remote cause of the predisposition to insanity among certain classes of the population (Qy. 52) as well as the primary exciting cause, we should fear to weaken our argument by stating what we could not satisfactorily support, and thus lay ourselves open to disregard when we sought for respect. But why, upon a subject of such great interest, should we have any unnecessary vagueness, if, as his Lordship states, the Commissioners in Lunacy “have a full account of all the patients, and a full account of the causes, so far as we can ascertain, of their madness?” Why should his Lordship have contented himself with a doubtful, and, indeed, in great measure speculative answer, and refer to data collected many years ago, when the question touched upon the present time, and the materials for a tolerably positive reply were accessible to him? It is to be regretted that the Committee did not ask for the return proffered by his Lordship, and we trust when again called together they may do this, for an account

of the *assigned* causes of insanity throughout England and Wales for a definite period would be of great interest.

Not having the clue to what Lord Shaftesbury means by "the true Gospel spirit of true Christianity," we cannot enter with any benefit into the discussion which he starts respecting the influence of religion as a cause of insanity. The signification of the term religious enthusiasm, or religious exaltation, as used by medical men to express an occasional cause of insanity, is tolerably well understood, and is not usually supposed to convey any disrespect of religion. Perhaps the best commentary upon Lord Shaftesbury's remarks on the causes of insanity is a return made by the French Asylums in 1853, and recently published among other returns relative to insanity in France, by the Imperial Government. We quote M. Brierre de Boismont's summary of the most important points of the return referred to, partly for brevity's sake, and partly for the additional remarks on the value of asylum returns on the causes, and on intemperance as a cause, of insanity.

"Of 2883 lunatics in 1853, hereditary predisposition is stated to have existed in 1410 men and 1470 women. Of 1000 lunatics, the cause of insanity was said to be physical in 572, and moral in 428. We have already remarked upon the necessity of living in intimacy with the insane, in order to obtain a correct knowledge on this subject; and that the inexact information obtained in asylums, both public and private, reduces very much the value of the figures referring to heritage and other causes. There are also other objections in regard to the physical causes, because it is evident that drunkenness, bereavement, and misery have a double meaning. The man who, for example, drinks to stupify his grief and becomes insane, at first acts under the influence of a moral cause. Accidental suppression of menses (150) and puerperal insanity (150), in a great number of cases, arise from moral impressions.

"Among moral causes, the most frequent is grief arising from the loss of money; 899 cases of insanity are attributed to this cause, which is, by comparison with the total figure of moral causes, a proportion of more than 12 per cent. Afterwards come religious exaltation (894), love (792), violent emotions (698), pride (600), the loss of a loved one (510), disappointed ambition (495), jealousy (442), political events (308), excess in intellectual work (156), *simple* imprisonment (154), nostalgia (48), isolation and solitude (41), change of life (32), association with and assiduous attention upon the insane (16), *cellular* imprisonment (4)."

In the official returns, out of 9764 cases assigned to physical causes, 2594 are attributed to epilepsy and convulsions, and 1502 to drunkenness.†

* "Journal of Psychological Medicine." No. XIV., N. S. p. 304.

† "Statistique des Etablissements d'Alienes de 1842 à 1853 inclusivement," 1857, p. xxxix.

We have already quoted a sufficiency of Lord Shaftesbury's evidence on private asylums to show with what feelings of animosity he regards those institutions. It is now needful that we should know what suggestions he makes for the diminution or removal of the evils which he regards to be all but inseparable from them. We may state first, however, that his Lordship is of opinion that "the state of licensed houses, and the condition of the poorer patients" in them, have been "*inconceivably*" improved of late years (Qy. 157); and we may also remark that he also states that the chief obstacles to their thorough reform (apart from the "principle of profit") are constantly diminishing (Qy. 103).

Notwithstanding that Lord Shaftesbury is disposed to regard a medical man's *opinion*, as a general rule, of no greater value than that of a sensible layman, yet it is requisite to name that, in so far as the *care* of the insane is concerned, he considers that the medical man should be all-powerful. Thus his Lordship being asked, "Is it not the fact, that in the case where the medical man is under the proprietor, he is, in fact, liable to be very much influenced by the proprietor of the asylum?"—he replied, "There is no doubt about it; and it is not the true position that a medical man ought to occupy. The medical profession stands too high to be placed in that position; and they are under influences which they cannot resist. I have reason to speak in the highest terms of estimation of some of the medical men in charge of asylums; and I can only deeply deplore that they are not placed in their true position" (Qy. 94). Again, being asked whether (Qy. 95) "The medical man ought to be a kind of inspector and check upon the proprietor?"—he replied, "And more than that; he ought to be lord paramount in the asylum."

Badly as Lord Shaftesbury thinks of private asylums, and vicious as he considers the principles upon which they are worked, he would not, however, do away with them altogether; but he would diminish their operations as far as practicable, by the establishment of self-supporting asylums for the middle and higher classes of society. But it is necessary to quote his Lordship's evidence upon this point—

"507. * * * * I now speak with reference to that large class of society which begins just above pauperism, and goes on to the highest in the land. All the difficulties in legislation arise out of that particular class; we have none with respect to the management of the paupers in the county asylums; they go on very well. There is nothing in them but the ordinary decay, and the difficulty that arises in all institutions out of occasional ignorance and mismanagement. If you had establishments of that kind, asylums or public hospitals, I should like to say chartered asylums, you would find that they would be precisely the reverse of those I have mentioned. First of all, there

would be a total absence of that motive which constitutes the vicious principle of the present licensed houses, there would be no desire or view to profit of any sort.

"508. *Chairman.*] Do you suggest that there should be no private asylums of any sort or kind, and would you absolutely prohibit them by law?—No, certainly not. I would leave them, and leave it to the public to choose which kind of asylum they wished to go to. I have no doubt that a certain number of those licensed houses would continue, and I dare say that persons, from peculiar notions of their own, would resort to such asylums. I would allow them to continue, and I would also have, as you have public asylums for paupers, houses on a public footing for persons in a better condition of life.

"509. Would you have them in every part of the kingdom, as you have public asylums for paupers?—Yes. These asylums would be quite free from all those vicious motives that have been referred to in the licensed houses. There would be no eager desire to take the people in, and no desire whatever to stint them in any one way, and so far from there being a desire to retain them, they would run rather into the other extreme, for there would be rather a desire to turn them out; because I think there would be such a pressure upon them that their only anxiety would be to make room for others by turning some out.

"510. *Sir George Grey.*] Before your Lordship fully states the results which you anticipate, will you define how they will be maintained, whether at the public expense, or from local funds, and under what control they will be placed?—I will. I was going to add that these asylums would be free from all the objections which exist to licensed private houses. The example which I principally should follow would be the example of Scotland. In Scotland, the chartered asylums have existed for a certain number of years, and they have been productive of the very greatest benefit. We have a certain number of institutions similar to them in England, and they are called hospitals. Hospitals in England are founded upon private funds. The chartered asylums in Scotland are also founded upon private funds. I do not think that any one of them, except that at Morningside, has ever received a grant, and I think that it received 2000*l.* out of some of the forfeited estates in the year 1745, and to what extent they have been considered satisfactory to the people of Scotland I will show: of 833 private patients, placed in asylums in Scotland, 652 are in chartered asylums, and only 230 in licensed houses. The contrast in this respect between Scotland and England is very striking. By the last Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy, it appears that there were 4442 private patients in asylums in England and Wales; of those, 2746 are in private asylums, and 1696 are in public hospitals; these latter comprising 669 patients in Bethlehem, St. Luke's, and Guy's Hospital, and the Institution for Idiots. Then it goes on to show how popular they are, and how beneficial they have been, in every sense of the word, and how they have provided the very best care and treatment of the patients, and that it has been done at a very low figure compared with the cost of other establishments.

"511. You have not stated where the funds come from?—Those are founded upon private contributions.

"512. *Sir George Grey.*] Sustained by private endowments?—Yes.

"517. *Chairman.*] What you wish for is an encouragement for the endowment of hospitals for lunatics?—Yes; to be founded in two ways, either, as in Scotland, and in some parts of England, by private contributions, and we have 11 hospitals in England also so founded, or, as in England, in respect to borough and county asylums, upon the public rates. I think it would be sufficient only to make known the want, and I have no doubt the money would flow in: but I would give in the Bill a permissive clause to counties for the purpose of founding these asylums entirely for the reception of the middle class patients.

"518. *Mr. Drummond.*] Do you mean to be annexed to others?—Not necessarily so.

"519. *Sir George Grey.*] A permissive power to found them out of the county rate?—Yes; it would not require that the county should do more than give the guarantee of its rates; it would not be necessary that the county should expend a farthing, in fact it would incur no hazard of its own whatever. But then it should have a power to erect an asylum of that description; I would leave the governing power, the initiating power, just the same as with regard to the county asylums, with the magistrates in quarter sessions, or it might be vested in the visiting justices of the present county asylums, who, having considered all matters, might, with the consent of the magistrates in quarter sessions, if they thought it desirable to institute such an asylum, merely take the guarantee of the rates, to raise the necessary sum of money upon the guarantee of the rates, and raise the money at 6½ per cent., the whole interest and principal being thus paid off in 30 years. The thing would be self-supporting, and the moment the asylum was opened it would be filled with patients, some of a higher class and some of an inferior class, who would pay the whole expense; their payments would cover not only the 6½ per cent., but the whole expense of carrying on the institution, the care and maintenance of the inmates, and all the salaries and everything else.

"520. Might not that interfere with their being founded by voluntary contributions like hospitals for any other disease?—The voluntary principle has its limits, and I think that the voluntary principle on this head has reached its utmost limits in England. It has founded 11 hospitals that have worked well, but the voluntary principle has not gone any further, and I do not think it is likely that any more will be founded."

His Lordship contemplates that the cost of keeping a patient in one of these institutions might be reduced to 15s. a-week, the cost in a private asylum being from 35s. to 40s.; that with this diminished cost all the benefits of a well-managed public asylum might be obtained, and the disadvantages and evils of a private one avoided; and that these advantages would be placed within reach of persons who cannot afford to pay the costs of a private

asylum, and yet wish to avoid the humiliation of consigning a lunatic relative or friend to a pauper establishment.

Dr. Conolly's evidence upon chartered asylums will form a fitting note to Lord Shaftesbury's suggestion.

"1956. Have you considered the system that is pursued in Scotland in the chartered asylums, basing these asylums for the middle classes on a public foundation as they do?—Yes, I believe that some of them are very excellent institutions, but I do not very much approve; indeed, I more than doubt the propriety of having patients belonging to the higher classes and pauper patients in the same institution.

"1957. You think it would be desirable if public institutions for the middle classes could be established in this country?—Most desirable.

"1958. To supersede the private asylums altogether?—Not exactly that; I mean for persons who cannot afford to pay, say 100*l.* or 50*l.* a year. There is scarcely a week in a year in which people do not apply to me either about a daughter, perhaps a governess, or a young man with a small salary, and they cannot pay the necessary expense of the cheapest asylum, and the friends are reduced to ruin by it; it often happens in the families of the clergy, and such cases have occurred to me over and over again.

"1959. *Chairman.*] In that class of cases no asylum could pay its own way without voluntary contributions?—I believe none; there are but few asylums where we can now send them like Northampton and Coton Hill; but many more such institutions are very much wanted.

"1960. *Sir George Grey.*] The Committee have been informed that there are eleven such now existing in England. Have you had any personal experience in the management of those institutions?—Yes, I have seen something of the one at Northampton, and a little of that at Coton Hill, near Stafford, and I have the highest opinion of both.'

It is simply necessary to add to this quotation that, while Dr. Conolly points to a want which our private asylums cannot, and our public asylums do not, provide for, but which might be obviated by the establishment of asylums capable of meeting the requirements of persons of contracted means; Lord Shaftesbury seeks to provide, in the first instance at the public cost, asylums which would accommodate alike those of contracted and those of abundant means. The one scheme would probably be a feasible plan to attain a well-defined and clearly requisite object; the other, while including this object, would aim also at one the necessity for which has not been shown.

The next topic which demands our attention refers more or less to the medical certificate of insanity which is requisite before a lunatic can be confined in a private asylum.

The Chairman of the Committee put the following question (qy. 185):—

"The medical man, if he be the proprietor of the house, has a direct interest, if the patient be rich, not to part with him. If there is no doubt about the facts, which is the most important part of the whole proceeding, is it not necessary that there should be some authority who might be put in motion by the relations independent of the medical superintendent of the house, who might be interested in keeping a patient in, in order to see the Commissioners were rightly informed with reference to the case of a patient who was confined?"

To this Lord Shaftesbury replied :—

"If you could devise such a personage as that, it would no doubt be beneficial, but you must be careful, while you are endeavouring to protect the patient, that you do not throw too great impediments in the way of his being put under proper care; for, not only are the public to be protected, but even in the interests of the patient you must not multiply the difficulty in determining the point when a person should be deprived of his natural liberty, and be subject to restraint and medical treatment. If you wait until the symptoms are so clear and so developed that there can be no doubt about it, then you will have waited till such a time that the man is probably become an incurable patient; but if the case be taken in time, when the symptoms are only discernible to an experienced eye, and when they would not be discernible to an inexperienced one, the probability is that the man will be cured, and will return to society in the course of a very short time. It is a curious thing, but it is the result of very long experience, and I am sure the Committee will find that all my brother Commissioners will concur in it, *that however imperfect the certificate is, in a great variety of respects, remember in the first place it is the only document that you have to go on, and therefore you must, to a very great extent, rest upon it; but nevertheless there are very few instances; I do not think, in my experience of nearly thirty years, a single case, or not more than one or two cases, in which any person has been shut up without some plausible grounds for his or her temporary confinement; but in every instance, with these exceptions, there have certain plausible grounds in facts and in logic, sufficient to justify the temporary confinement of the persons and their being submitted to medical treatment.* I believe that very few have been really shut up without cause, but I have no doubt that very many indeed have been detained beyond the time when they might have been set at liberty; I hope, however, that we are reducing the number every day, yet I have no doubt that many are detained a long time beyond the period when they should be set at liberty.

"186. *Mr. Tite.*] But who were not received improperly originally?—No.

"187. *Mr. Coningham.*] Do you mean detained by interested parties?—Yes, detained by proprietors, or detained through the non-intervention of their friends; but such is the melancholy condition of patients, that from the moment a patient is struck by this affliction of Providence, from that hour he becomes, civilly and morally, dead in respect to his relatives."

We presume that no one will question his lordship's position respecting the inadvisability of throwing unnecessary impediments in the way of the early treatment of lunatics, yet it is to the persistent misapprehension of the efforts made by medical men to bring about this early treatment, that several of the most important difficulties of lunacy legislation are due; and this must be so if, as in Lord Shaftesbury's evidence, mere suspicions of the most offensive character are to be permitted to take the place of facts, and to overlay all that the medical proprietors of asylums, and medical practitioners in general, have done for the amelioration of the care and treatment of the insane. "If you wait," says his Lordship, "until the symptoms are so clear and so developed that there can be no doubt about it, then you will have waited till such a time that the man is probably become an incurable patient." But *who* is to decide upon the incipient symptoms of lunacy necessitating treatment, if, as his Lordship asserts (with what consistency we have already seen), *the opinion of a sensible layman upon the symptoms of lunacy is of greater value than that of a medical man* (Qy. 192); or if his Lordship's views concerning insanity are to be taken as our guide.

"193. *Mr. Coningham.*] Insanity is always accompanied, is it not, by a morbid condition of the brain?—It may be so or not; still it is not always apparent. Insanity is often accompanied with bodily derangements and symptoms which the medical man alone can deal with; but it is not in all cases the object so much to determine whether a man is out of his mind or not, as to tell whether a man, although being a little queer, as it is called, is capable of managing his own affairs. A man is not to be shut up because he is eccentric, or somewhat strange. If a man is altogether harmless, capable of taking care of himself, and of managing his own affairs, and not in an early stage of the disorder, there is no reason why that man should be shut up.

"194. But insanity is invariably accompanied, is it not, by a morbid condition of the brain?—I am afraid of going into that question. Many men say that there is such a thing as moral insanity, which is not connected with any functional disorder. However that may be, it is clear that the value of the certificate must depend upon the experience of the people so sign it."

If the dicta contained in the answer to Query 193 are to guide us, of course the early treatment of cases of insanity would be rendered an impossibility, and an asylum would become solely a house of detention for chronic and incurable lunatics.

As may be imagined, from what we have already said, his Lordship does not entertain a high opinion of the value of the medical certificate, as a *medical* certificate. His remarks upon this point are worth noting, as they show good reason for the greater cul-

tivation of the study of mental disorders among medical men, but they also afford another example of his Lordship's inconsequent method of reasoning.

"197. *Sir Erskine Perry.*] But your Lordship does not consider this medical certificate of much intrinsic value, as the medical men know no more of lunacy than any other educated men in society?—In many cases they do not; if you were to look at many of these certificates, and read the reasons which are assigned by them, you would think that some of them were less capable than many others in society.

"198. Then what is the value of such a certificate?—Many of these medical men do not judge from their medical knowledge, but from their general experience of mankind. They see a person, and they see that he is mad; but some of them may give very bad reasons, although their conclusions may be just, for shutting him up.

"199. Then if it be as well to have the certificate from some educated man, a medical man is as good as any one you can get?—Yes; they will always ascertain whether there is any functional disorder.

"200. *Chairman.*] They are at any rate as good as any other men, for they possess knowledge which other men have not?—Yes. As I said before, the certificate has been on the whole very efficacious, and I think, as I said before, that not more than one or two cases have been admitted into asylums without a foundation."

The chief point with which we have to do in this quotation is the reiteration of the opinion that few unnecessary or unjustifiable certificates of insanity have been given by medical men. This may well lead to a doubt whether any benefit would result either to the patient or to his friends from requiring that any other precautions against improper confinement than those already in vogue should be had recourse to. Lord Shaftesbury states that the establishment of *medical examiners* who should examine and countersign the certificates within a brief period after a patient's removal to an asylum, was suggested by the Commissioners "*only as an expedient, with a view of satisfying public feeling, and not with any hope that it would really be effective*" (Qy. 81); and subsequently his Lordship states, "I do not see any necessity for it" (that is for the appointment of medical examiners: Query 823). But surely the public would be better satisfied with the facts and proofs, which the Commissioners apparently have at command, and which would show that individuals were already sufficiently guarded against being unduly confined, than with suggestions for useless and expensive legislation?

Mr. Bolden (Queries 2625—29) proposes to give greater security to the public through the magistrates. He suggests that no lunatic should be admitted into an asylum unless the certificates were accompanied by the warrant of a magistrate, who should have the power of satisfying himself of the necessity for the confinement. The sheriff exercises a judicial function of this

kind in Scotland, but from the first Report of the Scotch Commissioners in Lunacy, we learn that from the exercise of this function, a serious impediment is often thrown in the way of the early treatment of cases, and that, indeed, the evils arising out of the arrangement far outweigh the good. The Commissioners do not, however, advise that the sheriff's authority in regard to lunatics should be entirely done away with, but that it should be so far modified as not to interpose any obstacle to the immediate reception of cases into asylums when requisite. The Scotch experience is in reality far from favourable to the exercise of a power such as that which Mr. Bolden would vest in a magistrate.

A suggestion of Lord Shaftesbury's, having reference to the prevention of unnecessary detention of lunatics, is worthy of consideration, and would seem to be well-calculated to give increased confidence to the public. He says :—

"201. * * * The only suggestion that I can make with regard to the certificate is this, that supposing the present system to go on, I think that some benefit would be gained by granting in the first instance a certificate for only three months; now it is granted in perpetuity, so long as the patient is under the disorder; but in the first instance, I would have it given for only three months, and I think the effect would be to compel a revision of the case by the family or friends; the relatives would then be obliged to look again into the matter, as they would know that in all probability, if they did not do so, the patient would be returned upon their hands.

"202. In order to justify the retention of a patient for more than three months, that form of certificate would have to be gone through again?—Yes, but only in the first instance; I should not have it every three months; I should say that it would be necessary at the end of the first three months after the detention that the certificate should be reviewed. That I know was the opinion of Dr. Heberden in 1815, when he gave evidence before the House of Lords."

His Lordship laid considerable stress upon the value of a power which would have been given to the Commissioners, by Mr. Walpole's proposed amendment of the Lunacy Law, and by which they might authorise the provisional discharge of patients from asylums for periods say, of two, four, or six months, the original certificates of insanity remaining in force during the interval. This power doubtless would prove of no small benefit.

The condition of single patients in private houses was entered into tolerably fully during Lord Shaftesbury's examination, and his Lordship spoke even more unfavourably of the position of lunatics so circumstanced than of those in private asylums. He asserted that he had reasons for the belief that many of the single patients, "of whom we (the Commissioners) know nothing, are in a very bad ('most frightful.' Qy. 354) condition" (Qy. 280); but when asked for the grounds of this belief, his

Lordship quoted examples from the year 1846—a period when the powers of the Commissioners in Lunacy had hardly come into operation, which powers were specifically designed, among other things, to remedy the then acknowledged ill-treatment of single patients! If now we turn to his Lordship's evidence as it bears directly upon the state of single patients at the present time, we find as follows:—

“352. *Chairman.*] In the cases that you have recently discovered within the last three years of single houses, where single patients were kept, and where a certificate ought to have been sent to you, but it was not, did you find the treatment particularly bad?—No, not particularly bad; in a few instances we found that there had been a good deal of neglect; the poor patient has been in a miserable isolated state, and very little attended to; in one or two instances they were very well taken care of; but in the vast proportion of instances, I should say, that there was a great deal of neglect, in consequence of people feeling that there was no supervision over them.

“353. It is more a want of sympathy, and the state of isolation in which they are, than any actual cruelty which you believe to be practised towards them?—Exactly so. We did not find any cases of special ill treatment, but we were obliged to take all our evidence from persons interested to give the most favourable representation of the case, while the poor patients could give no evidence in the miserable position in which they are placed, and Heaven alone knows how they are treated.”

Here, then, it would appear that the only evidence his Lordship has to offer in support of his assertions of cruel neglect, are surmises grounded upon suspicions similar to those which formed the basis of his assertions respecting the “indefensible and abominable” character of private asylums. Of the value of these suspicions as evidence, his Lordship has given us the measure, by his frank confession as to their origin (*ante*, p. 384); but we may well ask what good is to arise from raking up events which occurred *many years ago*, and advancing them as illustrations of an *existing state of things*, when we are seeking to know the *present* condition of a class of lunatics, and the mode in which the law operates for their protection—that law having specific provisions to prevent the abominations which Lord Shaftesbury named, and having come into operation since they occurred?

His Lordship thinks that the law should be so extended that a large number of single patients, so-called *nervous* patients, and others not strictly lunatics, but almost verging on lunacy, should come under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners in Lunacy. The addition which his Lordship is desirous of making to the law is as follows:—

“432. * * * ‘Whereas many persons suffer from nervous disorders and other mental affections of a nature and to an extent to incapacitate

them from the due management of themselves and their affairs, but not to render them proper persons to be taken charge of, and detained under care and treatment as insane; and whereas such persons are frequently conscious of their mental infirmity, and desirous of submitting themselves to medical care and supervision, and it is expedient to legalize and facilitate voluntary arrangements for that object so far as may be compatible with the free agency of the persons so affected, be it enacted as follows:—

“Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, it shall be lawful for any duly-qualified medical practitioner, or other person by his direction, to receive and entertain as a boarder or patient any person suffering from a nervous disorder or other mental affection requiring medical care and supervision, but not such as to justify his being taken charge of and detained as a person of unsound mind.

“No person shall be received without the written request in the form, schedule , to this act, of a relative or friend who derives no profit from the arrangement, and his own consent, in writing, in the form in the same schedule, the signatures to which request and consent respectively shall be witnessed by some inhabitant householder.

“The person receiving such patient shall, within two days after his reception, give notice thereof to the Commissioners in Lunacy, and shall at the same time transmit to the Commissioners a copy of the request and consent aforesaid.

“It shall be lawful for one or more Commissioners, at any time after the receipt of such notice as aforesaid, and from time to time, to visit and examine such patient, with a view to ascertain his mental state and freedom of action; and the visiting Commissioner or Commissioners shall report to the Board the result of their examination and inquiries.

“No such patient shall be received into a licensed house.”

“So that we should say that every person, professional or not, who receives a patient into his house, or attends a patient in such circumstances, should notify it to the Commissioners; but we should not require them to notify it until after three months should have elapsed, because a patient might be suffering from brain fever, or a temporary disorder; but I would say that any person accepting or attending a patient in these circumstances should notify it to the Commissioners, after three months shall have elapsed from the beginning of the treatment.

“433. *Sir George Grey.*] Do you think that this would include a class already not included under the general terms of ‘unsound mind,’ the description being, ‘Whereas, many persons suffer from nervous disorders, and other mental affections, of a nature and to an extent to incapacitate them from the management of themselves and their affairs.’ Would not that definition almost be included already in the description of persons of ‘unsound mind?’—The distinction is so very fine-drawn that it is almost impossible to say, for there are many persons in a nervous state, though not of unsound mind, and yet who cannot take the management of their own affairs.

"434. *Sir Erskine Perry.*] It seems to me rather an objection to that form of drawing the clause, that it makes it lawful for any medical man to do so and so, whereas, by the present state of the law, it is lawful for any person to receive any person into his house?—I should not wish to throw any impediment in the way of that; no impediment in the early treatment of cases of that kind; I only want, in giving facilities, to take care that there shall be no abuse.

"435. But it is lawful now for anybody to do it?—We might alter it; it is not drawn with sufficient technicality, no doubt."

It is needless, perhaps, to indicate any other objections to his Lordship's suggestion than those pointed out by Sir George Grey and Sir Erskine Perry; but we may add that we are much afraid it would be necessary to increase greatly the number of Commissioners, if their jurisdiction were to extend to all "nervous" cases, and it would be cruel and monstrous to class the nervous with insane cases and treat them as lunatics.

There is nothing in his Lordship's observations upon criminal lunatics which requires particular notice, but an incidental commentary upon the plea of insanity in criminal cases is deserving of regard:—

"I am unwilling to say, [remarked his Lordship, in reference to the life-confinement of persons who have committed great crimes under the influence of insanity] that in every instance a man should be condemned to imprisonment for life because he had committed, however fearful an act in a sudden aberration of mind. That must be left, I think, to the discretion of the Secretary of State; but then it is becoming more delicate and complicated every day, because, it will be observed, that the medical men who are called to give evidence, in 99 cases out of 100, give evidence in favour of insanity, and *persons who have any great crime to perpetrate know that very well.* I am told that there is one medical man of considerable reputation, who has openly said that it is his rule always to give evidence in favour of insanity, as he has such an opinion of the general misconstruction of the whole human mind; and even when it is not so, see how juries are influenced by the profession. They bring in other arguments which perplex the jury very much, who are told that the man is not absolutely insane, but that he is labouring under the effect of an impulse that he cannot control. I must say that the medical men oftentimes talk an immense amount of nonsense when they come before juries, and I believe that that is the received opinion."—(p. 52.)

We presume that as his Lordship's suspicions and assertions respecting private asylum proprietors were dictated by the consciousness (as he avowed) of what he would do himself if he were in their position; so the last sentence in the preceding quotation was dictated by a consciousness of the nature of his efforts in the preceding portion of his examination to enlighten the committee respecting the nature of insanity. As to his assertion

respecting the particular medical man mentioned in the quotation, it is evident that his lordship has been victimized by a *canard*. We can quietly submit to an implication which involves judge, jury, and the bar in a very comprehensive charge of ignorance ; but what shall we say to the grave assertion that the plea of insanity, as supported by medical men, is an incentive to great crimes ? The assertion is either true or not true. If it be true, there must be evidence in support of it. Where is the evidence ? If it be not true, how must we characterize so unjustifiable an assertion ? The remainder of the paragraph in which the statement is found points too clearly to the kind of evidence (if mere unsupported assertions can be termed evidence) on which Lord Shaftesbury would rest his statement, and as clearly to the opinion which every right thinking man must entertain of it.

On one of the most important portions of his Lordship's evidence, that on the condition of lunatics in workhouses, we shall not dwell, as we have elsewhere noticed at length the recent Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy on that question, and his Lordship's statements were based upon the facts contained in that Report.

A few additional remarks will suffice to bring our notice of Lord Shaftesbury's evidence to a conclusion.

His Lordship urged the importance of raising the character of the attendants who had charge of lunatics, and the necessity that they should receive good and sufficient wages, in order that an intelligent and trustworthy class of people might be secured ; he also suggested that the superannuation of attendants in public asylums should be placed upon a more definite, and in other respects, better footing. He would fix the minimum number of attendants in these asylums at one to every twenty-five patients.

In his remarks upon private attendants his Lordship contrived to introduce a charge against medical practitioners in lunacy, which cannot well be passed unnoticed, but which serves only as another example of the incautious method in which his Lordship's assertions when affecting medical men were made. The character of the assertions will be sufficiently understood by the questions founded upon them in Dr. Sutherland's examination :—

" 2135. I will read this statement to you, 'Several of the London physicians, practising in lunacy, conduct a regular trade in the supply of attendants to medical men and others. They pay them a yearly stipend, and support them when they are not employed ; when they are employed, the physician takes from two-thirds to three-fourths of the attendants' fees for his own profits'—I think I had better state exactly how it is ; the attendants have a regular salary, and when they

go out, they are on the principle exactly of the Nursing Sisters' Institution of Queen's Square, they have double salary, that is, they have fifty guineas instead of twenty-five, and then a sum is certainly given to the asylum they come from, for their board and maintenance, when they return to the asylum.

"2136. *Sir George Grey.*] Do you mean that the attendants themselves receive fifty guineas, when actually employed, instead of twenty-five?—Yes.

"2137. Then what is it that goes to the asylum?—A guinea a week.

"2138. Paid by the attendant, and deducted from the fifty guineas?—No; when they are out, the attendants have a guinea and a half, besides the salary which they have, which is twenty-five guineas a year, they have that half guinea a week per year.

"2139. Is that paid by the proprietors of the asylum?—No, it is paid by the friends who employ them.

"2140. And that goes to the asylum?—A guinea a week goes to the asylum.

"2141. *Colonel Clifford.*] Is it the fact that some of these attendants are in the apparent position of owners of the houses in which the patients are, and that when in that apparent position they pay over a portion of the sum paid for the maintenance of the patient to any medical man?—I believe it was so in former days; and when I commenced practice, I was asked to do it, but I always refused, and in fact I never have received anything but my own professional fees, as any other medical man would receive for attending on his patient.

"2142. You are not aware whether any other medical man has acted on that same principle, and refused?—I do not know.

"2143. *Sir George Grey.*] Is it the case with regard to those payments, when one of these attendants is employed in the service of any family, that he receives from the family a guinea and a half a week, a guinea of it going to himself, and half a guinea to the proprietor of the house?—Just the contrary; the half guinea goes to him, and the guinea to the asylum.

"2144. Does he receive that half guinea in addition to the twenty-five guineas a year salary?—Yes.

"2145. *Sir Erskine Perry.*] Then the salary from the family must be seventy-five guineas a year, and not fifty guineas?—Yes. It is supposed that the proprietors of asylums derive a large profit from this plan, but I know from calculation that it is not so, and that it is done at a loss, when you calculate the wages and the board and lodging of these attendants.

"2146. Can you give the Committee anything like an average of the time during which these attendants are out of employment?—They are generally thrown out of employment in the winter. They are employed more in the spring.

"2147. With regard to the former practice that existed, as to sharing the allowance paid for maintenance with the medical man, you do not know whether the same practice exists now, or have you any reason to believe that it does?—I really do not know."

Lord Shaftesbury's assertions were grounded upon the letter of an unnamed "medical man of great experience in insanity" received on the morning of the second day of his Lordship's examination. Has his Lordship made any inquiry as to the correctness of the statements contained therein? For our own part, we were not aware until we read Dr. Sutherland's answer to query 2141, that the custom there indicated had ever existed; and certainly an example never came under our own observation. But surely we have a right to expect that if statements of the kind referred to are made, that the Commissioners in Lunacy should take at least ordinary trouble to ascertain whether they are correct now or not, or whether they were correct only many years ago, and that such statements should not be mentioned on the irresponsible authority of an unnamed correspondent.

In his remarks upon the Bill, laid before the late Parliament, "to Amend the Laws concerning the providing Lunatic Asylums for Counties and Boroughs, and the Maintenance of Pauper Lunatics," Lord Shaftesbury approved of the power proposed to be given by the Bill to the Secretary of State to effect an annexation between counties and boroughs, without the consent of the Committee of Visitors of the county asylums, as well as to direct that the boroughs provided with accommodation for their lunatics in county asylums shall pay an equitable sum towards the maintenance of such asylums. His Lordship also approved of the remaining sections of the Bill, to wit, that plans, &c., of visitors when not approved by the Quarter Sessions should be submitted to the Secretary of State; that land and buildings may be taken from year to year, on lease, by way of addition to an asylum; that estimates are to accompany the plans which are to be submitted to Commissioners under 16 and 17 Vict. c. 97, s. 45; that visitors of lunatic asylums may contribute to expenses of enlarging or providing burial-grounds; that s. 132, c. 97, 16 and 17 Vict., be repealed in respect to the signification of the word "county" therein (to meet a difficulty which has occurred at Norwich); that a patient may be ordered to be discharged if defective medical certificate be not amended within fourteen days; and that the provisions for the chargeability of pauper lunatics whose settlements cannot be ascertained when found in certain boroughs, 18 and 19 Vict., c. 105, s. 14, be repealed, and other provisions, making such paupers chargeable upon the said boroughs be enacted, as set forth in the bill.

In the course of his remarks, Lord Shaftesbury made one or two suggestions which may be noted. He expressed a desire that a clause should be added "making it part of the duty at the Quarter Sessions to read openly in court the 'entries' which are made by the Commissioners at their several visitations once a year"

(qy. 759). He expressed the opinion that the payment of the medical superintendents of county asylums was much too low, and that he hardly knew an asylum where the salary was adequate to the work done. In this we fully concur with his Lordship, as also in the subsequent remark, "I cannot think that any superintendent ought to receive much less than 500*l.* to 600*l.* a year, besides a house and allowances" (qy. 767). His Lordship expressed in detail his opinions upon the superannuation of attendants and medical officers, affirming that it should be fixed and not left optional to the visitors; and finally we may note that his Lordship considered that the Secretary of State's power should be increased in reference to the enlargement of public asylums, so that some check might be placed upon the indefinite and enormous increase of several of the large county asylums.

His Lordship's remarks upon the Bill to "Amend the Law concerning the Care and Treatment of Lunatics," require only brief notice, as we have already, as will be immediately seen, considered or glanced at the principal points in his Lordship's evidence which touch upon the provisions of the Bill, and require attention.

The first clause of the Bill provides that a licence shall not be granted by Justices of a house for the reception of lunatics without inspection and Report by the Commissioners. This would not supersede the action of the local magistrates, but would give them the benefit of the Commissioners' experience, and is so far good. The second clause provides for an alteration in the form of the licence, which the first clause would necessitate; and the third clause provides that notice of all additions and alterations in licensed houses should be given to the Commissioners. Clauses four to nine inclusive, relate to the appointment of medical examiners; and clauses eleven to fourteen inclusive, detail the duties of the medical examiners, and the mode in which they are to be effected. We have already seen from Lord Shaftesbury's statements, that the appointment of these examiners would probably have no other benefit than that of satisfying public feeling. The tenth clause provides that the copy of order and certificates shall be sent to the Commissioners within twenty-four hours. The 15th clause provides that certain persons are not to sign certificates for the reception of patients, the said persons being the proprietors of or having an interest in licensed houses. This, as we have already remarked, would deprive the public, as a rule, of the most trustworthy, because the most experienced, opinions upon cases of lunacy under circumstances where the said opinions are of most moment, to wit, when required to be stated in a certificate of insanity. The 16th clause provides that a patient may be ordered to be discharged if a defective

medical certificate be not amended within fourteen days ; the 17th provides that patients may be permitted to be absent on trial from hospitals and licensed houses ; the 18th provides that notice of the recovery of a patient shall be given forthwith to the Commissioners ; the 19th, that every house licensed for fifty patients or more, shall have a resident medical practitioner ; that every house licensed for more than thirty, and less than fifty, and having no resident medical man, shall be visited *daily* by a legally qualified practitioner ; and every house licensed for less than thirty, shall be visited by one *thrice* a week, if a medical man be not resident ; the 21st clause defines certain powers to be exercised by the Commissioners or visitors to require more or less frequent medical visitation if necessary ; the 22nd clause provides that licensed houses shall be visited by a single Commissioner once a year in addition to the visits now required, and that every single Commissioner visiting alone shall have the like powers as two Commissioners would have under section 61, 8 and 9 Vict. ; the 24th clause provides that the Commissioners' shall report specially on cases admitted within the year preceding each visit ; the 25th provides that copies of Commissioners' entries in the books of provincial licensed houses shall be sent to the clerk of the visitors ; and the 26th clause provides that the proprietors of licensed houses, and persons having charge of single patients, shall furnish information to the Commissioners as to payment for patients.

Lord Shaftesbury approves of the whole of the clauses, qualifying, as we have seen, his approval respecting medical examiners. His Lordship would, however, add a clause to prevent corrupt agreements between medical men and the proprietors of asylums ; another to make it "compulsory" upon every medical man receiving a patient termed a nervous patient, or any medical man attending a patient called a nervous patient, to communicate the same to "the Commissioners" (qy. 921) ; and also a permissive clause respecting the construction of "middle-class asylums."

To the objections we have already made respecting certain clauses of the Bill, we would add solely a remark respecting the 26th clause. This clause does not provide that on due and sufficient cause being shown warranting the suspicion of neglect of a patient, the Commissioners shall have the power of requiring an account to be submitted to them of the receipts from and expenditure for the patient, but gives them an unlimited power of requiring such accounts to be laid before them, when, how, and for whatever cause they might think fit ! Such a proposition as this evidently emanates from the same suspicious spirit which infects the whole of Lord Shaftesbury's evidence respecting medical men practising in lunacy. It is not a *bonâ fide* provi-

sion, and would, no doubt, if it were enacted, have the same fate as all vexatious legislative provisions ; but, in the meantime, it, and the rest of the clauses of the Bill conceived in the same spirit, would have a diametrically opposite effect to that which they were intended to have. It is surely sufficiently disheartening to the medical practitioner in lunacy to be assailed by foul suspicions which are unsupported by almost a tittle of trustworthy evidence, and which by their vagueness elude all attempts thoroughly to crush them by an appeal to facts ; but when these suspicions are made grounds for legislation, it is clear what must follow. No man of right feeling, honour, and integrity will expose himself to the annoying and harassing consequences which such bungling and disgraceful legislation would certainly entail upon him ; every man who might be exposed to such consequences, but who had any respect for himself, would as soon as possible escape from the questionable, suspected, and degrading position in which he would be placed ; and, as a consequence, the treatment of the unhappy insane would be entirely left to inexperienced persons, and to those with whom mercenary considerations might outweigh all feelings of personal honour. Thus we should have brought about the very state of things implied by the suspicions expressed by Lord Shaftesbury ; there would be a distinct retrograde movement in all that referred to medico-psychological science, and the care and treatment of lunatics ; and the present attempt to benefit the insane by throwing about them more effective legal protection, would become (as it bids fair to be) a *quasi*-philanthropical fiction.

One would, *à priori*, conceive, that all legislative enactments regarding the care and treatment of the insane, should have in contemplation one great essential and important object—viz., to encourage medical men of reputation, practical experience, and of high moral character, to identify and connect themselves with institutions organized for the reception and cure of lunatic patients, by placing confidence in the honesty and integrity of their conduct, and legally protecting them, whilst in the discharge of these trying, anxious, and responsible duties, from all unfair and unjustifiable attacks and aspersions. Alas ! a course the very opposite of this appears to be the one held up for popular admiration and legislative adoption. The design appears to be to *drive* men of character, respectability, and honour out of the speciality, by rendering their position so odious, offensive, and repulsive, that no gentleman who had any respect for himself would think of occupying it. For the misdeeds of one or two delinquents, the whole body of men connected with asylums are made to suffer ! The order of the day is, hunt the “mad-doctors” down ! extend to them no mercy, give them no quarter ! treat

them and legislate for them as a *suspected class*! Is it right, honest, just, and consistent with English notions of fair play, thus to join in the hue and cry against a section of the medical body who, at great pecuniary and personal sacrifices, engage themselves in so thankless, but nevertheless if rightly viewed, honourable and sacred vocation! "Oh," says the Earl of Shaftesbury, "the system of profit vitiates the whole proceeding!" In reply to this disingenuous remark, we ask, whether the bulk of men connected with, and having an interest in, private asylums, are not far above such low mercenary and commercial considerations!

If a physician is, alas! by nature so dishonest, corrupt, and so incapable of being influenced by other than sordid and selfish motives, he has ample opportunities of exhibiting his character in *ordinary* as well as in *special* departments of practice. But is there a man in the ranks of a profession so honourable as that of medicine, who would be guilty of such brutal and villainous conduct? We maintain without fear of contradiction, that there is no kind of justification or excuse for the imputations made against the respectable class of men engaged in this country in the treatment of the insane. It was asserted by the Earl of Shaftesbury, that patients are detained in asylums for considerations of profit longer than their state of health justified! But we ask, upon what *data* does his lordship base so serious an imputation? Who is the best judge, whether a patient has sufficiently recovered to warrant his discharge from control and medical treatment and supervision, the Commissioners who only see him for periods ranging from ten to thirty minutes, four times in the course of the year, or the medical superintendent of the asylum who has the case constantly under his observation, and who is most anxious to send him back into the world cured? Is it not a notorious fact, that a large number of patients who are temporarily removed from asylums return to them shortly afterwards in an acute state of insanity? What object is gained by thus sending them from the institution? Is not this course productive, in many instances, of sad results, by seriously interfering with a regular and continuous course of treatment, upon which the cure in the majority of cases depends?

If a physician discharges his duty, and says a particular patient is not yet in a condition to leave the asylum, that he is not sufficiently well to justify the experiment of his removal even into lodgings, he unavoidably exposes himself to suspicion, and gives his *enemies* the opportunity of saying that he is detaining the patient for his own pecuniary advantage!

The psychological physician, it must be admitted, has not even fair play in this country. In France, Germany, and other conti-

mental countries, as well as in America, men of the highest professional standing, of unimpeachable honour, of unsullied character, and of great scientific eminence, do not consider themselves guilty of an act of social or professional degradation by associating themselves with private asylums for the insane, and even in deriving what Lord Shaftesbury terms, a "profit" for their care and treatment. Every labourer is worthy of his hire; and surely the man who occupies his talent, professional skill, and time in restoring the poor lunatic to the bosom of his family in a state of sanity, cannot be overpaid for the great benefit he has thus conferred. These matters are not to be estimated as you would the value of a horse or a piece of land. It is impossible for the Commissioners, or any other body of men, to establish any scale of remuneration for such cases. How is it possible for them to strike a balance, and say such a patient costs so much, and then estimate to a fraction the profit which the proprietor of the asylum puts into his pocket? Loose calculations like these are utterly valueless and worthless apart from a knowledge of the particulars connected with special and peculiar cases. One patient may pay a sum of money apparently large and quite disproportionate to the accommodation afforded; but there may be circumstances in connexion with such a case known only to the parties immediately connected with it, which renders it, instead of being profitable, an actual loss to the medical man. Such is occasionally the case. If it were a mere question of rooms, chairs, tables, curtains, pictures, beef, mutton, and wine, the question would be amenable to ordinary commercial considerations and calculations; but there are other and more important elements that enter into the question, and which remove it entirely from such a basis. Is not the skill bestowed in the treatment of the case to enter at all into the calculation when the question of "profit" comes to be considered? Are not the wear and tear of body and mind, the constant fret, worry, anxiety, and *occasional loss of reason* to which the physician is exposed who has under his care this unhappy class, points to be estimated when making out the balance-sheet? Surely it is monstrously unjust to ignore this view of the matter in any calculations that may be made as to "profit and loss" in any asylum or particular case!

Really one would conceive, after wading through the bulky Blue Book, that a lunatic asylum was a perfect Elysium, a paradise upon earth, and that the physician who had the charge of it occupied a most enviable, agreeable, and pleasing position! In

* We could mention the names of several physicians who have become insane in consequence of anxiety of mind caused by residing in lunatic asylums, and constantly associating with the insane.

such an institution, where the spirit of love, concord, and harmony reigned paramount, he would, surrounded by his happy and contented family, be exposed to no care, trouble, and anxiety. If one of his associates were from a mistaken impression or an erroneous judgment, to try to fracture the proprietor's skull, it would be considered an incident hardly worthy of notice. If another lively companion, whilst enjoying the social privileges of dining with the proprietor and his family seized hold of a knife whilst at dinner, and were deliberately to cut his throat from ear to ear, in the presence of the domestic circle, thus deluging the table with blood, it is a mere *bagatelle*, not entitled to one moment's consideration.* If another skittish associate concealed about his person for some weeks a deadly weapon, with the avowed intention of taking the first favourable opportunity of waylaying the medical superintendent, and estimating the distance between the cutis and the right or left ventricle of his heart;† if another piece of eccentricity howled like a wild animal over his head for six consecutive hours, rendering "night hideous," and all attempts to "steep the senses into forgetfulness," abortive, these would be nothing but pleasantries and pleasures, making life happy and agreeable, and a lunatic asylum the most charming residence that the imagination could by possibility picture to the mind!

As to the proposed clause respecting *nervous* patients, we shall be anxious to know how Lord Shaftesbury will define the term *nervous*. When this is done satisfactorily, then perhaps the clause will be practicable.

Lord Shaftesbury's evidence guided, in a great measure, the committee in the examination of subsequent witnesses; but with his Lordship's evidence terminates the necessity for any further detailed notice of the statements laid before the committee. Mr. Gaskell, one of the medical commissioners in lunacy, gave additional evidence on the duties of the commissioners, and on the condition of the lunatics in workhouses; and Mr. Farnall, the Metropolitan Inspector of the Poor, gave also evidence on lunatics in workhouses. Mr. F. Barlow, one of the Masters in Lunacy, and Mr. Wilde, the Registrar in Lunacy, gave evidence on the duties of the Masters and on Chancery lunatics. Dr. H. H. Southey, one of the Medical Visitors in Lunacy, also gave evidence on Chancery lunatics. Evidence was given by Mr. Johnson, one of the Visiting Justices of the Surrey County Asylum; by Sir A. Spearman, the Chairman of the Committee of Visitors of Hanwell Asylum; by Mr. Cottrell, the Chairman of the Committee of Visitors of Colney Hatch Asylum; by Mr. Woodward, the Chairman of the House Committee at Colney

* This circumstance occurred in a private asylum near London.

† Ditto.

Hatch ; and by Sir G. Robinson, one of the magistrates of the county of Northampton, on the condition and general management of the insane in lunatic asylums. Dr. Conolly and Dr. J. Sutherland, both gave important evidence before the Committee, that of the former forming a grave and weighty protest against the unguarded statements of the Chairman of the Commissioners in Lunacy, and against unnecessary and vexatious legislation ; and that of the latter is very valuable from the light which it throws upon the condition of single patients in private houses. Dr. Hood, Col. Jebb, and Mr. Everest of the Home Department, gave evidence upon the condition of criminal lunatics. Dr. Hood expressed the opinion that criminal lunatics would be better treated in special wards connected with convict prisons, than in a special asylum such as is now being erected for them by the State ; but Col. Jebb (qy. 3293) thought such a course highly inexpedient. Mr. Monckton Milnes, M.P., gave brief evidence respecting certain lunatics in York Gaol ; and lastly, Mr. Gilbert Bolden, and Admiral Saumarez, gave evidence as representatives of the "Alleged Lunatics Society." Mr. Bolden makes many suggestions extending over almost the whole field of lunacy legislation, and his suggestions merit attention, although they are too frequently based upon evidence insufficient to show their necessity, and they partake too largely of that perverse, single-eyed attention to the *civil* rights of lunatics, as contradistinguished from, and to the neglect of their *medical* rights, which is too common with lay lunacy-law reformers. He sees a greater evil in a person being too hastily confined as a lunatic, than in throwing impediments in the way of the early treatment of incipient cases of lunacy. It is, however, the avoidance of both these evils which should form a chief question in lunacy legislation, but which has, thus far, been entirely omitted from the consideration of the Select Committee. *How shall we best secure the necessary treatment of incipient cases of lunacy in private asylums, or "middle-class" asylums if established, without branding the cases from the outset as lunatics ?* This is the cardinal point for the nascent lunatic, and the first and main consideration of the medical man ; but it is just this point that we cannot get the lay-friends of lunatics to listen to. We feel convinced that the question can be solved if the public will rest content for a short time to regard medical practitioners in lunacy as curative agents, and not as avaricious ogres, such as Lord Shaftesbury portrays them ; and we also feel assured that the question might be solved with due and strict attention to the preservation of the civil rights of the lunatic.*

* See an important suggestion, bearing upon this question, by the Scotch Commissioners in Lunacy, pp. 434 and 437 of the present number of this Journal.

In bringing our notice of the Select Committee's Report to a close, we may remark that, if in reading the minutes of evidence we note the details, (where those details are simply records of facts,) which indicate the manner in which the existing lunacy laws operate, we may gather much valuable information; if we note the spirit which characterizes those portions of the lay-evidence which may be assumed to represent the public desire for further legislative interference respecting lunatics, we cannot but regard it with profound regret, and entertain a fear that it will impede rather than promote effective legislation, or if it does hasten legislation forward, will so affect it in certain most important particulars as to complicate the whole matter still more; and if we note (which most concerns us at the present moment) what solid material the voluminous evidence affords us to aid in the formation of a firm foundation for further legislation, we are constrained to exclaim, "O monstrous! But one halfpennyworth of bread to this intolerable deal of sack!"

The conclusion of the whole matter is precisely that which the Committee came to, that the evidence is not sufficient to enable any one to form a definite opinion on the subjects to which it referred, and that "the inquiry is altogether incomplete."

ART. V.—DANTE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY.

THE name of Dante is not only the most conspicuous in Mediæval history, but, as a poet, he takes rank among the foremost of any age or nation. In the literary firmament he shines "a bright particular star," and is one of the few master-spirits who have created the national poetry of their country, and given to its language and literature the impress of their own mind. Physically and intellectually considered, he must have been endowed with extraordinary powers; the mould in which he was cast was one of the choicest;—

"The master mould of Nature's heavenly hand,
Wherein are cast the heroic and the free,
The beautiful, the brave."

Gifted with transcendent genius, he has been an object of the highest admiration to his countrymen for more than five centuries, and is regarded with increasing esteem and veneration throughout the civilized world.

The vigour and fertility of Dante's imagination, the faculty most essential to the poet, is displayed in the variety of characters and scenes which he has described, some remarkable for their beauty and pathos, and others for their terrible grandeur and sub-

limity. His delineation of Capaneus, unsoftened by the eternal fire, and obdurate as ever, scarcely yields to the *Prometheus* of Æschylus, and is the prototype of the Satan of *Paradise Lost*. Dante tells us that he asked Virgil,—

“ Who is that mighty one, morose and grim,
 Who careless of the burning seems to lie,
 So that the fire-shower cannot soften him ?
 And he, as to my leader I apply,
 Perceiving 'twas of him I thus enquire,
 Cried, ‘ What I was alive, such dead am I.
 If incensed Jupiter his workman tire,
 From whom he snatch'd the thunderbolts that day,
 Which was my last, and struck me in his ire ;
 If he—the rest all spent by turns while they
 The sledge in Mongibello's black forge wield—
 Cry, ‘ Help, good Vulcan, help ! ’ as in the fray
 He cried of old in the Phlegræan field,
 And launch his bolts at me with all his might,
 A joyful vengeance it shall never yield.”

Inferno, Canto xiv. 46.*

In sublimity he is only surpassed by the Hebrew prophets, by Homer, and by our own Milton ; yet even in the most thrilling and tremendous descriptions of infernal misery, we are ever and anon presented with images of beauty and calm delight, which are all the more pleasing and welcome from their contrast with the scenes of suffering, the timeless gloom, and the air for ever shaken, from which we have just escaped, and into which we have so soon again to pass. It is as if when treading “ over the burning marle,” we suddenly came upon some happy valley, or entered some sylvan shade, where the song of birds is heard amidst the foliage, or the music of the rill that murmurs on the verge of the enamelled green. Take for instance the limbo of the unbaptized, to which we shall again refer ; or the tale of Ser Adamo :—

“ O ye who even in this world accurst,
 I know not wherefore, no affliction have,
 He thus began, ‘ Behold and hear rehearsed

* Our quotations are from a new translation which has just made its appearance, entitled, “ *The Trilogy ; or, Dante's Three Visions. Inferno, or the Vision of Hell.* Translated into English in the Metre and Triple Rhyme of the Original ; with Notes and Illustrations. By the Rev. John Wesley Thomas. Henry E. Bohn, York-street, Covent-garden, 1859.”

We would commend this translation to all lovers of Dante for its beauty and accuracy. It deserves, moreover, especial notice from its being executed in the rhyme of the original. The author has indeed successfully overcome the great difficulty experienced by all translators of the immortal Florentine's poem, and at which the majority have blanched, to wit, the preservation of the metre and triple rhyme of the original, while at the same time rendering truthfully the poet's meaning. In the copious *Notes* also, there is much interesting and varied information, and a great clearing up of obscure and disputed passages:

What Ser Adamo suffers in this cave.
 Alive I had enough of all at will,
 And now, alas ! one drop of water crave.
 The brooks which downward o'er each verdant hill
 Of Casentino to the Arno flow,
 Making their channels fresh and soft, are still
 Always before mine eyes, nor vainly so.
 For more their image dries me up than this
 Disease which in my unflashed cheeks I show.
 Now from the place in which I did amiss,
 Derives avenging justice a supply
 Of means to augment my sighs in hell's abyss.
 There, in Romena, did I falsify,
 The coin that bears the Baptist on its front,
 For which I left my body burnt on high.
 But could I see tormented here the Count
 Guido, or Alessandro, or their brother,
 I would not change the sight for Branda's fount."

Inferno, Canto xxx. 61.

But while the *Divina Commedia* presents us with such admirable specimens of vigorous description, it also excels in portraying the deep feelings of the mysterious human heart. What Piero Della Vigne did for his imperial master, Frederick II., Dante does for his readers :—

"I then am he who once held both the keys
 Of Frederick's heart, and who in that high post,
 Opening and shutting turn'd them with such ease
 None else his secret confidence could boast."

Inferno, Canto xiii. 58.

This mastery over the passions is shown alike in the despair which petrifies Ugolino, as the wretched father beholds his children droop and die with famine ; in the self-devotion of Francesca and her love, unquenched by misery and death ; in the melting influence of the sound which makes the new pilgrim of love start, when the evening bell, swinging in the far-off tower, tolls the knell of the dying day ; in the blasphemies of the lost on the shores of Acheron ; in the milder sorrows of the repentant in Purgatory ; and in the joy with which the poet hails the object of his undying attachment, Beatrice, in the realm of blessedness. Dante was, moreover, in a remarkable degree the poet of his time ; he has portrayed the creed, philosophy, politics, and superstition of the age in which he lived. His conversation with Farinata in the tenth Canto of the *Inferno*, says Mr. Hallam, "is very fine, and illustrative of Florentine history." That with Piero Della Vigne, in the thirteenth Canto, exhibits in a light equally striking the cabals which infested the court of the Emperor Frederick II. ; while the narrative given of himself by Guido Montefeltro is a damning exposure of the Papal Court

and its intrigues and tyranny, under the ambitious and unprincipled Boniface VIII., "the Prince of the new Pharisees." Dante's writings afford also an illustrious example of self-portraiture. In *La Vita Nuova*, the earliest of his known productions, he paints the workings of that youthful passion which helped to stamp his destiny as a poet, and inspired his hymn of the eternal rest. But in his great poem, the *Divina Commedia*, he presents us with a mirror which reflects the mind and character of the author, as well as his life and times. For with all the fire and sublimity of his genius, his personal feelings and experience form the groundwork of his poem, and furnish its most glowing materials.

His education is referred to in his conversation with Brunetto Latini, whom in hell he recognises as his old preceptor, and says :—

"For in my memory fix'd now grieves my heart,
The dear and good paternal image known,
Of you on earth, where with a master's art,
You taught me how eternity is won.
How dear I hold the lesson, while I live
'Tis fit should by my eloquence be shown."

Inferno, Canto xv. 82.

In the very commencement of the poem, he describes, though in a strain somewhat allegorical, his thoughts and feelings in middle age, when he called himself to account for his previous errors, and resolves to enter on a new life. Canto i. l. His exile is foretold by Farinata, Virgil and Vanni Fucci, and his misfortunes and fame are foreshown by Brunetto Latini and Beatrice.

His power of sarcasm and invective was terrible ; witness his imprecation on Pisa for its heartless cruelty to the innocent children of Ugolino, his reproof of the Emperor Albert for permitting the continuance of Italian anarchy, and the reproach with which he thunder-strikes Pope Nicholas IV. and the Simonists in hell. We quote the first and last of these examples :—

"Ah, Pisa! shame of all who appertain
To that fair land with language of soft sound,
To punish thee since neighbours yet abstain,
Capraia and Gorgona from the ground
Rise, and a mole o'er Arno's entrance throw,
Till with her waters all in thee be drowned.
That he thy castles had betray'd, although
Count Ugolino was accused by fame,
His children thou shouldst not have tortured so.
The shield of innocence which youth may claim
(New Thebes!) Uguccio and Brigata share."

Inferno, Canto xxxiii.

In relating his conversation with Pope Nicholas IV., he says:—

“I know not if too rashly I my mind
Express'd, but my reply this burden bore;
'Alas! now tell me, when our Lord inclined,
To put the keys into St. Peter's power,
What treasures did he first of him demand?
None:—'Follow me,' he said, and asked no more.
Peter and th' others of Matthias' hand
Nor gold nor silver took, when lots they cast,
For one in Judas' forfeit place to stand.
Then stay, where thy just punishment thou hast.
And look that thou guard well that wealth ill-gain'd,
Whence thou against King Charles embolden'd wast.
And if it were not that I am restrain'd
By reverence for the keys which once did fill
Thy grasp, while cheerful life to thee remain'd,
The words I speak would be severer still,
Because your avarice the whole world hath grieved,
Trampling the good and raising up the ill.
You shepherds the Evangelist perceived,
When her who on the waters sits he saw,
And who with kings in filthy whoredom lived.
Her who with seven heads born could also draw
From the ten horns conclusive argument,
While yet she pleased her spouse with virtue's law.
What could the idolater do more who bent
To gold and silver, which you make your god?
But to a hundred worship ye present,
For one! Ah, Constantine, what ills have flow'd
Though not from thy conversion, from the dower,
Which to thy gift the first rich father owed.”

Inferno, Canto xix. 88.

The great characteristics of Dante are his earnestness, energy, and elevation of sentiment, for which his compressed diction, and the emphatic cadences of his metre furnish an admirably suitable vehicle. Of Dante's pithy and pungent style, Cary's blank verse may enable the reader to form some notion, but can give no idea of his music—that melody with which he wins and pleases the ear, and charms the imagination, while it indelibly impresses on our memory the lessons of truth and wisdom which it is his object to impart. It must indeed be admitted that the *Divina Commedia* is not without its faults—for what human work is perfect? “*Aliquando dormitat Homerus.*” And the instances in which Homer has been observed occasionally to nod, are in the management of his machinery, or treatment of the gods of the Olympus. The blending of Pagan mythology with Christian tradition and the truths derived from Holy Scripture, makes

Dante's poem in some parts appear like the debateable ground between the ancient Superstition and the newer Faith ; in which, however, the latter is victorious, and the dethroned and desecrated gods of the Pantheon, transformed to demons, are dragged at the chariot-wheels of the conqueror. But if in this respect the poet falls short of that higher and purer standard of taste which has been recognised in later times, this defect has been amply compensated, not only by his innumerable beauties, but especially by the high purpose with which he wrote—a purpose hitherto unaccomplished, indeed, but not less important at the present moment than when the *Divina Commedia* came fresh from his hands and from the depths of his soul. To use the language of an eloquent and learned writer in the *Athenæum*—

“He desired the regeneration of his country, and her restoration to that place and power among the nations of Europe, from which internal dissensions and strife, the madness of opposing factions, and the selfishness of oppressive and tyrannical rulers, had deposed and degraded her. Poet, patriot, philosopher, historian, Dante Alighieri shines forth a great and glorious light in the stormy firmament of the Middle Ages ; and in the midst of wild confusion and the crash of elements, rises up the zealous advocate of order, stability, and the supreme divine rule.”

To ascertain the circumstances which contributed to mould, and fashion, and direct the genius of Dante, an extensive acquaintance with the age in which he lived, and of that which immediately preceded it, as well as with his ancestry, birth, education, and condition through life, is necessary. As far as our limits will admit, we shall exhibit these in their immediate bearing on the subject of this article.

Dante was born in the thirteenth century, and arrived at manhood when Florence, his native city, was foremost in civilization, commerce, arts, and freedom. He was nobly descended ; his great-grandfather, Cacciaguida Elisei, having accompanied Conrad III. in his crusade to the Holy Land, was knighted by that emperor, and died on the field of battle, A.D. 1147. In the *Paradiso* he relates his adventures to Dante, with an interesting account of Florence and the manners of her citizens, before the breaking out of the great feud between the Guelfs and Ghibelines. Dante, while yet a child, was deprived of his father, but his education was amply provided for by the care of his mother, who had been left in affluent circumstances, and who obtained for her son the best instructors that Florence could supply. The early indications of his genius appeared in a noble and contemplative disposition, and that enthusiastic love of learning and study which is the surest presage of distinction, and which accompanied him through every period of his life. Among his intimate friends were some of the most celebrated men of his time—philosophers, poets,

musicians, and painters; and in the pursuit of wisdom, he not only studied in the famous universities of Padua and Bologna, but is also said to have visited those of Paris and Oxford. The vicissitudes of his life were great. Although not a warrior by profession, he was in the battle of Campaldino (*Inferno*, xxii. 5), and in the victory there achieved by his countrymen over the Ghibelins of Arezzo, distinguished himself by his bravery. In the thirty-second year of his age, he entered on the honours and anxieties of the chief-magistracy in his native city; but soon after was banished with his party, the Bianchi (Whites), and afterwards in his absence, by a most iniquitous sentence, and without a hearing or trial, condemned to be burnt alive!

In Dante's age, and long after, the authority of Aristotle was undisputed and supreme in the European schools of learning. How great was Dante's veneration for the Stagyrte, may be seen in the epithet by which he distinguishes him, "Il maestro di color che sanno" ("The master of those who know"), *Inferno*, iv. 181; and also in the somewhat prodigal and ostentatious display which he makes of the Aristotelian lore in the eleventh canto of the *Inferno*, where he formally quotes the *Physics* and the *Ethics*, and gives a complete synopsis of the sins and crimes which have been or can be committed, according to their various degrees of demerit, according to "the Master," whose authority was then paramount; so that "*Ipse dixit*," with a quotation from his works, was deemed a sufficient and all-conclusive argument in any controversy. This may seem almost incredible to us; yet it is not less certain, that even in Theological speculations, though himself a heathen, his authority was appealed to by Christian divines. Dante consults him in arranging the different degrees of suffering in the world below; and Melanchthon complains, that even in his time, that sage's works were read in some churches instead of the Gospels. In the schools they were both law and gospel; but it is to the Reformation that we are indebted for the emancipation of the human understanding from the fetters of human authority.

In the age of Dante, the Ptolemaic system of the universe was equally prevalent; the poet accordingly regards the earth as immovably fixed in the centre, the sun and all the planets, as well as the fixed stars, moving round it once in every twenty-four hours.* Nor need we marvel much at this, when we consider that three hundred years later, Milton, who had conversed with Galileo, although inclining to the theory which that philosopher taught, speaks doubtfully of the comparative merits of the old and new systems of astronomy, and has often adapted his expres-

* See an original, ingenious, and beautifully-coloured diagram, illustrative of Dante and the Ptolemaic system, prefixed as a frontispiece to Mr. Thomas's *Trilogy* of Dante.

sions and ideas to the Ptolemaic theory rather than to the Copernican system.

Dante's fame as a poet should not make us forgetful of his claim to be ranked among the metaphysicians of his age. He everywhere exalts and glorifies the intellectual nature and greatness of man, while glorifying the Supreme. Thus he says—

"It is the intention of God that every created thing should represent the Divine likeness, as far as its nature allows, according to the saying, 'Let us make man in our own image.' And though it cannot be said that inferior natures are made in the image of God, still, all may be said to bear a similitude to Him, since the whole universe is nothing else but a trace of the divine goodness."—*De Monarchiâ*.

"The best state of man is that in which he is most free . . . and the foundation of our liberty is the freedom of the will, which many talk about, but few understand. And this liberty is the greatest blessing which God has bestowed on human nature, since by means thereof is secured our happiness here and hereafter."—*ib.*

"Everything desires its own perfection, and in this all its desire will rest, and it is only for its sake that everything else is desired; and it is this desire that seems to make every pleasure deficient, since there is no happiness in this life so great as to allay this thirst and banish it from the mind."—*Convito*.

"When one speaks of a man's living, it is implied that he employs his reason, which is his special life, and the use of his noblest part."—*ib.*

"It is manifest that universal peace is of all things best suited to the promotion of human happiness. . . . Hence the voice from heaven spoke not of riches, nor of honours, nor of beauty, but of peace. For the heavenly host cried, 'Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, goodwill towards all men.'"—*De Monarchiâ*.

The influence of the classical writers of Greece and Rome on the mind of Dante is everywhere discoverable—in the deference which he pays to Virgil as his teacher, guide, and master; in the veneration with which he regards the shades of Homer, Lucan, Ovid and Horace (*Inferno*, Canto iv. 88 &c.); in his frequent adoption of the Greek mythology; and, above all, in his having contrived—for the express accommodation of the great classical heroes, poets, and philosophers of antiquity, whom the orthodox theology of the time had excluded from heaven—a kind of paradise in hell.

But lest any reader should doubt our correctness in the last-named instance, or think that we misinterpret the poet's meaning in ascribing to him this "large economy," we quote the passage:—

"Now to a noble castle's foot we came,
Seven times with lofty walls encompass'd round;
And round it also flow'd a pleasant stream,
O'er which we pass'd as if upon firm ground:
Through seven gates entering with the sages there,

We reach'd a meadow with fresh verdure crown'd ;
 With grave slow eyes, the crowds assembled there
 In their appearance of great majesty ;
 And as they talk'd their words were sweet and rare.
 Thus to one side retiring enter'd we
 An open place, light, lofty, and serene ;
 So that all there were visible to me.
 There just above, upon the enamell'd green,
 The mighty spirits I could recognise,
 Whom I esteem it honour to have seen."

Inferno, Canto iv. 106, &c.

The remainder of the Canto contains a description of them by name.

Besides the descent of Ulysses into Hades related by Homer in the *Odyssey*, and that of Æneas, by Virgil in the *Æneid*, many visions of the other world had been related and proclaimed by the Monkish writers during several centuries preceding the age of Dante. The exhibition of mysteries, or dramas on sacred subjects, in churches and elsewhere, were the earliest scenic performances in Europe after the downfall of the Roman empire : and these were still more likely to excite the imagination of Dante and direct him in the choice of his great subject. Thus the operas, or musical dramas, which, in a later age, our own great poet witnessed when in Italy, are supposed to have influenced the mind of Milton in the conception and composition of *Paradise Lost*.* A remarkable instance, and possibly one of the earliest of those mediæval dramatic performances, occurred in the lifetime of Dante and in his native city. On the occasion of a public festival, under the auspices of the clergy, to celebrate the entrance of the papal legate, a representation of infernal torments was exhibited in the bed of the Arno, which was converted into the gulf of perdition, where all the horrors invented by the prolific imagination of the monks were concentrated. But in the midst of this extraordinary drama, the wooden bridge on which the multitude of spectators were congregated gave way beneath them, and the shrieks and groans of simulated sufferers were suddenly exchanged for those of real ones. This catastrophe, although it happened about two years after Dante's exile had commenced, must, when reported to him, have made a deep and indelible impression on his mind. It is one calamity among others which the poet is supposed to allude to, by a kind of *ex post facto* prognostication. *Inferno*, Canto xxvi. 9.

* In Todd's notes to Milton may be seen the passages from the Italian opera which are supposed to contain the *germ* of his great poem. It has been said that Satan's address to the Sun, "O thou that with surpassing glory crowned," &c., was at first intended as the commencement of an English opera. The Italian opera was not introduced among us till the beginning of the eighteenth century. See *Tatler*, No. 4 ; and *Spectator*, Nos. 5 and 18.

The genius of Dante cannot but have been greatly influenced and directed by the early poetry of France. The Troubadours, who employed the Provençal tongue, were the instructors of Europe in the rules of modern versification. They visited every court; their presence was welcomed by kings and nobles; and all the historians of Italy have recognised their powerful influence on the literature of that country. The first lisplings of the Italian muse were but humble imitations of Provençal lyrics, and it was from among these, which in their day had been so famous, that Dante arose to pale their ineffectual beams by the superior splendour of his genius. But besides the Troubadours, whose genius was lyric, and who sung of "faithful loves," there were the Trouveres of Northern France, whose genius was epic, and who in the Wallon dialect sung "fierce warres." The compositions in which they celebrated the exploits of Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table, and those of Charlemagne and his Paladins, were not less popular in Italy than those of their Provençal brethren. Dante describes Paolo and Francesca di Rimini as reading for their amusement the Romance of *Lancelot du Lac*, which was commenced by Christian de Troyes, and completed by Godfrey de Ligny (*Inferno*, Canto v. 128). He alludes to the same romance, Canto xxxii. 62, and *Paradiso*, Canto xvi. 15. And besides these allusions to the romances of the Trouveres, their spirit may be recognised in the majestic allegories of Dante, who, according to Sismondi, has taken for his model the most celebrated and most ancient of them, the *Romanse of the Rose*, which, however, he has infinitely surpassed.

The two passions which predominated in the breast of Dante were love and patriotism. We all know that early attachments are often the purest, and the most lasting in their influence; and how some object of our boyish passion, whom death or distance has separated from us, continues to exist for us, enshrined in our memory, or visiting our dreams, as when she rose upon us like an Eve, or as when we last saw her, long years ago, in all her virgin charms. Thus it was with Dante. In the ninth year of his age he first saw a young lady a few months older than himself, an event which made on him an indelible impression. The vision of Beatrice Portinari, which at a festival given by her father to the young people of the city, on May-day, 1274, never departed from him; but awakened in his bosom a feeling which, intensified by that glowing clime and the fires of his own genius, became his ruling passion. As in the case of another great poet of our own country, the object of his first and passionate love could not be his. Yet

"—— She was his life,

The ocean to the river of his thoughts."

After several years of declining health, she died at the age of

twenty-five;—unconscious, probably, or but half conscious, of that admiration with which she had inspired the youthful poet. But of the extent of its influence on his mind and character, every reader of Dante cannot but be aware. To her he consecrated the earliest strains of his lyre; and in his maturer age, while he is passing through the regions of blessedness, listening to celestial harmony, amidst the shining companies of saints and angels, *her* presence heightens heaven.

Equally intense was his love of native land, and the bitter disappointment of perpetual exile from it. Throughout the *Divina Commedia* we see the banished magistrate of Florence, the exiled statesman, whose bowels yearn to be restored to his native country.

“La carità del natio loro mi strinse.”

For the love which he bears to Florence he stoops to gather up and reverently deposit the human spoils of one of her citizens whom he meets with in the hell of suicides. And yet how terrible are his denunciations against Florence for the cruelty and crimes of her children. In Canto xvi. of the *Inferno*, Jacopo Rusticucci, a Florentine, asks Dante,

“If still as wont reside
Courtesy and valour in our urban state,
Or if thrust forth by all they wander wide?”

To which Dante replies:—

“The new race and the sudden gains in thee,
O Florence, have produced excess and pride,
For which even now thou weepest wofully.”

L. 67.

And in the commencement of Canto xxvi. we have the following apostrophe:—

“Florence exult! thy greatness who can tell;
O’er sea and land thy rushing wings resound;
Meantime thy name hath spread itself through hell.
Five such among the plunderers there I found
Thy citizens, whence shame befalleth me,
And to thyself no glory can resound.
But if our dreams near dawn may claim to be
The truth, much time will not elapse ere thou
Feel what, not Prato only wisheth thee;
And ’twould not be untimely if ’twere now.
Would that it were so, since it must take place;
’Twill grieve me more the more with age I bow.”

Again, how touching are his appeals, and how unceasing and unwearied were his endeavours to obtain a revocation of his sentence. Yet how high principled he was, appears from his refusal to accept even restoration to his country and patrimony, on

the condition of acknowledging his fault and asking forgiveness. "No, father," he exclaims, "it is not this way that shall lead me back to my country. But I shall return with hasty steps, if you or any other can open to me a way that shall not derogate from the honour and fame of Dante." It is impossible to withhold our admiration from so high-souled a sufferer. He refused to demean himself even to escape the privations of poverty, the bitterness of dependence on strangers, and the anguish of irrevocable exile. The memory of the wrongs he had endured was indelible, yet amidst all his eloquent appeals and denunciations, we recognise, throughout his life-long struggle, an ardent love to his ungrateful country which refused to turn itself to hatred.

The anti-papal spirit of Dante is a remarkable fact in his history. The fact is not dependent for its proof on reasoning so subtle and recondite as that of Rosetti, who insists that the *Divina Commedia* is an allegory, the sense of which is figurative and esoteric. Dante, for aught we know, *may* have belonged to a secret society possessing a system of signs and an enigmatical language. But if its great secret was hostility to the papacy, that secret has been very *ill-kept* by him, and he ought to have been dismembered for betraying it! We believe Dante to have been too bold and plain-spoken to have required such a method. His hostility to the papacy is patent and undeniable, and is the more remarkable inasmuch as he preceded Wickliffe by some years, and Luther by two centuries. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries there were numerous sects in France, Brabant, and even in Italy, who were opposed to the doctrines and practices of the dominant church, and who were consequently the objects of papal vengeance; and almost every government then existing lent a willing hand towards crushing them. A crusade against those in the south of France was proclaimed by Innocent III. in the beginning of the thirteenth century, and pardons and paradise (besides plunder) were liberally promised by that pontiff to all who should assist in that holy war. A similar crusade was proclaimed by Clement V. in 1305, against Fra Dolcino and his followers in Italy. The heroism and fate of this leader of a sect, which were worthy of either the tragic or the epic muse have been commemorated by Dante. Mohammed, addressing Dante, says:—

"Thou who perchance the sun mayst shortly see,
 To friar Dolcin then this warning bear,
 If here he would not soon my follower be,
 That corn be stored, lest snow besiege him there,
 And victory to the Novarese convey,
 Which else for them no light achievement were."

Inferno, Canto xxviii. 58.

L. Mariotti, in his *Historical Memoir of Fra Dolcino and his Times*, regards the above as a hint from Dante to one with whose object he sympathized, and whom he might "almost contemplate joining." We rather think it an allusion penned after the fate of Dolcino had been decided, though in the form of a warning and put into the mouth of Mohammed, who is supposed to utter it some few years previously to its fulfilment—namely, at the date of the vision in 1300. Dolcino needed no such caution, which, if given, would in the circumstances have been useless; the Bishop of Vercelli, who commanded the army of the faith, having desolated the whole country round, and removed its inhabitants, for the purpose of starving the heretics whom he could neither conquer by carnal nor spiritual weapons. Dolcino and his little band in their mountain fastness withstood the forces of the crusaders for two years, and whether assailed or assailing were victorious on every occasion. But the heretics were at length vanquished by famine, and then burnt at Vercelli, June 1st, 1307; Dolcino as their leader having first been torn with red-hot pincers. Although the only accounts of him which have come down to us are the writings of his enemies, yet it is admitted that he possessed extraordinary talents as a popular orator and a military strategist, and that both he and "Sister Margaret" endured their fate with a courage and firmness worthy of a better cause.

But besides the sects which lay under the ban of the Papacy, and were the objects of its relentless persecution, there were many among the leading minds of Italy, who although continuing in outward communion with the Church of Rome, had received no small portion of evangelical truth; while the spirit of inquiry, and the impulse given to thought by the revival of classical learning, had tended to open their eyes to the corruptions of the Church, and the daring usurpations of its chief. Dante's politics were very nearly, if not quite, identical with those of Dolcino and his followers. Gregory VII. had reared up the Papal authority on the ruins of the civil power; it was for an Emperor to reassert his supremacy, and redress the grievances of Italy by the humiliation of the Papacy. The Abbot Joachim had foretold as much; and his predictions were immensely popular. He is eulogized by Dante, who places him among the saints in Paradise.

"Il Calvarese abate Giovacchino
Di spirito profetico dotato."

"The abbot of Calabria Joachim,
Who with prophetic spirit was endow'd."

Paradiso, Canto xii. 140.

Dante's treatise *De Monarchia* was written to prove the independence of the civil magistrate; and is worthy of perusal for the

strength and freedom of its arguments. It is therefore not surprising that, as the only method of answering them with which he was acquainted, Pope John XXII. had it publicly burnt a few years after Dante's death, and that it has found a place in the Roman catalogue of heretical and prohibited books.

Dante, without question, like Luther at the commencement of his career, acknowledged the spiritual supremacy of the Pope and held most of the doctrines of the Church of Rome. But in early life he had become acquainted with the Holy Scriptures, and the result is obvious throughout his great poem. To them he ascribes the light of truth which had been poured into his soul, and not to his own labours, learning, experience, or philosophy. In reply to the question, "What is faith?" he answers in the words of St. Paul, "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the proof of things not seen." St. Peter then says, "This precious jewel, whence comes it to thee?" Dante replies, "The copious rain of the Holy Spirit, which is poured out on the Old and New Testament, and an argument which so conclusively convinces me that every other proof seems obtuse in comparison of it." In another part of the dialogue he says, "I believe in one God, sole and eternal, who, unmoved himself, moves all heaven with love and desire. And for such belief I have not only physical and metaphysical proof, but also the truth which is showered down from heaven bestows it on me, through Moses, the prophets, the Psalms, the Gospel, and through you who wrote when the burning spirit made you sublime. And I believe in Three Eternal Persons, and these I believe in essence one, so one and so trine that they admit conjointly of *are* and *is*. Of this profound and divine condition, which now I merely touch, the evangelic doctrine (*l'evangelica dottrina*) hath often sealed the impress on my mind. This is the principle, this is the spark, which afterwards is kindled into a vivid flame, and shines in me like a star in heaven."—*Paradiso*, Canto xxiv. 52—147.

Dante appears to have been endowed with a rare sagacity. His mind went far ahead of the times in which he lived. In the imaginary voyage of Ulysses to the Antipodes, in Canto xxvi. of the *Inferno*, he has foreshadowed the discoveries of the Portuguese in the southern hemisphere, and may have given a hint to Columbus himself.

Ulysses, in describing his voyage southwards, says—

"Each star of the other pole, as on we bore,
The night beheld, and ours had sunk so low,
That now it rose not on the ocean-floor."

Inferno, xxvi. 127-9.

And relating his own voyage to the Mount of Purgatory, Dante says:—

"I turn'd me to the right, and fix'd my mind
On the other pole, and those four stars I saw,
Ne'er seen save by the earliest of mankind."

Purgatorio, i. 22-4.

The southern cross, which Dante here describes, consists of four stars. Amerigo Vespuccio, in his third voyage in 1501, first applied these lines of Dante to that magnificent constellation, which is to the southern what our pole-star in *Ursa Minor* is to the northern hemisphere.

We have Cuvier's theory of the earth anticipated in a single line of the *Inferno*, Canto xii. 43 :—

"The world has oft been into chaos turn'd."

One can hardly withhold from Dante the credit of having been acquainted with the state of the pre-Adamite earth, and with its enormous occupants, now extinct, and so recently unveiled by geology. Of "the horrible giants," he says :—

"Nature, indeed, when she declined the art
Of forming such as these, did what was meet,
Taking from war these vassals grim and swart ;
And if the elephant and whale so great
Repent her not, who ponders as he ought
Holds her herein more just and more discreet."

Inferno, Canto xxxi. 49.

In the thirty-fourth canto, he displays his knowledge of gravitation, and the sphericity of the earth, when he speaks of its centre as the place

"Towards which all heavy things from all parts tend."

Line 111.

Dante has been described as of middle stature and grave deportment, rather long-featured, with large eyes, aquiline nose, prominent cheekbones, dark hair, and an under lip that slightly pouted. Besides the description given by contemporary writers, we have the portraiture of his calm, dignified, and interesting features from the pencil of his friend Giotto, the gifted pupil of Cimabue. It is said that Dante had somewhat impaired his sight by his intense application to books and study. His dress was plain, and his habits temperate. He was at times a little absent and abstracted, as well as a little sarcastic. G. Villani, the historian of Florence, says, that "upon the strength of his knowledge he was somewhat haughty and disdainful, and like an ungracious philosopher could not endure to converse with the ignorant." It is probable that this made him enemies, and increased the griefs and troubles with which he was beset. As an instance of biting sarcasm, it is related that while Dante was the guest of San Francisco Scaglieri, surnamed *Il Grande* (The Great), one day when that nobleman was amusing himself by listening to the

court jester or fool, he asked the poet why it was that so many of the nobles had a much greater regard for the fool than for him? To which Dante replied, "Because they are by nature much more like him than me, and therefore they naturally prefer his society to mine."

Dante was not only a man of vast energy, but he also seeks to inspire his readers with the same temper. His disdain of those who trifle with great affairs, or give way to useless repining, or waste their lives in indolence, was unbounded. He speaks of them as "drones who never truly lived," as "abject wretches whom God and godless men alike must hate:" and he gives them a place with the neutral angels, for ever hovering in the outskirts of damnation. And among them he places the hermit Pope, Morone, Celestine V., for having, when raised to the Papal throne, instead of exerting himself vigorously to reform the Church, sighed for his retirement, and at the instance of the crafty Cardinal Cajetan (afterwards Boniface VIII.), abdicated his office, and thus missed the opportunity of effecting that great work which had been generally expected from him. This Dante calls *il gran rifiuto*, "the great refusal." And what a lesson have we in the doom of the discontented!—

"‘Fix’d in the mire,’

They cry, ‘we once were sad in the sweet air
Which the bright sun makes glad some with his beams,
Carrying the sluggish smoke within us there:
Now are we vex’d in these black muddy streams.’”

Inferno, Canto vii. 120.

It is pleasing to observe the increased and increasing interest in the character and writings of Dante which is felt in our own country, as it tends not only to increase our sympathy with Italy in her sorrows and sufferings, and our indignation at her wrongs, but also affords us a salutary warning against the indulgence of those passions and vices by which Italy was first divided, and then made the prey of domestic and foreign tyrants. We would fain see Italy freed from her oppression and her woes. We hope to see her self-reliant, united, free, and happy. And that she may be so, let her children listen to the teachings and admonitions of their own poet—of him whose name still gives renown to the land which his genius illumined, and who has pointed out so clearly the causes of Italian degradation and bondage: and let them steadily pursue that path which he has indicated as the only way to national greatness and prosperity, and thus prove themselves, at length, worthy of their illustrious countryman and predecessor, DANTE ALIGHIERI.

ART. VI.—THE LAW OF LUNACY AND THE CONDITION OF THE INSANE IN SCOTLAND.

THE first Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy for Scotland has been recently published. The document is curiously instructive. Never was a necessity more thoroughly appreciated than that which led to the enactment of the Act "for the Regulation of the Care and Treatment of Lunatics, and for the Provision, Maintenance, and Regulation of Lunatic Asylums in Scotland," which received the Royal Assent on the 25th of August, 1857; never, it would appear, was an Act more ingeniously worded for rendering nugatory the presumed intentions of its framers; never was a Board created to carry out the intentions of an Act more impressed with the spirit, yet more perplexed with the letter of the law than the General Board of Commissioners in Lunacy for Scotland.

"The chief objects of the Statute," write the Commissioners, "are to provide for the building of district asylums for the reception of pauper lunatics, and to insure the proper care and treatment of lunatics generally, whether placed in asylums, or left in private houses under the care of relatives or strangers" (p. i.); but the provisions for attaining these ends are, in certain essential particulars, so peculiarly phrased that, if they were carried out to the letter, they would almost depopulate existing asylums, notwithstanding that one main object of the Act is to provide an increase of asylum accommodation. They would, also, remove a large number of pauper lunatics and lunatics under treatment in private dwellings from the control of the Commissioners, yet leave the latter responsible for their rightful care and treatment—the Act being, moreover, intended "to insure the proper care and treatment of lunatics generally;" and while permitting the Commissioners to have a wide range for "*suggestion*" (that pretty fiction by which the appearance of a reform is occasionally obtained without the reality), the provisions restrict their power of enforcing compliance with their suggestions in several of the most important matters relating to the care and welfare of lunatics.

The first Annual Report of the Commissioners is, indeed, valuable as showing the folly of legislating for the insane from a too strictly legal point of view; from the light it casts upon the difficulties, the dangers, and the eccentricities of Lunacy Legislation; and from much special information of wide and general application which it contains: and although the Commissioners state that, from the pressing character of their first year's duties, they have not been able to record the results of their experience

so fully as they could have wished, yet the careful mode in which the Report has been drawn up deserves warm praise, and the excellent and conciliatory spirit displayed by the Commissioners amidst the difficulties with which they have had to contend must excite admiration.

We propose to examine the more generally interesting portions of the Commissioners' Report.

I. The *number* of lunatics in Scotland reported to the Commissioners on the 1st of January, 1858, and the manner of their distribution in asylums and private houses, were as follows:—

(1) In *Public Asylums*,—males, 1226; females, 1154; total, 2380. Of these numbers, 786 were private patients, and 1594 parochial paupers. In *Private Asylums*,—males, 830; females, 415; total 745. Of these numbers, 219 were private patients, and 526 parochial paupers. In *Poor-houses*,—males, 362; females, 487; total, 839. Of these numbers, 6 were private patients, and 833 parochial paupers. "This enumeration, however," the Report states, "cannot be considered accurate, as the Commissioners, in the course of their visits, found many paupers in poor-houses who had not been returned to us, but who were, nevertheless, persons of unsound mind." (p. ii.) (2) The Commissioners had not the means of obtaining any returns of the number of the insane in *Private Houses* possessing such claims to accuracy as would permit them to adopt them. The Statute confers no power upon the Commissioners to call for returns of private patients in the houses of relatives or others. "The number of the insane poor in private houses, as returned by the inspectors, amounted to 1784; of whom 810 were males, and 974 females. The subsequent investigations of the Visiting Commissioners, however, showed that the actual number of pauper lunatics was considerably greater, but to what extent will not fully appear until the returns for 1859 are received." (p. ii.)

The total number of the insane in Scotland on the 1st January, 1858, as returned to the Commissioners, and with the exception of private single patients, was 5748—*male*, 2718; *female*, 3030: *private*, 1011; *pauper*, 4737.

The proportion of pauper lunatics to paupers is thus stated by the Commissioners:—

"On 15th May, 1855, the number of registered paupers in Scotland amounted to 79,887: and the proportion of pauper lunatics to paupers, taking the number of the former at 3904, as reported by the Board of Supervision, was accordingly 4.88 per cent. On 15th May, 1857, the number of registered paupers amounted to 79,217, and the proportion of pauper lunatics to paupers, supposing the number of the latter to be the same on 1st January, 1858, as on 15th May, 1857, was thus 5.979 per cent. The basis on which this calculation is founded will appear erroneous if the number of registered paupers, as stated in the Twelfth Report of the Board of Supervision, be adopted as correct. They are there estimated at 69,217, or 10,000 below the actual numbers, a result apparently due to an error in addition. When this mistake has been corrected, the comments of the Board of Supervision upon the large decrease of paupers generally, and the nevertheless still increasing number of pauper lunatics, will be found to rest upon erroneous premises."—(p. iii.)

Steps have been taken by the Commissioners to ascertain as far as practicable the number of private insane, placed as single patients; but the investigation was not completed at the time of drawing up the report.

II. For the purposes of the Act, Scotland is divided into *eight* districts; but the Statute contains certain provisions for the alteration or modification of the districts, and these provisions have been so freely used that twenty-one districts have actually resulted. Indeed, in the initiatory arrangements for carrying out the objects of the Act, so far as districts were concerned, counties were permitted to exercise a somewhat wide discretion, without any efficient check as to the ultimate intentions of the Statute; and the result has been, not only that a multiplication of districts not contemplated has taken place, but also that different counties having given greater attention to local conveniences than to the intentions of the Act, the districts are, the Commissioners state—

“Very unequal as regards population, extent, and wealth; and several of them are perhaps too small to support efficient asylums. This remark is especially applicable to those which have been isolated, less perhaps by their own choice than from the refusal of the counties, with which their connexion seems more natural, to enter into combination with them. It is, however, not improbable that some modification of the existing arrangement may yet take place; but as the Statute confers no power to force one district into combination with another, the union of the isolated counties, with already constituted districts, is scarcely to be expected. Were any arrangements contemplated under the provisions of section 49, we might indeed stipulate for the reception of isolated counties into the new district before approving of the proposed combination, but there is little prospect of any application being made to us to alter or vary the districts as at present constituted.”—(p. vi.)

III. The districts having been formed, the Commissioners had to make the best they could of them. And, first, it was necessary to determine “whether the existing accommodation for the insane poor in each district was sufficient for its wants; or, whether, and to what extent, additional accommodation should be provided.” Here, however, a serious hitch in the phraseology of the Statute was experienced; for it was very doubtful what the meaning of the term “existing accommodation,” as used in the Act, was. There was no lack of statutory explication; but, unfortunately, it did not very well apply to the object it was intended to elucidate—existing accommodation *in Scotland*. It was doubtful whether the Commissioners were called upon to recognise private asylums and the lunatic wards of poor-houses: it was questionable whether District Boards were not compelled to adopt the accommodation aforesaid, and use it for the reception of the pauper lunatics of the district before proceeding to erect a district asylum: and it was certain that local authorities asserted that the lunatic wards of poor-houses not only constituted existing accommodation, but were, in fact, public asylums. Counsel were called in to explain the explanatory clauses of the Statute, and to set the matter at rest in so far as the lunatic wards of poor-houses were concerned; and the said counsel “advised that poor-houses, including their lunatic wards, could not be recognised or licensed in terms of the Act”—thus confirm-

ing the very proper opinion of the Commissioners that they *ought* not to be so recognised. Parliament was, however, invoked, and on the 2nd August, 1858, a short *amendment* was passed, by which the Commissioners were empowered to grant licenses for the reception of pauper lunatics into wards of poor-houses, for a period of five years, from 1st January, 1858, "as it is expedient that provision should be made for the custody of pauper lunatics till district asylums are ready for their reception." One parochial board, however, that of Barony, unawed by the Commissioners, by counsel, and by Parliament, exhibits a tenacity of parochial rights befitting the hey-day of local authority, and has intimated that it considers the lunatic wards of its poor-house as embraced by the statutory definition of a public asylum. Although the parochial board has been compelled to apply for the Commissioners' license, it has done so on the stipulation that this step shall not be held as implying an abandonment of the claim. The Edinburgh City poor-house also holds out on the ground that its lunatic ward represents the Old City Bedlam.

Having defined the meaning to be attached to the term "existing accommodation," and stated the mode in which this meaning was arrived at, the Commissioners proceed to report upon the amount of existing provision for the insane poor in the various districts as now constituted, and to describe the measures which are in progress for supplying such deficiencies as, on investigation, have been ascertained. The details under this head are preceded by sundry remarks of considerable interest upon the objects which should be had in view in the admission of lunatics into asylums. The Commissioners write—

"We do not conceal from ourselves the practical difficulties which lie in the way of determining with accuracy the number of insane at large who should be placed in asylums. The conclusions at which we arrived were not altogether based on the nature or curability of the malady, but were influenced also by the circumstances in which the patient was placed, and the degree of care bestowed upon him. We asked ourselves, whether in the interests of the patient himself, or in those of society, it seemed most desirable to place him in an asylum or to leave him at home; and our decision was taken upon a general consideration of all the facts of each case. For, in addition to the mental and bodily condition of the patient, as well as the general circumstances by which he was surrounded, we felt bound also to take into account the constitution of our asylums; and we were conscious that our difficulties would often have been materially lessened had these establishments been based on the idea of providing a diversity of accommodation for patients affected with different degrees of mental incapacity. There are many persons, for example, whose mental condition requires that they should be placed under the care and control of others, yet whom we would hesitate to deprive of liberty to the extent almost necessarily involved in sending them to lunatic asylums as at present constituted.

"There is a growing conviction throughout Europe, manifested in the writings of various psychological writers of repute, in England, France, Germany, Belgium, and even Spain, that the constitution of lunatic asylums requires great modification. This opinion is founded chiefly on the diversity of the forms of insanity; but it rests also on the difficulty of suitably providing for the always increasing number of the insane. It may be open to question, whether this difficulty is caused by an actual increase of persons affected with insanity, or whether it is simply due to an accumulation of the insane

through the prolongation of their lives by better care. It is not unlikely that both causes may be in operation; but, at the same time, it is probable that the increase is in a great degree only apparent, arising from more attention being directed to the subject of insanity, and the consequent discovery of a greater number of persons affected with the malady. However, be this as it may, it is an ascertained fact, that the erection of an asylum always increases the known numbers of lunatics, by bringing into public notice cases which were formerly hidden from view in private houses. Beyond all question, transference to an asylum is very generally calculated to prove most beneficial to an insane patient, but the extent to which asylums have contributed to diminished insanity is not so easily determined. Statistical returns, it is true, show that, under present circumstances, nearly one half of the cases admitted into these establishments are restored to sanity; but at the same time it must be remembered that we have no means of forming an opinion as to what the result would have been had the treatment of these patients been conducted in private houses.

"The question, however, is one of great practical importance, because on its answer naturally hinges a powerful argument in favour of or against the extension of asylums. But we must here state our conviction that the influence of asylums in restoring patients to sanity cannot be fairly tested by the experience of the past, for hitherto their curative agency has to a very considerable extent been neutralized by the combined effect of neglect, prejudice, and ignorance. It cannot be too often repeated, that in the treatment of insanity, loss of time is unfavourable to recovery, and that every impediment that is thrown in the way of immediate treatment acts most prejudicially upon the patient by tending to render permanent the aberration from normal action, which, under favourable circumstances, would speedily have subsided. We are, therefore, of opinion, that asylums are capable of rendering to humanity far greater services than they have yet achieved. There cannot, however, be the smallest doubt, that these establishments have, even in times past, proved of great public utility, by undertaking the treatment and management of patients requiring special medical care, and of those whom, from violence or other peculiarity, it is found dangerous or impossible to retain in private houses. Moreover, it has been clearly proved that the discipline of an asylum exercises a most beneficial and curative influence upon many patients who, if left at home, would probably have become confirmed lunatics, and is calculated to ameliorate in a very remarkable manner the condition even of the most intractable incurable cases. It is very certain, then, that asylums prove of the greatest service both to the patients and the public; and, therefore, the question to be considered is, not whether their extension is required, but whether, as at present constituted, they fulfil all the expectations which led to their erection, and which the expense of their maintenance might warrant us in entertaining. Beyond all other aims, an asylum should have for its object the cure of the insane and the diminution of insanity. Now, in relation to this malady, two important facts have been clearly established, first, that one chief cause of the affection is hereditary predisposition; and secondly, that the success of curative treatment depends in a very great degree upon its being undertaken at an early stage of the disease. In the course of our investigations, we have obtained abundant proof that fatuous female paupers frequently become the mothers of illegitimate children, who, in their turn, grow up imbeciles, or become lunatics; and although there is naturally more difficulty in tracing the source of idiotcy or insanity to a paternal origin, there can be little doubt that male fatuous paupers contribute to this evil. In illustration of these remarks, we shall here give the result of our investigations in one county into this painful aspect of insanity. The number of single patients visited or reported on amounted to 349. Of these, 33 were reported to the visiting Commissioners as illegitimate; 22 being registered paupers, and the remaining 11 indigent private cases,

Of the 349, 113 were females above 17 years of age. Of these, 22 were in circumstances affording adequate protection to their chastity. Of the remaining 91, 15 were known to have given birth to illegitimate children, and 5 to have borne more than one child. Of the 15 mothers, 3 are known to have been illegitimate, and 12 are at present paupers; of their children, 6 are known to be idiots. There are, besides, in the county, 3 other idiots who are known to be the offspring of insane or imbecile mothers, who are dead or have disappeared. These facts are most deplorable; nevertheless, it would be esteemed a harsh measure to send all such cases to asylums, and yet society has a right to demand that all persons who are supported on charitable funds should be placed in such circumstances, and under such control, as will guard against the propagation of this social evil. This result, we are of opinion, might be obtained by attaching to asylums adjunct houses, in which such patients, and others of analogous character, could be placed, without to the same extent depriving them of liberty as the patients in the asylum proper. And we are further of opinion, that many of the objections at present entertained, both by the friends of such patients and the public generally, in regard to placing them in asylums, would be obviated by the proposed modification of these establishments. Moreover, experience shows that there is frequently great unwillingness on the part of relatives to send to asylums patients who are suffering from the milder and incipient forms of insanity. Yet these are precisely the cases in which removal from the home circle is most likely to exercise a beneficial influence. This unwillingness appears to be in a great measure due to the necessity of obtaining two medical certificates of insanity and the sheriff's order, before a patient can be placed under treatment—formalities from which many sensitive minds shrink until the malady has become confirmed. Indeed, it may be said that these precautions, which are intended for the welfare and protection of the patient, are frequently calculated to affect him most injuriously, by delaying appropriate treatment until the mental aberration has become so apparent, that two medical men, on a cursory examination, can, without hesitation, certify to its existence. On this account, we are inclined to think that adjunct houses, in which patients, affected with certain forms of insanity, could be received without the strict legal formalities at present required, would prove a beneficial modification of our asylums, and would tend to increase recoveries, by inducing patients and their friends to have recourse to treatment before the malady had become confirmed."—(pp. ix.—xi.)

The truthfulness of the foregoing remarks may be fully conceded, and the last suggestion contained in them merits careful consideration from its importance.

The illustration given of the propagation of idiocy or insanity by the child-bearing of fatuous females, although sufficiently painful in the brief summary contained in the above quotation, becomes still more so by a reference to the Appendix of the Report, a section of which, entitled *Illegitimacy and Erotic Tendencies* (p. 195), contains a brief account of the several instances alluded to by the Commissioners, than which a more painful picture of degradation or one requiring more prompt and decisive measures of interference cannot well be conceived.

The amount of asylum accommodation existing in, or which can be had recourse to by, different districts varies greatly, and it is not easy to estimate the amount of deficiency in each case. The Commissioners detail at length the circumstances of each district, and the following illustration may be perhaps received as setting forth the *plus* and *minus* degrees of deficiency.

"If we take the counties of Forfar, Edinburgh, and Lanark, as examples of districts already tolerably provided for in this respect, we find that of the 1617 pauper lunatics with which they are chargeable, 1360 or 84·11 per cent. are in asylums or poor-houses, and that only 257 or 15·89 per cent. are left at home. Whereas, if we take the counties of Caithness, Ross and Cromarty, Sutherland, and Inverness, which are altogether unprovided with asylum accommodation, we find that of the 492 pauper lunatics with which they are chargeable, only 136 or 27·64 per cent. are in asylums, and no less than 356 or 72·36 per cent. are left at home. Taking, accordingly, the first set of counties as a standard, it follows, that in the northern counties there are at least 277 pauper lunatics at home who should be removed to asylums."—(p. xii.)

IV. But the Commissioners were not only placed in tribulation by the vagueness and insufficiency of the statutory definition of "existing accommodation;" they were also, and still are, reduced to great straits by the definition of the word *lunatic*, which the statute declares "shall mean and include any mad or furious or fatuous person or persons so diseased or affected in mind, as to render him unfit in the opinion of competent medical persons to be at large, either as regards his own personal safety and conduct or the safety of the persons and property of others or of the public." Whether we regard this explication as a piece of composition, or in reference to the presumed ultimate intentions of the Act, we are equally lost in wonder. If we note the former, we cannot but admire the vagueness of the definition; for, had the sentence been penned with the especial object of leading to a contention of opinion, the point could not have been more aptly hit: if we note the latter, nothing can be imagined better calculated not simply to cause difficulties in the execution of the Act, but, if the definition were followed to its most legitimate conclusion (if any one conclusion more legitimate than another may be supposed to arise out of or may be derived from it) to render the whole Act almost useless.

"The question here arises, [write the Commissioners,] whether the second part of the definition is simply explanatory of the first part, or whether it is an amplification of the definition; whether, namely, every mad, fatuous, or furious person is *simpliciter* a lunatic; or whether to be so accounted he must *also* be unfit to be at large, as regards his own safety and conduct, or the safety and property of the public. It may further be considered doubtful, whether it is contemplated that a person, in order to be declared a lunatic, must be unfit to be at large as regards *both* his own safety and conduct, or as regards *both* the safety and property of the public; or whether the definition will be fulfilled if he be unfit to be at large, as regards *either* his own safety or conduct, or as regards *either* the safety or property of the public. In practice, the view has generally been adopted, that every person certified to be of unsound mind is, in the statutory sense, a lunatic; but the Board of Supervision appear to be of opinion that no pauper of unsound mind can be considered a lunatic in terms of the Statute, unless there is also reason to apprehend danger. (See Correspondence in Appendix D.) In accordance with this view, it has on various occasions been maintained not only by parochial boards, but also by sheriffs, that fatuous or idiotic paupers, although totally incapable from mental deficiency of acting for themselves, are not lunatics in terms of the Act. The question, therefore, is one of great practical importance, and its early adjustment is extremely desirable."—(p. xxvi.)

The correspondence referred to in the foregoing quotation forms a

very interesting episode illustrative of the contention between the *spirit* and the *letter* of the law.

The vagueness of the statutory definition of the term "lunatic" constitutes a ready resting point in the majority of instances, where it may be an object to throw obstacles in the way of the Commissioners carrying out the Act. The other difficulties with which they have had mainly to contend in the disposal of lunatics, have been the want of asylum accommodation; the mistaken affection of relatives; the penuriousness of parochial boards; and certain objections made by medical men to grant certificates of lunacy. The last-mentioned difficulty has not been of very frequent occurrence, but it is of considerable importance. The Commissioners state that—

"By the Statute, all pauper lunatics shall be sent to the asylum of the district in which the parish of the pauper is situated, unless the board agree to their disposal otherwise. But the statutory form of the medical certificate of insanity required to place a patient in an asylum, includes an expression of opinion that he is a proper person to be detained under care and treatment; and, accordingly, some medical men, while admitting a patient to be of unsound mind, have refused to certify that he was a proper person to be detained under care and treatment, when the question of sending him to an asylum was also involved. The practical result of such refusal is to deprive the board of all power to compel improvement in the condition of a patient; and, in this way, a pauper lunatic, for whose care we are legally responsible, if not certified 'to be a proper person to be detained under care and treatment,' is practically removed from our jurisdiction, without being placed under that of the Board of Supervision, whose authority, in matters of treatment, is now limited to ordinary paupers.

"Occasionally, also, medical men have refused to grant certificates, in the cases of patients suffering under certain forms of insanity, on the ground that they do not come within the scope of the Act.

"From the vague and unsatisfactory nature of the definition of lunacy, we have, in several instances, had no alternative, but with regret to yield our own views to those expressed by the local medical men, and to leave the patient in circumstances which we considered unsuitable."—(p. xxx.)

Another important difficulty in the effective carrying out of the objects of the Statute has proved to be the provision, that in no case shall a lunatic be admitted into an asylum without an order from the sheriff. This vexatiously impedes the early reception of patients into asylums without any resulting benefit of importance. The Commissioners write—

"In granting his order for the detention of a lunatic, the sheriff exercises judicial functions; for he takes into consideration the terms of the medical certificates, and grants or withholds his order according as he considers the facts therein stated as sufficient proof or otherwise of insanity in a statutory sense. Accordingly, it frequently happens that the sheriff refuses to accept the medical certificates as sufficient warrant for him to grant his order; and on one occasion, on which the patient had been received on a certificate of emergency, this refusal was necessarily followed by immediate discharge. This difference of opinion between the sheriff and the medical men occurs principally in regard to dipsomania, as a patient affected with this form of insanity is not considered by some sheriffs as a lunatic in terms of the Statute. But the cause of the refusal of the sheriff to grant his order lies sometimes merely in the fact, that the circumstances stated in the medical certificates, as indicating insanity, do

not in his opinion afford sufficient evidence of its existence. In this respect, however, great differences occur in practice, as some sheriffs reject statements which others consider sufficient; while others receive, as satisfactory, statements which certainly do not meet the requirements of the Statute."—(p. xxxiii.)

The Commissioners suggest certain changes by which the objections that at present attach to the sheriff's order may be done away with, and still its value remain as a "guarantee against the granting of hasty or improper certificates of insanity by medical men."

It is necessary to remark that difficulties are occasionally thrown in the way of the sheriff's coming to a right conclusion upon the cases submitted to him, from the careless mode in which the medical certificates are sometimes filled up.

The Commissioners next comment upon the powers which they possess in respect to the visitation of asylums, and the insufficiency of the means as yet at their command, from the imperfect carrying out of the statute by district boards, for the efficient inspection of the whole of Scotland. They also suggest that district asylums, in order that local obstacles be avoided, should be supported by a general district rate, or a rate of the whole country, and not by parochial rates, as set forth by the present law—each parish supporting directly the burden of its pauper lunatics. The defective provisions of the statute for the discharge of patients from asylums form, moreover, a subject of remark in the Report.

Concerning the condition of lunatics placed singly in private houses, the Commissioners report of those who are paupers, that although in several districts their state is most miserable, yet that a large proportion of the cases "are treated with kindness and consideration." "On this fact," the Commissioners observe,—

"Rests our chief hope of the success of the cottage system of accommodation, should it be considered proper by district boards to give it a trial as an adjunct to their district asylums. For, if kind and humane treatment be extensively found in cottages, even under the present system of imperfect supervision, there is every reason to think that, under the immediate superintendence of the asylum officers, it could be so fostered in growth as to open up a prospect of escape from the many questions that are every year rendering the care and management of the insane poor a problem of more difficult solution. In every country of Europe, the question of the accommodation of the insane is daily becoming more and more embarrassing; and we see how in England, notwithstanding the wealth of the country, and the humane spirit of the people and of the Legislature, the increase in the number of lunatics keeps ahead of all the exertions made for their accommodation. This is a grave fact which deserves our most serious consideration before we commit ourselves to the building of asylums, in the expectation that no further call will be made upon us. No doubt, it is theoretically easy to maintain the doctrine that asylum accommodation should be provided for all the insane poor, and that no expense should be spared in supplying the wants of this afflicted class. But the sane poor have also their claims; and the question may be asked, how far it is right, that an idiot, or a lunatic in a state of dementia or general paralysis, who is beyond all hope of being restored to sanity; and who, moreover, is little able to appreciate kindness, or to derive pleasure from the care and attention bestowed upon him, should receive treatment greatly superior to that bestowed upon an aged or infirm ordinary pauper, who, though in a sense also incurable,

is more capable of appreciating kindness and showing gratitude in return? In England, the poor-house is open to the able-bodied labourer, but in Scotland it is reserved for the aged and helpless poor; and, accordingly, with us there is not perhaps the same reason for drawing a distinction between the treatment of ordinary paupers and that of incurable pauper lunatics. But there will always be this essential difference between the two classes, calling for special consideration in their treatment, that the latter are labouring under a degree of mental incapacity which renders them altogether dependent upon the care of others, and incapable of appealing against harshness or neglect. Still, as we must place a limit on our charitable expenditure, we should beware of making such a distinction in their treatment as might raise a doubt as to its propriety; and must therefore take care not to be too lavish with the one hand, lest we be forced to be too penurious with the other. On this account, we lean towards any scheme that will embrace good and economical accommodation for the whole insane poor, rather than to one which, from the expense of carrying it out, will sooner or later be of only partial application."—(p. li.)

From the returns given by the Commissioners, it seems that, on the 1st January, 1858, the number of pauper lunatics amounted to 4737, of whom 2120 were in asylums and licensed houses, 883 in poor-houses, and 1784 in private houses. The average weekly allowance for out-door relief amounted in the districts from which returns of the allowance had been made, to 2s. 10½d. This, however, on account of a few exceptional cases of allowance, would be rather above the mark; but, it must be added, that grants of clothing are also made.

The Commissioners speak highly of the general condition of the patients in the public asylums. They remark:—"In none of the asylums have we observed mechanical restraint in use; and the registers show that it has been resorted to in one or two instances only, in which there appeared to be good grounds for its application. Seclusion for short periods is in frequent use; but no case has come under our observation or notice, in which it has been improperly applied or injuriously extended" (p. liv.). They add also:—"The extent to which amusement and recreation have been carried is a remarkable and very gratifying feature in most of the asylums; but in all of them there is still a deficiency of objects calculated to arrest the attention and rouse the feelings of the patients. We, however, notice with pleasure a gradual improvement in this respect, which is more especially apparent at Glasgow" (p. lv.).

Particular attention is directed to the wretched and very insufficient stipends of the assistant medical officers in the different asylums; and the Commissioners express a regret that in none of the asylums measures have been taken to secure the superintendents retiring allowances.

The average number of patients resident in the public asylums in 1858 amounted to 2421, of whom 1253·5 were males, and 1167·5 females. The admissions, were 449 males and 498 females; recoveries, 151 males and 201 females; discharges not recovered (many being transferred to other asylums), 149 males, and 140 females; deaths, 109 males, and 94 females. Proportion of recoveries per cent. on admissions, 33·680 males, and 40·361 females; proportion of deaths per cent. on numbers resident, 8·699 males, 8·051 females.

Of the condition of the pauper patients in licensed houses, the

Commissioners speak somewhat unfavourably, although considerable improvements have taken place since the Report of the Royal Commissioners in 1857, and many improvements are still being effected. Of the pauper licensed houses it is stated that they "are generally overcrowded" (mainly from the inadequacy of the accommodation for the insane throughout the country generally),—

"Though the evil, from the precautions we have taken, is gradually diminishing. The ventilation, especially during the night, is in a corresponding degree imperfect. The rooms, however, are generally comfortably heated, and the furniture has, to a certain extent, been improved by supplying tables, and benches with backs; but the system under which these houses exist is fundamentally wrong, and there is, and must continue to be, a great and pervading want of cheerfulness and amenity.

"The patients, when within doors, are generally found sitting in cheerless rooms, ranged on benches, listless, and without occupation; and, when out of doors, they are usually lounging sluggishly about the airing-courts, or are crouching in corners. But we have pleasure in stating that, in regard to Millholm House and Longdale, this description admits of considerable modification, as in both of these establishments praiseworthy exertions have been made to provide occupation for the patients. At Longdale, with 130 patients, Dr. Muirhead has about eighty acres of land in possession, the produce of which is all consumed on the premises. The house is supplied with milk and butter from his own cows; he feeds his own stock; raises his own vegetables; and evidently turns these farming operations to good account. His experience in this respect should be received as a valuable hint by the district boards, as it tends strongly to show that a good-sized farm ought to be an economical appendage to an asylum.

"The diet and clothing of the patients have generally been found sufficient, and there has accordingly been no recurrence of that excessive mortality, the result of cold and starvation, which called for such severe comments from the Royal Commissioners. We have, however, still reason to doubt, principally from the low condition of the vital powers of the patients, whether the diet was always appropriate; and in one instance we have pointedly directed the attention of the medical attendant to the subject. There seemed to us to be a want of sufficient variety in the food, and possibly also an insufficiency of nutritive principles. Our views on this head were confirmed by the improvement in the physical condition of the patients which followed on a change of diet. The error here committed was due to the ignorance of the proprietor, who did not seem to be aware of the necessity of varying the food; and this fact alone is sufficient to show the impolicy of confiding the care of even incurable patients to uneducated men. We take this opportunity to state, that in the only instance in which we have granted our license to a new proprietor, the licentiate had received a professional education.

"Mechanical restraint has been almost entirely banished from the licensed houses, and patients who are recorded in the Report of the Royal Commission as almost always under restraint, are now habitually freed from their bonds."—(pp. lix.—lx.)

The average number of insane resident in the licensed houses in 1858 amounted to 817, of whom 355 were males and 462 females. The admissions, were 125 males and 222 females; the recoveries, 48 males, 86 females; discharges not recovered (several being transfers to other asylums), 21 males, 35 females; deaths, 30 males, 35 females. The proportion of recoveries per cent. on admissions was 38·400

males, 38·738 females; the proportion of deaths per cent. on the numbers resident, 8·450 males, 7·575 females.

Concerning the two idiot schools which exist in Scotland, the Commissioners express the conviction that, as at present conducted, they will not prove ultimately successful. In the one school the training is too scholastic; in the other, although sounder principles of tuition prevail, the funds are unfortunately too scanty to permit of their being fully carried out. The Commissioners insist that the preliminary training of idiots should be chiefly physical, and that in tutoring the senses objects should be had recourse to, not books. Above all, in the more educable idiots the training should mainly be in useful physical occupations.

The treatment and accommodation of lunatics in poor-houses is emphatically and most righteously condemned in the Report. The average number of insane resident in poor-houses in 1858 was 746, of whom 131 were males and 201 females; the admissions were, 131 males and 201 females; the recoveries, 45 males, 92 females; discharges not recovered, 28 males and 41 females; deaths, 49 males, 53 females; proportion of recoveries per cent. of admissions, 34·351 males, 45·771 females; proportion of deaths per cent. on numbers resident, 15·909 males, 2·087 females.

The Commissioners point out the imperfections and inconsistencies of the provisions respecting dangerous lunatics and the evils resulting therefrom, as well as the harsh and oppressive manner in which the regulations respecting alien lunatics are carried out. Further, certain suggestions respecting the management of criminal lunatics are given, and, after expressing an opinion against the establishment of an especial asylum for lunatics of this class, the Commissioners propose that "special wards for their reception should be provided in connexion with one of the district asylums. The chief advantage of this scheme would be the supervision and management of the patients by an experienced medical superintendent and skilled attendants" (p. lxxviii.). The whole of the criminal lunatics in Scotland do not, on an average, exceed thirty, and there is not much probability that this number will ever be greatly increased.

The Report concludes with a statement of the powers which the Commissioners possess respecting the property of lunatics. The Statute sets forth that the General Board shall perform sundry important duties protective of the property of a lunatic; but the means provided and the powers granted for the performance of these duties are so limited that the intentions and provisions of the Act are practically nullified (p. lxxix.).

It is to be hoped that the shortcomings in phraseology, drawing-up, and working of the New Scotch Lunacy Act, will operate as a caution to those upon whom the duty may fall of amending or remodelling the English and Irish Lunacy Acts; and we would recommend all who are interested in lunacy legislation to read carefully the First Annual Report of the Scotch Commissioners in Lunacy.

MEDICO-LEGAL TRIAL.

DISPUTED WILL.—PLEA OF UNSOUND MIND.

COURT OF PROBATE, WESTMINSTER, May 5th.

(Before Sir C. CRESSWELL, the Judge Ordinary, and a Special Jury.)

TERRINGTON v. TERRINGTON AND JOHNSON.

THIS was a suit to try the validity of the will and the testamentary capacity of the testator, one William Terrington, of Emneth, near Wisbech. The plaintiff, Zachariah Terrington, the executor, averred that the testator at the time of the execution of the will was of perfect sound mind, memory, and understanding. The defendants, who contested the will, were Mrs. Mary Terrington, the mother of the testator, and Mrs. Hannah Johnson, his sister, and they averred by their pleadings that the testator was not of sound mind, memory, and understanding, and that the execution of the will was obtained by undue influence exercised over him by Zachariah Terrington.

Mr. Serjeant Pigott and Dr. Tristram were counsel for the plaintiff; Dr. Phillimore and Mr. D. Keane were for the defendants.

It was stated by Mr. Serjeant Pigott, in his opening of the case, that the plaintiff, Mr. Zachariah Terrington, was uncle of the testator. The will was made on the 19th of January, 1859, by Mr. Ollard, Solicitor, of Upwell, near Wisbech, and the testator died on the 24th of that month. By the will he bequeathed a legacy of 19*l.* 19*s.* to his uncle; he bequeathed the interest of a sum of 200*l.* to his sister, a Mrs. Desborough, in America, and at her death the principal was to be divided amongst her children; and the residue of his property, which consisted of about thirty acres of land, and some 300*l.* or 400*l.*, he bequeathed to the children of his uncle, Zachariah Terrington. The learned counsel detailed the history of the testator's life, to show how it was he had been induced to exclude his mother and others of his family from any benefit under his will. It appeared that at the early age of two or three the testator was sent to live with his grandfather, where he remained until he was fifteen, the grandfather having in the meantime attended to his education, and in fact brought him up as one of his own children. When he had attained the age stated, he was sent home with the view of his providing for his own livelihood. It was alleged, however, that the boy was treated with the utmost neglect by his mother, and after remaining under the parental roof about a week, he set off roaming about endeavouring to earn a living by his own labour. Sometimes he obtained a job at one relative's and then at another's, but was eventually so reduced that he had to apply to the guardians for relief. Subsequently he worked a passage out to America and back, and after that it seems he resolved to try his fortune in America, and accordingly in the year 1850 he went out and settled in that country. In 1852 his brother John died and left him the property now in dispute. The testator continued in America until 1857, when he returned to England, and first made his way to his uncle Zachariah's house, and remained there some short time. He was persuaded to go and live with his mother, but it was stated that he experienced the same want of maternal affection on her part that drove him away from home at the former period of his life, and in addition to this he had got the impression that she wished to poison him. He accordingly returned to live with his uncle. This was on Monday, the 17th of January, in the present year. On Wednesday, the 19th of the same month, he went to Upwell and made his will, and on the following Monday he died. All the circumstances will be found fully set forth in the evidence.

Mr. Ollard, attorney, Upwell, Norfolk, examined by Serjeant Pigott: I had no acquaintance with the testator before the 19th January, 1859, further than having seen him occasionally. I have known his uncle Zachariah for many years. On the 19th of January the testator came to my office accompanied by his uncle. It was between ten and eleven in the morning. William Terrington said, "I wish to make my will." I said, "Would you not like to be alone?" Upon my saying so, Zachariah Terrington got off his chair, and the testator said, "No, I don't wish you to go; I wish you to stay; I mean to appoint you one of my executors, and I would rather you stayed and heard." The testator appeared to me to be faint, and I said to him, "Would you not like to have a little ale?" He replied, "Walking is an exertion to me, and I am tired; but I am determined not to take a drop until I have made my will." I then said to him, "What property have you?" He said, "I have about thirty acres of land, and about 600*l.* which I have lent to my brother-in-law, Johnson, on a note, and a few other things of small value." I then said, "How do you wish to leave it?" He said, "I wish to leave the interest of 200*l.* to my sister in America for life, and then to her children; 20*l.* to my uncle Zachariah; and the remainder of my property to be divided amongst his children." I said, "Who do you wish to be executors?" He said, "I wish my uncle Zachariah to be one, and I should like you to be the other." I said, "I hardly like to be so. What makes you choose me; you don't know me?" He said, "I don't know you myself, but I have heard many speak of you, and I have a particular wish that you should be my executor." He said, "I don't want to trouble you in the matter, but I want some one that I can rely on to send the money to my sister in America regularly." I said, "If that is your object I don't mind." I then said, "Trustees are not entitled to charge; and as you are no interest to me I should object to be a trustee and not charge." He said, "Oh, I don't want that; I wish you to be paid all your usual charges." I said, "Very well; I'll put a clause in the will;" and he said, "That's right," or "All right." I then commenced writing the will. After I had written a line or two, I said to him, "You seem to me in a very feeble state of health." He said, "I am not well; I am subject to bleeding, which weakens me a great deal." I then said, "I am quite satisfied with your perfect comprehension; but seeing your state of health it would relieve my mind that you should see a medical man." He said, "I have no objection. I wish everything done to make my will secure; send for anybody you like." I called my clerk, and directed him to bring the first medical man he found at home. Whilst the clerk was gone I said, "Are you quite determined to leave nothing to your mother and your other sister?" He said, "Not one farthing." I said, "It will excite a very bitter feeling in your mother's mind." He said, "I have no doubt of it; but I expect I have a right to do what I like with my own." Upon that I went on writing the will until Mr. Tubbs came. When Mr. Tubbs arrived I said to him, "This is Mr. William Terrington, sir; he has instructed me to make a will, and he has given me instructions with very great clearness, but he seems to me in a feeble state of health, and there will probably be dissatisfaction caused if he should die; and I therefore should be glad if you would examine him yourself and say what you think." Mr. Tubbs sat down by him and asked him his age, or something to that effect, and then said, "Are you in the habit of drinking?" The testator said, "I am sorry to say I am; but I have not taken one drop this morning, for I was determined to come solid and sober to make my will." Mr. Tubbs then went on speaking to him, and I went on writing the will in hopes of being able to finish it in time for Mr. Tubbs to sign it. Before I had finished writing, Mr. Tubbs said to me, "He is as fit to make a will as I am." I said, "So I thought myself, but still it is a satisfaction to have your opinion. Will you stay and witness it?" He said, "I am in a hurry, and cannot; but you can go on with perfect

propriety." He then left, and I went on and finished the will. After I had finished it, I read it over to the testator. He put several questions upon it as I proceeded. He asked whether his lands would go under the general description, and other questions all relevant to the matter; and when I finished he said, "You have got it quite right." I then went for Mr. Stuck, my nearest neighbour. Mr. Stuck came, and I called Balding, my clerk, and I said in their presence, "Mr. Terrington, you have heard this will read, does it correctly express your desires?" He said, "Yes." I then said, "Will you then execute it, and desire these two gentlemen to attest it?" He said, "Yes." And he then signed it, and Mr. Stuck and Mr. Balding signed it in his presence. When that was done he said, "Uncle, I wish you would kindly fetch the gig from the Five Bells, it will save me the trouble of walking." His uncle went, and he stayed with me and said, "You offered me a glass of ale, but I would not take it before I signed my will; now, I should be much obliged if you would let me have it." I rung for a glass of ale, and he leant back in his chair and said, "Now I feel very much relieved now that I have made my will; and I should have been very much annoyed if my mother or Mrs. Johnson got a farthing of my money." I said, "What is the reason you seem to dislike your mother so much?" He said, "Oh, she has never been a mother to me." I said, "You have been living with her for some time, have you not, though?" He said, "Yes, but I have never been comfortable there; but I have long been wishing and intended to leave. I rather hastened away, and have left her now for good." I said, "What hastened you away?" He said, "Why, the servant girl told me something which I did not like." I said, "What was it?" She said she saw my mother put something in my drink when I was not there. She told me she threw it away and put me some fresh drink." I said, "Oh, your mother could not have intended to have hurt you." He said, "I don't know that she did; but you do not know my mother as well as I do." He said he was going to live at his uncle's a little while, and then he intended to take a cottage.

Did he appear to you to understand what he was talking about?—Most perfectly so.

Was his conversation all rational?—Perfectly so in every respect.

Did he say anything to indicate an unsound state of mind in any respect?—Not one word.

Cross-examined by Dr. Phillimore: I would not undertake to say the conversation I have detailed is verbatim, but it is the substance of what he said. I know Mr. Bays, conveyancer, of Wisbech. He came down to have the will read on the part of Mr. Johnson, at the funeral. He did not say that he was surprised I made a will for such a person as that. Mr. Bays told me the will would most likely be disputed, and I said, if that is so, I shall not act as executor; and I did not much like being made executor at all, but the testator pressed me. I did not know the testator before he went to America. Zachariah, the uncle, I have known many years; he keeps a public-house at Enneth.

Do you not know that it is a disreputable house?—Certainly not; on the contrary, I think it is a most respectable house. I was never there with Mr. Tubbs. About a fortnight ago I met the witnesses there and took their evidence down in a room. During the whole of the conversation with the testator the uncle never said a word. This was the first intimation that I was required to make the will for him. The uncle had not said a word to me upon the subject. I know Mr. Metcalfe is solicitor for a portion of the family, but there is not what I call a family solicitor. I know Mr. Wilkin. I do not know that he refused to make the will. The testator answered all my questions very clearly, and gave his instructions as clearly as either you or I. I do not know that I should have suggested sending for a medical man had I not known Mrs.

Terrington's peculiar character. I thought she would be sure to dispute the will if there was the slightest occasion for it. I was not at all aware of the habits of the deceased beyond what he himself told me.

Mr. James Francis Balding examined by Dr. Tristram: He said he was clerk to Mr. Ollard, and recollected the testator coming to the office on the 19th of January last. Witness was present the whole time Mr. Tubbs was in the room, and he was one of the attesting witnesses to the will. The testator signed in the presence of witness and Mr. Stuck; and the attesting witnesses signed in each other's presence and in the testator's presence. Witness heard Mr. Tubbs say, "He is as fit to make a will as I am." The testator appeared to be as fit to make a will as any one he had ever seen in the office.

Cross-examined by Dr. Phillimore: He judged of the testator's competency to make a will from the straightforward manner in which he answered the questions that were put to him.

Mr. James Reynolds Stuck examined by Dr. Tristram: He lived at Upwell, and carried on the business of a grocer and draper. He never saw the testator until he attested the will at Mr. Ollard's office. The testator appeared calm and collected, but very unwell. He saw nothing to indicate that the testator was not capable of making a will.

Cross-examined by Dr. Phillimore: Witness knew nothing about the family. He was in the room from ten to twenty minutes. He put no questions to deceased himself.

Zachariah Terrington examined by Serjeant Pigott: I am the uncle of the testator. I live at Emneth, near Wisbech. I am a publican and a farmer. The house is called the Hungate Inn. I farm about 120 or 130 acres of land. I possess land of my own besides. My father's name was John Terrington. The testator lived at my father's house some time. He was between two and three years old when he first came there. He continued at my father's till he was about fifteen. He was thirty-two when he died. I lived at home while he was with us. My father sent him to school, and when he was fifteen he was sent home to his father and mother. He lived at home a day or two, until he fell out with them, and then he went roaming about from one place to another. When roaming about he was sometimes along with me and sometimes at Mr. Howlett's, working for us. I had a farm of my own then. He would stay a fortnight or three weeks with me at a time. Mr. Howlett married his mother's sister, and was a publican and a farmer in the Fens. The testator was not able to get a livelihood; and on one occasion, in 1849, he applied to the parish. I was not present when he applied to the guardians, but I heard my brother say one of the guardians had given him an order. The testator went to America, working his passage out, and then he came home again. He returned to America, and was away six years. Before he went to America he borrowed money of me several times, as he was in poor circumstances. His father died about 1852, and left the testator a sum of 20*l.*, which I believe my father sent out to him. I produce letters from the testator, written while he was in America. [One of the letters, dated April 25th, 1852, was read, acknowledging the draft and giving the testator's impressions of American character. He described their extreme inquisitiveness and their proneness to relieve strangers of their money, "either by hook or by crook;" and he added, "You must not get drunk here and lie on the seats as I used to do in those old publicans on the smecs or fens." Other letters were read.] I remember his brother John dying in 1857. It was soon after that the testator was sent for to return home. I never wrote to him while he was in America. My father has been dead about three years. The testator arrived home from America in November, 1857. He came to my house the day after he landed, and stayed a week with me. He was taken ill the day he arrived, and Mr. Wallis, a doctor, was called in to attend him. Mr. Wallis is since dead. The testator was in bed all day. I

believe his illness came through drink. He went to bed as soon as he came. He got up the next morning. The doctor visited him twice, but only saw him once. He had some medicine the first time the doctor came. While he was staying with me that week he amused himself by walking about with me on my business. He talked about farming and about America, and appeared to be well. He went to see his mother on the Saturday in consequence of my expressing a wish to that effect. He went off to see her by himself, but I met him on the road and accompanied him. We met Mrs. Johnson on the road in a gig, going to market. I was walking by the gig, and we saw the testator coming. She said, "That's my brother." I said, "Yes, I think it is;" and she said, "I'll drive on." She drove away, and after she had passed him he came up and said, in reference to her conduct, "She's a nice sort of a sister; she didn't speak to me." He asked me to go with him to his mother's, and I turned back and accompanied him. While we were going along the road, he said my wife wanted him to go and see his mother. He stayed at his mother's about ten minutes. I do not know whether it was a friendly meeting, as I stopped outside. I remember his asking me to go to Mr. Metcalfe's about his brother's affairs. He said, "Will you go and see me righted about my money?" I said "Yes." He told me his money was all at Mr. Metcalfe's office. Mr. Metcalfe said it was not the proper time to receive it. At the end of the week he went to live at his mother's, and remained there till January, 1859. He visited me two and three times a week, and on one occasion stayed all night. I remember his coming on Monday, the 17th. He came with Mr. Forth, the baker, in his cart, and he said he and his mother had been falling out, and he would not stay any longer with her. He asked whether he might keep along with me. I said he might as long as he liked, and when he got tired he might leave. He then asked me if I would go along with him and make a will the next morning. I said I would if I was not busy. I was busy the next day and did not go with him; but I went with him on the following day, Wednesday. There was a man named Diggle in the house when he asked me, and the testator wished him to go along with us. I drove him to Upwell to Mr. Ollard's office at his request. He had seen Mr. Ollard's name in the newspaper. He said, "We'll go to that little man at 'Well.'" I said, "You mean Mr. Ollard?" and he said "Yes." He said he would not go to Mr. Metcalfe because he could not get his money from him. We conversed but little on the road. He borrowed some money of me as we went along, for the purpose of paying Mr. Ollard for making the will. I remained in the room while the will was made at his own request. I remember my nephew speaking to me about having bought a hoe to amuse himself with it, and telling me that his mother complained of his eating too much, and wished him not to use the hoe. He also said his mother had a cask of liquor in the house, and wanted to sell it out to him by the bottle. He drank a good deal occasionally. I have never seen him intoxicated. I remember his mother coming to my house when he returned from America, but I was not at home at the time. He was taken ill on Sunday afternoon. I asked him if I should fetch a doctor. He said no; if he was worse he would let him know. I saw him again that day. He said he neither felt ache nor pain. I again spoke to him about the doctor, and he said if he felt worse he would let him know. The next morning at nine o'clock, after I came in from the farm, my wife told me he was a little worse. I went up and finding he was much worse, I put my horse to and went for Mr. Tubbs. Mr. Tubbs came between eleven and twelve, but by that time he was dead.

Cross-examined by Dr. Phillimore.—I did not send for Mrs. Bradley on Saturday to nurse him. Mrs. Bradley is a charwoman. She came on Saturday and sat up with him all night, for the purpose of giving him a little drink when he wanted it—wine-and-water and gin-and-water.

The Judge.—Why did Mrs. Bradley sit up with him on Saturday night to give him drink?—Because there was no bell-pull.

But how was it that she sat up with him that night and not on Friday night?—Because “my missus” could not do so.

But was it necessary that anybody should sit up with him at all?—I don’t know any reason particular. He might be a little worse—he was not much worse. He was not bad the day before.

How came you to swear that you did not know anything of his illness until Saturday afternoon?—He appeared much the same as usual.

Cross-examination continued.—My son always slept with him except one night, and then my son refused to sleep with him because he wetted the bed. He did not tell me he was frightened to sleep with him because he raved so. When he was in America I am not aware that his father and mother sent him money.

Was he not an habitual drunkard before he went to America?—He used to drink a little; he used to get drunk sometimes, and sometimes he did not.

Was he not generally drunk?—Yes; he used to get drunk a goodish bit. He returned in 1857. He was brought to my house in a cart. He was not capable of taking care of himself. I believe he was a little bit drunk. During the week he was at my house he was never drunk but once.

Upon your oath, was he not covered with lice, owing to his drunken and careless habits, when you took him to his mother’s?

No. I did not say to his mother, “Unless he is well looked after, he will be lost;” nor did I tell her that he had been found in the road with his clothes down and his shirt over his head, and his body covered with dirt. I believe he was so found on the road, and he was brought in that condition to my house. His mother kept an inn called the Jolly Farmers at that time. I do not know that in April, 1858, the testator was at a public house called the Chequers, at Emneth. That house is kept by my niece. I never went to Mrs. Terrington, the mother, to tell her of what her son was doing at the Chequers, or what was being done to him. I never said they were going to get him to marry that girl (meaning Thrasher’s sister), and that they were going to take him to Lynn to get him to turn his money over to her, and that when they did they would soon turn him off, and fly about spending the money. I know Mrs. Terrington’s (the mother’s) servant. I did not know her name was Mary Fundry. I never said to her, “I am sure he is not in his right mind; he never was in his right mind all the time I knew him.” Nor have I said that I had to get up four or five times in a night to bottle off brandy for him, and that I had to lock him up. I never said to Mary Fundry that I was sure his mother had poisoned him. I swear distinctly that I never said to her that the deceased had told me that his mother had poisoned him. He had fits when he first came home, but not lately. The fits lasted about two or three minutes. He would lay quite stiff, with his hands contracted and his mouth wide open. I gave no notice to Mr. Ollard beforehand that we were coming to make the will. My nephew began the conversation by asking me if I would go with him. He never said how he was going to leave it. I never said anything to him about leaving it to his mother and his sister, or to his sister in America. He never said anything about having asked either Mr. Metcalfe or Mr. Wilkin to make his will. I heard the solicitor ask him if he was ill. I did not say anything. I knew he was ill from bleeding; I did not know that he was ill from excessive drinking. I do not know that excessive drinking causes death. I never said to Mary Fundry anything about the difficulty of getting his clothes off the night he made the will. His legs were not so contracted that he could not get his clothes off. Mr. Tubbs gave the certificate of the cause of his death. Mr. Tubbs saw him at Mr. Ollard’s, and he did not see him again until after his death. I did not tell Mr. Tubbs the cause of his death. After he came back on the Monday

from his mother's he was not once drunk up to the time of his death. He was not drunk on the Tuesday; he had about a pint of beer that day. He had no spirits. He might have had two pints of beer. On the Monday he did not have above one pint at my house. Nobody sat up with him on Monday and Tuesday nights. My son slept with him. I was not present when my wife told Mr. Johnson my boy dare not sleep with him on account of his raving. I do not know that on one occasion he was so drunk that he fell down in the pigsty and the pigs walked over his body. He could not hold his water; he stood trembling, and the water fell from him. He was sometimes covered with his excrement, which fell from him. I did not tell Mr. Ollard any of these things. I did not think that Mr. Ollard ought to have been made acquainted with his condition. He took no liquor on the Wednesday morning when he went to get his will made. The reason why he took none was because he was ailing from bleeding at the nose and mouth in bed. He came down with his mouth all covered with blood.

Re-examined by Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—The woman Bradley occasionally did work at my house. I never asked her to sit up with him, and I am not aware that my wife asked her to do so. Mrs. Terrington's servant (I did not know her name was Mary Fandry) came to hear the will read at the funeral. He had no fits in my house during the last week before his death.

By the Judge.—When he came back from his mother's house the last week before his death, he said the girl had looked through the keyhole and seen her mixing something in a glass.

Mr. William Tubbs, examined by Serjeant Pigott.—I have been in practice in Upwell upwards of twenty years. I remember being sent for on the 19th of January to go to Mr. Ollard's office. I there saw the testator. Mr. Ollard told me why I was sent for. He said: "I have sent for you to see this Mr. Terrington, although I am perfectly satisfied as to his capability to make a will." After passing Mr. Ollard, I questioned the testator as to his past life. He had the appearance of taking a little drink, which he acknowledged. I said, "Are you rather fond of taking a little drink?" He said, "Yes." I gave him a multiplication-table to test his capability. I asked him how much twice seven was, and three times seven. All I can say is, that he answered all my questions in a straightforward manner. He said he had come to give Mr. Ollard instructions to make a will, that he came sound and solid on purpose, and had taken no drink that day. I felt his pulse and looked at his tongue. His pulse was slow and jerking—what we call a hæmorrhagic pulse. I sat down and conversed with him for about a quarter of an hour. I am satisfied from what I saw of him that he was then endowed with full consciousness and perfect reason, and quite competent to dispose of his property. I detected nothing to indicate an unsound state of mind. I examined his mouth, and found symptoms of a scorbutic humour in the mouth, as well as of raising blood. The inability to retain water may arise from other causes than from excessive drinking. Epileptic fits and delirium tremens do not necessarily produce mental incapacity. I said I was perfectly satisfied as to his competence to make a will, and I left. I was sent for about a week afterwards to his uncle Zachariah's, and found him dead. I gave a special certificate, which I derived from the examination I made on the day I saw him at Mr. Ollard's office. His condition then was consistent with the nature of his death. I apprehended that he might be suddenly carried off from syncope, the languid circulation being insufficient to drive the blood to the head.

Cross-examined by Dr. Phillimore.—I gave the certificate to Mr. Terrington, stating that if that certificate was not satisfactory it would be necessary to have an inquest. I conceive syncope to have been the cause of his death. I found that opinion upon the languid circulation he had, and from the circumstance stated by his attendants. They stated they were going to give him some drink,

when he turned up his eyes and died. I have no doubt that the deceased was of full consciousness and reason when I saw him, and I founded my opinion as to that upon the general conversation with him. I did not ask him about his property or about his relatives. I recollect asking him what day it was, and he told me correctly. I did not ask him about his former illnesses. I was not aware he had had epileptic fits; had I known it, it would not have altered my opinion. Epilepsy proceeds from a variety of causes, not entirely from drink. Had I been aware that the deceased was subject to epileptic fits, and was an habitual drunkard, it might have modified my opinion as to his full consciousness and perfect reason. I have performed an operation under the influence of mesmerism.

You are a believer in mesmerism?—Of course I am. I could mesmerize you in a very short time. (Laughter.) I beg to say that I have cured cases of insanity by mesmerism.

The Judge Ordinary said there was no rule of law, whatever differences of opinion there might be upon the subject, that because a person believed in mesmerism he was insane.

Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—Nor that a witness is not to be believed.

Cross-examination continued.—I never said the testator told me that his mother had poisoned him. What I said was, that I heard a man, who was getting his dinner at the house when I called there on the day after his death, say the deceased had said that if he had remained with his mother he would have been muddled out of his life. By his appearance at Mr. Ollard's I thought he was fond of drinking. His flesh was pale and emaciated.

By the Judge Ordinary.—Drinking sometimes produces a rubicund colour and sometimes a pale colour; the pale colour denotes a more advanced stage of intemperance.

Cross-examination continued.—I should say he had the appearance of being a confirmed drunkard. His observation that he came sound and solid struck my attention. He had symptoms of pectoriloquy, or talking in the chest. The inability to hold water is a sign of an affection of the brain, but it might also result from a calculus in the bladder.

Re-examined.—With inability to retain water there may be perfect soundness of mind.

Mrs. Mary Terrington, examined by Dr. Tristram.—I am the wife of the plaintiff, Zachariah Terrington. I have known the testator for the last twenty-seven years. I recollect him going to school in 1840. After he left school he went home, and after he left home he was with me the whole of one summer—that was some time before he went to America. On his return from America he came to our house, and was brought in a cart. He was very dirty indeed, and my daughter washed him, and put him one of my boy's shirts on, and put him to bed. We then sent for Mr. Wallis. Friday he was ill. Saturday he got up as usual, and I advised him to go to his mother. A day or two before the 17th of January last I received a message from the testator. I sent word back that he might come and stay with me as long as he liked. He came on the 17th, about six in the evening. He was quite sober. He had something the matter with his legs then, so that he was obliged to walk on his toes. I heard him ask my husband and Mr. Diggle to go with him to make his will. He was sober on the 18th, and was down in our little grass-field. On the 19th he bled very much in the morning. He got up about nine. I washed his hands and face, and combed his hair out, for he was smothered with blood. He told me he was very often so. On Thursday, the 20th, he was up all day. On the Friday and Saturday the same. On the Saturday night I thought he was worse than he had been. I said I would not let my little boy sleep with him, and I sent for Mrs. Bradley to sit up with him. I never heard him complain during Saturday night. On Sunday I proposed to send for a doctor. He said, "I

won't have him fetched; I shall know when I am any worse, and I will call you." On the Sunday he had some wine-and-water. On the Monday morning he was worse. I gave him wine-and-water three or four times in the course of the morning. When Terrington came in from the fields I told him the testator was worse, and told him to go for Tubbs. He got his horse, and, without waiting to put on a saddle, he went for Tubbs.

Cross-examined by Dr. Phillimore.—I remember on one occasion calling at Mrs. Terrington's after she left the Jolly Farmers, and having some conversation with her about the deceased. I do not recollect saying that he was not in his right mind. I could almost swear I did not. He was constantly in a state of the most horrible filth when he was with us. I have complained of his wetting the bed. He was subject to that when he was a child. I have often heard him say that his mother tried to poison him, but I always hushed him, and told him it was all nonsense. I have heard him say so several times. I never told Johnson that my boy could not sleep with him any longer on account of his raving. I never said we would not let him have any drink because Mr. Tubbs told us not.

Re-examined by Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—I never saw Mr. Tubbs. He said the girl told him his mother had tried to poison him. His mother saw him at our house after he arrived from America.

By the Judge Ordinary.—I sent for her the same day. She came and saw him. He was then in bed. I heard him tell her she had never been a mother to him. She said, "How can you say so." He made answer, "You never was a mother to me; my grandfather's old housekeeper was my mother." If it had not been for me and Mrs. Henry Terrington he would have got out of bed and knocked her down. I held him in bed, and Mrs. Henry Terrington took the mother into my room. I first recommended him to go to his mother. I recommended him on the Friday to go and see his mother. He was sensible, and able to help himself. My daughter washed him because he was dirty. I sent for the mother because I thought she would like to see him. He was tolerably sober when he wished to use violence towards his mother. He always had a strong feeling against her. The next morning I persuaded him to go, when, for what I know, he might be in a little milder temper.

The Judge Ordinary.—We can all judge about that.

Thomas Bellinson, examined by Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—He lived at Walsoken, and was a farmer and innkeeper. He knew the deceased before he went to America, when he was greatly in want. He got into debt at his house to the amount of twenty-eight shillings, and as soon as he returned from America the last time he called and paid the money. He understood what he was about just as well as witness. He talked about America, and about old times. He had a long memory, and told witness things he could not recollect himself. Witness saw him after that about once a week. He took a glass occasionally at witness's house. Witness had seen him walking about with the superintendent of the fens and other persons, and had frequently conversed with him. There was nothing to indicate in the slightest degree an unsound mind. Witness saw him about a fortnight before his death, when he came to his yard and said his mother had been trying to poison him. Witness replied, "You should not say so; you'll get your mother into difficulties." He asked witness what he had better do, and the reply made was, "I would neither eat nor drink in the house again if I thought so." He said the servant girl told him. He had been tipsy that day, but he had laid down to sleep, and had got over it. When he was talking to witness he appeared "quite undisturbed" in his mind. He walked with a stick.

Cross-examined by Dr. Phillimore.—The money testator owed him was for beer. Witness saw Mr. Ollard at Zachariah Terrington's beer house, and told him he did not wish to be a witness. He never told Johnson that he thought

the deceased was crazy: he never said such a thing. Witness could not answer the question, whether he believed at the time that the mother had been trying to poison him—he should think the mother knew better than that. By “undisturbed in his mind,” witness meant “disturbed.” He had seen the deceased drunk, and so he had a great many men, and no fools either. He might have had some conversation with the testator about his property.

Re-examined by Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—About a month after his death his mother sent for witness and said she was a poor widow in difficulties, and she wanted him to do her a kindness. She said, “I want you to go and say that you think my son was not in his right mind.” Witness replied, “I cannot say any such thing. I believe he was as right in his mind as I am.” I said, “Johnson was a drinking man; Howlett was a drinking man; and they made the best of bargains and made lots of money; therefore, if a man is capable of getting money being drunk, he is capable of giving away money being drunk.” I added, “The last word I heard your son say was that you had been trying to poison him.” She said, “Nonsense, I used to give him a small pill of opium at times, when he had a craving for it.” She said she would show him the size of the pill, and she then showed him a pill in a tin-box.

Cross-examined by Dr. Phillimore.—Before he went to America he was accustomed to smoke and chew tobacco.

William Wightman, examined by Dr. Tristram.—He was a farmer and inn-keeper. He was acquainted with the testator, and had known him for fourteen years, and had played and worked with him. On his return from America, he paid witness a debt of 15s. or 16s., which he contracted before he went to America. Since his return witness saw him repeatedly. A few days before his death, he said his mother had tried to poison him. The servant girl told him so, and that his mother had mixed up some several times, and he attributed his bad legs to what she had given him. The testator talked rationally upon subjects that had occurred many years before.

Cross-examined by Dr. Phillimore.—Part of the debt was for drink and part for victuals.

Charles Diggles, examined by Serjeant Pigott.—He was a farmer at Emneth, and knew the Terringtons. Before the testator went to America he lent him 7s. He was fond of drink. Since his return from America he had seen him regularly once and twice a week. He always talked as well as another man could. On the 17th of January witness saw him at the Jolly Farmers, when he said, “Have you heard anything about this pill concern?” Witness said he had heard a little about it, but he never took any notice of it. He rejoined, “There’s a large pill here which mother was going to give me.” Witness asked, “What was she going to give you that for?” “Well, I don’t know,” he said, “she sent the gal with it.” He added, “That arn’t all, Charles; the gal was looking through the keyhole, and she see my mother mix something up in a glass, and she gave it to the gal and told her to bring it to me, and the gal told me she flung it away.” He then said, “You shall have that little money as soon as I can get hold of it, but I shall have a row with my mother and Mr. Johnson, for they will not let me have enough to pay you with.” Forth then came in, soon afterwards, and the testator went away with him in his cart. He had heard there was a pill in the house, but he did not see it. On the same occasion the testator complained of his infirmities, and gave that as a reason why he stopped so long at his mother’s. In the evening witness went to Zachariah Terrington’s, and the testator asked him to come and sit by the fire. He then said he wanted witness to go with him and his uncle Zachariah to ‘Well, as he wanted to make a will. Witness said “he would rather have nothing to do with it, as he was no scholar.” About two nights afterwards witness again saw him, when he said he did not feel very well, and very soon afterwards he called to his aunt to assist him upstairs. The calves

of his legs were affected, so that he was obliged to walk on his toes. He always spoke very badly of his mother, saying that before he went to America she would not let him go nigh the house. Witness had seen the tears fall from his eyes when he had been speaking about it. He always talked rationally and as well as anybody else.

Cross-examined by Dr. Phillimore.—The testator said the pill was kept at the Jolly Farmers, but witness had never seen it. What he said about the pill in the morning did not influence him in the evening in refusing to go and attest the will.

William Forth, examined by Dr. Tristram.—He was a baker and grocer at Emneth. He knew the deceased for twenty years. He had frequently seen him since his return from America. He took him to Zachariah Terrington's on the 17th of January. Witness had heard the report about the mother trying to poison him at the Hungate, and when he saw him at the Jolly Farmers, the testator declared it was true. He never said anything in favour of his mother. On one occasion he said he would make a will as soon as ever he left the old b——, and that when he did make his will he should think of his uncle Zachariah, of whom he always spoke very highly, saying he was the best uncle he had. Since his death witness had talked with the mother about the will, and she said she did not think it was right to leave the money out of the family; and she said if he was called as a witness at the trial he need say nothing on either side.

Cross-examined by Dr. Phillimore.—The first he heard of the report about the poisoning was from Mrs. Zachariah Terrington, who, at the same time, said that he might go and live there as long as he liked. He had seen testator so drunk that he had brought him home in the bottom of the cart. He was very fond of drink. Witness did not consider a man drunk who could sit up in a cart.

The Judge Ordinary.—I have heard a man say he did not think a man drunk who could lay on the ground without holding. (Laughter.)

Mr. John Terrington, examined by Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—He lived at Wisbech, and was uncle to the deceased. Before he went to America the first time, the deceased went to the Board of Guardians for relief. Witness was at the mother's the same afternoon, when Mr. Bays, a guardian, informed her of the application. The mother said she did not care what became of him or where he went to, they would not give him any money. The father said they must allow him something. On his return from America, he slept the first night at witness's house. He was then the worse for drink. Afterwards he used to come to Wisbech market, the same as other people, and call upon witness. He always talked intelligibly and rationally. He once told witness that his mother said he ought to leave her part of his money.

Cross-examined by Dr. Phillimore.—Witness was on friendly terms with his nephew before his death. He was a drunkard, and his appearance was that of a drunkard. Witness kept a public-house at Wisbech.

Mr. Henry Terrington, farmer, examined by Dr. Tristram.—He was an uncle of the testator, and saw him after his return from America. He talked sensibly.

Mrs. Margaret Bradley, examined by Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—She was a widow living at Emneth. She had known the deceased twenty years. She was accustomed to work at Zachariah Terrington's. She was there on Saturday afternoon, the 21st of January. The testator was out in the grass gound with the little boy. He asked witness how she was, and then told her about his mother attempting to poison him. In the evening Mrs. Terrington sent for her to sit up with the deceased, and give him a drink now and then, as she was poorly and unable to sit up herself. Witness gave him some weak gin-and-water, and weak port wine and water. He took very little. The next morning he was rather worse, and on Monday morning his aunt offered him something to drink,

and he turned round on his side, then turned on his back, and went off like a lamb. Mr. Terrington was then gone for the doctor.

Some other letters, written by deceased when in America, were here put in and read.

This was the case for the plaintiff.

The Court adjourned till the next day.

MAY 6TH.

The case for the defendants was proceeded with this morning.

Dr. Phillimore addressed the jury on behalf of the defendants, Mrs. Terrington, the mother, and Mrs. Johnson, the sister of the testator. The grounds of the opposition to the will were in formal language that at the time of the execution of the will, the testator was of unsound mind, and that he executed it under undue influence exercised over him by his uncle Zachariah. In other words, the defendants would contend that the deceased was labouring under imbecility caused by epilepsy and continual and ineradicable drunkenness; that he was also the victim of an insane delusion respecting his mother, who had been excluded from all share in his testamentary bounty. It would also be contended that the party principally benefited in this case, the uncle Zachariah, worked upon this state of the deceased's mind in order to obtain an instrument whereby he was largely benefited. Before coming to the facts of the case, the learned counsel proceeded to state the law upon the subject. He submitted that the mind of the deceased was between a state of absolute idiocy and perfect capacity, and that, according to its degree and amount, the law considered the person suffering under it to be incapable of making his testament. With respect to delusions, the law held, first, that the existence of an insane delusion vitiated a will, whether that delusion was apparent or not at the time of making the will; secondly, that when such a delusion was once proved to have existed, the burden of showing that it had ceased lay upon those who propounded the will. The true definition of a delusion, as given by the law, was this,—a belief of things as realities which existed only in the imagination of the patient.

The Judge Ordinary said the existence of the notion with reference to the mother might not have been a delusion. It must be proved that it was a delusion.

Dr. Phillimore said he was prepared to prove that it was a delusion. At present he should contend that the notion prevalent in the deceased's mind that his mother was seeking to poison him, was to all intents and purposes an insane delusion. The learned counsel then entered into the history of the case, and with reference to the alleged harsh treatment by the mother at an early period of the testator's life, he remarked upon the omission of any evidence in support of that charge, and further submitted that the bestial habits of intoxication which the testator had acquired—which his mother had not taught him, for he had been brought up by his grandfather—rendered it impossible that he should live under his mother's roof. That these habits had not been abandoned upon his return to England was abundantly shown by the evidence which had been given. He was taken to his uncle Zachariah's house in the bottom of a cart; and it would be shown that when drunk he was a dangerous lunatic, and when sober he was perfectly imbecile. In addition to epilepsy, he had had a slight attack of palsy, and he would call evidence to prove that so far from being rational and of sound mind, he was perfectly incoherent in his conversation, and that he was desirous to make a will under the notion that some person would take his property away unless it was secured to him in his lifetime by executors and trustees being appointed to take care of it through the instrumentality of a will. It would also be shown that he had the notion that if he put his money into a bank he could never get it out again; that he could not count his money; and that he did not know the days of the week.

Besides this, the learned counsel referred to the testator's filthy bodily habits as evidence that the brain was affected; and with regard to the conduct of his mother in mixing something in a glass, it would be shown that a medical gentleman had advised her not to deprive him of spirits suddenly, for fear of the consequences, but to gradually reduce the quantity taken by diluting it with water; while at the same time he ordered her to let him have opium occasionally, the testator having been a determined opium-eater. This might be the foundation for the opinion he had formed that his mother was attempting to poison him, for it would be shown that the existence of a poison pill was entirely a delusion. Another fact that would be given in evidence was that the testator made three attempts to make his will, and that the solicitor to whom he applied in each case, being perfectly satisfied that he was incompetent, refused to comply with his request. Having commented upon the case for the defendants at some length, the learned counsel called the following evidence:—

Mrs. Mary Terrington, examined by Mr. Keane.—I am the mother of the testator. I recollect his going to America about eight years ago. He was a very bad boy and we could do nothing with him. He always would have drink ever since he was a child. I recollect his return home in November, 1857. Zachariah brought him to my house, saying he could not do anything with him, and that he could not have him. Zachariah said, "Unless he is well looked after he will be lost;" and that we must either take his clothes away or lock him up, or he would get out in the morning before we were up, and he would be lost. On that occasion, when he came back, my son was drunk. At that time I kept the Jolly Farmers. He continued to live with me while I kept the Jolly Farmers. Upon leaving the Jolly Farmers at the end of February, 1858, we removed into the house adjoining; my son went with us. During the time he was with me, he never thought about anything else but drink. If he was not asleep, he was always drinking, from morning to night, and at night also. He would have drink by the bedside; he never went to bed without. Sometimes he would be a-bed for nearly a week together; sometimes for two or three days. He was very filthy in his habits on these occasions; he used to soil the bed and wet the bed five nights out of seven. He was not clean when out of bed. He never dressed or undressed without assistance; he never washed himself or combed his hair. He used to have vermin, and the girl used to comb his head for him. He used to drink porter when he first came home, then beer, and then brandy. He would get up sometimes four and five times in the night; we could not satisfy him; he either wanted drink, or he wetted the bed, or had one fancy or another. One week I kept account of the quantity he consumed—it amounted to six bottles of brandy, one bottle of rum, and one of gin, besides porter and beer. He would have three pints of brandy and water mixed for him at night. On one occasion I tried to prevent his having any more, and he requested the girl to go upstairs and put his things on. When he came down he said he wanted some brandy-and-water. I told him I wished he would drink something else. He said he would have some brandy, and he reached across and got the poker from my side to knock me over the head. He fell down in reaching for the poker. I got up and ran into another room, and he crawled on his hands and knees and followed me. He drew himself up again by the parlour door, and I and the girl ran out. This occurred one Saturday after we left the Jolly Farmers, some time in April. He was very frequently violent towards me. If we did not let him have the drink he wanted upstairs he would break everything. One morning Zachariah came with a letter from my daughter in America. I asked whether he would have a drop of anything to drink. I said, We have had a bad night with William; he has broken every jug in the house. The testator could not count money; he did not know a sovereign from a half-sovereign. Sometimes he would eat scarcely anything for two or three weeks together; sometimes he would be

very ravenous (once or twice in the month), when he would have victuals seven times in the day. I have seen him sleeping in the straw-yard and in the sties out of doors, and sometimes in the chaff-house. On these occasions he was always drunk. In April, 1858, I remember his being away at the Chequers. Zachariah came to me and said they were going to get the girl at the Chequers to marry him; that they were going to take him to Lynn to turn his money over to that girl; and that then they would finish him off as the other was, and then fly about and spend his money. He left me on Monday, the 17th of January. I made him a basin of gruel for his breakfast with some brandy in it. He did not take it; he said he felt he should throw it up. He had some tea and some meat. He said nothing to me, and left me without provocation. On one occasion—the Friday night before he went away—he ground his teeth at me and raised a stick, and said he had a good mind to split my skull. I said, “William, what is this all for?” He said, “You’ve been after poisoning me.” I said, “How can I poison you when I have no poison in the house of any sort.”

The Judge Ordinary.—Did he say anything about what you were going to poison him with?

Witness.—No; I called the girl, and said, Mary, he talks of my poisoning him; what can it be about? She said, “Nothing at all, only what he has conceived himself.” She got him to bed, and I never heard any more about it. On the Sunday night he wanted to sit up to enjoy himself. He had some beer and tobacco, and he sat up till ten o’clock. I then asked him to go to bed, and he said he would, and he went. That was the last night he was at home. He had been attended by Mr. Wallis and by Mr. Ingle. He took medicine, but he would have beer immediately afterwards. I had opium in the house. I used to get a pennyworth at a time made up into about twelve pills. He used to say, “Mother, can’t you give me something to sleep?” I said, “I’ve got nothing, without it be a little bit of opium, and that can do you neither good nor harm.” I had given him a pill now and then. If I had given it as frequently as he asked for it, I should often have been giving it to him. He had not a pill two months before he went away. He had altogether about seven before Michaelmas and two after. I never mixed any opium in what he drank. On Friday, the 21st, the son of Zachariah came for his shirt and stockings; I gave them to him. Some time after I left the Jolly Farmers, I recollect Zachariah and his wife coming to me, and Zachariah said of William, “I am well sure he is not in his right mind.” He had convulsive fits very often. During the time he was with me he was not in his right mind. He could remember things many years ago; but he could not remember things that occurred within the last ten minutes. He did not know anything at all about business.

Cross-examined by Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—It was his general habit to drink from a child, when he was seven years old. He would get tipsy, and we could not trust him alone. He would always have drink if he could get it. He was along with his grandfather, and he used to watch for our men to take him to Wisbech. My grandfather put him for a year at a boarding-school. He went to his grandfather at four years of age, and remained with him till he was about seventeen. I had a heavy family of fourteen children. During the time he was at his grandfather’s, he used to come to my house occasionally, and would have drink.

By the Judge Ordinary.—I should think he was then about thirteen years of age. He would fly to drink in spite of us, and would take so much as to reel about.

Cross-examination continued.—My husband was accustomed to set a bad example in that respect. He made it the worse for me. My son never took his father before the guardians in consequence of his destitute state. My husband used to give the grandfather something to give him. After he left the

grandfather he came home. We could not do anything with him; he wanted to go to sea. He lived with us a year or two before he went to sea. After his return from Quebec the first time, he went about working for his uncle Henry, for Mr. Howlett, and others. He was a bad boy, and robbed us, and we turned him out. He took a young mare off the land, and sold it for 17*l.*, and spent the money, and picked our pockets at night. My husband so provided that he had money to provide him with victuals and clothes, though he did not know where it came from. The money was given to his aunt, Mrs. Howlett, who kept a public-house.

Was not your husband ordered to give him something to maintain him by a guardian?—No, never, sir; my husband always provided for him. I remember Mr. John Terrington and Mr. Bays being at our house on one occasion, but nothing was said about allowing the testator something. I was not on bad terms with him when he went to America. He never wrote to me, but to his grandfather. He used to think his grandfather would leave him a fortune. My son John died in 1857. I was on bad terms with him because he took to drinking and wasted his money. I refused to attend his funeral because he would have taken everything from me and turned me into the Union. He was a good boy to me until he took to drinking. He left his property to his son William, in America. When the testator came home from America I was sent for to go to him at Zachariah's. He was in a fit, and they thought he was dying. He was asleep when I got there. He came to my house a day or two after. He walked over with his uncle Zachariah. He did not stay above ten minutes. I believe he did not sit down, though I had not seen him for six or seven years. He seemed to be wild, and was in a hurry to be off. He came to live with me on the following Tuesday, and it was on that occasion his uncle told me to take his clothes away, or he would be lost. He was drunk when he came. We put him to bed, and put about a quart of porter by his bedside, as he said he would have it. He did not know a Sunday from any other day until the girl told him. He generally asked the girl in the morning what day was this. When it was Saturday we used to tell him it was Friday, as we did not want him to go to Wisbech Market. If he found it out he used to be in a rage. He put his best clothes on to go to market, and on Sundays, when they were got out for him. He was washed every morning and his hair brushed out, and we did not care who saw him. The account I kept of the quantity he drank one week was after he took his money from Mr. Metcalfe—600*l.* or 700*l.* He said he would have a frolic. He received the money in a cheque, and also the title-deeds to the land. He brought them home in his hand. He began to drink liquor in February. Up to that time he principally drank beer and porter. He did pay for the liquor he had after he took his money. I do not recollect how he paid for it. When I wanted a little money I used to ask Johnson to let me have it. The testator, if he had ever so much money, would not pay me himself. He had lent his money to Johnson, who paid interest for it. He kept 100*l.* in his own pocket, which he did not lend to Johnson. He kept his money in his pocket, but it was soon gone. I never saw him pay for anything. He did not pay for his board, nor have I been paid for it from the time he took the money. He settled with me up to the time he took his money. I had lent him about 18*l.* for pocket money, and paid for his clothes. I believe he never knew how much I lent him. I once lent him 5*l.* at a time, and I do not believe he knew whether it was a 5*l.* note or a 10*l.* note. The week he drank the quantity of spirits I have enumerated he was in bed, and I and the girl would take it up to him. He would have two or three pints of brandy-and-water mixed at a time, and put on a chair by his bedside. We could never mix it strong enough; he wanted to have it all brandy. At first I put a quarter of a pint of brandy to a pint of water, but he would have it stronger; and then I put half a pint of brandy to a pint of water.

He would drink till he got drunk?—I believe he would drink till he got sober

again. (Laughter). He would drink till he fell asleep. He was always comfortable till he went down the fens in Forth's cart, and then when he came back he appeared quite set against me, and I used to think somebody had been saying something against me. I believe Forth made a deal of mischief. I have said to Forth that I thought he ought not to leave his money out of the family. I thought Forth was "egged" on by the other party to get him away from me. I sometimes take opium by the advice of my medical man. The opium was not got into the house on his account. I have been too good by half to him in letting him have drink. On the Friday, when he spoke to me about the poisoning, was after he had been with Forth down the fen; and then when he came home he was fit to murder me. He was drunk. He used to go out for a walk in the day as far as the public-house. I remember he did go down to Mr. Thomas Bellinson's that week. He used to take a drive in Forth's cart twice a week. He once had a fancy to go hoeing. He went to work about half an hour, and he gave his hoe away. Sometimes he went to market.

Mr. Thomas M. Wilkin, examined by Dr. Phillimore.—I am a solicitor at Lynn, and one of the coroners of the county of Norfolk. I have been in practice twenty years. I know the last witness. I remember in January, 1858, meeting her at Mr. Metcalfe's, Wisbech. The deceased was present, and Mr. Metcalfe, Mr. Johnson, Mrs. Terrington, and myself. A sum of 720*l.* was paid over to the deceased, either in notes or a cheque. I took the title-deeds, and at his request gave them to his mother. When this 720*l.* was paid to the deceased he did not seem to know the value of it. He put the money into his outside pocket. At the Rose and Crown I endeavoured to explain to him the amount of it, and asked what he was going to do with it. He said he did not know. Mrs. Terrington said it would be better to let Mr. Johnson have 600*l.* of it, for which he was to give a promissory note. Mr. Johnson did so, went for a stamp, and I filled up the promissory note, made payable at five per cent. interest. At his request I handed the promissory note to his mother. During this time he was drinking brandy-and-water. He went with Johnson to the bank, and I advised him to put the balance into the bank; and he said, "I can't get it out again if I do." I advised Mr. Johnson to put the balance into the bank on his account, and on their return I asked the deceased what he had, and he said he did not know. I said, "You had better take it out. His mother wanted him to pay some money he owed her for clothes. I told him he had better pay her, and he took the money out of his pocket, and did not know the sovereigns from the half-sovereigns. He then said, "I want a will." I saw he had taken two or three glasses of brandy-and-water, and I said, "You had better come to my office at Lynn, and bring Mr. Johnson with you." He came on the 22nd of February, and he wanted a will. Mr. Johnson was with him part of the time. The deceased said he knew, unless it was done directly, the property would be all gone. I explained to him that it would not, and I asked him what property it was. He said he did not know. I asked to whom he wished to give it. He said he wanted executors to protect the property. I saw he evidently did not know what his property was, and I told him to see me again. He said there was somebody after his property, who had followed him that morning. He came to me again alone in April, and said his uncles were trying to catch him; that they had followed him in a gig to Lynn, and that he was sure the property would go unless something was done. I again asked, "Who is to have your property?" He said, "Mother, Mrs. Desborough, and Mrs. Johnson." I said I would see Mr. Johnson about it, and he went away. He came again in November in a most dreadful state of tremor. I observed the water running from his trousers. I called his attention to it, and he was perfectly unconscious of it. He could not hold a conversation with me for five consecutive minutes upon any subject. On the occasion when I met him at Mr. Metcalfe's, he made a noise, and said he wanted some drink.

Cross-examined by Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—On the occasion when he could not tell the difference between a sovereign and a half-sovereign, he had taken, I should think, two glasses of brandy-and-water, which he drank ravenously. He was never sober when I saw him. On the occasion in question he was not sober when we went to the hotel. Mr. Metcalfe paid the money into William Terrington's hand. There was a release executed by William Terrington. It was not read to him. There was a receipt endorsed on the back. I am not sure how the money was paid, but I remember there was a cheque. He had about 40*l*. when he came back from the bank. On either of the occasions when he came to me he was not in a fit state to make a will. He was under a strong delusion that his uncles were after him. Lynn is about ten miles from where he lived. I had to arrange with a gentleman about some rents due to him, and I remember I could not make the testator sensible about it.

Mr. Joseph Johnson, examined by Dr. Phillimore.—I am the husband of one of the sisters of the deceased. I have been married twelve years. I first saw the deceased after his return from America about the first week in November. I saw him on the road. I stood against the Jolly Farmers. He was coming that way. I considered that he was drunk. He beckoned to me with his hand, and said, "Come, and go with me." I asked where he was going, and he answered he was going coursing. I said, "You have nothing to course with." "Oh," he said, "never mind; if I can find them I can catch them." His mother then came up, and said, "This is Joseph, that married your sister." He came up to the door, and we went into the house. He called for some drink, and I remember there was a man present whom the deceased wanted to fight. By his mother's advice I took him home with me, and as soon as he got into the house he had a fit, which lasted a quarter of an hour. When he recovered from the fit he laid down on the sofa, and fell asleep. My wife came home; and when he awoke he said, "Oh, here's my sister." He sat and talked with us in the evening, and when he went to bed he threw himself on the bed in his clothes, and had another fit. The next morning we went to Wisbech, and on our return I left him at his mother's. On a subsequent occasion I went with him to Mr. Metcalfe's. The testator said he had come to hear about his money. Mr. Metcalfe said the things could not be settled yet. I said there is some of the land uncultivated, and Mr. Metcalfe said he might take possession of that; and the deceased said I might have it. On a third occasion I went with him to Mr. Metcalfe's, and Mr. Metcalfe drew out the lease for seven years. I was also present when Mr. Wilkin settled the affairs of the land in January. Mr. Metcalfe paid the deceased a cheque for 700*l*. or better. He put the cheque into his pocket, and I went with him to the bank; 600*l*. was put to my account, 80*l*. was put to his own account, and he drew a cheque for the remainder. He said he did not like to put money into the bank, because he was afraid he should not be able to get it out again. He did not appear to me to understand the value of money. I farm about 500 acres of land; two-thirds of it is my own, which has been in our possession a century. I hire some land of his mother, and I also hired the deceased's thirty acres, at 2*l*. an acre. He said his uncle was always after him, and he was afraid he would get his money. I saw the corpse of the deceased after he was dead, and I remember Mrs. Zachariah Terrington saying that her boy slept with him for a night or two, but that he did not dare to sleep with him any longer. The deceased slept at my house three times. I paid the deceased money from time to time; sometimes five shillings, sometimes ten, sometimes more. I have paid his mother money on his account. On one occasion I paid her 18*l*. for clothes, shortly after he had taken his money. I know Bellinson; he told me he did not believe that any man who drank like the deceased was fit to do business. I saw Mr. Tubbs on the day of the funeral. He told me, when he attended the deceased at Upwell, the deceased said his mother was going to do for him. In my

opinion I did not consider the deceased was in a state to make a will. When I used to give him money, he used a few hours after to say that I had not given him any. That happened several times.

Cross-examined by Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—I did not attend the funeral. I went the night previous. I had heard that there was a will made, and I asked Mrs. Zachariah and the son whether there was a will, and they never spoke. I learned the fact from Mr. Zachariah. I had been to Mr. Metcalfe's to hear about it, my wife having told me she fancied there was a will made. They said they were going to bury him the next day, but they never invited me to attend. When I say he drew a cheque, I mean the bank gave him a deposit receipt for the balance, which he left in the bank to his own account. He also received some 30*l.* or 40*l.* in gold and silver, and he put it into his pocket. I think he put it into his outside pocket. He said his uncles were always after him. I said, "It's only your imagination." He said I did not know so much of them as he did. He said on other occasions that they wanted to get his money.

By a Juror.—I was to pay the rent for the thirty acres quarterly. I have paid rent and have a receipt for the money.

By the Judge.—I took the land at Michaelmas after the deceased came home. I did not pay him quarterly because he said he would rather have the money when he wanted it. I paid him five shillings at a time, and ten shillings, and so on. I have one receipt for the first half year's rent. I have not got it with me, because my solicitor, Mr. Wilkin, told me he thought it would not be required. I mean that he said I need not bring the accounts. I don't think I asked him about the receipt particularly.

The Judge Ordinary.—Another time a solicitor gives you such advice don't obey it; it is much safer.

Mary Fundry, examined by Dr. Phillimore.—I am servant of Mrs. Terrington, the mother of the deceased. I went to live with her the Michaelmas before last. I remember the deceased coming to her house with Mr. Zachariah Terrington. He looked very ill. He went away with Mr. Terrington. He came back on the Tuesday following and was then tipsy. His person was very dirty; he had some things in his head. I always washed him. There was another servant in the house named Charlotte Peek. Sometimes he was violent. I never heard him talk rationally. He used to be bad in bed. I have seen him have fits. He had one the first night he came home. I have seen him have three of a night. Sometimes he used to swear at his mother; sometimes he would say, "You aint half a bad one, don't take notice of me." I remember Zachariah Terrington saying that the deceased was not in his right mind. He said it three times. The deceased never said anything to me about his mother's treatment or about what she had given to him. On Friday night I heard him tell his mother, after he had been out with Mr. Forth, that she was after poisoning him. I heard him say so once before in the public-house. I asked him how he came to think so. He said he did not know. I am sure he did not know the value of money, because when she used to give him money of a morning he would say shortly afterwards, "Mother, give me some money." She would say she had. He replied, "It's a lie." I told him to feel in his pocket, and he would turn his pocket inside out and the money would fall out, when he would say, "Damn it, there is some money; I didn't believe you, you are such liars." On one occasion he asked me to count some money for him, and I counted it for him three times, and he didn't know how much there was. He used to ask me every morning what day it was. I used to dress and undress him. He never said anything to me about his mother putting anything into his drink, nor did I say anything to him about it. I never had such a thought.

Cross-examined by Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—I used to tell him lies sometimes, when there was a fair or anything of that kind, and we did not want him to go

for fear he should be lost. He never came home but what he was tipsy. I went to hear the will read, but did not hear it read. He told other people he would put me down in one corner of his will. I never said anything to the effect that I was glad he did not die in our house, or else it might be said I poisoned him. I never said that his mother put something into his drink. I never heard that he said I did. I remember one night she called me in and said, "Mary, come here; William says I've been trying to poison him." I told "missus" not to take any notice of it, for he would say anything. I don't know what my "missus" said; I know she was finely hurt about it. I say he never talked rationally, because he would run on such a many things. He would say sometimes, "I want to go to such a place." I used to get out his best clothes for him; he never told me to get them out. He would say, "I am going with Mr. Johnson." I very often used to take brandy upstairs for him. I used to take up half a pint of brandy and put it behind his pillow; and then I used to get up in the night and give it to him. He would make such a noise, calling out, "I want something to drink," and he could not find it. He would break the mugs, and everything in the room.

By the Judge.—I used to tell him not to drink so much or he would kill himself. I used to mix his drink for him at night. I never could make it strong enough for him. Once he hurled some at me because it was not strong enough. He complained several times that his mother did not mix it strong enough, and he would make me take it down again. I never told him I had thrown it away and mixed him some more. I used to put some more brandy to it, and then he would say, "It's damned little you put to it." I used to say, "It is not my fault, I didn't mix it; it's no use grumbling with me, your mother mixed it for you." When he was at the public-houses I used to say he would poison himself drinking so much brandy. He would say he didn't care.

James Morris Miller, examined by Mr. Keane.—He was the landlord of the Jolly Farmers, and succeeded Mrs. Terrington. He saw the deceased for the first time last January twelvemonth. After he took the house he saw the deceased every day that he could get out. He used to be generally drunk; that was his general habit. He had seen him lying down with the pigs in his yard; he was in such a dirty state that he did not look like a human being—he was wet and dirty. At the best of times he did not appear to be a rational man. Witness did not believe he could attend to business. In paying for his drink, if he gave half a sovereign or a sixpence, he never knew when he got the right change. On one occasion, a day or two before he left home, he said he thought he should be poisoned. Witness told him he was a foolish chap; he got drunk; and did not know what he ailed. Deceased offered to sell him land once, and when asked at what price, he said, "Damn it, what do I know about it;" and when asked whether it was copyhold or leasehold, he said with an oath, "What should I know about it."

Cross-examined by Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—The deceased used to drink at his house, too much to his sorrow. He could not keep him from having drink; if he refused to serve it, the deceased would kick up a row. Witness always gave him his right change. Mrs. Terrington was the owner of the Jolly Farmers.

Henry Cott, examined by Mr. Keane.—He was a farmer at Marshland Smeeth. He recollected the deceased's return from America. He was always drunk, and did not appear to be fit for any kind of business.

Mrs. Mary Ann Clarke, examined by Mr. Keane.—Her husband was the landlord of the Smeeth Station Inn. The deceased called sometimes every day. She had wondered how he would appear when sober; she never saw him sober; was very dirty in his habits, and did not appear to be conscious of it. His memory was defective. He used to say that he was going to alter his will, and he would leave her child a fortune. Sometimes he said he would divide

it equally between his mother and two sisters. Sometimes he promised to leave land to persons in her house. When she had taken a shilling from him in payment of beer, and had fetched the change from another room, he appeared to have forgotten all about it, and asked what it was for. He did not seem to know the difference between halfpence and pence, or between a sixpence and a shilling.

Cross-examined by Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—On these occasions he was tipsy, or if not tipsy he was in a very strange state of mind. He conducted himself in her house in a strange way, and would sometimes express in the most impious terms a wish that his legs might drop off.

Mr. William Pike Bays, examined by Dr. Phillimore.—I am a conveyancer at Wisbech. I attended the funeral of the deceased. I saw Mr. Ollard there and had some conversation with him. I expressed my surprise that he had made the will; and he said he did not like it, and he thought he should not act. I knew the deceased several years ago, before he went to America. I have seen him only once since his return.

Cross-examined by Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—I attended to have the will read at the request of Mrs. Terrington and Mrs. Johnson. I told Mr. Ollard the will would be disputed. He said he was pressed to be a trustee, and I thought I would call in Mr. Tubbs as to the competency of the deceased to make a will. Mr. Ollard said he did not like it, and he thought he should not act. That was before I said the will would be disputed. I made a minute of the conversation, and I find in that minute, "Mr. Ollard said he intended to renounce; he didn't much like the business."

Mr. John Gathergood, examined by Dr. Phillimore.—I am a general practitioner at Terrington St. John's, near Wisbech. I have seen the deceased repeatedly up to within a very short period before his death. I had opportunities of forming an opinion as to his mental condition. I considered him a person of weak mind, and not competent to do an act that required thought, memory, and understanding.

By the Judge Ordinary.—By that I mean I never saw him in a condition to transact business properly.

Examination continued.—He showed the weakness of his mind by the incoherent manner in which he spoke, and the unreasonableness of the matters which he brought under my notice. He has called at my residence to consult me professionally, and in attempting to detail the history of his case he has made remarks of a very irrelevant character. He especially on one occasion seemed to have a sort of delusion that he could see things that did not exist. On one occasion he said, "Look there, Gathergood, there goes a man with a ball of fire on his head as big as a bass drum." He also said his mother was attempting to poison him, and that the servant girl had repeatedly thrown the poison away. He said he felt very uncomfortable in his mind, because he was afraid that some of his relatives would deprive him of his property. He asked me to go with him and have his will made. I refused, as I did not think it was a matter that concerned me. He has spoken to me about his death. He said if he died at his mother's residence, he hoped I would cause a coroner's inquest to be held over him, for he was sure she would poison him. With regard to the state of his health, on the first occasion of his consulting me he was suffering from syphilis. He was subject to incontinence of urine, and maladies of a similar nature. He was subject to epileptic fits. His appearance was that of a person totally emaciated from irregular habits. I considered he was partially suffering from palsy. He spoke to me about his property. He said he should leave some to his sister in America, and the remainder to Mrs. Johnson. He expressed a desire to leave my son 100*l*. I believe he was a person of that character that any person could control him at the time.

Cross-examined by Mr. Serjeant Pigott.—I married Mr. Johnson's sister. Habits of intoxication may be as common in our neighbourhood as in other parts. I have been given to them occasionally.

By the Judge.—I have heard him say repeatedly that his mother was attempting to poison him. Last June was the first time. It was about last Michaelmas when he asked me to have an inquest held should he die at his mother's house.

Dr. Forbes Winslow, examined by Mr. Keane.—Intemperance is a common cause of insanity.

The Judge Ordinary.—Some people go mad from drink; that's the whole of it.

Examination continued.—A craving for drink is not always a proof of a diseased state of the mind. Epilepsy, in conjunction with intemperance and delusions, would be a symptom of a diseased state of the mind.

The Judge Ordinary.—Dr. Forbes Winslow is assuming the existence of delusions.

Examination continued. — Incontinence of urine and other matters indicate a want of control over the parts, and would lead to the suspicion that the mind was affected; it might exist, however, without disease of the brain.

The Judge Ordinary.—Assuming all those symptoms existed, and the person in whom they were observed should go to an attorney and hold a continuous conversation with him, and explain to him his views about his property distinctly, and express in a distinct manner the disposition which he meant to make of it, and to reason upon it, and he is remonstrated about not leaving it to his mother and sister, and he says he is resolved he would not, whatever might be the consequences, would you say those symptoms would under such circumstances indicate insanity?—Certainly not.

The Judge Ordinary.—You see, gentlemen, it is merely a speculative opinion.

This was the case for the defendants.

Dr. Phillimore summed up the evidence.

Mr. Serjeant Pigott replied upon the whole case. He would not question for a moment that the deceased was an habitual drunkard. The question they were trying was as to the validity of this will. It had been attacked on two grounds. With respect to the exercise of undue influence by his uncle, there was not a tittle of evidence. The man came from America, and went to his uncle's house, and they instantly sent for his mother; and it was by their advice that he called upon her the next day. So little did Zachariah Terrington desire to interfere that he remained outside while the interview lasted. The son remained in the house only ten minutes, and, considering that she had not seen him for six years, that of itself was a proof of the state of feeling that existed between him and his mother. He afterwards went and lived with his mother for twelve months, and during the whole of that period there was no proof that the uncle ever attempted to exercise any influence whatever over him. The mother said they were on good terms with uncle Zac. That part of the case, then, might be dismissed. Then they came to the more important ground of opposition—that the testator at the time he made the will was in an unsound state of mind. It must be for the jury to say whether on that 19th of January, when he went to Mr. Ollard's office and gave the instructions he did as to the distribution of his property, and showed a full knowledge of the nature of his property, and of the persons to whom he wished to leave it, and conducted himself in the sensible and rational manner which had been spoken to both by Mr. Ollard and Mr. Tubbs, whether upon that occasion he was not in a state of mind competent to make a will? The learned serjeant then reviewed the evidence adduced on the part of the defendants, and submitted that the conduct attributed to the testator by the various witnesses, and his acts of folly and weakness, might be attributable to his drunken habits, but that they were no proof of insanity.

The Judge Ordinary summed up at great length. He said there were two points for consideration. First, whether the testator had sufficient understanding to dispose of his property at the time he made his will, and secondly, whether he was under any undue influence at the time. He would dispose of the latter question first. Undue influence did not mean persuasion and cajoling, by pretended kindness, or anything of that sort, but it meant the exercise of such control as to induce the party to make a will otherwise than he wished it, because he was controlled and urged in that manner so that it was not his will but the will of somebody else. Now, in this case there certainly was no evidence of any undue influence of that sort. The man went with his uncle into the office of the attorney, and there was no proof of any attempt to control on his part. The case resolved itself into the question whether he had capacity enough to make a will at that time. This again divided itself into two questions. A man was said to have sufficient capacity to dispose of his property by will if he had mind enough to understand his position, the nature and amount of his property, to remember his different relations, and to form a judgment as to those who should be selected as objects of his bounty. If he had sufficient understanding for that, he had enough to enable him to make a will. But the understanding, although limited in its range, must be a sound understanding. A person who was mad on half a dozen points might have sufficient capacity to know his property and to prove an intention as to who should have it after him. His will would not stand good because the mind was unsound. So if in this case the man had any insane delusion upon his mind, and acted under the influence of an insane delusion, that mind was unsound, and they could not maintain a will that was made by a person under those circumstances. If he acted under a mistaken belief that certain things had been done or said of him or towards him, although it might be that such things never were said and never were done, if he believed that seriously, and acted upon that mistake, that would not invalidate his will. But if it was an insane imagination, not formed upon any ground whatever, but a mere conceit of his own, not founded in reason, but proceeding from insanity, then undoubtedly the existence of such a delusion would invalidate the will. The case most frequently cited was the case of *Greenwood*, a barrister who had been undoubtedly insane. He recovered so far as to follow his profession for many years, but the impression that his brother intended to poison him was never effaced. That insane delusion remained to the last; there was no doubt that the origin of it emanated from insanity; that was an insane delusion that pursued him through life, and his will was not established. In the present case there was a statement that the man had got it into his head that his mother intended to poison him. He assigned as a reason for it that the girl told him so. If the girl had said so, or if any other person had told him that the girl had said so to somebody else, and he having heard that, although it was an absurd thing to believe, yet did believe it, there would be no proof of insanity there. It might show a weak mind; it might show a person liable to be imposed upon; and if they could trace that imposition to any person who imposed it upon him for the purpose of procuring a will, and the will was made under the influence of the imposition, that would invalidate it; that would indeed be undue influence, and would be recognised, as in a case in the House of Lords, as sufficient ground for setting aside the will. With these preliminary remarks, the learned Judge proceeded to comment upon the evidence in detail as given on the respective sides.

A Juror.—If the deceased made a will under the delusion that his mother intended to poison him, would that invalidate the will?

The Judge Ordinary.—If it was an insane delusion it would; if it was a misapprehension, a mistake, a suspicion, it would not.

The jury retired, and after remaining out of court about ten minutes, returned with a verdict in favour of the plaintiff upon all the issues.

The question of costs was left for future consideration.

SUSSEX LUNATIC ASYLUM.

HOW THE INMATES WILL BE LODGED, FED, CLOTHED, EMPLOYED, AND AMUSED.

DURING the two years that this structure has been in course of erection, we have taken occasion to give Brighton people—and it must be remembered that our town alone contributes one-fifth to the cost of it—an idea both of its character and extent. Our readers know that it stands on a farm of 120 acres, in the parish of Wivelsfield, at the southern extremity of Hayward's Heath, and about a mile from the station. They know it is a building in what we suppose must be called the Italian style, to which a degree of novelty is imparted by the use of parti-coloured bricks, conveying the idea of simple-chromatic decoration. They are aware, also, that the frontage is 850 feet in extent; that the structure consists of a centre-building and two wings; and that there is, in addition, a detached church, which rumour speaks of, and without exaggeration, as the prettiest in the county. This and much more having already been explained, we do not at present intend to detain the reader with that kind of information which is derived from plans and sections and architectural "views;" but rather to convey an idea or two of the accommodation which the inmates of this asylum are to receive—how, in fact, they will be housed, fed, clothed, taught, amused, and, in many cases, let us hope, cured.

Lunatic accommodation in the olden times was a simple matter enough. Such and such strength of dungeon, so much length of chain, such and such allowance of straw, of bread and of water; and there was an end of it. If the poor wretch raged, they tortured him; if he pined, he might, if it pleased him, pine to death. The asylum was like that place of horror over the door of which the Italian poet wrote that those who entered were to abandon even Hope. How all this has changed in our day, we need hardly say. The experiment first tried at Hanwell, of discipline without restraint, has produced results alike cheering and overwhelming. Half the horror of the most horrible of human calamities has passed away since it no longer exposes its victim to the brutality of ignorance, but renders him an object of generous and enlightened solicitude. And it is to this change in the aspect of the question that we owe our Sussex Asylum, and all the arrangements and provisions we are about to describe.

On visiting this building the other day, our first desire was to see the ordinary living and sleeping rooms of the inmates. This will probably be the first object of curiosity with our readers also. Supposing that to be the case, and that they were being shown over by Mr. Mortlock, the intelligent superintendent, he would probably say to them as to us—"You will form a rough idea of the building by remembering that the central portion is chiefly devoted to the various offices connected with the institution; the whole of the west wing is devoted to the females; and the whole of the east wing is devoted to the males. We will proceed, first, to the west wing."

With this we enter a suite of rooms, one room opening into another, and the suite extending the entire length of that wing on the ground-floor. These are the day-rooms for the patients. Here they will sit and read, or sew, and will take their meals—for no dining-hall has been provided, it being found better that the patients should dine in their own wards—not in solitude, but in families of greater or less magnitude, according to the stage, condition, or peculiarities of the malady of each. These rooms are all roomy and cheerful; and all command a wide country view, not through gratings or loopholes, but from glazed windows, constructed so that the safety of the inmate is secured without the idea of confinement being conveyed. The rooms are simply but comfortably furnished, each article of furniture being grained in imitation of oak. What took us more by surprise than any other circumstance was, that

these rooms, and, indeed, those throughout the building, are heated, not by any arrangement of steam or hot air, but by means of open grates similar to those in ordinary drawing-rooms. "But," we exclaimed, seeing these open grates, and chests of coals beside them ready for use, "can you trust the patients with fire? Is it safe?" "It is considered perfectly safe," was the reply; "and is both more healthful and more cheerful than any system of heating by means of pipes."

Out of these wards or day-rooms, open bed-rooms, to be used by the patients. These are of two kinds: there are single rooms for one inmate each, and dormitories which will accommodate six or eight. Both kinds are light and airy; the fittings are similar; but as the single rooms are intended for the more violent or dangerous patients, they are not quite so amply furnished. In a single room there is a birch-wood bedstead with sacking-bottom, hair mattress, and the usual bedding, &c. The floor is bare; but beside the bed lies a strip of carpet. The windows of these rooms can be secured by shutters on the inside. The dormitories, or larger rooms, have no shutters, and are in every respect like ordinary bed-rooms. The inmates of these rooms are furnished with washstands for their use, though there is a lavatory attached to each ward for general purposes, fitted in the most complete manner. It has rows of basins, with hot and cold water taps to each; a bath, either hot or cold; a shower-bath—in fact, every means has been adopted to secure the perfect cleanliness of the inmates. We should have mentioned that between each sleeping-room is a nurse's room, with a window on either side, overlooking the patients; obviously a very necessary precaution. In answer to a question, we were informed that there are two or three attendants on these wards; but that the bulk of the work necessarily arising out of the daily life of so many persons will be chiefly performed by the inmates. Under proper guidance, they are quite capable of light work, and it is better that they should be employed than remain in listless idleness.

The wards we have inspected will be occupied by those properly designated "patients;" but a large number will come under the category of "convalescents," and though unable to be sent abroad, or, at least, likely to benefit by remaining in the Asylum, they are quite capable of following the occupations to which they have been accustomed, or others which they may be taught. For the use of this class, the upper story of this wing is devoted to what is called a sleeping-gallery, but which is, in fact, a corridor, flanked with bed rooms like those on the first floor. These rooms, for the most part, contain eight beds. Among the most necessary occupations in the building will be those connected with the laundry, and in these the convalescent among the female inmates will be largely engaged. And the laundry arrangements (at the extremity of the wing) are very perfect. There are two large apartments filled with washing apparatus—with troughs, into which water, hot or cold, is admitted by taps, with boiling coppers, &c. In one of the wash-houses a "wringing-machine" has also been provided—a most ingenious contrivance, by which some of the hardest work in connection with the washing is saved. The linen is put wet into a cylindrical sieve, the sides of which are formed of wire, and by means of a handle and wheel this cylinder is made to revolve so rapidly that all the moisture from the linen is, in fact, whirled off. When wrung, the clothes are taken into a spacious drying-yard, fitted with copper-wires in place of clothes-lines. There are also three hot closets, heated by means of pipes, for drying and airing clothes; a sorting-closet; in fact, every necessary for carrying on this branch of domestic economy in the most expeditious and satisfactory manner.

Thus much for the western wing, devoted to the female inmates. The east wing, for the men, is similar in its fittings in all respects, until you reach the extremity, and there, in place of the laundry, you find provision made for pursuits adapted to the male convalescent patients. There is the tailors' shop,

(with its indispensable board), the shoemakers' shop, the upholsterers' shop, the carpenters' shop, a bakehouse with its oven, a brewhouse, stables, and so forth. Thus many, if not all, the necessities of the Asylum will be supplied from lunatic labour. This also will extend beyond the interior. Already there are eleven acres of land under cultivation as a kitchen-garden, and in time the rest of the 120 acres on which the Asylum stands will constitute a farm in which every branch of labour will be performed by the insane, of course under proper training and *surveillance*. It will be a curious, yet a gratifying sight—all these farming operations progressing quietly and in perfect order, in the hands of those who but a few years since were deemed incapable of anything but violence and destruction!

In the little world of the Asylum, however—and a strange, fantastical little world enough it will be—labour must have its relief. There must be repose. There must be amusement. There must be devotion. And for each of these exigencies provision has been made.

For repose, as well as exercise, pleasant-terraced grounds have been provided for the use of the inmates. These spread out before the southern front of the building, and are ingeniously formed, so that, while really surrounded by a high wall, they do not appear to be enclosed. The grass plat rises in terraces, one above the other, and each terrace is raised above the wall, and commands a prospect, taking in the whole range of the South Downs from Lewes to the Dyke, a pleasant wooded country, dotted here and there with well-known villages.

These airing-grounds, as they are called,—and we may observe that there is one for each sex—will conduce both to repose of mind and invigoration of body. But it is found that the insane require something more. They need society and amusement; and with this view a Recreation Hall has been erected in the centre of the building, which will be used for lectures, music, dancing, and such modes of entertainment as are adopted in all the modern Asylums. The Hall is spacious, capable of holding some 300 persons, and presents a cheerful and pleasing appearance; the only drawback being that the roof, which is supported by pillars, is too low. In this Hall both sexes will mingle in the dance, or listening to music, or witnessing entertainments, and perhaps on the occasions of these *réunions* the poor unfortunates will be seen under the most favourable circumstances. Accounts have so often been given of the *soirées* at St. Luke's, Hanwell, and other large Asylums, that this is a phase of lunatic life with which the public are now quite familiar.

Less has been written upon the lunatic at church; but that also is a strange as well as a solemn spectacle. In this Asylum unusual attention has been paid to this matter, and the consequence is, that the Asylum Church is, as we have said, the most beautiful for its size of any in the county. And next to its beauty, one is struck by the fact of the simple means by which it has been obtained. The difference between a beautiful and an ugly structure is often put upon the ground of difference of cost. There is no greater fallacy. It is to taste rather than to money that we owe everything in architecture as in the rest of the arts. Now, the taste evinced in this matter by the architect (Mr. H. E. Kendall, of Brighton, we believe), is exquisite, and the result is, that we have a gem without extravagant outlay. The material of the church is brick; but it is of various colours, and those colours are artistically worked up. The architecture is simple; but the proportions are such as to please the eye. So, again, in regard to ornamentation and fittings—all is simple, but in keeping. As points that arrested our attention, we may note the open roof, stained in imitation of ancient oak and satin wood; the chancel, with the transparent roof of purple glass, through which stars appear to be shining. The painted windows, inexpensive, but serving to give a subdued "religious light," in which the homely-sculptured stone is as effective as marble would be under other circumstances. The chief specimen of sculpture, by the way, is the altar-piece, representing

Christ among the Disciples, with the legend, "And He was known to them by the breaking of bread." Other points might be specified; but we must only add that this church will accommodate about 300, and that the seats are open, in a manner precisely similar to those of most modern Gothic churches. One side of the sacred edifice will be devoted to the males, the other to the females, but they are not even separated by a central aisle.

Those curious as to the economy of the Asylum may ask—"How do the inmates dress?" Well, there is no uniform dress, as, in fact, the different classes of patients require different clothing; but the prevailing colours for garments are blue and grey, and the style is that ordinarily adopted by persons in the humbler walks of life.

"And as to culinary utensils, and so forth?"

They are of the customary description. We saw a large store of crockery, all of it white, with the Asylum stamp on it, and comprising plates, dishes, jugs, &c. Among other articles which arrested our attention were some dozens of earthenware spittoons. "You permit smoking in the Asylum?" we remarked. "Yes," was the reply, "many of the inmates of these establishments find great relief in the pipe." "You do not regard it as one of the predisposing causes of that state of mind which sends them here?" "No; or after what I have seen of madness I would never touch a pipe again." From the extensive beer-cellar disclosed to us, we gathered that the poor inmate is not denied the simple luxury of a glass of beer either.

We have almost exceeded the due length of our article; and have now left unnoticed various points, such as the lighting of the building from gas manufactured on the grounds; the water supply, by means of a well, water-towers, &c.; the extensive kitchen and storage arrangements necessary for the supply of the daily wants of 450 persons; the medical department, and so forth. We should also allude to the infirmaries. These are two in number, one at either extremity of the building, and are furnished with every care for the comfort of those sick in body as well as in mind. While inspecting the male infirmary, we ventured to ask, upon an idea which had suddenly struck us—"In all that we have seen there is no provision for restraint: now, however perfect your system, you *must* sometimes have violent patients whose paroxysms it is impossible to restrain. How do you act?" Our guide answered the question fairly and promptly, by leading us into a room similar to the ordinary bedrooms. "This," said he, "will be padded: the walls, to a height of eight feet, and the floor will be covered with a sort of mattress padding, against which the patient may even dash his head without sustaining any injury." There will be no furniture here. A second room of a like kind was shown us, and we also saw two rooms in which there were wooden "cribs" instead of bedssteads, designed for epileptic patients, who are apt to be seized with paroxysms in the night.

With an acknowledgment of the courtesy with which we were received and shown over the Asylum, we must conclude this article; first, however, adding, for the public information, the names of the heads of the staff already appointed for the management of the Asylum. They are as follows:—

Medical Superintendent—Dr. Robertson. Steward and Clerk—Mr. Mortlock. Assistant-Surgeon—Mr. Guynne. Housekeeper—Mrs. Stroude.—(*Brighton Herald*, June 4.)

THE CASE OF MR. RUCK.

It was our intention to have published, *in extenso*, the particulars of this remarkable case, but we are obliged to defer doing so until the next quarter. We cannot, however, permit the present number to go to press without calling the attention of our readers to two or three important matters eliminated during the recent legal proceedings in the Court of

Queen's Bench. After a trial of three days' duration, the jury (a special one) came to the following verdict:—

"1. That if receiving certain payments as shown made Dr. Conolly part proprietor, they found the fact of receiving the money.

"2. That Dr. Conolly was a regular medical attendant at Moorcroft."

The jury therefore assessed the plaintiff's damages at £500.

"3. That there was not sufficient evidence before them to show that Mr. Barnett, at the time of signing the certificate, was not in actual practice.

"4. That there was not sufficient evidence to show that Dr. Conolly had not examined Mr. Ruck apart from Mr. Barnett."

We have no wish to impugn this decision. If Dr. Conolly was the "regular medical attendant" of the asylum, the verdict was in conformity with the statute law of the land; in other words, the certificates upon which Mr. Ruck was confined were invalid. The questions whether Mr. Ruck was actually insane at the time of his being sent to the asylum, and when Dr. Conolly and Mr. Barnett signed the certificates, and how long his state of insanity justified his detention there, were matters not referred to or considered by the jury. Medical evidence, however, was adduced in behalf of the plaintiff with the view of establishing that Mr. Ruck ought never to have been certified to be insane, and an attempt was made to prove that he was improperly transferred to and detained in Moorcroft Asylum.

The evidence in support of these allegations was not of a psychological character. It consisted in the opinions of one physician, and three consulting surgeons, all of whom laid no claim to any particular or special knowledge of insanity. The four medical witnesses examined, viz., Dr. Geo. Johnson, Mr. Skey, Mr. Carter, and Mr. Gray assumed that Mr. Ruck's case was one of ordinary "*Drunken Insanity*," or *delirium tremens*. Upon this gratuitous assumption and implied hypothesis they deduced their conclusions. There was no evidence that proved the case to be one of *delirium tremens*. No doubt Mr. Ruck indulged freely in the use of stimulants, but this disposition to drink to excess, and his occasional paroxysms of intoxication, were clearly, from the facts deposed to, merely symptoms of a prior and chronic state of disordered mind. The tendency to stimulants sprang out of the insanity being associated with it, and was certainly not its proximate cause.* There was not a tittle of evidence to establish the case to have been as the medical witnesses affirmed, one of *delirium tremens*. It was admitted on both sides that Mr. Ruck laboured under delusions of a dangerous character, and that he was in the habit of occasionally taking stimulants to excess; but in what respect does this condition of disordered mind resemble *delirium tremens*? Mr. Ruck's was not a case of active acute delirium caused by a series of debaucheries, for it was clear that even when entirely free from the influence of intoxicating liquors his mind was under the influence of the same extraordinary delusions respecting his wife's infidelity. However, it suited the purposes of the action to make it appear that Mr. Ruck's case was one of *delirium tremens*, and the medical witnesses assuming such to be the fact, were of opinion that there was no justification for his being restrained in a lunatic asylum. No practical physician accustomed to treat cases of *delirium tremens*, and in the habit of distinguishing between this temporary state of mental alienation caused by the presence of toxic agents in the blood, and legitimate attacks of insanity, would have so confounded the two conditions. There is no excuse for so egregious a blunder and so serious a mistake of the evidence adduced at the trial; it constituted the basis upon which the medical men referred to grounded their conclusions. Assume that Dr. Johnson, and Messrs. Skey, Carter, and Gray were right in their diagnosis: when asked whether in their judgment Dr. Conolly and Mr. Barnett were right in considering Mr. Ruck's case to be one of ordinary insanity and transferring it to an asylum—their reply was emphatically *in the negative*, thus passing a severe condemnatory sentence upon the sagacity, knowledge, and humanity of Dr. Conolly and Mr. Barnett.

In the name of common sense how could these gentlemen have given such evidence? It was utterly impossible for them to pronounce a safe and sound opinion as to Mr. Ruck's state of mind at the time when Dr. Conolly examined him and certified to his lunacy. They may entertain a doubt as to the nature of the case and question the necessity for restraint; but does this justify them in positively asserting that Dr. Conolly and Mr. Barnett entirely mistook the character of the case? We tread on hallowed ground when called upon to give evidence likely to damage the reputation of a professional brother, and therefore we should proceed with the greatest caution, circumspection, and humility, considering well the opinions we express when placed in so trying a position. Supposing a physician accustomed to deal exclusively with medical cases were called

* The disposition to indulge freely in the use of intoxicating drinks is unhappily a symptom frequently associated with ordinary attacks of insanity; but this does not constitute them cases of *delirium tremens*. If every insane person who is disposed to drink to excess is to be said to labour under *delirium tremens*, how endless and fatal would be the mistakes committed, ending alas! often in the serious sacrifice of human life.


upon to sit in judgment on a disputed point in practical surgery. We will imagine that Mr. Skey, Mr. Carter, or Mr. John Gray had been called in to deal with a complex and difficult surgical injury. If in twelve or eighteen months afterwards a question were to arise as to whether the surgical case had been treated with scientific skill by any one of these surgeons, and the matter were to be brought into court with a view to obtain compensation for alleged injuries, what would these gentlemen think if Dr. Watson, Dr. Burrows, or Sir James Clark, were to go into the witness-box and swear that these gentlemen had grossly misunderstood the character of the surgical case, and had treated it unskillfully? Would not the profession cry shame upon such evidence? Mr. Skey might with justice say to Sir James Clark and Dr. Watson, what do you know of practical surgery; how is it possible for you physicians to give any opinion on the subject? If you had seen the case when I was called in to it, and acquainted yourselves with the great difficulties with which I had to contend in its treatment, you might, perhaps, have been able to guess as to whether I had mismanaged it; but without this knowledge your opinion is not entitled to any consideration, and should not be recorded against a professional brother. If Mr. Ruck entertained, as Dr. Conolly and Mr. Barnett represents at the time of their examination, the most dangerous delusions respecting the fidelity of his wife [against whom the shadow of a suspicion never existed], was he not a fit subject for restraint, and were not Dr. Conolly and Mr. Barnett justified in so certifying? Supposing that Dr. Conolly and Mr. Barnett had hesitated in placing Mr. Ruck under control, and he, influenced by his terrible hallucinations, had sacrificed Mrs. Ruck's life, would not both these medical gentlemen have been seriously censured and called to account for not recognising Mr. Ruck's dangerous insanity, and for not advising that he should be placed in a position of safety and security?

There is one remarkable feature in this case to which we wish to direct particular attention. In reply to a series of questions put to Mr. Ruck by Mr. Montague Chambers, he frankly admitted that the delusions ("suspicions" he termed them) regarding his wife continued on his mind until Mr. Wainwright undertook to examine into their reality. Mr. Wainwright saw Mr. Ruck at the asylum, and assured him that he had fully investigated into the matter, and that his, Mr. Ruck's impressions regarding his wife had no foundation in fact. As soon as this statement was made to Mr. Ruck, his delusions, it is alleged, respecting his wife's numerous acts of infidelity immediately vanished. *For ten months previously Mr. Ruck's mind had never apparently been free from these delusions, and in one moment Mr. Wainwright succeeded in dissipating them from his morbid imagination.* "Veni Vidi, Vici," exclaims this wonderful psychological lawyer. Let not the question be asked, "Who can minister to a mind diseased?" as long as Mr. Wainwright's valuable services can be obtained for the benefit of the insane.

Considering this matter in its strictly legal bearing, perhaps the jury had no alternative but to find a verdict for the plaintiff; but were not the damages (£500) excessive, and is there no hope of appealing against the verdict on this ground? Was it not necessary for the safety of human life that Mr. Ruck should be confined as a dangerous lunatic, and if so, ought not that slight irregularity in Dr. Conolly's certificate to be considered with a lenient eye?

The editor of a weekly paper, when alluding to this case, justly remarks, "We strongly protest against the doctrine that no restrictive measures are ever to be employed until an insane person takes to knife, poker, or razor, and proves his madness by slaying somebody else. It is by well-timed and kindly precautionary measures that real madness may be averted, and the patient restored to health; and it is by no means improbable that the gentleman who was plaintiff in this case, owes his ability to be so to the period of restraint to which he appears to have been somewhat irregularly confined." The following remarks on the case are important, as proceeding from the *Solicitor's Journal*.

"The prominent feature in the Courts during the week has been the case of *Ruck v. Stilwell*, an action for damages for illegal detention in a lunatic asylum. It appears that the certificate authorizing the detention of the plaintiff was signed by Dr. Conolly and a Mr. Barnett; and it was contended by the plaintiff that the latter was incapacitated, because he had ceased to practise, and that the former was disqualified, because he had a pecuniary interest in the establishment to which Mr. Ruck was sent. The jury thought that the case, as related to Mr. Barnett, was not made out, there being no evidence that he was not practising as a medical man; but with regard to Dr. Conolly, they found that he was the regular professional attendant at the asylum, and, therefore, unable (under the statute) to sign the certificate. The plaintiff accordingly obtained a verdict, and damages to the amount of £500, but subject to the opinion of the Court above on a point reserved. We have no hesitation in expressing our opinion, that the pecuniary mulct inflicted on Dr. Stilwell is unjust, because no one can doubt that the plaintiff was insane at the time of his confinement, and that he benefited by the restraint, although there may have been some irregularity in the signing the certificate. That irregularity was a subject for fair comment, and, slight as it was, it has been made the most of for Mr. Ruck."




MAP
SHOWING THE DISTRIBUTION OF SUICIDES,
in
ENGLAND & WALES
in 1856-57-58.

Scale of Shades indicating
the average proportion of
Suicides per 100,000 of the
population in the different

- Counties
- Under 2
 - 2 & under 4
 - 4 & under 6
 - 6 & under 8
 - 8 & under 10
 - Above 10

Maximum proportion
11.1, Westmoreland; Min-
imum, 1.0, Pembroke.
Average of England &
Wales 6.8.



THE JOURNAL
OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE
AND
MENTAL PATHOLOGY.

OCTOBER 1, 1859.

ART. I.—ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF SUICIDES IN
ENGLAND AND WALES.

(With a Map.)

WHEN Virgil consigned the souls of suicides to a special region of Hades, and Dante planted them in a particular division of Hell, each poet represented as being a law of the infernal, what is in no small degree a law of terrestrial regions. There is, unhappily, no segment of England that is not blurred by suicides; but the number of suicides predominates conspicuously in certain districts as compared with others, so that we may map out particular localities in which there appears to be an extraordinary tendency to the act of self-destruction, and which may perhaps not unfittingly be designated *suicide-fields*.

The data at our disposal from which we may ascertain the distribution of suicides in the kingdom, are derived from the tabulated returns of inquests "touching the cause of death" contained in Mr. St. Redgrave's "Judicial Statistics," (*Blue Book*). These returns, made by the coroners throughout England and Wales, extend over a period of three years. In making use, however, of Mr. Redgrave's tabulated arrangement, in so far as it refers to counties, it is requisite to note that the boundaries of a county do not always represent the actual limits of a coroner's district; for it sometimes happens that the coroners of one county will, in cases of necessity, extend their jurisdiction into neighbouring counties, but the inquests so held are entered in the returns of the coroner who presides. There is no means of determining whether the errors arising from this irregularity affect materially or not the special results of the returns, but it is probable (as will appear subsequently) that they exercise but slight influence over the comparative results.

According to the coroners' returns, the following were the numbers of suicides which were committed in England and Wales during the years 1856-57-58:—

1856.		1857.		1858.	
M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.
919	395	960	389	909	366

These figures give an average of 6·8 suicides of both sexes in every 100,000 of the population of England and Wales during the three years 1856-58. The average of the five years, 1852-56, was, according to returns made to the Registrar-General, 5·8. In accounting for the difference between the two averages (putting aside the fact that the periods do not correspond), Dr. Farr's statements have to be considered, that the suicides returned to the Registrar-General are probably one-tenth below the actual number ascertained to have occurred, (an opinion doubtless founded upon a comparison with the coroners' returns for 1856), and that a few should be deducted from Mr. Redgrave's tables for "the duplicate return," (*19th Annual Report of the Registrar-General*, p. 203).

By a reference to the accompanying *Table (I.)*, it will be seen that the proportion of suicides in fifteen counties is above the average of the kingdom (6·8); in one it is about the average; while in the remaining counties it is, in different degrees, below. The counties in which the proportion is in excess of the average are as follows:—

Westmoreland.....	11·1	Warwick	8·5
Middlesex	10·5	Lincoln	8·4
Surrey	10·4	Cumberland ...	8·4
Kent	9·9	Derby	7·7
Leicester	9·6	Southampton ...	7·7
Nottingham	9·5	Lancaster	7·6
Sussex	9·0	Chester	7·1
Brecon	7·0		

The average of Gloucestershire (6·5) is about that of the kingdom, and next in order of proportion to that county stand Northumberland (6·1) and Durham (6·1). The position of those counties, the averages of which range below 6·0, will be most readily seen by a reference to the Map which accompanies this article, and to *Table I.* Lowest in the scale are the Welsh counties of Carmarthen (1·7) and Pembroke (1·0).

I. Table showing the Distribution of Suicides in the different Counties of England and Wales during the Three Years 1856-57-58.

	1856.		1857.		1858.		Average of the Three Years.	Estimated Average Population.	Average of Suicides to 100,000 Population.	Proportion of Persons to 10,000 Population who signed the Marriage Register with Marks, 1857.
	Male.	Female.	Male.	Female.	Male.	Female.				
Bedford	4	7	2	4	2	2	7.0	134,402	5.3	73.2
Berks	6	8	1	2	9	3	9.2	175,045	5.4	50.3
Buckingham . .	11	5	3	2	8	1	10.0	168,091	5.9	45.4
Cambridge . . .	5	4	2	1	1	2	5.0	197,989	2.5	56.6
Chester	21	39	3	15	21	9	36.0	462,065	7.1	59.5
Cornwall	8	5	2	3	7	5	10.0	363,592	2.7	58.6
Cumberland . .	14	14	4	3	13	4	17.3	205,962	8.4	33.6
Derby	14	24	8	8	13	5	24.0	310,412	7.7	43.0
Devon	31	10	11	13	28	10	34.3	587,576	5.8	40.3
Dorset	8	2	2	5	5	4	8.6	189,697	4.5	44.9
Durham	16	24	9	7	15	10	27.0	440,815	6.1	67.3
Essex	12	16	5	2	19	11	21.6	383,916	5.6	43.0
Gloucester . . .	23	21	6	13	23	7	31.0	475,191	6.5	45.5
Hereford	5	7	3	1	0	1	5.6	116,755	4.7	36.4
Hertford	4	11	4	3	4	1	8.6	173,676	4.9	56.2
Huntingdon . . .	1	4	1	3	0	0	3.0	67,561	4.4	48.8
Kent	51	41	19	16	52	16	66.0	655,612	9.9	36.3
Leicester	136	129	54	46	114	36	171.6	2,249,744	7.6	52.2
Leicester	14	20	6	3	20	6	23.0	238,972	9.6	47.3
Lincoln	23	24	15	13	24	10	36.1	427,994	8.4	40.6
Middlesex	144	159	69	89	140	68	219.6	2,072,540	10.5	80.5
Monmouth	5	8	1	0	5	4	7.6	171,248	4.4	+
Norfolk	16	30	14	9	8	4	27.0	460,744	5.8	53.9
Northampton . .	12	8	3	5	9	2	13.0	220,270	5.9	54.9
Northumberland .	10	14	9	8	11	8	20.0	326,092	6.1	46.9
Nottingham . . .	18	18	5	9	26	7	27.0	282,733	9.5	67.4
Oxford	5	7	2	2	7	4	9.0	174,825	5.1	45.2
Rutland	1	1	2	0	0	0	1.3	23,991	5.4	31.2
Salop	13	5	1	2	11	3	11.6	231,453	5.0	62.6
Somerset	18	11	4	5	12	4	18.0	448,902	4.2	47.8
Southampton . .	26	34	6	6	22	7	33.6	435,778	7.7	37.8
Stafford	26	14	5	4	25	11	28.3	664,280	4.2	100.5
Suffolk	16	18	3	2	8	6	17.6	350,499	5.0	56.2
Surrey	61	49	38	21	44	19	77.3	742,506	10.4	30.6
Sussex	20	23	8	9	31	7	32.6	358,900	9.0	29.9
Warwick	23	34	14	14	28	16	44.6	518,999	8.5	59.4
Westmoreland . .	6	3	3	2	5	1	6.6	59,385	11.1	22.3
Wills	8	6	4	3	9	3	11.0	252,991	4.3	44.4
Worcester	10	12	3	1	7	5	12.6	294,002	4.2	62.6
York	73	71	30	25	94	42	111.6	1,621,563	5.8	59.1
Anglesey	0	1	0	1	1	3	3.0	61,185	3.2	+ Monmouth and Wales. 81.5
Brecon	3	5	1	0	4	1	4.6	64,996	7.0	
Cardigan	1	1	4	1	1	0	2.6	72,014	3.6	
Carmarthen . . .	3	2	0	1	0	0	3.0	113,212	1.7	
Carmarvon	3	4	1	1	2	0	3.6	91,932	3.9	
Denbigh	0	3	1	0	2	0	2.0	95,043	2.1	
Flint	0	2	0	0	3	1	2.0	68,894	2.9	
Glamorgan	3	9	3	5	11	5	12.0	268,245	4.4	
Merioneth	1	1	0	1	0	0	1.0	38,555	2.6	
Montgomery . . .	3	2	0	0	2	1	2.6	65,973	3.9	
Pembroke	1	0	0	1	1	0	1.0	97,794	1.0	
Radnor	0	0	0	0	2	1	1.0	24,272	4.1	
ENGLAND AND WALES . . }	919	395	360	389	909	366	1312.6	19,108,506	6.8	

If the foregoing figures be regarded as a measure of tendency to suicide, it would appear that in the three years, 1856-58, the maximum disposition to self-destruction was manifested in Westmoreland; that next in rank, and hardly inferior to Westmoreland,

stood the metropolitan counties of Middlesex and Surrey; while the minimum disposition was shown in Carmarthen and Pembroke.

From the general distribution of suicides throughout the kingdom, we learn that there are three districts in which the tendency to suicide is in excess. For the convenience of description we propose to designate these districts *suicide-fields*, and to distinguish the one from the other by their relation to the metropolis, the midland, and the northern counties.

I. *The London Suicide-field*.—The metropolitan counties of Middlesex, Surrey, and Kent, and the adjoining counties of Sussex and Hampshire, form a well-defined district in which the proportion of suicides is considerably in excess of that of the whole kingdom.

If (as in the case of the departments adjoining Paris) the excess of suicides in this district is to be ascribed mainly to the influence of the metropolis, it is remarkable that that influence should be manifested only in the counties south of the metropolis, being confined on the north, north-east, and north-west, within the limits of Middlesex, and on the west not extending beyond the boundaries of Surrey. Paris forms the *centre* of a vast suicide field, and M. Guerry has remarked, and his remark has been confirmed by subsequent writers, that, generally speaking, from whatever point of France we start, the number of suicides increases regularly in proportion as we approach the capital.—(*Essai sur la Statistique Morale de France*. p. 65. 1838.) M. Brierre de Boismont states that, "It appears certain that the moral action of the capital radiates from a central point towards the surrounding districts." And again, "It may be regarded as a fact perfectly established, that the number of suicides increases regularly and in all directions, in proportion as Paris is neared."—(*Du Suicide et de la Folie Suicide*, pp. 356-357.) Marseilles appears to affect Provence and Dauphiné much in the same manner as Paris affects the rest of France.

It can hardly be doubted that the excess of suicides in the metropolitan counties—Middlesex, Surrey, and Kent,—is due to the metropolis; and probably the peculiarity of the social relations of London to Sussex, and even Hampshire, may account for the excessive suicidal tendency manifested in those counties, as well as for the southerly extension of the baneful influence of the metropolis.

The sea-board of Sussex is one of the most favoured places of resort, and one much frequented, for its readiness of access, by Londoners; and it is a suggestive fact that of ninety-eight suicides which were committed in Sussex in the three years, 1856-58, *thirty-nine*, that is to say, considerably more than one-third (in fact, 40·8 per cent.) occurred within the boroughs of Brighton and Hastings,

and the rape of Hastings,—Brighton numbering twenty suicides, and Hastings and its rape eighteen.

It may be questioned to what extent Hampshire is affected by the metropolis, since there are local causes in operation at Portsmouth and Southampton which might alone elevate the average of suicides in that county to its present pitch, and thus perhaps constitute Portsmouth and its vicinity a species of secondary suicide-field. Of 101 suicides committed in Hampshire in 1856–58, forty-two were committed in the boroughs of Portsmouth (24), Southampton (7), and in the Isle of Wight (11). Still the intercourse between the sea-board of Hampshire and London is so intimate and peculiar, that we must not lightly put aside the probability of suicidal infection from the metropolis, particularly as it would appear that while the suicides in the borough of Portsmouth form 24·0 per cent. of the suicides of Hampshire, those of the borough of Plymouth form for the same period but 13·5 per cent. of the suicides of Devonshire, and those of the borough of Liverpool 15·5 per cent. of the suicides of Lancashire.

The excessive tendency to suicide in the borough of Portsmouth as compared with the other great sea-port boroughs named, relatively to their counties, is sufficiently remarkable. The suicides in the borough of Kingston-upon-Hull form only 5·0 per cent. of those of Yorkshire, but we should perhaps have the proportion of suicides in this sea-port borough relatively to those of the East-Riding of Yorkshire, in order to make a legitimate comparison with Portsmouth.

Until 1858, we possessed no very trustworthy data of the actual number of suicides occurring in the metropolis itself. In and since that year, however, suicides have been distinguished in the Registrar-General's Weekly Bills of Mortality, and it would appear that, in the twelve months of 1858, 283 individuals committed self-murder in London, giving an average of 9·2 in every 100,000 of the population.

II. *The Midland Suicide-field.*—Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, Warwickshire, and Lincolnshire constitute a well-marked suicide-field, the centre of which is formed by Notts (9·5), and Leicestershire (9·6), in which counties the tendency to suicide is greatest, and about equal—while the extremities are constituted by Lincolnshire (8·4), and Warwickshire (8·5), the tendency in these counties being also about equal, but less than in the two previously named counties. There is a considerable falling off of intensity in adjoining counties, the diminution, however, being less marked in Derbyshire (7·7), and in Gloucestershire (6·5), the tendency to suicide in the latter county being about the average of the whole kingdom (6·8).

III. *The Northern Suicide-field.*—This field is formed by

Westmoreland (11·1), Cumberland (8·4), and Lancashire (7·6). To meet the exigencies of a shaded scale, in the Map Northumberland, Durham, and Cheshire are darkened to the same degree as Lancashire; but a reference to *Table I.*, or to the figures marked in the Map within the counties named, will at once show that they are rightly excluded from entering into the formation of the suicide-field. In the two first-mentioned counties, the tendency to suicide barely exceeds that of Yorkshire, and is below the average of the kingdom; in Cheshire it is about the average. It is to be regretted that the coroners' returns do not show the proportion of suicides in the different Ridings of Yorkshire, but, so far as can be ascertained from the said Returns, it would seem as if the average of suicides of the West Riding at least, did not differ much from the general average of the county.

The excessive proportion of suicides in Westmoreland, and the greater diminution of tendency to suicide in Lancashire, as compared with Cumberland, are interesting facts. It will, however, be matter for subsequent inquiry, how far the great apparent tendency to suicide in Westmoreland and Cumberland may be determined by causes not inherent in the counties. For instance, both counties, on account of the beauty of their scenery, are greatly resorted to from neighbouring counties, and, indeed, from the kingdom generally. Is the proportion of suicides exaggerated by suicides among casual visitors, or temporary residents?

Should Breconshire be described as a Suicide-field? Certainly the average of suicides occurring in it (7·0), is barely in excess of the average of the kingdom (6·8), but it is singularly in excess as compared with that of the Welsh counties (3·3); hence, if subsequent returns should show the persistence of this excess, and the continuance of the present isolation, on account of that excess, from neighbouring counties, Brecon may rightly be termed a suicide-field.

We should have felt some hesitation in describing the foregoing suicide-fields as such, and as if they were probably persistent features of the distribution of suicides in the kingdom, upon the authority of the coroners' returns alone. It would appear, however, from an analysis of the returns of suicides contained in the Registers of Deaths for 1838-9, made by Dr. Farr, and published in the Third Annual Report of the Registrar-General (p. 75, *et seq.*), that the districts of greatest excess of suicides in the two years mentioned were the same as in the three years 1856-8. This important and interesting fact affords strong presumptive evidence that the localities of greatest tendency to suicide are, comparatively speaking, persistent.

The following Table shows the average proportion of suicides in the different registration districts in the two periods 1838-9

and 1856-8. It is necessary to remark, however, that this comparison is approximative only in the London and South-Eastern districts. London not being specified apart from the Metropolitan Counties' Returns in the coroners' lists, it has been necessary to unite Surrey and Middlesex together to form the London district, and Kent, Sussex, and Hampshire to form the South-Eastern district. The great preponderance of suicides in these districts, however, in both series of averages, shows that the want of accurate correspondence in the character of the divisions does not affect the comparative result. Probably also, a want of narrow agreement between the boundaries of the registration districts and counties, and the ordinary boundaries of counties as summed up according to registration districts, will not affect materially the general results obtained, from a comparison of the averages derived from the Registrar-General's and the Coroners' Returns.

II. *Table showing the Distribution of Suicides in the different Registration Divisions, in the two Periods, 1838-39, and 1856-58.*

Registration Divisions.	I. London.	II. South-Eastern Counties.	III. South-Midland Counties.	IV. Eastern Counties.	V. South-Western Counties.	VI. West-Midland Counties.	VII. North-Midland Counties.	VIII. North-Western Counties.	IX. Yorkshire.	X. Northern Counties.	XI. Monmouth and Wales.	England and Wales.
Average Annual Cases of Suicides to 100,000 Inhabitants, 1838-39.	10.9	8.4	5.8	5.7	5.3	4.4	6.8	6.5	5.2	6.5	2.2	6.3
Average Annual Cases of Suicides to 100,000 Inhabitants, 1856-58.	10.5	8.6	4.8	5.5	4.4	5.8	8.6	7.5	5.8	6.5	3.6	6.8

If the figures for the two periods contained in the foregoing Table be compared, it will be seen that the averages of the Metropolitan and South-Eastern districts scarcely vary; that the North Midland district holds the same relation to the other districts in both periods, although the average of the last period has increased one-third; that the Northern and North-Western districts have also the same comparative relationship in the two series of averages, although the average of the North-Western district is higher in 1856-9 than in 1838-9, that of the Northern district being the same in both periods. It is seen also that the averages of the South-Midland and South-Western districts have diminished, while the averages of the Eastern and remaining districts vary

but slightly, except Monmouth and South Wales, the average of which district, notwithstanding that it still remains the lowest in the kingdom, has increased one-third.

Thus far, we have dealt with the results derived from the total number of suicides of both sexes. If, however, we separate the one sex from the other, several interesting particulars will be ascertained.

The average proportion of suicides in every 100,000 of the *male* population during 1856-9 was 9·9; of the *female*, 3·9. Now if a reference be made to the following *Table* (III.), it will be seen that the proportion of *male* suicides was above the average of the kingdom in two districts only, the Metropolitan and South-Eastern, the proportion being above the average in the North Midland. But the proportion of *female* suicides was above the average in no less than *eight* of the *eleven* districts, to wit, the Metropolitan, South-Eastern, Eastern, West-Midland, North-Midland, North-Western, Yorkshire, and Northern, while it was at the average in one, the South-Midland. Moreover, the proportion of male and female suicides was about equal in three divisions, the South-Midland, Eastern, and Monmouth and Wales; the proportion of males was but slightly in excess of females in the Northern district; and it varied only from one-fourth to one-third in excess in the remaining districts.

III. *Table showing the Distribution of Suicides of each Sex in the different Registration Counties, 1856-58.*

Registration Counties.		Average to 100,000 population of each sex.	
		Males.	Females.
I.	London.	12·5	8·1
II.	South-Eastern Counties . . .	10·3	6·6
III.	South-Midland Counties . . .	4·7	3·9
IV.	Eastern Counties	5·8	5·5
V.	South-Western Counties . . .	5·9	3·0
VI.	West-Midland Counties . . .	6·8	4·4
VII.	North-Midland Counties . . .	9·8	7·7
VIII.	North-Western Counties . . .	8·7	6·4
IX.	Yorkshire	6·9	4·8
X.	Northern Counties	7·2	6·1
XI.	Monmouth and Wales	3·5	3·3
ENGLAND AND WALES		9·9	3·9

In addition to the facts already set forth from the coroner's returns, there is another well worthy of being noted, namely, the great fluctuations in the number of suicides from year to year in several counties. Thus, for example, 60 suicides were committed

in Cheshire in 1856, 18 in 1857, and 30 in 1858; 60 were committed in Hampshire in 1856, 12 in 1857, and 29 in 1858. Other illustrations may be obtained by referring to *Table I.* If the coroners in one or more of the counties where these great variations are observed, could be induced to record carefully the circumstances attending and determining the act of self-destruction, doubtless much light would be thrown upon the influences which govern the prevalence of suicide.

If we seek now to ascertain the causes which lead to the peculiarities of distribution of suicides in England and Wales, we are at the very outset confronted with difficulties which are for the present insuperable. The data which we have made use of in this article enable us to determine the general facts of the greater or less prevalence of suicides in different localities; but they furnish no particulars by which we might eliminate errors, or with any information concerning the age, the civil condition of the suicides, or the circumstances which prompted the act of self-destruction. We can only then endeavour to ascertain if the general knowledge we possess of the etiology of suicide will in any way aid us in elucidating this subject.

Brierre de Boismont (*Op. cit.*, p. 100) collated the causes which led to the committal of suicide in 4077 cases, and with the following results:—

Insanity	15·9 per cent.	Hypochondriasis	8·2 per cent.
Drunkenness	12·9 „	Remorse, fear of dishonour or of justice	2·9 „
Diseases	9·9 „	Misconduct	1·2 „
Domestic troubles	8·8 „	Idleness	1·3 „
Chagrin, disappointment	7·6 „	Acute delirium	1·3 „
Love	7·4 „	Gaming	1·0 „
Poverty, misery	6·9 „	Want of work	1·0 „
Pecuniary difficulties	6·8 „	Pride and vanity	0·67 „
Ennui	5·8 „	Divers motives	0·97 „
Feebleness, exaltation, sadness	3·5 „		

Of any single, well-defined cause of suicide, insanity, according to the foregoing list, plays the foremost part. Does insanity manifestly contribute in determining the position of the districts of greatest excess of suicides in England? The only statistics accessible by which an approximative knowledge of the distribution of unsoundness of mind throughout the kingdom may be obtained, are those contained in the returns of pauper lunatics chargeable to parishes, furnished at intervals by the Poor Law Board to the Commissioners in Lunacy. The last return made of this character is for the year 1857,* and it is contained in

* The 13th Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy, recently published, contains an abstract of the "Annual Returns of Pauper Lunatics and Idiots belonging to the several Unions in *England* and *Wales* on the 1st of January, 1859."

the Twelfth Annual Report of the Lunacy Commissioners. From this return it would appear that the greatest proportion of pauper lunatics is found in Gloucestershire and Berkshire; next in the scale stand the counties of Middlesex, Surrey, Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Wiltshire, Northamptonshire, and Shropshire; while in reference to the counties of less tendency (confining our attention to the suicide-fields), Kent and Hampshire hold a third place in the list (this being divided into five classes), and Sussex a fourth, in the London field; Nottingham and Warwick also hold a third place, and Lincolnshire a fourth, in the Midland field; and Cumberland a third, and Westmoreland and Lancashire a fourth in the Northern field. Thus it will be seen that there is no systematic agreement between the counties of greatest tendency to lunacy and the counties of greatest tendency to suicide. Of the counties standing prominent in the suicide-fields, Middlesex, Surrey, and Leicester alone appear as manifesting a more than average tendency to lunacy.

With the exception of drunkenness, no one of the remaining determining causes of suicide is so prominent that it might be expected to exert a marked influence upon the geographical distribution of the act, and the promptings of drunkenness are so often interwoven with the moral causes which too commonly bring about intemperance, that it cannot very well be separated from the moral causes of suicide.

Suicide is, indeed, an exceptional result of the disease and wretchedness, the many bitter pangs and troubles which infest life, and a tabulated list of the causes which have apparently immediately brought about the act of self-destruction, presents but a reflex of every-day events and evils. Are we then to look upon suicide as an index of the degree of tension of those moral and physical causes which predispose to and determine it? This proposition may involve a truism, but if we assume it, we shall find that it will aid us but little in our quest, and that we fall short of some element or elements in the causation of self-murder.

It is certain that the greatest tendency to suicide is found for the most part in districts which are chief centres of commercial activity, and where the mental, moral, and physical powers are kept in the highest degree of tension. This is true of London; of Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, and Warwickshire; of Cumberland and Lancashire; and the seemingly anomalous positions of Westmoreland, Lincolnshire, Kent, Sussex, and Hampshire may perhaps be subsequently explained by suicidal infection from the counties first named. But, admitting this, Gloucestershire, Derbyshire, Staffordshire, and Shropshire, Cheshire, Durham, and Northumberland, and we believe also the West Riding of Yorkshire, all localities second to none of the suicide-fields, except

perhaps the London field, in their commercial activity, and in the turmoil and tension of life in them, exhibit but a slight tendency towards self-destruction.

Differences in the character of the industry of different counties do not apparently solve the question. The tendency to suicide is below the average in the purely agricultural counties, with the exception of Lincoln, Kent, Sussex, and Hampshire. In Herefordshire, Buckinghamshire, Bedfordshire, and Somerset, counties in which agricultural pursuits predominate, but in which small manufactures are carried on in cottages, such as lace-making, straw-plaiting, and glove-making (Somersetshire), and in which immorality and ignorance are great, suicide is also below the average. If we compare the agricultural and mining counties of Westmoreland, Cumberland, Northumberland, and Durham, with the agricultural and mining counties of Cornwall, Monmouth, and the districts of North and South Wales, we see the northern counties ranging towards the highest pitch of suicidal disposition, the southern and Welsh towards the bottom of the scale. Of the great manufacturing and mining counties of Lancashire, Cheshire, Staffordshire, Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire, Warwickshire, Worcestershire, Gloucestershire, and the great manufacturing district of the West Riding of Yorkshire, we find Gloucestershire, Staffordshire, and Worcestershire, and probably also the West Riding of Yorkshire, manifesting a much inferior disposition to suicide than the other counties.

But, in addition to the causes which determine the act of suicide, there are others which are influential in predisposing towards it; to wit, hereditary tendency, sex, age, civil condition; fortune, profession, and character or degree of instruction.

We have no means of ascertaining the influence which hereditary tendency might have in determining the geographical distribution of suicide, if, indeed, it were supposed that such influence would be appreciable; and we have not been able to trace any relation between the distribution and that of the different sexes, of celibates, widows, or widowers. We entirely fail of those data which would enable us to ascertain the effects of age, and also of professions; and, guided by Mr. Fletcher's Tables of Moral and Educational Statistics (which refer to a period intermediate between 1838-39 and 1856-58), we have not discovered any intimate relation between the distribution of crime and immorality and suicide (and, we may add also, as requiring notice, density of population).


It may be remarked here, however, that in 1841 the greatest number of persons of independent means in proportion to population were to be found in Surrey, Middlesex, and Westmoreland;

and in 1842-43, the greatest amount of real property existed in Lincolnshire—all counties of excessive suicidal tendency. These coincidences deserve to be remarked in connexion with the opinion of some writers, that wealth and a sufficiency of means predispose to suicide—in fact, that a greater tendency to suicide is manifested among those of easy circumstances than among the impoverished. Thus Dr. Marc d'Espine remarks on the suicide-statistics of the Canton of Geneva:—"If we consider the suicides apart, we find that thirteen were wealthy individuals, thus giving 1·85 per cent. as the lethiferous figure of the wealthy, in place of 1·21 per cent. the lethiferous figure of the whole population. Another calculation leads to the same result. The deaths among the rich form 4·2 per cent. of the whole mortality, and suicides among the rich form 6·3 per cent. of the total deaths from suicide. Easy circumstances then increase the chances and occasions of suicide."—(*Statistique Mortuaire Comparée*, p. 114.)

In one respect only do we find any general correspondence between a predisposing cause of suicide and its geographical distribution. It is a fact of singular interest that suicide prevails most in the most educated districts. If we adopt as a measure of the degree of ignorance of different counties, the number of persons who sign the marriage register with marks, we find, as a general rule, that the *average number of suicides decreases as the average amount of ignorance increases*.

The relationship existing between suicide and ignorance will be best seen by a reference to the accompanying diagram, in which is depicted the proportion of suicides and the degree of

Diagram representing the relative proportion of Ignorance and Suicides in the different Counties.



— Curve of Suicides.—Scale to 100,000 population.

..... Curve of Ignorance.—Scale to 10,000 population.

ignorance in the several counties of England, and in the registration division of Monmouth and South Wales, as set forth in *Table I.* The lines of suicide and ignorance describe curves in opposite directions, and although the points of depression of the one curve and of elevation of the other do not absolutely agree, still the correspondence is such as, perhaps, to justify the conclusion that *the prevalence of suicide and the degree of ignorance in a district are in inverse relation the one to the other.*

This, which is true of 1856-58, is also true in the main of 1838-39. Dr. Farr writes:—"Suicide is, in fact, most frequent in the metropolis, the south-eastern counties, and the northern counties, where the greatest number can write, and it is the least frequent in Wales. The intermediate counties range from 82 to 48, who could write, in 100 (persons married), the suicides from 4·5 to 6·8 in 100,000." The proportion who could write, in the metropolis, was 82 per cent., in the northern counties, 68, in the south-eastern, 62, and in Monmouth and Wales, 41.—(*Third Report of the Registrar-General*, p. 80.)

The general relationship which exists between the amount of instruction in the different French departments, and the number of suicides occurring in them, is similar to that found in the English counties. But, in addition to this, the French statistics of suicide and instruction for the thirteen years 1836-48 show, that *suicide has progressively increased in frequency in proportion as instruction has become more diffused in each region, as well as throughout the whole of France.* M. Lisle, from whose valuable work, *Du Suicide, Statistique, Médecine, Histoire, et Législation* (Paris, 1856, p. 79), the foregoing conclusions are derived; asserts also, that wherever a comparative examination of the relation of suicide to instruction has been made, the results have proved absolutely similar to those obtained in France. He quotes the following *Table* from a memoir, by M. Brouc (*Annales d'hygiène publique et de médecine légale*, t. xvi.)

Table showing the Relation of Suicide to the State of Instruction in different Countries.

Names of Cities or Countries.	Proportion of Scholars to Inhabitants.	Proportion of Suicides to Inhabitants.	Average of Scholars.	Average of Suicides.
Boston . . .	1 in 3·5	1 in 12·500	1 in 5·6	1 in 12·644
New York . . .	1 ,, 8·9	1 ,, 7·797		
Prussia . . .	1 ,, 7·0	1 ,, 14·404		
Philadelphia . . .	1 ,, 8·0	1 ,, 15·875		
Austria . . .	1 ,, 18·0	1 ,, 20·900	1 in 132	1 in 30·274
France . . .	1 ,, 17·0	1 ,, 20·740		
Russia . . .	1 ,, 367·0	1 ,, 49·182		

The figures in this Table are derived from M. Balbi's work, *La Monarchie Française comparée aux principaux Etats du Globe*, and they refer to the interval comprised between the years 1827 and 1834, but it is not improbable that later inquiries would have furnished similar results, and M. Lisle thinks that he is warranted in assuming from his own and M. Brouc's researches, that for a considerable period the frequency of suicides has been in the direct ratio of the state of instruction.*

Of 3086 cases of suicide in which the degree of instruction was ascertained by Brierre de Boismont (*Op. cit.* p. 85), it was found that the education of 18·5 per cent. was good; that 25·5 per cent. read and wrote well; that 53·7 per cent. read and wrote without orthography, or read without writing; and that 2·1 per cent. were entirely without instruction.

Suicides and criminals have this in common, that a very large proportion of both classes are very imperfectly educated; and the conclusion to be derived from this fact is doubtless the same in both instances, namely, that much of the instruction in vogue is accompanied by moral influences of a very doubtful character, or is indeed entirely deficient in the elements of a sound moral training.

The preponderance of instruction among suicides, and the preponderance of suicides in instructed districts, are facts which probably explain each other, and they lead to the deduction that the differential element in the etiology of suicide,—that element which determines the act of destruction as an exceptional result of the wide-spread causes to which it is ordinarily attributed—is to be sought in a peculiar vicious or morbid tone of thought. Hence on this view the number of suicides occurring in a locality would be an index of the degree of prevalence of this mental perversion. The character of the perversion, assuming that it exists, and the circumstances which foster it, must be a subject of specific investigation.

The imperfection of our data interposes insurmountable obstacles in the way of any satisfactory inquiry into the causes which determine the different degrees of prevalence of suicide in different districts, and we are constrained, however unwillingly, to confine

* There is a general but no constant relation between the state of education thus tested, and the commission of suicide. It may be admitted that there is some relation between the development of the intellect and self-destruction; but the connexion must be in a great measure indirect and accidental. In opposition to the arguments derived from agricultural districts, and labourers in towns, there is the fact that suicide is more frequent among several classes of artisans, than it is among better educated people. If the progress of civilization is to be charged with the increase of suicide, we must therefore understand by it the increase of tailors, shoemakers, the small trades, the mechanical occupations, and the incidental evils to which they are exposed, rather than the advancement of truth, science, literature, and the fine arts.—*Dr. Farr. Op. Cit.* p. 80.

ourselves to an indication of the general and probable bearing of the scanty particulars which we possess capable of throwing any light upon the subject. The question is a complex one, and it is not unlikely that it may be found that the excessive tendency to suicide in certain localities is dependent not upon one cause only, but upon a combination of causes which may not be the same in each locality.

For the present, the facts we have detailed showing the distribution of suicides in England and Wales, must be regarded simply as facts, the full significance of which has still to be ascertained.

ART. II.—THE PSYCHOLOGY OF KANT.

BY PROFESSOR HOPFUS.*

(Concluded from p. 64.)

WE have seen that, under the head of "Transcendental Logic," Kant treats of Analytic and Dialectic. The latter is now to be noticed. Our philosopher here discusses the claims of the faculty of Reason. His use of this term, however, is far from uniform, and largely partakes of the latitude of meaning which has attended it from early times. He often employs it to signify our faculty of knowing in general, both by external and internal sense, as already expounded; also to denote especially the function of thought, in which acceptation, reason, though always requiring the materials of sense to work with, is above sense in rank, and is synonymous with understanding.† Sometimes Kant treats the general cognitive, faculty of thought, as including understanding in the limited sense, of a faculty of notions (*Begriffe*), judgment and reason; which latter, again, is sometimes identical with understanding, at other times distinct. Again, "reason," in the *Kritik*, by its unchanging laws, enters on a self-examination; hence the title, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*; and metaphysic is but the exact inventory of all that pure reason gives us. Reason has pure cognitions resting on sure *à priori* principles. The system of pure reason in the *Kritik*, is a complete whole essentially unalterable. Every man has a metaphysic as soon as reason awakes to speculation. The faculty of pure reason is the natural disposition of the mind to metaphysic. Reason is the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of

* Immanuel Kant's *Sämmtliche Werke* (Rosenkranz). Leipzig.

† *Prolegom.* sec. 1, where he says, "metaphysic is knowledge *à priori*; aus reinem Verstande und reiner Vernunft."

knowledge *à priori*. Such is Kant's own selected language, in which it is evident that he is far enough from always attaching to the term reason the special sense which he claims for it in the part of his work which we are now upon.* It is here a distinct faculty, not to be confounded with understanding.

All our knowledge, says our author, begins in sense (*Sinnlichkeit*); understanding (*Verstand*) works on the materials given by the senses, elaborates them into order, and reduces them to certain generalisations; Reason (*Vernunft*) aims at bringing these products of the understanding to the highest possible generality and unity. Sense is the faculty of intuitions, by which we perceive the phenomena around us, under the indispensable conditions of space and time; even self-consciousness is sensuous under the condition of time. Understanding, as distinct from reason, is the faculty of judgment, whence arise the categories or necessary conditions of all thought and the rules of thinking. Reason, distinctively, is eminently the faculty of principles: it seeks after conclusions and inferences, and it aims at the highest possible generalisations and abstractions. It has a logical function or use in reasoning, as we see in the syllogism. There are, indeed, says Kant, conclusions of the understanding merely; as when we infer from all men being mortal that some men are mortal.† But the syllogism of reason involves three propositions, of which the last or conclusive reason determines, *à priori*, from the major or general principle, and from the minor, which is subsumed under it. Thus, reason concludes that Caius, a living man, is mortal, because he belongs to mankind, and the race is mortal. Again, the major—"the race is mortal" may become a conclusion, and reason may ascend to a higher generality, proving this conclusion from the prior principle (as a new major) that "all animals are mortal," under which principle is subsumed the minor, that "all men are animals;" thus reason may ascend by retrogressive steps to higher and higher generalisations, and so aim to reach the highest possible principles and abstractions.

Further, says our philosopher, the syllogism has as many forms as there are relations which the major proposition exhibits between the subject and the predicate, as we have already seen in the three sub-categories of relation, namely, the categorical, the hypothetical (conjunctive) and the disjunctive syllogisms. But reason does not limit itself to the reduction of the laws of the understanding into system, as the understanding itself reduces

* Comp. Kritik, Vorrede, Ausg. 1. Vorrede, Ausg. 2. Einleitung, Ausg. 2, and *passim*. In comparing Hume with Beattie, Kant says the former had "a critical reason" (*eine kritische Vernunft*.) It is evident that "reason" here means a noetic rather than a logical or discursive faculty.—*Prolegom.* Einleitung.

† The cases of subalternation, as logicians say; or the relation of A and I, E and O.

under general conceptions the various materials of intuition. Does pure reason, then, he asks, like the understanding, contain within its own province synthetic principles *à priori** only of higher generality and unity? Now the transcendental *dialectic* is designed to furnish the answer to this question. Reason, we must remember, works immediately with the conceptions and judgments of understanding, and not with intuitions or perceptions; so that the unity at which reason aims is not a unity of experience which belongs to understanding alone, as exemplified, for instance, in the judgment which understanding pronounces as to the universality of causation, a principle which reason could never have produced by elaborating the bare conceptions of the understanding.

Still reason always naturally aims at the transcendental, at rising from present consequences to higher conditions, until it shall ascend to a principle so general that it is derived from no other as its condition—that it shall reach the *absolute* and *unconditioned* (*das Unbedingte*).† The one grand form or category of pure reason, therefore, in its transcendental aims and pretensions, is the *unity of the unconditioned*. The principle of it is: “The conditioned or the relative being given, there is also given the entire series of the conditions on which it depends, and consequently the unconditioned itself.” This principle, as it claims to transcend all conditions, is synthetical; but it is not a principle of the understanding, which faculty has only to do with objects of experience, that is with the conditioned.

Now, in thus seeking the highest generality, reason attains, by inference or conclusion, certain conceptions, which Kant terms *ideas*, and which are to reason what the categories are to the understanding. We have seen the latter to be the *à priori* forms of all our possible experience; but the ideas of reason aim at what experience can never reach, even the absolute and unconditioned; so that these ideas are transcendental. Our author borrows the term *idea* from Plato, as the term *categories* from Aristotle; in both cases with some change of meaning. Kant describes *idea* as a “conception of the reason formed from notions which transcend the possibility of experience,” whereas the *categories* have no validity but as applied to experience.‡

* This is asking whether reason, in its special sense, as treated in this part of the *Kritik*, is a noetic faculty, as understanding is, which Kant regards, as we have seen, as the seat of synthetic judgments *à priori*; e. g., “every event must have a cause,” a principle which he expressly states is “not known and prescribed by reason;” i. e., in the special sense of reason.—*Trans. Dial.* II. C. *Einleitung*.

† Kant holds that the unconditioned is not an object of knowledge; but that our notion of it has a regulative effect in our search after higher and higher generality.

‡ Plato gave the name of *ideas* to what he regarded as the eternal, immaterial forms which were the patterns according to which the Creator fashioned the pre-viously formless eternal matter of which all things were made. Kant's ideas are

Reason logically deduces particular consequences from general principles ; but, not content with this process, reason always strives after principles yet more general ; and thus by ever regarding the present general principle as but the consequence of one still higher or more general, reason seeks in her ascent to climb at last to a principle so general that it is derived from no other ; and which, unlike all the rest, does not depend on anything more general than itself ; that is, depends on no condition, but is, in other words, "unconditioned" or absolute. Kant refers to the use of the prosyllogism* in the common logic, as exemplifying in some measure this regressive procedure of reason. In this way reason aims at the highest possible generalisation of the judgments of the understanding, and to reach, by this logical process, principles and truths which possess independent and immediate certainty ; whereas, says Kant, all that reason can really do is to bring to order the knowledge we already possess, that is merely either to deduce particulars from generals, or, within certain limits, to generalise from particulars. And here, says he, we shall see that reason deludes herself with mere appearances, which she mistakes for ultimate and transcendental truths, the reality of which she infers from truths less general. Reason, though unable ever actually to rise to the unconditioned, ventures to regard it as though it were a legitimate conclusion from the conception of the conditioned, which latter the understanding can safely attain. Thus, as the representations of the senses are brought to certain generalities (categories) by the understanding, so the reason claims to bring to still higher generalities (ideas) the conceptions of the

only so far analogous to Plato's, that they transcend the sphere of the sensible world. In Kantian phrase, reason is a species of representation (*Repräsentatio*, *Vorstellung*.) Kant has the following scale (*Stufenleiter*), which is useful to the student of his philosophy :—Representation with consciousness is perception. A perception regarded only so far as it is a modification of the subject, (ego) is sensation. An objective perception is cognition, (knowledge) ; and it may be either intuition, or conception (*Anschauung* oder *Begriff*). The former relates immediately to the object itself, and is individual ; the latter has only a mediate relation to it, by means of a mark or term, which may be common to a number of things [*tree* for instance]. A conception, again, may be either empirical or pure ; the latter is called *notion* or conception of the understanding, where alone it has its origin, not being the conception of a mere sensuous image ; such, for instance, as that of a given mathematical figure. A conception formed from notions, and which transcends the possibility of experience, is an *idea*, or conception of reason.—Vid. *Kritik*, *Transc. Dial.* I. sec. 1.

* We may illustrate Kant's meaning by an example of the prosyllogistic method. The form X (being Y) is Z, V is X ; \therefore V is Z points back, by what Aristotle calls the prosyllogism, to a previous major and minor premise, from which the major X is Z is obtained ; for the implied condition by which X is Z is that Y is Z. Again, in like manner Y is Z may depend on a still more general condition, as in the form Y (being T) is Z, where Y is Z is conditioned by T is Z, and so on by regression. The logical reader will be aware that such a regression may be exemplified in a *sorites*. Thus the process may be supposed to be carried backward until we can go no further, having at length arrived at a principle which is unconditioned ; that is, which depends on no previous principle.

understanding. Hence it is that the transcendental ideas of reason, which have for their object the unconditioned and the absolute, are to reason what the categories are to the understanding. As time and space are the forms of sense, and the categories the forms of understanding, so ideas, in the Kantian sense, are the forms of reason, which have their foundation in the single principle of the unconditioned which becomes developed in three ways.

We saw that the number of the categories of the understanding was determined by the modes in which the terms (subject and predicate) occur in propositions or judgments. In like manner, the number of the *ideas* is determined by the modes in which propositions are connected together in order to form conclusions; that is, by the kinds of syllogisms, which are three, the *categorical*, the *hypothetical* (conjunctive), and *disjunctive*. Hence, there will be *three ideas of reason*, three forms of the unconditioned and the absolute, to which reason is led by her regressive search after more and more general principles; and these ideas correspond with the judgments of *relation*, according to the sub-categories.* These sub-categories show the ways or forms in which we can connect our judgments into conclusions.

If we first take the categorical form of propositions as elements of the syllogism, we may suppose a series of them, in which the subject of the first proposition becomes the predicate (attribute) of the second, the subject of the second the predicate of the third, the subject of this the predicate of the fourth,† and so on until we reach a subject which no longer becomes a predicate or attribute. Now, says Kant, reason concludes that the thinking being which presents itself in our consciousness is a *subject* which never can become a predicate or attribute of any other subject; that is, reason claims to have reached, in the *ego*, an absolute subject.‡ For all the faculties and affections of the thinking being (that is, all the conditions) imply something unconditioned, some fundamental element which renders them possible. Hence reason requires a self or *soul*, a noumenon apart from all experience; a substance which is the subject of all these qualities.

Again, in the hypothetical (conjunctive)§ syllogism, we have an antecedent or condition and a consequent, which are so related as that the one is dependent on the other; and this relation may be repeated in a series to any extent, until at last we can ascend from consequent to antecedent no higher, having arrived at com-

* See our first paper on Kant.

† This may be illustrated, if we ascend from consequences to principles, by reversing the categorical sorites, A is B, B is C, C is D, D is E, E is F, &c.

‡ At all events we here see that Kant's psychology is quite alien from Spinozism.

§ Boethius well employs *hypotheticus* and *conditionalis* as synonymous and as generic; *conjunctive* and *disjunctive* being the species.

pleteness in the relation of ground and consequence, and reached a point where the series is finished in the totality of the conditions, and nothing further is supposed as ground or antecedent.* Thus reason proceeds, by a regressive synthesis, through the series of antecedents and consequents in the phenomena of nature, to the idea of the absolute unity of the series of their conditions; that is, the idea of the whole of nature; in which procedure, reason, subordinating all the general conceptions of the understanding, such as animal, tree, rock, planet, &c., to the most general which embraces them all, reaches the absolute totality of all conditions and phenomena, that is the unconditioned. Such is the idea of the *universe*.

In like manner, from the disjunctive form of the syllogism,† in which we have the relation of parts and a whole, Reason seeks an unconditioned general existence which embraces in itself all reality, and is the foundation of all possibility of things. For, in the disjunctive syllogism, the whole number of propositions embraces all the possibilities of the given case. Reason, taking this into account, rises, to an idea higher than the unconditioned unities of the soul and of nature—an idea which is nothing less than that of God, the author of all. In rising to this idea, reason disjunctively excludes all the predicates which imply limitation, negation, and imperfection, and arrives at the conception of an unlimited, all-perfect, and most real being (*ens realissimum*), the ultimate ideal, the final conclusion of reason, the *Deity*.

In these three modes, then, does reason proceed on the basis of the one supreme principle of the absolute—the synthetic principle (for reason claims for it this character) that, when anything whatever is given to the mind, the whole series of conditions on which it depends is also given; and this highest principle of unity is exemplified in the above three ideas of reason; namely, the *soul*, the *world*, the *Deity*. These are the pure forms of reason, just as time and space are those of sense, and the categories those of understanding. We shall see, however, in the sequel, that our philosopher regards these products of speculative‡ reason as of by no means equal validity with those of sense and understanding.

No doubt this deduction of the ideas of reason from the logical function of the understanding in the judgments of relation, manifests ingenuity enough; but that it is equally satisfactory we cannot say. To us the procedure, clever and subtile as it is,

* As in a completed hypothetical sorites. If A is B, C is D; if C is D, E is F; if E is F, G is H, &c.

† Either A is B, or C is D, or E is F, or G is H, &c. The logical student (who alone can understand Kant's attempt to derive the psychological, cosmological, and theological ideas from the three kinds of syllogism) will remember that, in the disjunctive syllogism, the members are *exclusive*—one supposition only being admitted, the others are rejected.

‡ As distinguished from practical (*praktische Vernunft*).

appears much less plausible than that of the categories. In the first place, it is not very obvious how the idea of self or *soul* as a pure thinking being, apart from all its attributes and modifications, should arise out of a process of reason in an ascending series, according to the logical relationship of subject and predicate, till reason arrives at a final subject, no longer capable of being itself an attribute. We fully believe that the rational faculty naturally conducts us to the belief of the real existence of a thinking being, precisely from the actual thoughts of that being, and we believe further that reason here conducts us to the truth. Kant cloudily involves the whole matter in a regressive process by categorical syllogisms, which after all, he says, prove nothing. Again, while it does not appear that there was any need of a series of categorical propositions in order to enable us to arrive at the idea of a thinking principle distinct from the body, it seems an equally far-fetched procedure to make the idea of the natural world as a whole to depend on a conjunctive process of reasoning: surely we are not conscious of any such process; and multitudes have as distinct and probably as extensive an idea in connexion with the term "whole universe," who have never thought of it in the light of a completed series of conditions, as the profoundest logicians or mathematicians. Nor does it strike one as more appropriate to derive our idea of the Deity from the disjunctive form of the syllogism. That reason leads to the belief in a Deity we doubt not, and this on the principle of causation, the dictate of our intellectual and moral nature: but the elimination of this idea from the alternations of disjunctive reasoning seems to us circuitous if not apocryphal. Ratiocination may do much to extend and clear up our notions of the soul, the universe, and the Deity; but surely our rational nature attains to definite conceptions on these subjects before it applies to them that particular function belonging to it which we call *reasoning*, as in the syllogism.

The above three ideas of reason are founded on the "principle of the absolute," or the *a priori* principle to which reason aspires as the absolute condition of all knowledge—that "with a fact is given the entire series of conditions on which that fact depends." These ideas suggest three transcendental sciences, *rational psychology*, *rational cosmology*, and *rational theology*. But we must remember, says Kant, that in these analytic and regressive processes by which reason aims at completeness in her ideas, after all she only arrives at subjective abstractions, which she can never verify, though she attempts to treat them as objective realities—the soul, the absolute subject; the universe, the absolute total of all phenomena; the Deity, the absolute being. These ideas are forms, says Kant, which regulate the process of reason; but can speculative reason, he asks, regard them as

really applicable to objects? He answers "no." Sense can give materials on which understanding can operate; the categories, indeed, are subjective, but they can be validly applied to the sense-world (*Sinnen-welt*). Reason, in her syntheses, can only deal with the abstractions of the understanding; but she cannot, like understanding, appeal to experience, which can neither affirm nor deny the ideas of reason, which are out of experience. The categories of understanding are wholly limited to possible experience, even in their synthetic or *a priori* use, and they can never enable us to grasp the unconditioned or the supersensible. Nor can reason, in fact, do so; but only in appearance. It is the aim of this second part of the "Transcendental Logic" to point out the illusions into which, according to Kant, reason falls in speculating on these three ideas. He compares these dialectical illusions to the optical ones which inevitably force themselves on us whenever we see the moon larger in the horizon, or the sea elevated above the land; we can never rid ourselves of the impression, though we know it to be a complete illusion. So the transcendental ideas of reason ever present themselves to us as objectively true, and thus they plunge us into fallacies, contradictions, and impossibilities.

Our author first treats of what he terms the *Paralogisms* of pure reason, or the false conclusions which arise from the confounding of our conceptions of our subject (self) with an objective reality. The psychological idea (*soul*) is merely our subjective notion, but reason deludes herself by making it involve a real object. We assume, therefore, an imaginary science, *rational psychology*, from identifying with a supposed object this abstract notion of self or soul, which is necessarily connected with the consciousness of our mental phenomena. "I think," is a conception or judgment which accompanies all thought. The conception *ego*, so far as it is found in all thinking, and as connected with but independent of any one empirical determination of thought, is a pure or transcendental conception. Now to conclude the real existence of a thinking subject from the conception of it, as reason claims to do, is fallacious. When, indeed, we say "I think," or am a thinking being, we do but apply an attribute (thought) to the *ego*. But the permanent consciousness we have of *ourselves* as existing amidst all the variations of thought and feeling, causes us to regard this unchanging *ego* as a pure subject or substance*—not a predicate or attribute of any other—all our modifications being only predicates of it. Reason, therefore, regards this pure *ego* as absolute subject, which can only be, as it were, its own predicate.† Now reason adopts

* The psychological reader will here be reminded of Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*.

† Fichte afterwards expressed this in his fundamental formula *ego = ego*, or *ego sum ego*.

this conception, not as merely a subjective representation, which, says our philosopher, it truly is, but as objective and transcendental. Thus the empty logical notion of an abstract *me*, is taken by our reason to be of objective value, and is mistaken for an objective unconditioned and absolute reality.

Reason next proceeds to apply to this subjective abstraction certain predicates, according to the categories. 1. The soul is *substance* (not attribute). 2. It is *simple*. 3. It is numerically *one* and the same. 4. It is in relation to *possible* objects in space.* The soul, as substance, being supposed an object of the internal sense (consciousness), furnishes the conception of its *immateriality*; from its being simple, we have that of its *incorruptibility*; from its identity as intellectual substance, we obtain its *personality*: from all the three together, its *spirituality*. The relation of the soul to the body presents to us the notion of the soul as the principle of life (*anima*), and this conception limited by that of spirituality, gives us that of *immortality*.

Now, says Kant, this whole argument is illusive, all its conclusions are paralogisms (fallacies) founded on the assumption that there exists an object corresponding to our mere conceptions, which speculative reason can never tell us. In my internal sense there is nothing permanent; for the *ego* is the mere consciousness of my own thought, and we cannot by mere thought of an *ego* establish a real one as existing. Internal intuition only presents an *ego* as phenomenon merely, not as thing in itself (*Ding an sich*), we must not, then, confound the "I think" (*Ich denke*) of mere consciousness with the proposition "I exist thinking," which assumes to determine the *ego* in relation to existence, which is for us an unknown *x*, of which, therefore, we can predicate nothing; for mere thought cannot tell us anything; and we have no intuition of *noumena*, since they are beyond sense and experience. In order to support the argument respecting the soul's existence as substance, as simple, as one and iden-

* The categories frequently exhibit the great subtilty and ingenuity which cannot be denied to Kant's genius; but here they seem applied less adroitly than usual. The order here is relation, quality, quantity, modality. Substance, as opposed to accident or property, belongs to the first; but why "simplicity" should come under the sub-category of reality, as it must to belong to quality, rather than under relation, (for surely simplicity may be regarded as a property,) is not very obvious. No doubt "unity" comes under quantity. In the fourth item, which belongs to modality, Kant applies the sub-category of "existence;" but he admits that the reader will hardly guess why the "latter attribute of the soul" (its relation to possible objects in space) belongs to this sub-category. One might have supposed that this attribute might properly be assigned to relation; some would think, again, that the wording might point to the sub-category of possibility. Kant no further explains than by remarking that we distinguish our own existence as thinking beings, from that of all external things, including our own bodies; but that we cannot infer from this distinction whether this consciousness of self is possible without things external to us, or whether we can exist merely as thinking beings, without being men (i.e., without a bodily frame).

tical, as related to external things, we should require synthetic judgments,* which we can never form, according to our author's theory, but in connexion with sense and experience. All rational psychology, therefore, is based on the following sophism:—What cannot be thought (*gedacht*) otherwise than as subject exists as subject, and therefore as substance: A thinking being considered merely as such cannot be thought otherwise: Therefore it exists as subject and substance. Now the term "thought" in the major premiss applies to objects in general, including those of intuition: but in the minor this term refers merely to self-consciousness—hence the fallacy; and it reaches to all the predicates which reason attempts to apply to the soul.† Thus reason falls into illusions, pretending to prove what she can neither prove nor disprove. The Wolfian school attempted to demonstrate the existence and properties of the soul; but even if it be supposed they were in error about substance in general, mistaking the mere logical synthesis of qualities for a reality or substratum—yet, it may be said, is there not at least one exception, the soul of man? Is not this a real being? Abstract, here, all accidents, that is all thoughts and feelings, all unconsciousness of personality, identity, etc., and have you not still a real substance left, as the basis of these? No, says Kant, the conclusion though inevitable from the very nature of our reason is delusive. All you reach is but consciousness of modifications—that is modifications: you are not conscious of the soul itself. Neither external nor internal experience can give us more than this. That it exists, is therefore an assumption. All that you have left when you have abstracted all thoughts, feelings, and the like, is the bare logical abstraction "I think." You have only reached the thought of an abstract something, of which you know and can say nothing. The reasoning, therefore, is not conclusive—the conclusion *may* be true, but it is not proved.

This whole discussion partakes of Kant's usual obscurity whenever he treats of what belongs to consciousness. He here tries to separate the judgment "I think" from all that is concrete, from our empirical consciousness, that is from all actual thought; and all that we get from this transcendental notion of an "ego" is an unknown *x*, a logical subject, not any thing we can call real. Thus by attaining to a psychological idea which he imagines to be

* See our first article on Kant.

† Kant here criticizes Mendelssohn's argument, in his *Phædo*, for the immortality of the soul, founded on its simplicity, that "a simple being, having no parts, cannot cease to exist, or be annihilated." Kant says, that though a simple being cannot lose its *extensive* magnitude, since it has none, it may lose its *intensive* magnitude, and so fade away as a light diminishing to extinction. Mendelssohn's argument, no doubt, assumes too much, did we know ever so well what we mean by the soul's "simplicity;" but surely Kant's rejoinder is not very satisfactory, for how can a thing fade away whose existence, as he says, is a mere supposition, and that supposition an illusion?

wholly out of the sphere of experience, Kant pronounces this idea which we have of an *ego* wholly void of any certain validity. Kant's error lay in failing to perceive that our conscious experience is an experience which not only assures us of our phenomenal modifications, but of the existence of that which is modified, self or *ego*. It is evident that, ultimately, Kant's notions on the *ego* scarcely differ from those of Hume.

In regard to the *Cosmological Idea*, says our author, reason also seeks to ascend from condition to condition to the unconditioned. Here again he makes an ingenious use of his categories, by which the general idea of the *universe* gives us four subordinate cosmological ideas, as follows: *Quantity* gives complete totality or extent; *Quality*, or reality in magnitude (not the magnitude of empty space), gives completion of the divisibility of matter; *Relation* gives totality as to the causes or origin of the existence of the universe; *Modality* gives the totality of the dependence of existence, or of its contingency. In each case, we may either look on all the terms of the series taken together as representing the unconditioned, or we may reach the unconditioned in a first term. In the former case, the series goes on in an unlimited regression, and is therefore infinite and without a first term. In the latter case, we are supposed in ascending to reach a first term. Such first term, with respect to space, will be *limit*; with respect to time *beginning*; with respect to the elementary constituents of any mass of matter, absolute (monadic) *simplicity*; with respect to causation, the first term will be liberty or *freedom*; with respect to dependence or contingency, the first term will be absolute *necessity*. Thus, in each case, the completed series may be *finite*, or *infinite*. Hence, in reasoning on the world, we have four pairs of contradictions, which Kant terms *Antinomies*, each containing a Thesis, and an Antithesis.

First Antinomy: as to Quantity of time and space. Thesis; the world had a beginning in time and is bounded in extent. For if it never began to exist, then any moment whatever has been preceded by an infinite time, and at every moment an infinite series of successive states of the world has passed away. But the infinity of a series consists in its never being completed by successive addition; consequently an infinite series of successive states is impossible;* so that the world's existence must represent a finite series, that is the world must have had a beginning.

* In making out a case against the "natural dialectic" of reason, Kant seems to forget the difference between infinities; (e.g., eternity *à parte ante*, and eternity *à parte post*;) and that infinite quantities may have any ratio to each other; thus a line infinitely extended only in one direction from a certain point, is but half of that which is infinitely extended in two directions from the same point; but each of the lines which make up the whole is infinite. Sir W. Hamilton somewhat indiscriminately says, "nothing can be greater than infinite."—*Lectures* II. p. 527, 1859.

Again, the world must be limited in space, for if not, we can only conceive of it as an aggregate of an infinite number of successive parts, each surrounding the former, the conception of which enumeration involves that of an infinite series of times, that is an infinite time has passed away at any given moment exactly as before; therefore the world is not without limits in space.* Antithesis: the world as to time is eternal, and as to space unlimited. For if it had a beginning, then the preceding time must have been an empty time, but in an empty time nothing can begin to be, for such a time contains no condition of the existence of any thing, whether this thing be supposed to pass from nothing to existence of its own accord, or from some foreign cause. Time, like space, is only our mode of representing things. We can have no experience of it without objects, no experience of an infinite empty time; and this empty conception can therefore never become an object of our knowledge. And if we admit that the world is limited in space, it must be surrounded by an empty unlimited space, to which the existing objects are related. But the world to us is the complete totality of existences, beyond which there is no object of perception, and the relation of an object to what is not an object is a relation to nothing; for space itself is not an object; it is only a condition which our sensuous faculty gives to all phenomena, so that space cannot exist where there is no possibility of an object being perceived. Therefore there can be no empty space; and as there is nothing to limit the universe, it is unlimited.†

Second Antinomy (as to Quality, i.e., of Substance in regard to divisibility). Thesis: All compound substance is made up of simple parts, and all substance is either simple, or compounded of the simple. For if the parts of a compound substance are not simple but compounded, they will be divisible *in infinitum*. But if we suppose all composition of these decompounded parts to be done away in thought, no compound part would remain; and as

* Whatever objection there may be to supposing the material universe without limit, that is co-extensive with space itself, Kant's argument would seem to apply equally to unlimited space, for we are as much obliged to conceive of space as made up of parts, as the universe itself. Even Kant is obliged to speak of time and space objectively. Kant does not tell us that infinite space is inadmissible; but would not similar reasoning fairly apply as an objection to our so conceiving of space? Of course Kant would say that the conception is *a priori*, but as space is divisible this would hardly mend the matter.

† The whole of this argument is strange enough, on the principle of the objectivity of time and space; and Kant here at first condescends to speak of them in an objective sense. The material universe must have existed eternally, and must be unlimited, because time and space can never be empty of it! A *petitio principii* plainly enough. But our philosopher immediately falls back upon his strange fundamental principle that time and space are only conditions of our sensuous faculty, and not also conditions of things independently of us! If there were no eyes, Jupiter would not move round the sun—indeed there would be no Jupiter no sun, nor anything else!

by the supposition there are no simple parts, nothing would remain at all, and no substance is given, which is absurd.* Kant further observes, that this Antinomy concerns the division of phenomena, which are mere representations (*Vorstellungen*), so that the parts can exist only so far as represented to us in experience, where alone they can exist. The conclusion is, that all compounds have ultimate or simple parts. Antithesis: Nothing in the world is simple, all is compounded. For all composition of substances is only possible in space; and therefore every compound must have as many parts as the space which it occupies. But space is not made up of simple parts, but only of spaces. The simple, therefore, if it existed, would be composed of parts, which is absurd. Moreover, the existence of an absolutely simple is a mere conception of ours, for we can have no intuition of a simple object in experience. As the conception, therefore, has nothing in the sense-world corresponding to it, we may conclude that there is nothing absolutely simple in the world.†

Third Antinomy: (Relation of cause and effect). Thesis: Causality by the laws of nature is not the only cause of phenomena; there must also be a free causality. For if we suppose only physical causes or natural laws, we must go back, *in infinitum*, through a series of causes, each of which is also an effect, without completing the series, which itself would have no cause, as we never reach a first commencement. This contradicts the prime law of nature, that everything which happens must have a sufficient cause. Hence we must admit an absolute cause originating the whole series, one not determined, like all the rest, by any previous cause out of itself, that is, a spontaneous or free cause. Antithesis: There is no freedom of causality in the world, but all takes place merely according to the laws of nature. For if there be liberty, in this transcendental sense, as a particular kind of causality, still every causality is in itself a change, since it is the state of the cause when in action, which is different from its state when not in action. How then comes this free and active cause into actual agency at the time when it acts? Is its state before it acts so connected with its state when it begins to act, as that it is thus determined to action? If so, it is not a free cause, which is contrary to the supposition. If no

* This argument again (independently of the question in hand) has no force apart from Kant's idealistic aesthetics. Certain demonstrations of the higher geometry depend on the infinite divisibility of space; and how can we say *a priori* that matter filling a portion of space may not be capable of division, like space, without limit? We can only, in practice, indeed, divide either matter or space to a certain extent. To speak of annihilating all composition, "in thought," is surely to beg the question. Whether there are ultimate atoms or not cannot be decided by metaphysical reasoning.

† We must not confound Leibnitz's monads or Kant's "simple parts," which are supposed to have no extension, with the ultimate elements or atoms after which physical science seeks.

previous state of the cause has had an influence in determining it to action, it then acts without any cause of its acting; its determinations one way or the other have no foundation whatever. But this is opposed to the necessary condition of all the unity of experience, that every event must have a cause. Transcendental liberty, then, is a mere thing of thought, an empty idea or conception of reason, and therefore all phenomena result solely from the laws of nature.*

Fourth Antinomy. (Modality in Contingence and Necessity). Thesis: In order to explain the existence of the world, there must exist, in the world or in connexion with it, either as part of it, or as the cause of it, a being whose existence is absolutely necessary. For the sensible world exhibits a series of changes, which alone enable us to know succession in time,† each change being contingent on its condition, which precedes it in time. Now, every condition pre-supposes a series of conditions, running backwards up to the unconditioned or absolutely necessary condition. Reason, therefore, thus rises from the conditioned in phenomena, to the unconditioned in conception, which is necessary to the absolute totality of the series. Hence, something necessary must exist. Again: this necessary cause itself belongs to the sensible world, otherwise the series of cosmical changes could not possibly receive a beginning from it. For the beginning of a series in time is determined by what precedes it in time; so that the necessary cause must belong to time, and therefore to the sensible world (of phenomena), time being only possible as the form of phenomena. Hence there is contained in the world of sense (the sum total of all phenomena) something that is absolutely necessary, whether it be the whole cosmical series itself, or a part of it. Antithesis: There is no absolutely necessary being, either in the world or out of it, as its cause. For if either the world itself is necessary, or contains a necessary existence, then either there must be in the series of changes an unconditionally necessary, and therefore uncaused beginning, which opposes the dynamical law of causation determining all phenomena in time;

* The reader will here be reminded of the vexed speculative question respecting human liberty and necessity, usually put in this form: If the will's determinations are caused by motives, how can it be a free, spontaneous, autocratic power? If it be self-determining in the sense of not being under the ordinary law of causation, why does it happen that, in any case, it determines one way and not the other? Where is the *via media* between necessity and chance? Consciousness alone solves the difficulty, but only by cutting the Gordian knot.

† Kant says: "Objectively time precedes all changes, as condition of their possibility; but *subjectively* and in consciousness, the representation of time, like every other, is given solely on occasion of perception." *Transc. Dialek.* Antinom. IV. But even this subjective time, is, with Kant, only what is objectively supplied to phenomena by the mind itself. We everywhere, in this author, meet with his æsthetical idealism, as the prime element in his reasonings. It is assumed, in the latter part of this Thesis, that no being, necessary or contingent, can act, unless it be part and parcel of the world of sense!

or else the series itself is without beginning ; and though conditioned and contingent in each part, is still absolutely necessary and unconditioned as a whole, which is absurd ; for an aggregate cannot be necessary, if no one part necessarily exists. And, again : if a necessary cause exists out of the world, this cause, as the highest member of the series of causes, must begin the series. Its causality therefore would belong to time, and to the sum total of the mundane phenomena. It follows that the necessary cause cannot be out of the world ; but this is contrary to the supposition. Therefore, there is no absolutely necessary being, either in the world or out of it.*

Such are the contradictions into which reason falls, says the philosopher of Königsberg, when we attempt to conceive the finite as infinite or the infinite as finite ; and when we apply to existence and essence (thing in itself) that which is merely a form of phenomena. The questions raised in the antinomies are indeed most interesting to our curiosity ; but they only tantalize our minds. The Theses are the more popular, indeed, as having a more practical interest to us : the Antitheses have more of science in them, but seem less favourable to morals and religion ; but their proper use is to check the dogmatism of the Theses, and to restrain the presumption of reason where knowledge is not within her reach. A true criticism, says Kant, pronounces each alternative to be founded on illusion. For let us recur to the main principle of rational cosmology ; which is, that if the conditioned be given, all the conditions are given with it ; and therefore the absolute or unconditioned is given. Now we must remember that the doctrine of "transcendental æsthetic" is, that time and space being the forms of pure intuition, they are the conditions of all possible experience, and in our experience alone have they reality ; that is, they are wholly subjective, and phenomena, as extended in space and changing in time, have no existence out of our minds. If we examine the above cosmological principle,† we shall

* Kant observes that the same grounds of proof here establish the Thesis and the Antithesis. A necessary being exists, because the whole time past contains the whole series of conditions, and therefore the unconditioned (necessary). No necessary being exists for the reason that the whole time past contains the series of all conditions, and therefore the aggregate is conditioned. The cause of this incongruity is that, in the Thesis, we attend to the absolute totality of the series of conditions ; while, in the Antithesis, we consider the contingency of everything that is determined in the series. Kant compares this Antinomy to the controversy respecting the rotation of the moon on its axis, in which the parties drew opposite conclusions from the moon always keeping the same side to the earth. "Both were perfectly correct, according to their respective points of view," says Kant. But he seems to forget that one of the alternatives was true, and that the question was which was the *right* point of view.

† *In extenso* ; The *conditioned* being given, the entire series of conditions is given with it, and therefore the unconditioned ; but the objects of sense are given us as *conditioned*, therefore with them is given the entire series of their conditions, including the unconditioned or absolute.

find that in the major premiss, for it to be of any avail, the "conditioned" must involve *thing in itself* (noumenon); in the minor phenomenon or sensible object merely. Now of things in themselves we know nothing, we only know phenomena, as presented to us in experience by sense; and so limited is our experience that we can never reach the entire series of conditions in the mundane phenomena, and consequently we cannot attain to the unconditioned. In this way are noumena and phenomena confounded, and the conclusion is invalid. We must always remember that it is Kant's doctrine that phenomena alone are known to us. They do, indeed, presuppose something as their cause or basis, but what it is we cannot even guess, independently of our way of conceiving it. A phenomenon is an effect coming partly from this unknown x which affects us, and partly from the nature of our faculties. Phenomena only are given in our experience. If there were no beings sensuous like us, there would be neither space, nor time, nor the phenomena which are in them. When we dispute about the finite or infinite in time and space, we take phenomena for things in themselves; and we talk of the absolute completion of the form cosmological series. Whether we regard the totality as finite or infinite we take the series for so many things existing in themselves; and then we invent a syllogism about the "entire series being given," etc. The series do not belong to things, but only to us, and it is only in experience that we can find conditions of their completion. It is an illusion then, says Kant, thus to reason; for the universe is for us only the totality of phenomena: to argue from this totality to that of a thing unknown in experience, that is, to a complete totality of phenomena, is impossible. On these grounds, says Kant, we have the means of solving the Antinomies.

In the first Antinomy, the contradiction consists in reason trying to unite in one single conception two things diametrically opposed, which is impossible. Both in the Thesis and the Antithesis, we take the world for a complete whole, existing as such, not merely in our conceptions, but existing independently of them, in itself, in time and space; whereas time and space are only forms of our sensibility, not of things themselves. All we can do is, to conceive the possibility of the continuance of the series, according to what we have experienced of it; but we cannot say it is infinite, nor can we say it is finite, either in time or space; for our experience of the phenomena does not enable us to go so far as to say anything about a commencement or a limit; when we do so, we are no longer speaking of phenomena which we know something of by experience, but of things in themselves of which we know nothing. All we can say is, that to us the world is *indefinite* in time and space. Hence both the Thesis and the Antithesis are equally false; we cannot say of a mere conception

of our reason that it corresponds to what is either finite or infinite.

In the second Antinomy also, both alternatives are equally false, whether we say the series of division is finite or infinite. As we cannot know things in themselves, a series out of our perceptions is nothing to us. Matter as phenomenon is not given to us either as divisible without limit, or as composed of ultimate indivisible atoms. Neither the series of simple (indivisible) parts, nor of compound parts, is given; for experience has not attained to either. The divisibility of a whole, therefore, cannot be pronounced by us as either finite or infinite; it is only indefinite. If we say it is finite, or it is infinite, we are regarding matter not as phenomenon, but as thing in itself, which is to us a mere empty conception. For us, nothing exists but that which is possible to our experience. To us, therefore, matter is not monadic, nor is it divisible *in infinitum*.

Thus, says our author, in the two mathematical antinomies (so called as relating to quantity), the Thesis and Antithesis being founded on the blending of incongruous suppositions, are both false;* but in the two dynamical antinomies (so called as referring to the correlates of Relation and Modality), they may be reconciled, being only in apparent contradiction. For the dynamical antinomies say nothing of the matter or extent of the universe, but only refer to its existence, ascending to the source of its being, and demanding absolute completeness in the series of causes and of contingent things; and in these series the conditions are not necessarily of the same kind, but may admit not only sensuous, but also intelligible conditions, that is, conditions existing out of time and space.

The *Third Antinomy* admits of reconciliation, he adds, on the ground that a cause may be of a different nature from its effect; and that a phenomenon may in one respect be an effect of natural law, in another respect the effect of a free cause. These two are the only kinds of possible causes. The first must always have been the effect of a previous cause in time; free causation, on the other hand, must be out of the phenomenal world, its effect only is part of the series in time and space.† This spontaneous causation, therefore, belongs to the world of sense only so far as the whole series of its effects come under the ordinary law of causality, and are phenomena of nature; but of the free

* As though it were argued that a square-circle is not round because it is a square; again, a square-circle is round because it is a circle where incongruous conceptions lead to absurdity.

† Whatever difficulties may attach to the subject of free causation, we are, ourselves, as conscious, sure, that our spontaneous choices go on in time, as that we observe by our senses the natural series of causes and effects in time. It does not appear why the phenomena of volition, as registered by consciousness, the internal sense, should be regarded as out of time.

cause itself, as belonging to the intelligible (non-sensuous) world, we cannot predicate that it is itself determined by the law which reigns throughout the whole series in time and space, that every change must have a cause. Hence free and natural causation may exist together in the same events, according as the latter are viewed in connexion with their intelligible or their natural cause. True, free causality cannot be perceived by us, but this transcendental liberty may exist in connexion with physical causality. As phenomenon, for instance, man is subject to the universal law of causation; but as an intelligible (noumenal) being, he does actions which are independent of physical causes, and which have their principle in the sense of duty and moral law. Thus the same actions may be both free and subject to necessity; but if we reason on the supposition of the absolute reality of phenomena, as though they were things in themselves, then freedom is impossible, and natural law is the only cause.*

In regard to the solution of the Fourth Antinomy: we need not suppose it necessary that an absolutely unconditioned being should be of the same nature with beings which are subordinate, and of which this being is the first condition. Here the Thesis and the Antithesis may be equally true; for here, again, we may admit on the one hand, that all the objects of the sense-world are contingent and relative, so that if phenomena were real things, there could be no necessary existence, but, on the other hand, that the whole series of phenomenal existences may depend on a non-empirical condition, an absolutely necessary being. This being would be out of the world, forming no part of the series of phenomena, and thus free from the law of contingency and dependence. Hence, while all in nature is contingent, it is possible that beyond and out of nature there may be a necessary being on which all else depends. It is for theology to inquire into the proof of the existence of such a being.

Kant thus regards the scepticism of reason as cured by the Transcendental Criticism, in which his doctrine of "aesthetics" plays so conspicuous a part. We know nothing of things but as mere phenomena, under the conditions of time and space,

* Kant here no longer deals with reason simply as a logical faculty (*reine Vernunft*), but as an organ of moral law, determining actions *a priori* (*praktische Vernunft*). But surely moral freedom cannot incur any danger from our giving objective reality to phenomena; our consciousness of freedom attests sufficiently that we are free, without the aid of transcendental idealism. It would be true, indeed, that moral agency must come under the domain of a necessity as rigid as that of physical causation, if phenomena *alone* were real, and thus everything came under the law of necessity. Admit that phenomena are a real representation of things, and there is room for moral law and agency. Kant admits such law and agency, but he seeks to establish them by distinguishing *practical* from speculative reason, whereas no such distinction is really tenable. *Vid. Praktische Vernunft*. It is not clear how the same action of a moral agent should strictly be "both free and necessary." There is often antagonism and conflict, no doubt, in our moral agency; so far as choice is free (that is *choice*), it is exempt from necessity, and *vice versa*.

which themselves have no reality but in our experience, actual or possible. Reason disputes about the four cosmological series as to their totality, asks whether they are finite or infinite, mistakes pure objects of thought for realities, and then maintains that when the conditioned (objects of sense) are given, all the conditions are also given. Now, in a purely intellectual sense, this is true; the effects imply the causes, even up to the absolute or first in the series. But where phenomena are concerned, which are nothing but as perceived, we cannot in the same sense assert that, with the conditioned, all the conditions (as phenomena) are also given. We cannot get beyond empirical conditions. Hence the antinomies arise from confounding phenomena with noumena. We thus vainly speak of the infinite as a reality, when in fact we are only occupied with an indefinite conception of our own, and with attempting to identify things in themselves with our conceptions of them.

In this way, says the philosopher of Königsberg, are the Antinomies of natural dialectic solved by Critical Idealism, which admits and even demands the existence of *noumena*, or things lying behind our sensuous intuition; for our very consciousness of the *ego* implies a non-*ego*. This critical idealism is equally remote from materialism, which assumes that we have sensuous intuitions of things in themselves, as from empirical idealism, which denies noumena. Critical idealism does not deny objects beyond our senses. It only says we cannot have empirical knowledge of them. Where the Thesis and Antithesis are reconciled as both possibly true, the Theses look beyond phenomena to a cause without the bounds of nature—the Antitheses point only to phenomena. Thus in the last Antinomy, one view includes a noumenon among the phenomena of nature, while the other reasons back through phenomena to a noumenon beyond them. No demonstrative certainty is attained on either side; and one proof does not overthrow the other—it is possible that both conclusions may be true—so Kant.

A very few further remarks must close our notice of Kant's antinomies. As to the first; we agree with him so far as to admit that the question relating to the extent of the universe in time and space belongs entirely to speculative reason. Cosmologically, our knowledge of the universe does not allow us to decide whether or not the infinite space which is beyond our ken is everywhere as much studded with orbs as the space within range of it; or whether, again, the world is eternal, though our views of the Deity would lead us to believe that it had a beginning. As to the second; here again reason alone, by concluding from actual observation, can deal with the question whether matter is divisible in *infinitum* like space or not. We are cer-

tainly not in a condition, at present, to pronounce whether or not matter is composed of ultimate finally indivisible elements. One thing at least is inconceivable—the Leibnitzian monad of the lowest degree, particles inextended combining to form an extended mass of matter.* The *third* question must be referred to consciousness for its solution. Is there free agency to be found anywhere in the world, or is all agency determined by the necessity of natural law only? Our consciousness of freedom to act, will ever outweigh all reasonings to the contrary; just as all arguments employed to prove that we are free agents are of no significance unless our consciousness testifies the same to be. The question is not one for reason to solve, and consciousness offers no antinomy. We can only know what liberty is by exercising our free choice, just as we can only know what sight is by seeing. Liberty, with Kant, is a mere transcendental conception. Kant's false theory of consciousness deeply infects much of his doctrine of antinomies. Had he done justice to consciousness, which intuitively and irresistibly proclaims within us that we are free agents, he would not have made freedom a sort of *casus belli* of reason against reason. His antinomy, therefore, which arises from his mistaking the "place"† of liberty, may be regarded as imaginary, and its solution useless, and only attained by means of a forced distinction between speculative and practical (moral) reason.‡ As to the fourth antinomy; while it must be admitted that, in the sensible world, all presents itself to us as relative and contingent, this does not prevent our acknowledging beyond the series of phenomena a necessary being on which they all depend. M. Cousin holds that the evidence of a necessary being rests not upon any process of reasoning, but on the psychological fact that from our experience of the contingent, reason at once rises intuitively to the conception of a necessary absolute independent being. This was Descartes' theory of the proof of a necessary being. For our own part, we are more inclined to regard this conception of a necessary being as a clue to the evidence than as a substitute for all deduction of reason on the subject. A bare conception in itself can hardly be evidence: but when we consider that without supposing a necessary being, we are obliged to suppose an infinite series of effects without a cause, reason infers this necessary uncaused being, as incomparably the most satisfactory conclusion.

* With regard to the question as to the simplicity of the *ego* as substance, we must refer to the paralogisms. Some, with M. Cousin, rest not only the soul's unity and identity of substance, but also its simplicity, *etc.*, on the evidence of consciousness.

† *Vid.* Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe.—*Kritik*, s. 214, *Rosenkranz*.

‡ So far as this antinomy relates to free-agency as concerns the mundane phenomena, it properly belongs to the *theological idea*.

We come, finally, to the *Theological Idea*, which furnishes the "Ideal of Pure Reason," that is our conception of a deity, whose existence we seek to prove. We have seen that the pure conceptions of the understanding (categories) represent no objects apart from sensuous conditions. Ideas, as the soul, for instance, are still further removed from objective reality than the categories; for they cannot be represented by any phenomena in the concrete, since reason seeks a completeness which no possible experience contains, and which is therefore never reached. But the theological idea, or *ideal*, is the most removed of all from objective reality. Perfect virtue, for example, is a kind of idea; the sage of the Stoics is an ideal. We cannot realize perfect virtue, much less a perfectly virtuous man. The idea is a sort of rule of moral action; the ideal is an archetype, a model which we can never reach. The idea and the ideal have a regulative effect on us, and enable us to estimate our imperfection; but they exist only in thought. The transcendental ideal is the Deity; and we must here remember that in order completely to determine a thing, we must suppose the aggregate of all the attributes which may belong to it, and then withdraw those which do not, so as to find those which do.* Now, the law of determination is that only one out of two opposite attributes, positive and negative, can belong to a thing at one time; and the determination is only complete or absolute when all the possible attributes are supposed. But this completeness can never be reached in experience, it is only a conception of reason. If we conceive of a transcendental substratum of this complete determination, this substratum is just the idea of a whole comprising all reality, the limits of which are denied by the negations, as the infinite denies the finite. Hence our notion of a being who is the fulness of all reality (*ens realissimum*), the being of whom all equality with any other being must be denied, the supreme, the primitive existence, free from all contingency, the underived, unconditioned, unlimited being. But having thus aimed at reaching the sum of all perfection, and its synthesis in the ideal of an existing, personal being, what has reason done? She has attained to nothing more, says Kant, than a bare logical conception of something perfect, an abstract notion, which can be applied to nothing objective in experience. For though reason has done her best to personify and hypostatise her abstractions, it does not follow that there is any such actual, real being out of our subjective conceptions. We are apt to forget that nothing can be an object for us, unless it be a reality of experience; we assume as valid without restriction a principle

* This is according to Kant's principle before stated, that the ideal of reason is founded on a disjunctive syllogism; A is either B, or C, or D, etc.

which is only valid for the objects of our senses. Taking phenomena for things in themselves, we apply to things in general a principle which has no value but relatively to objects of experience. Thus the bare ideal of all perfection, illusively individualized, is regarded as a real, substantial, and personal existence.

Reason, however, is not unaware that this procedure is not quite satisfactory, and therefore seeks proof of the reality of her ideal, in three ways, which comprise all the grounds on which speculative reason can ever found her theory. The first method is the *physico-theological* argument, based on our experience of causation in the design and harmony manifested in nature, which leads us to ascend to a first cause; secondly, the *cosmological* argument, which, from our experience of the contingent existences in the world, points us to an absolute and necessary existence; thirdly, the *ontological* argument, which, apart from all experience of the phenomena around us, concludes that there is a God, simply because we have the idea of an all-perfect being in our minds. Kant maintains that it is impossible to attain to any valid proof of a deity from either of these arguments. He considers them in the reverse order.

1. The *Ontological* argument is founded on *à priori* conceptions. It amounts to this: We have in our minds the idea of a deity as necessarily existing, and this proves his existence. This mode of proof was advocated by Anselm of Canterbury, and has been substantially held by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and some of the followers of Wolf.* Kant refutes it in the form in which Leibnitz gave it:—"A being from whose essence existence follows, exists if he is possible; God is such a being, and he is possible; therefore God exists, by the very necessity of the con-

* St. Anselm maintained that "there is in man's mind the idea of infinite perfection, and that this implies a corresponding reality; this idea unites into one both logical and real universality." *Monologium. Lib. III.*—Descartes said, "a necessary existence is contained in the nature or concept of God, hence God exists." *Resp. ad Sec. Obj.*—Spinoza held that "our knowledge of the essence of God is involved in the true idea of him. *Ethic. III.*; and that God is *causa sui*, that is, a Being whose essence involves his existence, a Being whose nature cannot be conceived of but as existing." *Ethic. I. Def. I.*—Some of the Wolfians put the argument thus: "amongst the predicates contained in the conception of the absolute all-perfect Being, there is also that of existence; but existence is the completing of that which is possible; and the all-perfect Being is the sum and content of all that can be conceived as possible." *Chalybæus, Historische Entwicklung, u. s. w. Vorles. III.*—Leibnitz gives the following syllogism: "Ens ex cujus essentia sequitur existentia sequitur existentia, si possibile est, (id est, si habet essentiam,) existit.—Est axioma identicum demonstratione non indigens.—Atqui Deus est ens cujus essentia sequitur ipsius existentia.—Est definitio.—Ergo Deus, si est possibilis, existit, (per ipsius conceptus necessitatem.)" *Vid. Brief an Bierling; Korthold's Versammlung, B. IV. s. 21.* It is evident that these are only forms of one and the same ("ontological") argument. In each case the content of mere logical conceptions is substituted for reality and fact.

ception of him." Kant objects, that logical necessity between subject and predicate does not involve real necessity of the object; we cannot argue from our bare conceptions of things to their existence. It is true that the proposition, "the Deity is omnipotent," is a necessary analytical judgment. If the existence of the Deity be posited, his omnipotence cannot be denied; the two conceptions are identical; but it is the *existence* that you want to prove. If you suppose a triangle, you must suppose three angles; but this does not prove that a triangle must exist: so also with the conception of an absolutely necessary being. "It is absurd," says Kant, "to introduce into the conception of a thing which is to be thought solely in reference to its possibility, the conception of its existence."* If I think a being as the highest reality, without defect or imperfection, the question still remains whether this being exists or not? Kant holds that every form of the ontological or psychological proof rests on confounding a logical attribute with a real one. It is not enough that I conceive in thought a perfect being; the question remains, does such a being exist? We cannot but agree with our philosopher in rejecting the Leibnitzian argument; it is virtually a *petitio principii*. Even the purest form of the psychological proof, as given by Descartes, appears to us unsatisfactory, in so far as it is viewed apart from the general doctrine of causality. We are unable, however, to endorse our author's further remark, to the effect that "we have no means of knowing the existence of objects of pure thought; for that all our knowledge of existence belongs entirely to the sphere of our sensible experience, either immediately by perception, or by inferences which connect some object with perception: hence, though we cannot say that an existence out of this sphere is impossible, it is but an hypothesis which we cannot verify." Here, again, we come in contact with Kant's subjective idealism, and his doctrine of noumena. We should say, rather, that our perceptive and intellectual faculties bring before us facts—a state of things—which are possible only through the agency of a Divine cause, a cause which is to us an object of pure thought.

2. The *Cosmological* argument for a Deity, is what Leibnitz termed *argumentum à contingentia mundi*. The pure form of this proof, in the Fourth Antinomy, left it unsettled whether the necessary being were the world itself, or quite distinct from it. Here the reference is specially to a Divine Being, the all-real Being; that is, one who, as in the ontological argument, exists in such a way that, of all possible opposite attributes, one only of the two can belong to him. He cannot like man, for example,

* Kritik, s. 465. Leipzig, 1838.

be both wise and unwise, but only all-wise: he cannot be good and evil, but all-good: the predicates which belong to him admit no opposites. All is positive and unlimited reality. The ontological proof set out with the *à priori* conception of such a being (*Ens realissimum*), and then inferred his necessary existence: but the cosmological concludes in the reverse order from necessary existence to unlimited reality. Though Kant rejects both proofs, he thinks the latter more natural and plausible than the former. It is as follows:—"If something exists, an absolutely necessary being must exist: now I exist: therefore, etc. Here the minor proposition contains an experience (of my own existence), and the major appeals to a general experience." The argument, therefore, is not completely *à priori*, or ontological.* The proof proceeds thus; having arrived thus at an absolutely necessary being, we are led at once to a being of unlimited reality, as above explained, for the conception of an all-perfect being is essentially blended with that of a necessary being: hence a Supreme Being exists. Kant, on his own subjective principles, regards this whole argument as sophistical. It sets out with experience, indeed, but after the first step abandons that sphere, and then bases our supposed knowledge of what the necessary being ought to be—that is, a most real, all-perfect being, the Supreme—on mere conceptions, thus identifying itself at once with the ontological proof. True, says Kant, reason cannot help ascending from condition to condition, to the unconditioned and necessary; but in this attempt reason transcends all the bounds of experience, passes beyond all the phenomena of the universe (*κοσμος*), and deals with her own merely subjective conceptions as if they were objective. The transcendental principle, "every thing must have a cause," is a principle which has no meaning out of the sensuous world; we cannot apply it to *noumena*, the mere creations of reason. Reason, as in the fourth antinomy, tries vainly to complete the series of conditions, and then claims to have reached the unconditioned, mistaking the logical conception of totality for what is objective, contrary to the laws (categories) of the understanding, which are applicable only to phenomena. Here, as everywhere else, the *ideal* of pure reason is merely a regulative principle, wholly subjective, and the idea of a necessary being is only a method of bringing phenomena to the greatest possible unity.

We can only here repeat a former remark: what right has Kant to limit the application of his categories to phenomena?

* But might it not be replied to Kant, that the fact of having any conception of any kind, is at least so far empirical, that it is a fact of consciousness. Kant would say "I exist" is a phenomenon of consciousness; but is not the having a conception of an *ens realissimum*, no matter how gained, equally so?

and to say that the principle of causation has no meaning out of the sensuous world? In order to support this gratuitous theory, we have seen that he is obliged to make our whole consciousness, and even our very *ego* merely phenomenal! for he well knew that in the world of thought within us, we are perpetually conscious of changes, which we know to have been caused. We hold the cosmological proof of a Deity, so far as it maintains the necessity which reason is under to suppose an unconditioned cause of the whole series of natural phenomena in the universe, as a sound one: for otherwise we have no cause of the series, and we must go back *in infinitum*. This infinite regress is to us inconceivable; and it is much less difficult to suppose a necessary uncaused Being, incomprehensible as He must ever be!

3. The *Physico-theological* argument, as Kant terms it, is founded on the order and design exhibited to our view in the universe around us. Our author seems almost enthusiastic in his remarks on the "magnificent spectacle of order, beauty, conformity to ends—all the more eloquent that it is dumb"—which the creation presents to man. Here is "arrangement full of purpose, directed by a rational and disposing principle: there exists then a sublime and wise, a free and intelligent cause of the world, the unity of which may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relations existing between its parts. If this argument be shown insufficient, speculative reason has no remaining proof of a being corresponding to our transcendental idea." Our philosopher adds that this argument deserves to be spoken of with respect (*Achtung*), and is the oldest, clearest, and most conformed to common reason. He admits that philosophy can never rob it of its authority, nor inspire effectual doubt of it in the human mind. He denies, however, that this argument is sufficient of itself to prove the existence of a Supreme Being, since it is merely an introduction to the ontological proof, which alone could have had a claim to validity, had any proof of a Deity been possible to speculative reason. This physico-theological argument, he says, is built on our experience of the actual phenomena of the universe, but, as often remarked before, no experience of ours can reach an "*idea*;" its essence is to be beyond possible experience. How shall we bridge the abyss between natural causes and a Being which reason cogitates as apart from the whole series? "All laws respecting the regress from effects to causes relate solely to possible experience and the objects of a sensuous world, and apart from them are without significance." Besides, even the physico-theological argument, which is so generally received, says nothing of the *matter* or substance of the world. The contingency of its form and order on a higher cause are pointed to, but not its creation. This argument, then, adds our author, can

only claim to prove an architect of the universe, not a Creator—to prove the existence of a cause adequate to produce the order and harmony of nature, but not more. The extent and content of the universe, as known to us—the manifestation of power and wisdom—the apparent unity of design—are exceedingly great; but who can say they might not have been still greater, without limiting the very attributes they are brought forward to exhibit? Will any one then say that he is certain that these phenomena are exhaustive of our conception of absolute omnipotence, of absolute wisdom, of absolute unity in the cause which produced them? We see only evidences which must be as limited as our experience—with human experience the series of phenomena, however far regressive, must stop; on the path of experience we can attain no absolute totality of causation, yet reason vainly endeavours to leap the chasm, and arrive at the absolute, the unconditioned, the necessary being, possessing all possible reality of perfection. Thus this physico-theological argument falls back at once on the cosmological; which after all is but the ontological argument in disguise.

Kant might well anticipate that his transcendental æsthetics, which aim at chaining down all human knowledge within the limits of sensuous phenomena, would never be able to neutralize the argument for theism derived from the vastness, order, and adaptation which we see in the universe. We believe in unseen secondary causes in nature, causes which we only know by their effects; so we may say of the cause of nature itself and all its changing phenomena. With respect to our limited experience only leading us to the idea of a Being only relatively, not absolutely powerful, wise, and good—that is, limited and imperfect; we may remark that reason would seek a cause of this being, and nothing would be gained by not at once resting in the Infinite and Absolute. So with regard to unity, if we supposed a polytheism, we should want a cause of union in the unity of design which appears around us. God must always remain to us an awful mystery; but the mind must repose somewhere, and an infinite series and gradation of deities, multiplies all our difficulties at every step.

Kant, however, as we have now seen, only enumerates the arguments of speculative reason for the existence of a Deity, in order to prove that they are inconclusive. Neither the argument from our conception of an all-perfect being (ontological), nor that from contingent existence (cosmological), nor that from order and design (physico-theological), are sufficient, he says, to set the great question at rest. They are all based on a supposed inevitable inference from *thought*. They are all ultimately “ontological,” or, we may say, *psychological*, that is, the final result of

the conceptions of our minds as to what must be. We see marks of design in the universe ; and we cannot but think of a great designer : we see phenomena which form chains of causes and effects, contingent one on the other ; and the mind requires a first, non-contingent cause. We think a Being possessed of the reality of all possible perfection ; and we at once conclude there is one. But, says our sage of Königsberg, all these varieties (and there are no others), of the grand transcendental idea, are simply useful as directing, regulating, and systematizing our experience of the phenomena within and around us ; they prove nothing conclusive. We cannot affirm that these logical conceptions correspond to a real object. Naturally and inevitably as reason does and must aspire at so elevated a kind of knowledge, it is illusory, as carrying us beyond the bounds of experience.*

Though wholly differing from Kant as to the results of what he terms "speculative reason," we admit, in a general sense, that all arguments for the Divine existence may be traced to ontological, or, as we much prefer saying, psychological grounds, that is, to our mental constitution. The doctrine of causality is a necessity of this constitution ; and we hold that this principle, in some form or other, is mixed up with all valid arguments for the Divine existence. We would, however, here, for a moment, refer to the Cartesian method in the source, Descartes himself, using his own language in brief. First : "Necessary existence is contained in the nature or conception of God, hence God necessarily exists;" this is the common ontological argument. Secondly : "The existence of God is demonstrated from this alone, that the clear and distinct idea of Him is in us. The objective reality of this idea requires a cause which is not in us, and can only be contained in God himself." This argument, it is obvious, is purely psychological. Thirdly : "We ourselves who possess the idea of God exist ; and not having the power of self-conservation, from whom could I be conserved, or derive my existence, if there were no God, who has in himself all the perfections that are wanting in us ?† This latter argument is clearly from causation.

* Kant, in discussing the ontological argument, which professes to be wholly *a priori* and apart from experience, says : "I ask is the proposition *this or that object exists*, analytical or synthetical ? If the former you add nothing to the subject by affirming its existence." If synthetical, to deny the predicate is not a logical contradiction. Kant's aim is to show that real existence cannot be evolved from the mere thought of it. Chalybaeus remarks how nearly Kant here touched upon a principle of Hegel, who stated to the effect that the absolute (God) is that which thinks within ourselves ; thinking is identical with what is thought—the thought in us is the object itself. Thinking is itself the absolute, which therefore cannot be destroyed without destroying thinking itself. Chalybaeus, therefore, says that the ontological argument, as viewed by Kant, could only be admitted on the ground of absolute idealistic Pantheism. *Vid. Chal. Vorles. III.*

† *Vid. Princip. Philos. XIV., Meditat. III. V., Respons. ad Secund. Object.*

We repeat : we have long been convinced that every genuine argument in proof of a Deity must ultimately resolve itself into some form of the principle of causation, and is in an important sense psychological. Not that a clear and distinct conception, or logical proposition, must be objectively true simply because our minds are capable of thinking it ; for we can as readily form a conception of an Alpine range of glass mountains, as of the actual Helvetic Alps. But our minds are so constituted that we cannot help believing that all changes, all series of phenomena, all events, must have causation, and causation adequate to their production ; for a cause is not a cause, but as capable of producing its effect. The universe shows marks of design ; we cannot then help believing that it had a designing cause. We live in the midst of a system which is conditional, or made up of contingent events, a chain, each link of which depends on some former link : we cannot imagine any adequate cause of all but a necessary unconditioned being. We are capable of the idea of an all-perfect being (Descartes, with Leibnitz, would say it is "innate"), and whether this idea be strictly innate or not, what is its source ? Whence this range of thought ? Whence those faculties of man ? What is their ultimate origin and cause ? The reply is obvious.*

An appendix on the "Regulative Use of the Ideas of Pure Reason," closes the subject. Our author concludes, that these three "Ideas" merely serve to guide the understanding to the greatest possible unity of experience, as the understanding brings our sensuous experience to unity. Pure reason, however, after having presented to the understanding what seems an object, is found to have reached a mere phantom, of which no real existence can be predicated. The illusion is inevitable, and always will be so to each successive race of men ; but it is nevertheless an illusion. The facts of consciousness can be brought to unity only on the supposition that there is a me, a soul, simple, identical, personal. In cosmology, we can reach unity only by supposing a first term in the series of causes and effects. In theology we unite all that is real and perfect in existence, and suppose a Great Supreme. All, however, is hypothesis ; it may be so, but nothing is proved. Indeed, Kant alleges that to suppose these *ideas*, realities would check the progress of science, though in what manner certainly does not appear. Admit the possibility of a noumenal basis of psychology, of cosmology, of theology, still we know not, and cannot know anything whatever of noumena. All

* We may, at least, say that the notion of causation is intuitive in man, (in Cartesian phrase, innate—*née avec moi*.) All mankind have a belief in superhuman power ; though this belief may be polytheistic, fetish, and in various ways degraded—as well as monotheistic as in the Judaic and Christian theism.

our reasonings, then, on these subjects are entirely problematical, as to all that is objective. Such is the result of all.

What then, we ask, is this boasted faculty of reason on which we are so accustomed to-rely? It is little better than an *ignis fatuus*: it can neither tell us that we have a soul or a God—whether nature is all, or there be a mind and a free-will at the head of nature. It holds out false lights which we fly to for repose and security; but instead of attaining them, we find ourselves allured into a quagmire of scepticism. Reason, according to Kant, must be pronounced to be a faculty of illusion. Man, it would seem, had better be without it, excepting for one thing, that, notwithstanding it is so arrant a cheat, we can never, as he admits, rid ourselves of the spell which it throws over our minds, even when we know that it is a false guide: mankind will still, and for ever, believe that the objects to which it seems to lead are real. After all, however, Kant's distinction between understanding and reason is ill-founded and ill-supported: his "reason" is but *understanding*, which, according to his theory, overshoots what ought to be its goal.

Are we then to conclude that Kant is chargeable with atheism, or with scepticism as to natural religion, or even with psychological materialism? By no means; far from it. Having, as seems to us untenably, made pure reason a distinct faculty from understanding, in the matter of "ideas," (though he elsewhere confounds them,) he next attributes the solution of all that the three ideas relate to, to another faculty which he terms Practical Reason (*praktische Vernunft*). This is the faculty of moral theology and duty. Having in the *kritik* of Pure Reason, made a distinction between understanding and speculative reason, (though with little success, for they both aim at unity, and are really the same faculty under different names,) he exalts this new phase or faculty of reason above them both. It is at once to cure all the scepticism which speculative reason could not but produce on subjects the most profoundly interesting to man. Practical Reason is so termed because it involves absolute principles which regulate man's will and conduct. We have an imperative conviction of duty and moral law, therefore we must be free agents, having a liberty known in our experience. The moral world is then a reality, and the existence of freedom and a moral law in man implies a supreme moral lawgiver; but obedience to moral law deserves a happiness which is not attained in this world; there must, then, be a future state; and, for the realization of the *summum bonum*, the soul must be immortal. Kant terms the free-will of man, the existence of God, and a future state, the "postulates of Practical Reason."* He advocates a lofty morality,

* *Vid. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.*

and bases it on an *à priori* foundation—the “categorical imperative,” which is heard within man’s conscience, the voice of Practical Reason, commanding him to do right without making any allowance whatever for his passions and temptations. Thus Kant, though a sceptic as to what reason can teach us apart from duty and religion, is far from being such in what relates to morals and natural theology. But what becomes of his distinction between pure and practical reason? They are surely one and the same, so far as the term reason is applicable to our intelligence. From the moral law in man, Kant infers that man is free, that there is a moral lawgiver, and even that the soul is immortal, though the latter conclusion has rarely been regarded as belonging either to ethics or moral theology. The inconsistency of our philosopher in thus making two sorts of reason, has been widely admitted among his successors. His conclusions here, are the result of the operations of the same rational faculty which leads us to conclude that there is a God from the traces we find of him in nature; though Kant strangely regards the latter conclusion as merely subjective and hypothetical, while the former is objective and certain.

Our author closes the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* with a treatise on the Transcendental Doctrine of Method (*Methodenlehre*), “which he describes as the determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason,” and which treats of the Discipline, the Canon, the Architectonic, and finally the History of Pure Reason. The object is to unfold a plan or method in which the materials furnished in the previous discussion of sense, understanding, and reason, may serve for a finished metaphysical system of Pure Reason, in the most legitimate way; and this Transcendental Methodology is to be for Reason what Logic is for the understanding; but our space does not allow us to go into the details of this appendage to the *Kritik*.

Kant has a third “kritik,” that of Judgment (*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*), which proposes to inquire into the *à priori* elements involved in our judgments of the objects of sentiment or taste (the sublime and beautiful); and in our judgments respecting the adaptations, harmonies, and final causes which the phenomena of nature present to us. The former part of the work treats of æsthetical, the latter of teleological judgment. But we must not attempt to point out the bearing of this work on Kant’s general system; nor can we even enumerate here his many remaining pieces.

The philosophy of Kant presents a remarkable mixture of elements, sometimes opposed to each other, notwithstanding the consecutive order and concatenation of the parts of his system, amidst the labyrinthine details and doublings in which his doctrines

are often involved, in consequence of the involutions and the tedious sweep which too much characterize his style of writing. The system presents to us an idealism differing from that of Berkeley, in not absolutely denying the reality of external things, but denying that we know anything of them objectively. We may admit that Kant has elaborated, in a masterly way, the question regarding the subjective and the objective, and has more clearly than any of his predecessors pointed out the important truth, that we can only know what our faculties are adapted to receive, and that the constitution of our faculties is as great an element in our knowledge as the things that we can know; just as the spherical bullet is all that it is, not merely from its own material, but also from the mould in which it has been cast. Our knowledge is not the result of the presence of the object alone, nor of our faculties alone, it is the result of both combined. This, we say, is a great truth, and within certain limits Kant's theory of the subjective and the objective is a most valuable contribution to philosophy. But he carried it so far as to deny that things are in themselves what they appear to be to us. All that we see around us has no true objective reality, but only a subjective phenomenal reality existing solely in our minds. How, then, we may surely ask, do we know of the real existence of objects at all? And what is our guarantee against the Berkeleian hypothesis, which reserves not even a noumenal existence to the universe, but identifies it throughout with our own sensations and ideas? Or, again, how do we not know that Fichte is not right in asserting that the whole universe is but a dream, which the mind is always unconsciously creating for itself? According to Kant, since time and space are the conditions of all our experience, and are nothing but modes of our minds and not modes of objects, this complete ideality of time and space involves that of all sensible things as they are to us. Even what we term the laws of nature, as gravitation and the like, are only subjective and psychological; they are merely laws of our minds. This subjective idealism of matter, time, and space, involves the strange conclusion very obviously, that if all sensitive beings were to cease to exist, with no other change in the universe, there would remain no time, no space, no planets moving round the sun! Kant's admission of real objects (noumena) as the *substrata* of phenomena, has justly been regarded as out of harmony with his whole speculative system, which so obviously tended straight to an absolute idealism, that when the Kantian Fichte boldly threw away the conservative element of objectivity (*ding an sich*), and boldly plunged into an unqualified egoistic idealism, he received the appellation of "the consistent Kant." Our philosopher, it appears to us, went much too far in maintaining that we know nothing of things as

they really are, and thus divorced phenomena from the reality, which even he admitted is their basis. A man born blind cannot know colours, but he may know the other properties of matter as well as other people. There may be much in objects which we have not reached by our faculties, but does this prove that the properties we know are not a true manifestation of the reality? In so far separating phenomena from realities as he has done, and in denying that real objects have any relation to space and time, of which he has certainly offered no evidence that will at all bear out the assertion, his philosophy symbolizes in spirit with the *dogmatism* which he so often animadverts on as pervading the doctrines of other schools.

Moreover, by denying the immediacy of the knowledge which our faculties seem to give us, his system is not unjustly chargeable with containing an element of *scepticism*. There is no such world, in reality, as our senses tell us of—the real world is invisible, out of time, out of space, and we can predicate of it no quality. Our reason is not to be depended on, even when it tells us that we have a soul, and a God. It only leads us to a promised goal which turns out to be a mere illusion, fitter to be called a product of imagination than of intellect. Neither is seeing believing, with Kant, nor can the clearest and most inevitable dictates of reason and common sense be trusted. There is also an exaggeration of the *empirical* element in the philosophy of our author: for while one of its grand merits is, that it has elaborated the elements of thought *à priori* (in the categories), and has brought into deserved prominence what Locke too much neglected, the doctrine of axiomatic or self-evident truth (synthetic judgments *à priori*),* it refuses all application of these conceptions and judgments excepting to phenomena, of which we have “intuition” (*anschauung*), that is, which are presented to the sensuous faculty, to which even consciousness belongs. There is also to be found in Kant's theory of the world of sense something which has a kind of analogy with some parts of the *monadology* of Leibnitz; for what are the noumena which Kant admits as underlying all the phenomenal objects of nature? We are not allowed to assign to them any sensuous properties, not one of the categories must be fitted on to them; for these are only applicable to our phenomenal experience. We must not say that they are extended and divisible, or that they have parts. Kant asserts that Berkeley's idealism is fanatical (“*schwärmerisch*”), and that he himself has never doubted the real existence of things (*ding an sich*;) but how can he consistently, in his system, apply to noumena, even

* The reference, it will be understood, is here to the important subject infelicitously termed by the Cartesians “innate ideas.”

so much as either of the opposed correlate subcategories of Modality, existence or non-existence (*Daseyn—Nichtseyn*)?

In Kant's strenuous advocacy of *à priori* principles, again, we find a *Rationalism* which seemed to promise some good results. But these principles are all strictly limited, like the categories, to our sensuous experience; they belong to understanding as distinguished from reason; and they are invalid if we attempt to apply them to the loftiest objects of human contemplation. The only immediate exercise of reason which can be depended on beyond that of making syllogisms which prove no objective truth, is found in the moral faculty which has the technical name of practical reason, by which is understood moral judgment or sentiment, whose office it is to echo within us a moral law *à priori*, which is inseparably connected with free-will, and by which we know a moral lawgiver, a soul and its immortality, and a future state—now no longer mere ideals of imagination and hope, but realities on which we may rely. But here we again find the grand inconsistency of inferring conclusions by reasoning, under the cover of a variation in names, which have been denied as possible to reason. Kant's ethical views in themselves have been deservedly admired as the noblest part of his philosophy; for he founds morality on law and right *à priori*, apart from all human rules and interests,* and on the "categorical imperative" within us "thou shalt do this, thou shalt not do that." Nor can it be justly doubted that the moral nature of man furnishes one of the strongest arguments for a Deity.† But Kant wholly fails in attempting to set up a distinction between reason and reason; for when he deduces a lawgiver from the fact of a law, and so of the other "postulates," as he terms them, of practical reason, he is evidently arguing on discursive principles, or by inference; hence we should rather term them conclusions than postulates. Even in his giving a place to will and voluntary activity exclusively in his "Practical Reason," we see another considerable deficiency in the system. Will is not merely ethical, it is general; and it is evident that our faculties never act alone; will is obviously mixed up with all our mental processes.

Another source of blemish in Kant's intellectual system is that he too much neglected the important question of the *formation and origin of our ideas*. He sought to enumerate them; but he took for granted without investigation their source, mostly in the cur-

* Agreeably to the maxim of the Stoics, *φύσει και μη θέσει δικαίον*.

† Sir William Hamilton, in his Lectures recently published, says: "The assertion of Theism is that the universe is created by intelligence, and governed by moral laws. . . . The proof of intelligence and moral laws is the proof of a God."

rent logic. It is one thing to examine our knowledge as we find it grown to maturity in the mind of a philosopher; it is another to inquire into its infancy and development. Kant's whole system is too synthetical, though less so than those of some of his later countrymen; the analytical process of the rise and progress of our mental phenomena is little noticed.

Nevertheless, we do not hesitate to say that Kant is the greatest of the German philosophers. He had, at all events, a profound sense, generally, of the limitation of the human faculties, which cannot be said of his most celebrated successors: he better knew where to stop than they did. In some respects we think he stopped too soon. Speculatively he had too little faith in human reason. In other respects, and apart from his philosophical system, he sometimes had too much. He will always be read, for his critiques bear closely on all the grand points and difficulties of metaphysics; and even where he is wrong, he has much to say for his views. He gave an impulse to metaphysical study which has never ceased to be felt since his time; and he is the indispensable key to all the more recent German philosophy. His originality and ingenuity must always gratify, even when they are not attended with conviction. The *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is a study necessary to all who would fit themselves for a serious pursuit of the theory of truth and knowledge, and we can safely promise the student that if he wishes really to grapple with metaphysics, he will find the perusal a good test of his capability for this pursuit, and moreover as strong a gymnastic for the mind as any of the higher parts of mathematics.

We have just remarked that while, in one respect, Kant's "Reason," as we think, fell short of the knowledge due to it, in another respect its claims were too ambitious, and its decisions gratuitous. Kant's Rationalism is negative with regard to the most important objects which are commonly supposed to belong to reason; but in another aspect of it we find it assuming a very positive and dogmatic form. Everything in religion, according to Kant, is to be judged by practical or moral Reason, with little regard to historical considerations. While former philosophers, moralists, and theologians, had founded morality on religion, Kant reverses the order, and founds religion on morals. His principle is that our intellectual faculty (understanding and pure reason) cannot take cognizance of religious truth: it is above experience, above their function:—to judge of religious truth is the sole province of practical reason, which judges of all religious doctrine according to its own scope and aim—according to its agreement with the moral faculty of man. On this principle Kant takes a survey of Christianity, often in eloquent and admiring terms; but while not formally denying the facts of the

evangelical history, he lays no stress on them. He treats the historical element as in itself of little importance, as compared with the moral allegory, as it may be termed, which he everywhere finds in the narrative, exhibiting the *beau ideal* of human nature, which is to rise to its highest degree of virtue by faith in the dictates of practical (moral) reason. He does not deny Revelation, but he supersedes it by a moral theology, which he regards as the essence of religion. It is easy to see how a little further speculation in this spirit was sufficient to produce the doctrine of *myths*. It was the step taken by Kant, in regarding all doctrinal Christianity as essentially but an illustration or adumbration of a moral ideal, that led the way, as is admitted by the Germans themselves, to the subsequent antisupernatural Rationalism which has so widely prevailed in that country; so that, by a strange and lamentable paradox, the Christian church itself became the stronghold of infidelity.*

ART. III.—ON INFLAMMATORY AFFECTIONS OF THE BRAIN.

THE physician who attempts to penetrate the pathological mysteries of the central nervous system, is liable to be led astray by three errors, or sources of error, which have hitherto infected more or less researches into the morbid conditions of the myelencephalon.

He may adopt the notion (1), that functional perversions of the nervous system are not necessarily connected with or dependent upon organic changes; or (2), that it is vain to seek for anatomical diagnostics of such cerebral or spinal affections as may be accompanied by manifest alterations in the appearance or structure of the organs, and that we must be content with marking solely the functional phenomena which may occur. In either case he assumes that the limit of his then knowledge must be the limit of subsequent knowledge; that the difficulty before which he has recoiled rests in the question to be solved, and not in the method by which the solution has been attempted; or else that that method has reached its utmost perfection, and that, consequently the question must ever remain uninterpreted—than which conceptions, whether expressed or implied, nothing could be more disheartening to the eager student, nothing more prejudicial to the advancement of science.

* Vide Kant's *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*; also Bierdermann's *Deutsche Philosophie*, v. s. w. B. I.

The third error which is apt to prove a stumbling-block to the inquirer, differs from the two former ones in character, but is of no less importance. It is (3), looseness of *nomenclature*. We have in common use, as derived from phenomena, such terms as brain-fever, acute delirium, phrensy, apoplexy, muscular paralysis, convulsions, hemiplegia, &c.; as derived from anatomical characters, hydrocephalus, atrophy, or induration of the brain, congestion, softening, encephalic hæmorrhage, &c. Of these terms the phenomenal are vague in character, and several are apt to be applied to one and the same affection; the anatomical leave us in doubt as to the nature, presumed or probable, of the organic lesions they are supposed to designate. We cannot as yet apply to all lesions of the nervous system terms scientifically precise, but we can reject terms manifestly vague and incorrect, and which are used indifferently to express several morbid conditions.

Now M. Calmeil protests against these errors, and he endeavours to clench his protest by unfolding in two portly octavo volumes* the results of thirty years' study at the bed-side and in the dead-house of one large class of cerebral affections. So long a period of research would alone claim respect for the opinions to which it has given rise, apart from the weight which must attach to the honourable and high position which M. Calmeil holds among European physicians.

M. Calmeil treats in the work referred to, (1), of sudden and transitory attacks of encephalic congestion; (2), of acute delirium; (3), of incomplete general paralysis in its simple state and (4) as complicated with other affections; (5 and 6), of acute and chronic softening of the brain; (7), of recent local encephalic hæmorrhage; and (8), of non-recent hæmorrhagic centres.

These affections M. Calmeil classes with the phlegmasia (a), because the causes which give rise to them are commonly recognised as being irritant, as modifying the innervation of the blood-vessels, and abnormally exciting their activity; and (b), because he has, as he conceives, been able to demonstrate that they are all represented anatomically, according to their phases, either by enlargements of the capillaries, by plastic effusions, or by collections of granular products, such as pus globules, pyoid globules, molecular granules, agminated cells, and sometimes by the union of all these states and of all these abnormal products. (Vol. i. p. 7.)

Consistently with this view, M. Calmeil gives as terms scientific

* *Traité des Maladies Inflammatoires du Cerveau; ou, Histoire Anato-mo-Pathologique des Congestions Encéphaliques, du Délire Aigu, de la Paralyse Générale ou Périencephalite Chronique diffusée à l'état simple ou compliqué, du Ramollissement Cérébral, local, aigu et chronique, de l'Hémorrhagie Cérébrale, localisée, récente ou non récente.* Par le Dr. L. F. Calmeil, Médecin-en-chef de la Maison Impériale de Charenton, Officier de l'Ordre Impérial de la Légion d'Honneur. Paris. 1859. t. 2. 8vo.

cally synonymous with those by which we have designated the affections discussed, (1), sudden encephalic fluxions of an inflammatory character; (2), insidious forms of acute periencephalitis; (3), uncomplicated, and (4), complicated diffuse chronic periencephalitis; (5), acute, and (6), chronic local encephalitis without blood-clots; and (7), recent, and (8), non-recent local encephalitis with blood-clots.

These somewhat cumbrous phrases have at least the merit of indicating clearly the author's opinions upon the pathology of the diseases to which they are applied. In fact, by applying the commonly received doctrines of *inflammation* to the post-mortem appearances, general and microscopic, of many seemingly diverse diseases of the brain, he links them together in one great class, traces them to one and the same pathological change at the foundation, and thus attempts to simplify both the theory and practice of several of the most serious diseases to which man is liable. This track has been well beaten before in regard to the particular affections included in M. Calmeil's work, but to him will in especial belong the merit of the bold generalization which we have briefly noted.

It is not an easy task to do justice to M. Calmeil's voluminous treatise, more particularly as it is ballasted by numerous and elaborate reports of cases, which in themselves alone will prove an important mine for the cerebral pathologist. We shall, however, make an attempt to show to some extent his notions upon the several affections we have already specified.

I. *Temporary sudden Encephalic Congestion*.—Cerebral congestion cannot be satisfactorily studied in itself alone. It has so many bonds of connexion with other forms of cerebral diseases, both as to causation and results, that for its right comprehension it must be considered along with, as well as apart from them. The numerous points of resemblance which exist between temporary attacks of cerebral congestion and encephalitis, strike one at the first glance.

"These two pathological states manifest themselves almost constantly under the influence of the same causes; they effect equally the sensibility, intelligence, and movement; both have their seat in the capillaries of the encephalic nervous substance; both give rise to sanguineous suffusions; both appear to be excited by a modification, in every way the same, of the normal vitality; lastly, transitory and temporary congestive states are always apt to be transformed into durable inflammatory states, whilst long-standing and moderate encephalitis is always liable to be intensely exaggerated at any moment by most violent attacks of congestion. It is difficult to conceive, then, what reasons can be advanced against the classing of temporary congestive fluxions with true encephalitis.

"Nevertheless, temporary cerebral congestions have certain traits peculiar to them. In their mode of invasion, of manifestation of the divers functional phenomena and of the sanguine turgescence which accompany them; and in the promptitude with which the species of vital erethism which determines the accumulation of blood towards the encephalon at the moment of explosion tends to decline and subside, we have excellent characteristics by which to distinguish them from other inflammatory manifestations of the intra-cranial nervous centres, and it is precisely all these considerations which have compelled us in some sort to give them a paragraph apart; but our opinion is, that henceforth one can only apply to them the name of attacks of temporary encephalitis, or attacks of temporary inflammatory cerebral congestion." (Vol. i. p. 22.)

II. *Acute Delirium*.—This affection, commonly known as *acute meningitis*, is considered by M. Calmeil to be an *insidious form of acute periencephalitis*. Under this term would be apparently included the maladies, or one or more forms of them, heretofore known as acute phrensy, acute arachnoiditis, the meningitis of adults and infants, tubercular and epidemic meningitis, acute hydrocephalus, acute general paralysis, certain varieties of eclampsia, cerebral, ataxic, and even synochal fevers.

The symptoms which would lead to the suspicion that acute insidious periencephalitis exists, vary:—

"In one form the symptoms consist especially in certain disordered conditions of the intelligence, senses, and will; the functions of the circulation, respiration, and digestion.

"Some patients are a prey to obstinate sleeplessness, turbulent petulance, and irrepressible restlessness. They are incapable of attention, speak incoherently, utter detached words, vociferate, cry out without the power of restraining themselves, and without knowing why; and strike, with the head, the elbows, or the feet, their relatives and friends. Often they think they hear noises, which are but imaginary, or see frightful forms, which do not exist; and the liquids proffered to them are hastily rejected, as if they had an offensive taste or odour. The lips are dry, the tongue glabrous, red, sometimes covered with a brownish fur; the pharynx is filled with viscid mucus; when the patient consents to drink he swallows with difficulty, or he gulps the liquid at a draught; he becomes more agitated if the gastric region be pressed; and the bowels are either constipated or relaxed. The skin is hot, dry, or moistened with perspiration; the pulse is quick, full, or small; the respiration is irregular. Almost invariably, patients of this class must be fastened to their beds.

"In a second form the general symptoms are nearly the same as those we have detailed, and the acute encephalitis manifests itself equally by lesions of the intelligence and senses; but the hallucinations assume, as also the other delirious conceptions, the characters of partial delirium. Many patients of this class have a terrified aspect;

they endeavour to escape from the hands of those who have charge of them, as if their life were menaced; they expectorate around them without ceasing, as if to get rid of a suspected saliva; they oppose a vigorous resistance when it is attempted to place medicine in their mouth; they do not rest a second in the night, are assailed by menacing voices, by strange noises, and make in some instances desperate efforts to cast themselves down, or to kill themselves in some fashion.

"In a third form, the symptoms manifested by the intellectual and the sensorial functions continue the same; but these symptoms are complicated with certain abnormal states of the myotility. These lesions are scarcely appreciable, or they are very manifest. They are shown in a difficulty of speech, spasms of the facial muscles, startings of the muscles of the shoulders and arms, uncertainty of the gait, and in a graver degree, by paroxysms of epileptiform convulsions.

"Encephalitis, which takes this latter form, is rarely misconceived; nevertheless it is sometimes mistaken for a form of Saint Guy's dance, or for an attack of encephalic congestion." (Vol. i. pp. 145-6.)

The respiratory functions, and those of the alimentary canal, are frequently disturbed during the progress of acute periencephalitis, and this is important to be noted in practice. The prognosis of the disease is unfavourable. It rarely happens that the intelligence and health are completely re-established. Most commonly the affection passes into a chronic form, when it is known as *incomplete general paralysis*; occasionally it ends in simple permanent insanity.

The principal anatomical characters of the malady consist in the congested state, redness, and enlargement of the blood-vessels and capillaries, either of the cerebral pia-mater or of the cortical substance of the encephalon. To these lesions are quickly added, serous or sero-sanguinolent extravasations in the pia-mater, serous infiltration and softening of the grey matter of the turgescient convolutions, the formation either of pus-globules or of a certain number of minute punctated spherules, which seem as if they were diminutives of the large agminated cells that abound in old foci of chronic encephalitis. Acute meningoencephalitis, although of the same nature as insidious acute periencephalitis, differs from this affection in its anatomical characters; the latter exhibiting more inflammatory congestion, but less effusion of plasma and fewer fibrinous elements.

In fatal cases of acute insidious periencephalitis, it is frequently found that the mucous membrane of the stomach and the small and large intestines, is highly congested, and that there is an inflammatory condition of the pleura and pulmonary parenchyma.

"It is," says M. Calmeil, "evidently the co-existence of these inflammatory foci which has given rise to the opinion among certain

observers, that the delirium produced by the invasion of periencephalitis ought to be considered as purely a symptomatic lesion. This may be true in certain cases, but the cerebral accidents do not the less represent important material disorders, and we should reason ill to sustain that they are but the expression of a simple functional perturbation, and purely dynamic." (Vol. i. p. 149.)

III. *Incomplete General Paralysis*.—This malady, in its uncomplicated state, is best known under the term of *general paralysis of the insane*, or with mental alienation, a name originally given to the affection by M. Calmeil, but which he conceives to be now unfitted, since the true nature of the affection can be determined with some degree of certainty, it being a *diffuse chronic periencephalitis*.

This form of encephalitis has its special seat in the periphery of the cerebral hemisphere and cerebellum, but when it has endured some time, it tends to affect the deeper portions of the encephalon and the spinal cord, and sooner or later it occasions almost complete paralysis of movement, and disturbs the intelligence.

The post-mortem appearances which indicate the inflammatory character of the malady, are almost invariably readily appreciable by the naked eye. When chronic periencephalitis has lasted some time, the pia-mater is found highly congested, and there is effusion of serous, sero-fibrinous, and occasionally sanguinolent fluid into the areolar tissue which occupies the meshes of the membrane. Plastic effusions, distinguished by their opaline aspect, can also be traced along the track of the principal arterial branches. These alterations are most manifest in the interlobular fissures and the fissure of Sylvius, and they are more or less apparent according to the greater or less extension of the inflammatory action and its degree of activity.

If the pia-mater be raised from the nervous substance at a point where morbid action is marked, the congested vessels detached from the grey matter are found to form vascular and bleeding loops; and at the bottom of the principal anfractuositities the capillaries appear everywhere under the aspect of tortuous filaments. Often, however, the pia-mater cannot be detached without dragging along with it a portion of the nervous substance, which then appears excoriated, torn, red, and bleeding, more or less softened, indurated, or atrophied.

It is difficult to describe the aspect of those regions to which the pia-mater adheres intimately in the gravest cases of chronic encephalitis; but it may be said that the exposed surfaces of the brain and cerebellum have an ulcerated and ragged appearance, and that they are covered with nipples of greater or less prominence and depressions of different depths. In some instances the

tearing of the grey substance is very slight and superficial, and occurs only in spots of slight extent, which might without care escape the un instructed eye, but the structural lesions at these points differ only in degree from the more manifest changes alluded to.

The nervous substance surrounding and upon the borders of the apparent ulcerations will be found softened to a greater or less extent if it be examined with the edge of the scalpel. This diminution of consistence may extend deeply into the cortical layer; and it sometimes happens that while the central portions of this are softened, the superficial portion is hard and brittle.

When the substance of the convolutions is cut into, it is found to have a red, violet, or reddish tint, due to the accumulation of blood in the capillaries, or to changes undergone by extravasated hæmotosine. At times numerous specks of blood escape from the divided bloodvessels, and mark their state of injection.

Certain portions of the cerebral hemispheres are more affected by chronic diffuse encephalitis than others. The parts most commonly occupied by morbid changes are the convolutions bordering the fissure of Sylvius, those right and left of the falx cerebri, the convolutions which correspond to the inferior part of the anterior lobes, and the superior, lateral, and convex regions of the posterior and middle lobes. The superior and inferior faces of the cerebellum are the portions of that organ chiefly affected.

In general the inflammation extends only a few millimetres into the thickness of that portion of the nervous substance which is in immediate relation with the meninges, but when the inflammatory action passes beyond a certain degree of intensity, the grey matter of the corpora striata, the optic thalami, and the cornua Ammonis, is often affected.

When the white substance of the cerebral hemispheres and the cerebellum is cut into, it is found sanded, as it were, with bloody spots.

All these appearances point to long-continued inflammatory action, and microscopic observation of the affected tissues leads to the same conclusion.

Under the microscope, the vessels of the pia-mater are seen to be tortuous, red, and congested; while in the meshes of the tissue, and the effused serum occupying them, are found extravasated blood-globules, and a greater or less amount of granular cells and molecular granules. Pus globules are also occasionally met with. The capillaries of the pia-mater are frequently powdered, as it were, with a thick coating of fine molecular granules, which incrust them as a bark.

Many times portions of grey substance, as yet not softened, and from the centres of morbid action, have appeared, under a magni-

fyng power of from 400 to 450 diameters, as if furrowed by considerable vascular arborisations. Many of these vessels divided and subdivided, and ended by forming a species of plexus. Many of them also contained a column of liquid blood, others contained but a mass of heaped-up blood-globules, but all were noted by the enlargement of their calibre. Many capillaries were encrusted exteriorly with molecular granules, either whitish or blackish; others were as if strewed with small agminated cells, which abounded in the bifurcations formed by the branching of several vascular trunks. (Vol. i. p. 266.)

Where there was an evident defect in the consistency of the grey substance, on handling it in order to prepare it for examination under the microscope, a liquid was expressed, which contained blood-globules and the varieties of cells already described, but no disintegrated portions of nervous tissue. When the cortical substance was decidedly softened, the liquid which penetrated it was augmented in abundance; the nervous tissue was for the most part disintegrated and reduced into little particles of a greyish colour, and mingled with altered blood-globules; agminated cells were visible everywhere, but always small, and composed of very fine granules.

The foregoing morbid appearances, as well general as microscopical, according to M. Calmeil, differ in no respect from those we are accustomed to find in the majority of inflamed parts, and therefore the disease which gives rise to incomplete general paralysis, with lesion of intelligence, merits well the name of periencephalitis. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that "diffuse chronic periencephalitis of little intensity, and which is manifestly uncomplicated, partakes much more of chronic inflammatory congestion, accompanied by serous or sero-fibrinous extravasation, poor in fibrine, than of congestion with extravasation of a notable quantity of fibrinous plasma."

It must be added, that the vessels which ramify on the surface of the great ventricles and the capillaries of the grey substance of the corpora striata, optic thalami, cornua Ammonis, and the annular protuberance, exhibit more or less turgescence in individuals affected by diffuse chronic periencephalitis. We are, then, justified in believing that the inflammatory action tends to affect these different localities.

The vessels of the white substance, also, under a lens of slight power, are seen to be of greater capacity than is customary, and occasionally they are found to be covered with a species of granular incrustation.

We cannot follow M. Calmeil at length in his elaborate account of the symptoms of diffuse chronic periencephalitis, but his de-

scription of the precursory and initiatory symptoms is too valuable to be passed over:—

“In a very great number of subjects, the definitive outbreak of diffuse chronic periencephalitis is preceded by a period of remarkable functional aberrations which it is difficult to overlook. During this species of inflammatory incubation, it often happens that the moral and intellectual characteristics of the patient become completely changed. Sadness is replaced by gaiety which tends to extravagance; diffidence gives place to an assurance which is manifested in the gait, in the discourse, and which sometimes degenerates into a petulance of action and an exuberance of language fatiguing to those around. Some patients keep a-foot during the greatest part of the night, speaking, composing, writing, or constantly moving about, without undergoing any lassitude, whilst all around them are overcome with fatigue and sleep; others are irritable, apt to anger, vain, eager for novel emotions; others neglect their duties, their interests, in order to enter into speculations which the most ordinary good sense condemns, but which to them seem proper to double or quintuple their fortune; others become incapable of attention, forget those things which they knew best, hastening rapidly towards a complete fatuity; often, also, a commencing impediment in the pronunciation, mingled with a want of harmony and certainty in the movements, characterizes this period, of which the phenomena are susceptible of numerous other variations.

“In many cases, on the contrary, the invasion of diffuse chronic encephalitis is not first announced by any perturbation in the intellectual functions, but its first symptoms are manifested as the sequel of a comatose attack, caused by the sudden determination of an extraordinary quantity of blood towards the capillaries of the encephalon. . . .

“At the incontestable outset of this inflammation, those who have the pronunciation first affected manifest the impediment of speech most strikingly when they are intimidated or excited. Now and then, their lips are agitated by a species of undulatory startings when they open the mouth in order to express an idea, and then they pronounce imperfectly the final words which they seek to articulate well, and their tongue, when protruded, exhibits a vacillating movement; but these first symptoms are not always equally apparent at different hours of the day.

“Almost invariably, at the commencement of this phase of the inflammation, the muscles of the limbs and trunk suffer also from the effects of the changes going on in the periphery of the encephalon, and the following symptoms are noted:—The gait of the patients tends to become uncertain and irregular, their pace appears constrained, the movements of their arms imperfectly co-ordinated. The majority of them, nevertheless, continue to move about and attend to business, make visits, and go on foot, as if they had perfect health.

“Except in a few cases, lesions of sensibility are not easily demonstrated in this period of the disease; enfeeblement or loss of sight, either on one side only or on both sides, coincides, nevertheless, some-

times with the manifestation of the first symptoms of impediment of speech; the tactile sensibility is probably blunted, also, at this epoch, because the majority of the paralytic insane appear to be hardly conscious of their hurts.

"There is almost invariably lesion of the intellectual functions when diffuse chronic periencephalitis has acquired sufficient intensity to affect evidently the exercise of voluntary movements. All patients do not necessarily become delirious, all do not necessarily lose then their habitual judgment; but if they be submitted to an attentive examination, it will be discovered, nearly constantly, that there are, even when the inflammation is but slightly advanced, either signs of delirium, or irrational conceptions, or symptoms of commencing, or even already very manifest dementia.

"Maniacal petulance, exaggeration of ambitious ideas, predominance of a certain number of melancholic ideas, and powerlessness of the intellect, constitute the types of mental alienation or intellectual enfeeblement which require to be particularly noted in the first stage of diffuse chronic periencephalitis.

"The predominance of ambitious conceptions is most frequent in those individuals whose encephalic nervous centres are menaced, and, indeed, are already attacked by chronic and progressive diffuse inflammation. At first, the subjects who are suffering from this malady exhibit a certain degree of reserve in speaking of their dignities, their titles, their acquisitions, their riches, and the elevation which they expect, and they consider twice before they proclaim publicly and haughtily that they will presently be seated upon some throne. They fear still to encounter incredulity in endeavouring to pass themselves as illustrious conquerors, and in claiming those honours which are the apanage of great fortunes; but quickly all hesitation terminates, and they assert with a kind of joyous emphasis before every one that they have discovered mines of gold, that they possess mines of diamonds, that they are about to erect sumptuous palaces, that they surpass the greatest painters and poets in talent, that they can resuscitate the dead, create anew the world, and dismay armies by the force of their will. All these follies are uttered with quiverings of the voice which leave no doubt as to the impediment of the organs of speech, and they are accompanied with demonstrations of joy, satisfaction, and contentment, which form a marked contrast with the painful impression which they never fail to produce upon those before whom the delusions are manifested.

"The melancholic type occupies also an important place among the functional manifestations of diffuse chronic periencephalitis, and for a period of ten years this form of delirium has been manifested, in subjects suffering from the initiatory stage of general paralysis, nearly as frequently as ambitious monomania. Thus, among the individuals of whom we purpose to speak presently, there are found solely discouraging, fearful, and horrible ideas. Some imagine that they are about to be guillotined, others that they are calumniated, others that it is sought to poison them; all, or nearly all, have a wretched appearance and countenance, they refuse to speak, to do anything, to take their

food, and the efforts made in order to make them eat and to feed them are rarely followed with success, so that these paralytic lypemaniacs succumb generally much more rapidly than melancholics not paralysed.

"Hallucinations, more or less active and variable in their form, and affecting the sight, the hearing, and the visceral sensibility, are often added, among paralytics suffering from the beginning of diffuse cerebral inflammation, to the symptoms of mania, of ambitious monomania, and lypomania; but, in general, the hallucinations tend to disappear in proportion as the inflammatory action tends to induce disorganization of the cortical nervous element.

"Enfeeblement of memory and obliteration of the understanding, complicated or not with delirium, and with or without appearance of irrationality, ought to be accounted among the most insidious and most ordinary manifestations of commencing chronic periencephalitis. The importance of these phenomena cannot remain long misunderstood when the patients are the first to remark that they often forget dates and make omissions which they seek to avoid; when they complain of a failure of attention, either when they listen, or when they read, or when they write; when they become confused in their calculations and affirm that they have not the capacity necessary to superintend their domestic interests, to fulfil the obligations attached to their responsibilities, and to conduct properly their commercial and industrial undertakings.

"When these first signs of dementia are mingled with absurd conceptions, ideas of grandeur and opulence, frequent ravings, symptoms of exaltation, and sleeplessness; and the patients prove by the character of their actions that they no longer exercise any control over their decisions, it is still more easily and immediately perceived that the encephalic inflammation has already gravely compromised the organ of thought.

"It is easy, on the contrary, to be deceived with regard to the true state of the organs which serve for the manifestations of the understanding, when the subjects who manifest the first muscular symptoms of incomplete general paralysis in nowise fall from their accustomed tone of thought and feeling, when they do not cease to give proof of perfect rectitude and judgment, and they continue to manifest the bearing and conduct of sane men.

"Experience, nevertheless, has convinced us that these appearances ought to inspire only dubious confidence, because they serve nearly always to mask the invasion of dementia. When patients are examined with care who have at the time a difficulty in articulation and in governing their general movements, we may quickly assure ourselves, nearly always, that the operations of their understanding are less facile and prompt than was formerly the case, that their conversation has become barren, that they devote much time to make and correct their letters and in collecting their ideas, that they are irresolute, hesitate to begin anything, and have little confidence in themselves. On the other hand, the friends, the relations who have familiar intercourse with them, will tell you that they repeat without knowing it, that their principles are not so elevated as they have been, and that the

field of their conceptions becomes narrower and narrower. They are then upon the brink of dementia.

"I do not affirm that chronic periencephalitis always and necessarily (*qu'il soit dans l'essence*) affects the intellectual faculties, but I do not hesitate to affirm that it very rarely spares them. (Vol. i. pp. 274-278.)

We cannot follow further in detail M. Calmeil's carefully wrought description. But we would add, from his summary, that incomplete general paralysis especially attacks males, young, robust, sanguine, and with a well-developed muscular system; it is apt to be induced by all causes which exercise an irritating effect upon the nervous system; after some months' duration (twelve or fifteen) it often causes a general powerlessness of all the muscles, and, more or less, complete abolition of the intellectual functions; it often manifestly affects the senses and the transmission of tactile and visceral impressions; it is occasionally aggravated suddenly by intercurrent congestive attacks, and its progress is at times interrupted by remissions; it is essentially grave in character, but its degree of gravity depends in part upon the extent of surface which it affects or the depth to which it penetrates in the encephalon.

Is incomplete general paralysis a hopeless disease? When the malady is fully formed, the weight of authority is in the affirmative. M. Calmeil's opinion is very far from encouraging.

"Physicians who have observed but doubtful cases, or but few instances of diffuse chronic periencephalitis easily confound the remissions of this affection with cases of cure; but those who have continued their observations over a greater period than a year, and who have studied the course of periencephalitis in great hospitals, are nearly unanimous in proclaiming the rarity of true cures. We ought, then, to feel glad if after many able combinations we have succeeded in retarding notably the progress of the disease, or in bringing about intermissions of some duration." (Vol. i. p. 286.)

The chief points in the treatment of the disease are as follows:—

Removal of the patient to an asylum, or to a commodious house in the country, where he may be entirely separated from the influence of business or family cares; a generous, but not rich or stimulating diet; diluent and saline drinks; if young and robust small general and local bleedings, which are to be repeated at intervals, according to the effects produced upon the symptoms—ordinarily at intervals of one or two months; warm baths, prolonged during three, four, or five hours, with the application of cold to the head or the douche, according to the degree of maniacal petulance or of fury; hot pediluvia with sinapisms, or pediluvia with chlorhydric acid, and purgatives.

The activity of antiphlogistic measures must be diminished if the loss of memory, the obliteration of the mental faculties, and the difficulty of speech augment, notwithstanding the remedies used, and recourse must be had to setons, blisters, or cauterization.

So soon as indications of serous infiltration, or softening and disintegration of the brain, become evident, all curative treatment should be renounced. The physician's duty is then perforce confined to directing such hygienic care as may best conduce to the comfort of the patient, except when furious exaltation supervenes as a sequel of intercurrent congestion, which must be met by such a combination of the measures already mentioned as experience in each case alone can determine.

Diffuse chronic periencephalitis does not always run a simple course. Often it is complicated by alarming apoplectic symptoms, coma, paroxysms of convulsion, or by the paralysis tending to manifest itself more markedly in certain of the limbs. These phenomena are to be attributed to the supervention of inflammatory and congestive recrudescences; the course of the chronic inflammation is, in fact, traversed by true accessions of acute encephalitis. These recrudescences may be localized in any portion of the encephalon, and their seat after death is readily distinguished by the usual products and effects of inflammation. The complications must be combated by a well-regulated antiphlogistic and hygienic treatment.

IV. *Softening of the Brain.*—M. Calmeil treats of *acute* and *chronic* cerebral ramollissement, the former being distinguished as *acute*, the latter as *chronic local encephalitis without blood-clots*, seated under the form of circumscribed foci, either on the surface, or in the depths of the encephalon.

Acute local encephalitis without clot is brought about by the same mechanism as the great cerebral hæmorrhages, but it differs from the latter in this respect, that the congested capillaries pour into the interstices of the nervous tissue plasma and a few blood globules, but not an enormous quantity of blood itself. The study, then, of this form of encephalitis will include the so-called sanguineous infiltrations, ramollissements of *every colour*, recent abscesses, whether encysted or not, these as well as other cerebral lesions, originating in, and being consequences of, localized inflammatory action.

The changes manifested in the inflamed cerebral tissue in different stages of local encephalitis may be summed up thus:—

(1.) Congestion and redness of the capillaries. (2.) *Hepatisation* of the inflamed nervous substance. (3.) *Softening*. During the period of *hepatisation*, the inflamed centre presents, under the microscope, besides repletion of the capillaries, extravasated and granular elements; during the period of *softening* the nervous

substance is found to be permeated with serum and fibrinous exudation, softened, stuffed as it were, with spherical granules, large granular cells, and occasionally pus globules; and the nervous tissue itself is found to be more or less broken down. True *abscess* of the brain differs but little from ordinary foci of *ramollissement*, the number of pus globules in the former being much more considerable than the number of large granular cells within their detritus.

Acute local encephalitis may occur in one spot only of the cerebrum or cerebellum, or it may have many seats, either on one or both sides of the encephalon. The morbid action may not occupy a space larger than a pellet, or it may equal in volume an almond or an apple, or it may even extend to nearly the whole of one hemisphere.

Chronic local encephalitis differs from the acute in the duration or intensity of the inflammatory action, and after death, cysts filled with pus, granules, agminated cells, or a melange of these matters, cicatrices, or sundry membraniform structures, formed from the plastic fluids effused into the inflamed parts, are often met with.

V. *Cerebral hæmorrhage*.—Sanguineous apoplexy, interstitial cerebral hæmorrhage, according to M. Calmeil, is occasioned by the same causes, and is developed under the same circumstances, as every form of encephalitis. It ought, therefore, to be considered as an acute local encephalitis with extravasation of blood. It resembles in almost every particular acute local encephalitis without hæmorrhage, or local cerebral ramollissement, differing from this affection chiefly in the extravasation of blood. It may occur at a point already softened and affected with local acute encephalitis, or it may take place in a spot free from all inflammatory action. In effusions of the first character which prove suddenly fatal, the granular products of inflammation are found in abundance in the softened nervous tissue, but not in the recent coagulum; in those effusions which take place in a locality free from all anterior inflammatory action, and during the commencement of the period of congestion, there does not exist at the seat of rupture, neither in the torn tissue nor in the blood, any granular element. Hæmorrhagic foci, seven or eight days old, resemble in almost every respect foci of ramollissement without clot; they differ little except in the volume of the coagulum contained in them. It is not necessary in order that a hæmorrhagic focus should form in the cerebrum, that the nervous substance should invariably have been previously softened, but it is occasionally affected at the moment of effusion by softening more or less manifest. The diminution of consistency in the nervous substance which is found immediately after the formation of an effusion during the period of congestion, depends solely upon the

presence of effused serous and fibrinous liquids, because no granular cells are present, and the tissue is not much disintegrated; but the softening which supervenes a few days after the formation of the coagulum is characterized by an abundance of granular cells and the complete disintegration of the nervous fibres.

On the changes which occur in the seats of cerebral hæmorrhage, when this does not quickly compromise life, or of the *non-acute stage of local encephalitis* with extravasation of blood, we shall not dwell, although these changes and the symptoms they give rise to are discussed at length by M. Calmeil.

Our main object has been to convey some notion of M. Calmeil's pathological opinions, for these constitute the most novel portion of his work—we will not say most interesting, or most valuable, since this would be a moot point with many persons. For there are some who will doubtless regard M. Calmeil's admirable account of the symptoms and progress of the affections of which he treats as of greatest value; others the numerous and careful reports of cases and summaries of facts which he gives. Be this as it may, M. Calmeil's pathology has an immediate and important bearing upon his practice at the bed-side,—it in fact governs that practice entirely; nay more, it is requisite to know M. Calmeil's practice, in order fully to appreciate his pathology. He discusses the treatment proper to each of the cerebral affections of which he writes in its proper place apart, and at the termination of his work he considers at length the treatment proper to be pursued in inflammatory affections of the brain.

Let it be premised here that the causes which predispose to, or determine idiopathic cerebral affections, are the same under every variety of form of those affections. Hereditary predisposition plays an important causative part in many instances; men with voluminous hearts, well developed muscular systems, full blooded, and of hasty, overbearing, passionate character, are liable to these maladies. Males are more liable than females, but the liabilities to the different forms of inflammatory cerebral diseases, differ at various periods of life. Powerful emotions of every kind are apt to determine attacks; so also and very markedly the imbibition of spirituous liquors. Active exercise under a hot sun and certain not well-defined meteorological changes, are also influential causes.

A knowledge of these causes forms the basis of a well-considered preservative treatment, and M. Calmeil particularly insists on the importance of such a treatment in the case of children whose parents and ancestors have shown a marked predisposition to head affections, and who themselves have suffered from any cerebral disturbance in infancy, or manifested precocity in childhood. Such children should be pursued by a carefully regulated

hygiene, particularly in their school days, and much judgment should be exercised in the selection of a profession for them. It is not necessary, however, to enter into particulars respecting the methods of care which should be had recourse to; these can hardly be overlooked as soon as the predisposing and exciting causes of the diseases are rightly apprehended.

The treatment to be adopted during the initiatory stage and culmination of encephalic inflammation, should be, according to M. Calmeil, essentially antiphlogistic. His sheet-anchor is the lancet. Full and reiterated bleedings from the arm, according to the effects produced upon the symptoms, and the age, and general condition of the patient; while, when the lancet may be inadvisable, or, as a concomitant of it, the cupping-glass and leeches are to be freely used. Blood-letting in fact, general and local, is the great remedy, and its use is to be governed by those rules which are set forth in every work on practical medicine. Along with blood-letting purgatives may be used, and the rigid and careful application of cold (particularly ice) to the head, vesicatories, with diluent and saline drinks, complete the antiphlogistic scheme requisite in cerebral affections characterized by inflammation. Compression of the carotids may be used with benefit during convulsive paroxysms. The diet, of course, must be simple, plain, and non-stimulating, and steadily watched.

In the chronic state of these affections carefully regulated blood-letting, general or local, must be made use of either to combat the progress of the affection, or to check or overcome recrudescences, together with purgatives, frequent use of the warm bath, immersing the patient three, four, or even five hours, cold being applied to the head at the time; vesicatories, setons, and moxas, and a carefully regulated diet.

Now the treatment recommended by M. Calmeil clearly indicates (what, however, is very apparent from the general tendency of his reasoning) the vice of his whole book. He speaks of inflammation as if it were a clearly defined pathological state, subject only to variations in degree of intensity, and consequently to be combated invariably by the same means applied with different degrees of vigour. He does not seem to recognise, or he lays slight stress upon, the modifications which inflammatory action undergoes from an impoverished or vitiated state of the blood, or of the system generally, and that the indications of treatment differ much, under these circumstances, from those applicable to inflammatory affections of a sthenic character. He, in fact, governs his treatment of so-called inflammatory affections of the brain by a preconceived, but limited idea of the nature of inflammatory action, and he does not appear to us to recognise sufficiently the extent to which the character of the morbid change may be affected by a co-existent abnormal condition of

the system. Yet it can hardly be questioned that such a condition, whether in the form of Bright's disease, scrofulous taint, febrile infection, or anæmia, modifies very considerably the progress, results, and general character of inflammatory cerebral affections, and that it should exercise a most important influence upon the nature of the treatment adopted. Upon this question, so clearly recognised by English physicians, we need not dwell, otherwise than to point out that it is not sufficiently considered by M. Calmeil.

Notwithstanding, however, this, to us, serious drawback, we would say, in conclusion, that M. Calmeil's treatise, from the vast amount of valuable matter which it contains, and from the distinguished character of the writer, claims a very honourable position in medical literature, and it will form a fitting companion to Lallemand's anatomico-pathological researches on the encephalon.

ART. IV.—TRANSITORY HOMICIDAL MANIA: WHERE DOES REASON END OR MANIA BEGIN?

BY M. LE DR. A. DEVERGIE.

(*Read before the Imperial Academy of Medicine, Paris.*)

ON the 10th of November, 1854, a young man aged nineteen years, the son of one of the principal merchants of Bordeaux, dined with his father, to whom he was much attached, and his stepmother, whom he had regarded from his ninth year first with dislike, and subsequently with gradually increasing aversion.

The dinner, at which several friends should have been present, passed without any unusual incidents. At dessert, young Julius quitted the table, and went to the drawing-room in order to warm himself, but a fire had not been lit there. He then ascended to his chamber and took his fowling-piece and straw-hat, for the purpose of having a stroll in the country, as was his wont, when an idea of suicide, which had tormented him for a month, suddenly occupied his mind, and as suddenly was changed into the thought of *killing his stepmother*.

He threw aside his fowling-piece, went to his brother's room to seek two pistols which had been charged three weeks, although he was ignorant in what manner they were loaded, and at the same time he had pistols of his own that he had charged the day before.

He descended into the dining-room, approached his stepmother, still at table with her husband, and discharged one of the pistols at her temple.

Madame X—— sank down, and the young man recoiling, reated motionless against the wall. His father rose to seize him, but a feeling of self-preservation being aroused in Julius, he fled across the kitchen, through the midst of the terrified domestics, who had run at the sound of fire-arms, and he cried, "*I am a madman—an insensate! I have killed my stepmother!*"

He left the house, surrendered himself to the commissary of police, and related to him the circumstances of the deed.

Before and until this murder the life of this young man had been regular, indeed exemplary; he avoided youths of his own age, or associated but little with them, notwithstanding his great fortune. He fulfilled all the duties of a son and the affection of a brother, and his occupation was regular in a banking-house.

If the deed which the young Julius committed was an act of madness, there must have been a *brusque*, rapid, and instantaneous passage from reason to insanity, and an instantaneous return from insanity to reason. This, then, would be a very clear example of the species of insanity which has been termed transitory.

Where, then, was the limit in this case between reason and madness? Through what grades of change did the intellectual faculties pass to bring about such a transition, and to attain extremes so opposed? This is what we have to ascertain. In the meantime it may be said that the jury of the imperial court at Pau, before which the case was tried, adopted the opinion which MM. Gintrac, Delafosse (of Bordeaux), Calmeil, Tardieu, and myself entertained, and considered the young Julius as not possessing his free-will at the moment of committing the deed, since the court has pronounced a verdict of acquittal, pure and simple.

This judgment is very different from an opinion which was expressed at a period not very far distant, by M. Dupin, at that time advocate, who wrote in these terms to the then prefect of police:—

"Monomania is a new resource of medicine, but it will prove too convenient, at one time to tear the culpable from the just severity of the law; at another, to deprive arbitrarily a citizen of his liberty. When they might not be able to say 'he is guilty,' they will say, 'he is mad,' and Charenton will replace the Bastille."

This was written in the month of March, 1826, in connexion with the case of an individual supposed to be detained unjustly at Charenton. Now, this person had had, from 1804 even to the time of which we speak, a fixed idea that he was loved by all the French princesses. He sent to them, or threw into their carriage, letters, in which he recounted his amorous remembrances. He had been five times under arrest; yet he possessed fully his intel-

lectual faculties upon any other subject, and he was a man of learning; and thus it happened that M. Dupin was led into error.

The afore-mentioned judgment differs, also, very considerably from an opinion given at that time by one of the most eminent magistrates, who said to Marc, in reference to a case similar to that tried before the Imperial Court at Pau:—" *These men are madmen; but it is necessary to cure their mad acts in the Place de Grève.*"

The science of mental alienation has, then, made very great progress, since its doctrines have penetrated even the minds of persons the least acquainted with medicine, and have at once become understood and comprehended by them.

What data has it furnished?

What precepts has it laid down?

These data and these precepts, can they guide the physician in the appreciation of facts, so as to make now evident that which formerly was denied absolutely, since these ideas were at one time rejected entirely by public opinion? It is this that we propose to inquire into; and in order to show how greatly we differ from the past, we shall make an appeal to it.

At the commencement of the present century, Pinel had cast upon the science of mental alienation a light most fruitful for the future. His pupils, Esquirol, Ferrus, and Falret, and the pupils, also, of the last-named men, Georget and Leuret, studied and observed those varieties of insanity which until then had escaped the physicians of that epoch. Marc, following closely upon these so-weighty studies, collected from the annals of justice all the facts which could be grouped around these new ideas.*

Then appeared, in 1825, those remarkable articles of Georget, upon many criminal processes, in the *Archives Générales de Médecine*,† where he assigned and specified the part of each of the intellectual faculties, seeking thus to define them clearly and to establish their respective attributes.

Haste we to say, that Esquirol on the one part, and M. Ferrus on the other, have added lustre to the clear and lucid inquiry of Georget by their learned lectures, their works, and their profoundly elaborated articles in the *Dictionnaire des Sciences Médicales*‡

Then, also, arose those animated discussions between physicians, magistrates, and advocates, upon monomanias; but the acts of transitory madness were but slightly glanced at.

* Marc: *De la Folie, considérée dans ses Rapports avec les Questions Médico-judiciaires*. Paris. 1840. t. i.

† Tomes viii., x., xi., xii., xiii., and xiv.

‡ See Esquirol: *Des Maladies Mentales considérée sous les Rapports Médical, Hygénique, et Médico-legal*. Paris. 1838. 2 vols. in 8vo.

By a coincidence entirely fortuitous, there had occurred, within a very short space of time, the processes of Leger, Feldtmann, Lecouffe, Jean Poire, Papavoine, and Henriette Cornier, which had opened a wide gate to psychological discussions—discussions which contributed not a little to ensure the prevalence of the principles which had been laid down by the masters of the science.

Thus, in the short period of thirty years or more, we have passed from incredulity, nay more, from the most profound ignorance respecting the varieties of insanity, to an advancement so immense, that at this day magistrates and juries have accepted as clearly established, not only the doctrine of delirious ideas upon a solitary point (*monomania*), but also of transient aberrations of the reason, which, in the eyes of the world, transformed, in times past, the upright man into a criminal, so much the greater that he had carried his perversion of heart even to the extent of hiding during many years, under conduct the most irreproachable, the villany of his disposition.

It is no longer advocates who appeal to science to aid their clients, but magistrates, struck by the enormity of the crime and the feeble interest which has guided the perpetrator of it, address themselves to skilled men, and interrogate them upon the criminality or non-criminality of the deed.

Nevertheless, if monomania, or delirious madness upon a solitary point, with its diversities, its varieties of *haughty*, *homicidal*, *suicidal*, *incendiary*, and *contagious* or *imitative* monomania, are generally accepted by magistrates and juries as implying a fixed delirious, irresistible idea, which fetters the moral liberty, and dominates it entirely, it is necessary to say that it is especially in those cases in which the monomania is accompanied with hallucinations, and of which a fact quoted by Esquirol, among many, affords us a striking example.

A young girl in the Salpêtrière never saw Esquirol approach her without seeking to kill him. Being attacked with sickness, she was placed in the infirmary. One day, preserving the greatest quietude, she suffered Esquirol to approach her, when raising herself hastily upon her bed, she seized him by the cravat in order to strangle him. She was afflicted with homicidal monomania, accompanied with *hallucination*, because she believed that in Esquirol she saw the lover who had deceived her.

Putting aside cases of homicidal monomania, complicated with hallucinations, doubt is still unquestionably entertained by certain magistrates and men of the world, especially when trusting to their own judgment, whatever in other respects may be their capacity and learning. The following fact related by Dr. Rennes, (of Bergerac), will show the grave errors into which magistrates

may be led when they do not think it necessary to consult physicians.

B——, a rigorously upright man, loving his mother, and encompassing her with affectionate attentions, married a cousin; but he declared shortly after his marriage, that if he had any children he would desert them. Judge then of the reception which Dr. Rennes received when, at a later date, being called upon to attend the young wife in childbed, he went cheerfully to announce to B. the happy deliverance of the mother! Some time after she was sent back to her family, as well as the infant, which he quickly sought to disinherit.

The mother of B. died. Being ready of hand, and besides very ingenious, this man fabricated a coffin of wood, and one also of lead, and he enclosed in them the corpse of his mother, and shut up the remains in a dark room in his own house. Soon after he believed himself to be surrounded by spies and enemies; and he never went out unless armed to the teeth, when he spread terror around him. Subsequently he thought that it was attempted to poison him; then he bought his provisions himself, prepared his own food, and waited upon himself, and he would not permit any domestic to enter into his house. He collected there powder, lead, guns, and combustibles, ready to defend himself against invasion, and to burn his house, intending to blow out his brains in the midst of the flames.

He sold an estate that was left to him, and the 40,000 francs which he received for it he carried constantly about with him in the crown of his hat, so that nothing might revert to his daughter.

A year passed on, this disordered state of the intellect continuing. All-Saints' day arrived. B. had been over-excited. He met a servant who a year before had been obliged to hide himself, in order to evade the consequences of B.'s vengeance. He fired upon him twice with a fowling-piece, two balls traversing one of the domestic's arms. Another servant who ran to help the wounded one was attacked by B., who cast him down and shattered a leg.

Then the madman entered his house, seized a torch, hastened to the barn of his nearest neighbour, and set fire to it, and afterwards ignited his own house.

Every one hastened to give help, but B. fired eight times successively upon those who approached both the burning buildings. He uttered at each report of his gun strident cries, which resembled the outbursts of an infernal laugh.

Ere long the burning of his own house made progress; an explosion occurred, the accumulation of powder having ignited; and lastly, this furious maniac disappeared in the flames.

And in the midst of the rubbish what remained intact?
Solely the coffin of his mother !

This was a man in whom the leader of the bar had not been able two months before to recognise the signs of insanity. Indeed, in his calm moments, and beyond the circle of his fixed ideas, B.'s conversation was most consistent. Even his speech possessed a certain charm, and he discussed indifferent subjects wonderfully well. Truly intelligence and sagacity are not sufficient to enable one to judge if a brain be healthy or diseased ; it is necessary, in addition, to have studied individuals suffering from every variety and form of insanity.

An immense progress has then been realized by the habitual adoption of medico-legal examinations, in reference to the question of mental alienation, always assumed in doubtful cases.

And if we go back to the species of alienation which forms the subject of this article, transitory insanity, may we not consider that it is a true triumph for science to have been able to obtain the acquittal of the young man of Bordeaux, whose apparently criminal act we have already recorded ?

Those physicians who have devoted themselves to the treatment of insanity admit that, besides dementia, mania, and monomania, there exists an instantaneous, transient insanity, which they call *transitory*, and as the result of which an individual, until then, in appearance, at least, of sound mind, commits suddenly an homicidal act, and returns as suddenly to a state of reason.

Seek we, then, to define what ought to be understood by *transitory insanity*. It is not that species of insanity to which Marc and some other physicians have given the name—that is to say, the insanity which shows itself occasionally among epileptic individuals, or among those given to drunkenness ; at least we do not understand the term thus. When the *delirious* act is manifested as a sequel of epilepsy or of drunkenness, insane actions precede the criminal deed, and, after its accomplishment, traces of delirium persist for a certain time.

Is that transitory insanity which supervenes as a sequel of persistent emotions, since persistent emotions lead to monomania ? The name does not apply here. Murder, committed under the influence of *fanaticism, pride, hate, jealousy, choler, or love* has a *known* permanent cause, which acts incessantly upon the moral freedom, and which, in the end, dominates and vanquishes it, bringing about a criminal act.

Violent passions stupify the judgment, but they do not destroy it ; they lead the mind to extreme resolves, but they do not deceive it. In a word, the man then acts under the influence of propensities which end by governing, more or less, his

actions. But his *conscience* deceives him not. He knows rightly that which he does; he understands the bearing and the consequences. Solely led astray by the passions which have dictated his acts, he trips up his conscience.

Bellart has said that, by assimilating the passions to mental alienation, immorality is justified: it is placed upon the same level as calamity. The man who acts under the empire of passion has commenced by suffering his will to become depraved. The man who acts under the influence of calamity obeys, as a machine, a force, the power of which he cannot contend with.

Finally, it is not well to apply the term *transitory homicidal insanity* to that condition of mind which is developed under the influence of a nature originally depraved, and for which neither *education*, nor *precept*, nor *example*, nor *association*, nor even a *rigid social position* has done anything, but which has been entirely neglected by the individual thus unhappily born, as he falls little by little into infamy.

If, in some of these cases, the motive to action does not justify the action itself, doubt may arise in the mind of the physician; but the criminal act should not then be designated transitory insanity, because it has been gradually induced by social circumstances of an essentially vicious nature. All the causes that we have enumerated, taken singly or in their totality, explain perfectly, in a medical point of view, the delirious idea. Morally and legally speaking, they explain also, up to a certain point, the sudden eruption of an act of delirium; and they would warrant, in certain cases, the admission of attenuating circumstances. But, in addition to insanity developed under the influence of the causes named, it is possible to show another form of alienation to which the term *transitory insanity* ought to be applied—that is to say, a form to the ordinary observer without apparent premonitions, and without appreciable, proximate, or remote cause, manifested as suddenly as the explosion of powder, and ceasing completely with the criminal act. Is this not the history of the young man who has formed the subject of this article, and does not the brief relation which we have made of his reputed criminal act depict sufficiently the species of delirium to which we wish to see attached the denomination *transitory insanity*?

No incentive to the deed, either in passions not sufficiently repressed, or in an acquired fixed idea; antecedents and manners irreproachable; absence of hallucinations; outbreak of insanity manifested by a criminal act, and instantaneous return to reason as soon as the deed was accomplished—these are, according to us, the characters of transitory insanity. Nevertheless, the word *transitory*, perfectly just for the world in general, in the sense that the madness is but transient, though the deed done be of the

most criminal description, does not appear to me sufficiently exact for the physician. Individuals of the character described ought not to be considered of sound mind when an idea of crime has suddenly risen within them, when this idea has constituted with them a dominant and irresistible thought, stronger than *the Me*, stronger than the will.

Antecedents of family, divers acts of social life, propensities, tastes more or less perverted, tendencies to taciturnity, ideas of suicide, are often manifested for many years before the explosion of the irresistible criminal idea. So that, to say that *the passage from reason to insanity* can be hasty or instantaneous in the opinion of the physician is to commit an error. This state has prodromata, as every malady has; and, according to us, *if these prodromata do not exist*, it would be impossible to see in the reported criminal act an act of insanity.

Moreover, M. Lelut (*Recherches des Analogies de la Folie et de la Raison*, à la suite de son ouvrage *Le Démon de Socrate*, p. 318) has said, with much truth, in regard to this species of insanity, that at its commencement, and in the mental tendencies which are the predisposing or constitutional cause of it, that insanity is still reason, as reason is already insanity (*la folie est encore de la raison, comme la raison est déjà de la folie*). This constitutes, for the physician, one of the first elements towards the solution of the question.

A second datum of great interest, in a medical and moral point of view, is the disproportion which exists between the enormity of the offence and the motive or interest which has led to its committal.

If we examine all the criminal processes which have been instituted on the occasion of similar offences, and which have, moreover, been diversely adjudicated upon, but which, for the physician, have been acts of madness, it will be seen that the motive which led to the committal of the deed was not, so far as its consequences were concerned, in relation with the action itself. In other words, the accused, in committing the crime, had in prospect the scaffold; and, even in the case of impunity from it, he derived frequently no advantage, material or moral, from the act which he had committed.

Now, every important act of a man of sound mind has one end. That end is the attainment of an advantage proportionate to the consequences of the act. When an individual stakes his life upon it, he hopes to obtain in exchange material or moral advantages, more or less considerable, and by which he expects to profit largely.

If it be asked what are the conditions under which the reputed criminal act is performed, we are at once struck with the want of

foresight which has preceded and accompanied its fulfilment. Neither the moment of the deed nor the means by which it has been effected have been the object of any premeditation. Moreover, the deed has probably been committed at the most unfavourable moment, although the accused had had a thousand opportunities of effecting it in secret.

Far from avoiding justice, the insane individual, in other respects an upright man, comprehending quickly the enormity of the crime that he has involuntarily committed, occasionally—nay, most commonly—gives himself up to justice. In effect, the dominant notion has hastily ceased to exist; moral freedom has resumed its empire, and the so-called criminal has ceased to be mad.

If investigation is extended to the mental state of the paternal or maternal ancestors of the accused, it is common to find that one or more members of the family have committed suicide, or have had a more or less prolonged attack of insanity. Seneca has said:—"Nullum magnum ingenium sine mixturâ dementiæ." Seneca has exaggerated; but Napoleon said truly that "Between a man of genius and a madman there is scarcely the thickness of a six-liards piece." Antiquity presents us in Socrates, Pythagoras, and Democritus, proofs of the exactitude of this assertion, and among men of modern times, Tasso, Pascal, Rousseau still more justify it.

"If I did, not fear," says M. Lelut (*Le Démon de Socrate*, Paris, 1856, p. 96) "to renew contemporary griefs, I could show that there are very numerous representatives of art, literature, and science in lunatic asylums. In truth, genius, after having abandoned itself to its highest inspirations, has but one step more to make to break the limit which separates thought from morbid exaltation; the cord too tensely drawn may give way, and then the artist, the poet, the man of science, the philosopher, becomes changed into a poor lunatic: but a moment ago they were the glory of the world, now they are objects of pity." But if we observe those persons who have been attacked with transitory madness, we find generally conditions entirely opposed to these—slight education, little ability, contracted intelligence, and taciturnity, in a word, a monotonous ensemble, both physical and moral.

Lastly (and this is a criterion of great value), if we investigate the offence from two different points of view, the hypothesis of a criminal act, and the hypothesis of an act of folly, in order that either view should be established, it is necessary that it should explain all the facts without effort, while the opposite view should present a series of improbabilities which at once strike the judgment and are inconsistent with experience. This last method

leads the physician with the greatest certainty to a right appreciation of the facts ; by it doubt is dissipated, conviction arrived at, and the conscience relieved. This method enables us to carry conviction to the minds of magistrates and juries ; this, it is necessary to say, brought about the acquittal of young Julius of Bordeaux, and in the manner following. In place of delivering a scientific dissertation upon the question when I was before the court, I avowed that when I had first examined the case I had conceived an unfavourable impression of it ; but after I had investigated the offence, as well from the hypothesis of a crime as from the hypothesis of mental alienation, all doubt was dissipated from my mind ; and then proceeding in my deposition as I had done in my study, by giving prominence to the past and present state of the accused in their double bearing upon the question of insanity or crime, I was led to the formal conclusion that there had been one of those rapid transitions from the appearances of reason to an act of insanity, which constitutes a species of paroxysm of mental alienation, with its prodromata going back to a remote period and increasing little by little, until the violent outbreak in the reputed criminal act.

When I quitted the witness-box, the Honourable M. Gintrac said to me, " You have saved the accused ; from this moment he is acquitted." And, indeed, the next morning the verdict of the jury confirmed the prevision of M. Gintrac. But what did I do more than my four *confères* : we all concurred in and expressed the same opinion ? Nothing, unless it were to reason with the jury as I had reasoned with myself. Yet a few minutes before our examination the Advocate-General had said to me, " Your *confères* were heard yesterday, and I may tell you that public opinion as well as the opinion of the jury remains unaltered, that is to say, unfavourable to the accused." I do not cite this fact from vanity, but in order that physicians may understand that in doubtful cases, the interpretation of the facts under the double relation I have intimated is one of the elements most fitted to give a solution of the question.

In the case quoted, the young Julius had had among his ancestors a great uncle (maternal) who had a propensity to suicide and who had died insane ; an aunt (paternal) who had committed suicide ; a third relative (maternal side) who had all his life manifested bizarre and exaggerated ideas, so that it was necessary for him to live a retired life.

On inquiring into the conduct of the young man towards those around him, every one described him as being subject to motiveless outbursts of passion. One day he struck with his hand-whip a servant who was not sufficiently active in attending to his wants ; another day he became furiously angry because he could not have

immediate access to a room where his stepmother was having a bath. "When he became angry," a witness deposed, "he always seized upon something or some one."

A month before the offence, he had made known to Dr. Brunet his ideas of suicide. He said to the *Juge d'Instruction*, "When I ascended to my room on the day of the offence, I was not thinking of anything. I should not have gone above stairs if I had found a fire in the drawing-room. When I got into my room, having no evil intention, the notion of suicide possessed me; then my thoughts taking another direction, I threw aside my fowling-piece, ran to my brother's chamber, armed myself with two pistols, and re-descended to the drawing-room, *pushed by I know not what force which dragged me in spite of myself.*" I would add, also, that in the midst of opulence he enjoyed it not; that he avoided young men of his own age; that he was taciturn, and that he constantly isolated himself.

Finally, he had arrived at that degree of development of the feelings which is neither a healthy nor a morbid state, an organic disposition in virtue of which the well-born man, ambitious of elevated social positions, is led to actions the most sublime; the miserably-born to deeds the most criminal.

If we seek the cause of the offence committed, the motive for the deed, the benefits which the young Julius would derive from it, the preparations for its completion, and the place and moment of its accomplishment, we see nothing but improbabilities, if it be regarded as a criminal act.

So far as *premeditation* and the *choice of arms* are concerned, the accused took his brother's pistols, not knowing in what manner they were charged, although he had loaded his own with ball the day preceding the deed. In respect to the *day on which the crime was accomplished*, it was one on which several friends were expected to dine at the house.

As to the *moment of execution*, it was in the presence of his father, to whom he was much attached, that he killed his stepmother, and such was his veneration for his father that he feared to give him the least pain in the ordinary acts of life. Moreover, he said, during his examination, "If my father had addressed one word to me when I entered the drawing-room, a single word, whatever it might have been, *I should not have killed my stepmother.*"

Lastly; it was full day, in the house, in the middle of the domestics, that the deed was committed; and so far from any benefits arising to the homicide by its fulfilment, he had both step-brothers and step-sisters.

Are not all these circumstances unnatural on the hypothesis of a crime, unnatural for the sane man, natural for the madman? But it is said he had conceived a dislike—an aversion even, to

his stepmother ! This is true ; but he had known her since he was nine years of age. He had been surrounded by her cares ; those, it is testified, of a fond mother. Did she govern him harshly, or did she control his acts in managing his father's house ? Not in the least. Julius, loved by his father, was almost master of the house ; not only did he govern his stepmother, notwithstanding his age, but he at times insulted her in presence of the servants. The influence that he exercised was such that he would not suffer his step-brothers and step-sisters to be at his father's table, under the pretext that they made too much noise.

I have entered into these details because I have to justify the principal incident I have cited as an example of transitory homicidal mania. In these cases the part of the physician is every way exceptional. He is not solely consulted upon a legal point, the solution of which would form but a cipher in the balance of justice ; it is upon the entire question — the whole process. Magistrates and jury are effaced, so to speak, before the decision which he is called upon to make ; the physician pronounces upon the culpability or non-culpability of the accused ; by his decision, or with his decision, the crime ceases to be, or the cause proceeds. In face of such a responsibility is it not of weighty import that science should clearly specify the morbid phases which it recognises, and lay down criteria capable of establishing their dominant characters ?

This consideration has induced me to define what in my opinion constitutes the characteristics of *transitory insanity* (*folie transitoire*), a vague and elastic expression which ought to be limited to cases analogous to that which I have quoted. And if it be necessary to justify my efforts, we may say that under the term transitory insanity there have been related examples of dementia, mania, and monomania, more or less protracted.

Such was the case of the shoemaker, related by Lævanthal, in Hufeland's *Journal de Médecine*, who, one hour after rising, was seized with incoherence of ideas, and presently, armed with a leather-cutting knife, attacked his wife, who had barely time to escape with her infant. The patient was bled, he became calm, and refreshing sleep followed. Now we may assume that if this man had not been immediately bled he would have become for a longer or shorter time a furious maniac ; but this was not a case of transitory insanity.

Was the following instance one of transitory insanity ? A day-labourer absented himself from home, begging during two days. On his return he asked for his child. "It is asleep," answered the wife, pointing to a neighbouring closet. The man entered and found there the corpse of his child, which the mother had horribly mutilated, for it *wanted a limb*, which she had con-

verted into food! When, shortly after, the unhappy lunatic was interrogated by the mayor, she declared that want had constrained her to kill the child, but she had taken care to reserve *the other limbs* for her husband. Was there not unsoundness of mind after as well as before the act of insanity which was termed transitory? And how could that insanity be termed transitory, of which neither the commencement nor the termination was known?

Henrietta C—— was attacked with insanity, not transitory insanity, but *infanticidal monomania*. She had shown a disposition towards the insane act long before its execution, and mental unsoundness remained after its accomplishment; and M. B. de Boismont tells me, that since her trial it has been ascertained that a year before she had been sent to a lunatic asylum for having wished to shorten the days of another infant.

Many other examples related by Marc, Cazauvieth, Heim, and Castelnau, are equally erroneous.

But the farmer whose case is cited by Dr. Edwards (*American Journal of Insanity*—*Ann. Medico-Psychologiques*, t. IV., 2e. série), was really attacked with transitory insanity. When Dr. Daniel interrogated him upon the cause of his sadness, he answered, "I have undergone a trial which fills me with horror when I think of it. I was laid upon a sofa, and my wife and infants were near the fire. I spoke to them friendly, when suddenly my eye rested upon the poker. At the same instant I was seized with an idea of shedding their blood. I could not think of anything else. I became wretched; until at last unable to resist any longer, I ordered them, in a voice of thunder, to leave the room. Great God!" added he, "how greatly I thank thee that I am not stained with crime!"

This was transitory insanity, since eight years passed and Dr. Daniel's aid was not again required by the farmer; but it is necessary to add, that this man had passed from an active to an idle life—from poverty to riches; that he had during three years been melancholy and irascible, his aspect being unhealthy; but he had notwithstanding maintained agreeable relations with his neighbours.

There does not exist, then, transitory insanity in the pure acceptation of the term. Transitory insanity, like all other forms of insanity, has its prodromata, its remote and proximate symptoms, which the world apprehends not, and to which it does not attach sufficient importance; and which, sooner or later, explain themselves by the delirious act, the act recognised by every one, often prejudicial, and at times of a criminal character.

And if, with regard to transitory insanity, we ask where reason ends and mental unsoundness commences, although the question cannot be answered, we say that it is necessary first to establish

a distinction between the *delirium of insanity* and insanity itself. The explosion of delirium occurs long after the invasion of insanity, and it shows itself in a hasty and sudden manner. As to the insanity itself, it is impossible to lay down the limit which separates it from reason ; it is manifested by successive reasonings and acts, which for the world are acts more or less reasonable or unreasonable, but which, for the physician, are acts more or less imminent of insanity. Still these reasonings and acts are at the commencement so feebly marked that all the sagacity of the physician is necessary in order to appreciate their importance and gravity. In reference to this form of alienation we may reiterate M. Lelut's remark, *that insanity is still reason, as reason is already insanity.*

The individual who has perpetrated a reputed criminal act under the influence of transitory insanity, ought to be regarded as insane after as well as before the deed, notwithstanding the return to reason, because a similar tendency may sooner or later again originate in his diseased mind, and lead to a like result. Hence arises clearly this precept, that the physician of a family cannot too strongly direct the attention of parents to those eccentricities of character and conduct that are too frequently attributed to originality, but which are the beginning of mental derangement. How many outbreaks of insanity would be prevented by a special moral and physical education adapted to each of these cases !

Would not the preventive hygiene of insanity be a grand subject of study ? Certainly, insanity that is not hereditary has its starting points in the primitive organization, education, and social life ; but how great is the number of descendants from idiotic and insane parents, who might be saved from outbursts of insanity by directing their studies, their existence, their social relations and outer life, in such a manner as to fortify the intellectual faculties against all the struggles and contentions of society.

And now, if you please, recall to mind that in 1826, M. Dupin said, that monomania was a new resource of medicine. Remember, also, that in 1833, in this hall, on the occasion of a solemn sitting of the Academy, Marc accumulated fact upon fact, argument upon argument, in order to demonstrate not only that monomania existed, but that it also manifested itself in a *reasoning* form—ratiocinative monomania (*monomanie raisonnée*). If in connexion with these facts we place the recognition even of *transitory insanity*, not only by physicians, but also by magistrates and juries, ought we not to felicitate ourselves upon the immense progress which the science of mental alienation has made in its medico-legal relations ? This progress is due to the

persevering efforts of the present generation, of which I should fear to wound the susceptibility if I were to cite names which one day will belong to the history of science. By these persevering efforts many of those social punishments have been put aside, and will still be set aside, which stamp the seal of infamy not only upon the head of an innocent, but also upon his entire family, a diseased brain having been alone in fault.

This result is owing to those physicians of our epoch who have devoted their cares to the insane; to those men whose life has passed in the cold observation of the most cruel of human infirmities, most commonly without the hope of receiving one day from their patients those tokens of gratitude which often reflect greater honour upon the physician than the more ostentatious recompense of fortune.

Towards the end of February I received a letter from the brother of young Julius's victim. Having heard indirectly of the lecture I had delivered before the Academy, he thought it to be his duty to announce to me the death of Julius, and to inform me of the circumstances under which it had taken place. Since 1855, this young man had resided in Brussels. He lived there solitarily. On the 29th of January, he hastily quitted his residence, abandoning his furniture and all that he possessed, and having with him solely his ordinary attire. He went to Bordeaux, and alighted at an hotel, where he passed the night, not visiting either his father or brother. In the morning he purchased a brace of pistols, hired a cab, and was driven to the cemetery, and there at his request he was led to his stepmother's tomb. After sending away his guide, he knelt upon the tomb, wrote several sentences in his debt-book, which he deposited upon the monument, and then blew out his brains. Among the sentences traced in his debt-book there was found the following:—"I wish to die upon the tomb of her whom I have so much loved and regretted!"

How shall we reconcile this assertion, made at the moment of committing suicide, with the opinion entertained by some persons that the cause of the murder was *the deep aversion that the young man had nourished towards his stepmother during ten years?*

Evidently the language as well as the termination of life by suicide are the work of a lunatic. Not the slightest doubt can now be entertained even by the most prejudiced, concerning the correctness of the judgment of the Assize Court at Pau, and the scientific foresight which led to that judgment.

The foregoing information completes an example of transitory insanity which is unique in science, inasmuch as the pathological view of the case has been confirmed by the verdict of a jury.

ART. V.—THE ASYLUMS OF ITALY, FRANCE, AND GERMANY.

BY J. T. ARLIDGE, A.B., M.B., L.R.C.P. (LOND.)

(Continued from Vol. XI., p. 626.)

LYONS.

THIS, the second city in France, so well known throughout the world for its silk manufacture, and celebrated for ages as an emporium of commerce, possesses no institution for the insane which can be considered worthy of its civic importance and renown. Its past and present wealth is indicated by its public buildings and the extent of its quays; and its religion is symbolized by the gaudily decorated church crowning the hill of Fourvière, and itself surmounted by the gigantic gilded statue of the Virgin, the special protectress of the city, and the adored deliverer of its inhabitants from the plague of cholera, and of whose honour, glory, and miraculous virtues hundreds and thousands of votive offerings of wax models, tablets, and pictures, bear seeming ample witness to satisfy the most sceptical visitors of the church.

Near to this miracle-working edifice, on the brow of the same hill, overhanging the Saone, from whence a magnificent view of the great manufacturing mart is obtained, is a large, irregular, and sufficiently gloomy building known as the Hospice de l'Antiquaille, of which the lunatic asylum constitutes a considerable section. The buildings composing the Hospice are of very various dates; the foundations of the older portion, which was formerly a convent, having been constructed by the Romans at that early period when Lyons was the capital of Roman Gaul, and often the temporary residence of the Cæsars. However interesting these ancient foundations may be to the antiquary, and the comparatively modern conventual superstructure to the admirers of monastic life, they present no claim to the psychological physician, seeking information and suggestions for the improvement of asylum construction and arrangements.

The whole edifice, as before remarked, is not devoted to the purposes of an asylum for the insane, but serves besides as an infirmary for venereal and cutaneous disease, and for the old and vagrant population of the district, as in the case of the Hospice at Montpellier, described in my last paper. Like the latter, too, it is under one general administration, and the director, a non-medical official, superintends the whole institution, and is in all matters the paramount authority. The kitchen, laundry, and

other domestic offices, the dietary, the economical details, and the means of warming and ventilating, are common to the whole establishment.

The insane population is lodged in some portions of the old conventual buildings, and in several wings or semi-detached buildings of later construction, among which a semicircular edifice has the especial merit of having been built for its present purpose.

It was not until about 1815 that the insane of the department of the Rhone, of which Lyons is the capital, were transferred to their present quarters; and however ill-suited and defective these may now be considered, they must have seemed to the poor creatures first introduced into them a real Elysium, compared with the prison-house and the horrible dens from whence they came. "When I first visited the insane (writes Esquirol) at Lyons, in 1809, they were received into the Hôtel Dieu and at the Hospice La Charité. At the latter institution they dwelt in the vaults beneath; at the Hôtel Dieu they were imprisoned in the thirty-eight rooms of a three-storied building, forming three sides of a narrow, irregular, and excessively damp court, in the centre of which was a well. The insane were never allowed outside their cells, at the windows of which they might be seen standing with their faces pressed against the bars. Those it might be wished to subject to the 'bath of surprise,' were conducted through the underground vaults to the Rhone." What became of them when conducted thus far, Esquirol does not state; whether their surprise ended in the plunge within the narrow bounds of a bath-house, or whether they were let contend against the stream, and struggle for a life not worth, one might almost say, the conservation, under the ever-enduring miseries it had to subsist in.

To return from this digression. The prevailing arrangement in the present asylum is that of the day and work-rooms on the ground floor, and the dormitories on the upper floors, with the exception of the dormitories for paralytics and feeble, demented cases and the infirmary, which are on the ground level. There is also a row of single rooms on the ground floor of a detached wing on the male, and in the section for the refractory on the female side.

The divisions for the two sexes are closely contiguous; that for the females is the superior of the two, and to it belongs the modern semicircular wing, built of late years, which has the most cheerful aspect of all the buildings appropriated to the insane. It has a corridor of communication, lighted from the court by windows sufficiently numerous, but closely guarded by outside venetian shutters, which replace the iron bars placed everywhere else to defend the windows externally, and protected by a net-work of wire on the inside.

On the female side are two workrooms on the first floor, besides the day rooms on the ground floor; these are the most comfortable and cheerful apartments in the establishment, and are occupied by those of a grade of society above the indigent who are found elsewhere. On the ground floor of this side there is also a folding-room, where some of the inmates are employed in folding and arranging the clothes. Another apartment on each side on the ground floor, is set apart for patients under restraint, who we regret to add are numerous. The rooms on the ground floor, particularly in the female division, have windows along only one side, an arrangement necessarily adverse to proper ventilation. The sitting rooms throughout the establishment were indifferently furnished; in the refractory departments with fixed clumsy benches and tables, and in the rooms of the quieter and better sort there was little other difference, except the presence of some chairs; the walls bare, without ornament or picture, save perhaps a crucifix or a Madonna, with artificial flowers, whilst the otherwise possible, extensive, and fine view from the windows was cut off by adjoining buildings or high walls. The dormitories are generally large and lofty, and like all other rooms have tiled floors, and are heated by hot air admitted through gratings placed at intervals along the skirting. The usual number of beds in a dormitory varies, according to its size, from twenty to forty. The bedsteads are very closely placed, leaving a clear space between them of not more than eighteen inches, an amount of crowding condemned by the visiting physicians. The bedsteads are of iron; and although the bottom is less than eighteen inches from the floor, yet the surface of the bed when put in order is above three feet from it, by the interposition of a very thick bag of straw or of shavings to serve as a palliasso, and of a thick wool mattress upon that. Each bed is supplied with an upper and an under blanket, sheets, and a blue cotton or linen coverlet, where the patient is clean; but where this is not the case, there is no under blanket, but the lower sheet is stretched immediately upon the straw which takes the place of the usual bed and palliasso, and is loosely contained in a zinc trough the size of the bedstead, into which it is fitted. The bottom of the zinc trough or box is so sloped as to conduct the urine which permeates the straw to a channel by which it escapes in a vessel beneath the bed. The straw, when wetted, is renewed every morning. This sort of trough and loose straw bed is used for paralytics; and it was stated to me that bed-sores were of very rare occurrence. The bedsteads used in the single rooms on the ground floor, appropriated to noisy and refractory patients, were exceptional in being made of wood. They followed the original trough or crib fashion, were very heavy and clumsy, securely

fastened to the floor and wall, and duly furnished with rings for the paraphernalia of mechanical restraint, straps and bands.

The infirmaries differ in no respect from the dormitories, except in having a central stove, and, what must not be forgotten, a little cistern of water, with two taps and a sort of basin beneath, affording opportunity to wash the hands. As usual, the accessories, soap and towels, did not appear. I found the infirmaries, that on the female side more especially, close and hot. Provision is made in these apartments for the casually sick, for the paralytic, the aged, the feeble demented, and for some cases in which detention in bed is made to serve as a means of restraint.

Every dormitory and infirmary has a lantern suspended at the centre; but this imperfect means of illumination can only serve to make darkness visible. Two attendants in each division are on watch during the night, and perambulate the several apartments, and are especially charged to attend to those whose habits are bad, and to get them up once or more as occasion requires. The attendant also of each dormitory sleeps in a small room partitioned off from it, and is supposed to exercise a watch over its inmates through a small window which overlooks the room. The bath-house is a detached and indifferently constructed building, ill suited to its purpose. The baths themselves are of copper, short and narrow, but sufficiently deep. To every one is appended a clumsy wooden lid, which is used on every occasion, and the patient locked in under it by strong iron fastenings. Some short douche pipes were fitted over a few baths, but the douche was rarely used, and then not medically but as a means of repression and punishment. No shower-bath of the English model existed; but the effects of one were obtained at will by screwing a "rose" upon the end of a douche pipe. Nevertheless, here at Lyons, as at other places on the Continent, shower-baths were not so highly appreciated, and much more rarely used, than in England. They were held to be most beneficial in cases of melancholia. There were no water-closets within the building; these accessory structures were all outside, and may be briefly described as peculiarly unsavoury and French.

The airing courts were confined and small, surrounded by buildings or by high walls, dreary, neglected, and melancholy; their surface mostly uneven, and varied by the presence of holes, and when wet, with mud; in all respects calculated to render a monotonous, painful life more dreary and wretched.

It has been incidentally noticed that the dormitories are warmed by hot air entering by gratings placed along the skirting. In some of the sitting rooms the hot-air pipes pass along the centre, covered by iron plates; but besides these pipes the sitting rooms generally possess a central stove, surrounded and defended by a

strong iron guard some five feet in height. The plan of heating by hot air is common throughout the Hospice.

The Hospice de l'Antiquaille is essentially an institution for the indigent, although the friends of some patients who have the means—a matter always determinable in France by the activity of the police, seconded by that of the Government—contribute to their support. It receives every variety and complication of insanity and idiocy, and is under the control of the central bureau for the administration of all the hospitals and hospices in the department. This Board makes the principal appointments, receives the reports of its officers, and sanctions all the details and all propositions affecting the working of the establishment. Under them is the non-medical director of the Hospice, on whom the general management devolves. The two physicians are simply chargeable with the medical oversight of the inmates, and with their moral discipline, their classification, their employment, the special diet of the sick, &c. The chief physician (in 1855) was M. Arthaud, charged with the male division, and his adjoint, M. Lacour, superintended the female side. They both visited daily, when necessary twice; and were attended in their visits by the “internes” and a head attendant. The dispensary and dispenser serve the whole institution.

The male attendants wear a uniform dress, with a plated badge bearing a number. The nurses belong to a particular order, the “*Sœurs Hospitalières*,” a division, we believe, of the Sisters of St. Vincent de Paul, or Sisters of Mercy, who are devoted especially to the care of the sick in hospitals. The same order acted as nurses in the great hospital of Lyons—the Hôtel Dieu, containing 1300 beds. It is unnecessary to describe their peculiar dress, their extraordinary exaggerated caps, inasmuch as every visitor to France must have encountered some members of this sisterhood.

The number of patients at the Antiquaille, in 1855, was about 700, of whom 312 were males, and nearly 400 females. Nearly one-tenth of the males were stated to be paralytics, and about the same proportion epileptic. The classification adopted was into quiet and convalescent epileptics; noisy, and noisy and dirty, paralytic and dirty; it was found however not always perfectly practicable to carry it out. Those who were particularly noisy and troublesome were consigned to the single rooms in the basement, where they passed the night and more or less of the day, whilst in the state of excitement. The remainder of the refractory spent the day in the room set apart for them on the ground floor, and in the enclosed airing court attached to it. At night they were transferred to a dormitory, unless too riotous; indeed, except the few special cases referred to, the whole population of

the asylum slept in dormitories. With respect to suicidal cases, these were placed among those who were lively and watchful, and some of them in the infirmaries.

The day was passed variously, according to the condition of the patient and the system and means of the establishment. Occupation was encouraged, and with much success among the females; but for the males it was found difficult of attainment to any satisfactory extent. The only ground attached immediately to the asylum does not exceed three acres; of this a portion is laid out as a kitchen garden, and gives employment to a few of the men. But there is an auxiliary establishment, consisting of a farm, which lessens this serious disadvantage of the confined site of the asylum itself. It is situated some short distance from the town, and occupies in its cultivation about twenty of the male patients. There is a small house upon it where the detachment resides from Monday morning to Saturday afternoon, the Sunday being spent in the town institution with the other inmates. More than the number named would most cheerfully be sent by the physicians, but there is neither accommodation nor occupation for more. This auxiliary branch, *i.e.*, with respect to economic and administrative details, was stated to work well with the parent institution.

The male patients who had to pass their whole time in the crowded, ill-ventilated, dreary day-rooms and pent-up courts of the Antiquaille, were indeed greatly to be pitied. No amusements seemed to be provided for them; I saw no cards, no, not even dominós, which any visitor to France would set down as essential to a Frenchman's happiness. A very select few were permitted to read the few no doubt equally select books and journals which the asylum furnished; and a small number was seen engaged in sticking wire through the pattern cards used in weaving.

This history of insufficient day-rooms, of gloomy airing courts, of the absence of the means of amusement or of employment, will prepare the reader to hear of the application of much restraint. This indeed was very largely the case. Many were to be seen confined by camisoles; many fixed in strong arm chairs by straps, and often with the superaddition of camisoles; some wearing besides a stout leathern stock, about three inches wide, around the neck, fastened behind by a strap to the chair, or otherwise to a belt extending upwards from another one around the waist. Others handcuffed and imprisoned in chairs, with or without the freedom of their legs; and others, lastly, with more or fewer of the previously mentioned means of restraint, having in addition their feet manacled. Mechanical coercion, moreover, was not restricted to day use, but prevailed also at night, some wearing camisoles, others having their limbs fastened by straps;

and in either case, often further attached to the bedstead by other bands or belts.

The chairs in which so many had to pass their miserable existence during more or less of the day, and in the case of some, we fear, day after day, had their bottoms grooved and perforated, so as to allow the escape of the excretions into a zinc tray fitted beneath. Equally in pursuance of the same principle of applying mechanical contrivance in lieu of the supervision, the attention, and sympathy of fellow-men, the clothes of those lost to decency in their habits were made in one piece, and a sufficient opening left to permit the passage of the excreta.

Restraint is resorted to for the refractory, for some of the epileptic, for the paralytic under excitement, for the suicidal, and at night for those who would leave their beds. One homicidal man, who had once killed another, was pointed out as having had his arms constantly confined for several years. Excluding the particular class of patients of dirty habits and of those rendered so by confinement in chairs, the generality of the inmates were sufficiently and tolerably clothed. Most of the men had a suit of brown cloth; yet the dress was not uniform. The male epileptics wore a woollen cap, with a thickly padded wide rim, to screen the head from injury in their falls.

With respect to diet; soup is the staple article, made with or without meat, with vegetables, eggs, &c. They begin with a basin of soup at seven A.M.; at eleven A.M. comes another allowance of it, made from meat, with the wreck of the meat in the shape of "bouilli," and at four P.M. a meat dinner arrives, without the potage being forgotten. Wine was too expensive to be served out, except in that finely diluted form of "eau rouge," which demands a French stomach for its appreciation. A certain modicum of bread, a larger proportion than commonly enters into the dietary of this country, constituted an accessory portion of each meal. Owing to the very thorough soddening and cooking of the meat, knives were not wanted, and forks and spoons answered every purpose.

Medicinal agents were not in much request. To open the bowels if costive, and to confine them if too open; to prescribe ptisans if feverish; syrup of marsh-mallow or some equivalent bland substance if a cough existed; these and similar simple measures appeared to constitute the bulk of the medical treatment pursued. Strychnine had been tried in paralysis without appreciable results; opiates were sometimes given to induce sleep, but much less frequently than with us in England, and strong coffee had been advantageously administered in cases of melancholia.

To sum up our impressions of this the asylum of the important city of Lyons. As its name, Antiquaille, suggests, there is a heavy brooding antiquity about it, both as a material edifice and

as a living institution. It is a rusty antiquity, incapable alike of service and of serviceable repair. It perpetuates within it a system which has well nigh died out with advancing civilization, and this it does in a degree which we are glad to add is rarely seen elsewhere. There is positively nothing to be said by way of apology for the building. It is badly situated in a suburb of the city; has a very inadequate quantity of land attached to it; is, with respect to its architectural arrangements, very defective, and in its moral government ill-regulated. Even its only section, the semicircular building named, erected for the special purpose of an asylum, was long ago condemned by Esquirol as fraught with many disadvantages, notwithstanding the superiority of its arrangements and appearance over the other portions.

The confined site, the want of land to cultivate, the neglect of means of diversion for the inmates, their overcrowding, the insufficiency of male attendants, and the preconceived opinions and frequent impracticability of the religious sisterhood, a corps of *employées* in many matters independent in action of the medical staff of the institution, are among the chief causes of the excessive resort to mechanical coercion, in the place of which, moreover, the medical men doubtless can see no substitute, deficient as they are of experience in the management of asylums, possessing all the accessories of site, structure, space, and deprived of that unfettered power and rule with which the position of superintendent is rightly armed.

The office of director here at Lyons, as at many of the French asylums, resembles that of the governor of some of our oldest English asylums, and constitutes an insuperable difficulty to the free and effective medical and moral management of the establishment. The divided authority was felt and deplored as an evil; so was also the appropriation of the same institution to such incongruous purposes as those of an asylum, a Lock hospital, and a refuge and reformatory.

So far as it goes, the formation of an auxiliary to the parent Institution as a farm, is a step in the right direction, and shows that the necessity of better provision for the employment of the insane is recognised; but let us hope that it will shortly enter into the minds of the wealthy and numerous inhabitants of the second city of France, that a new asylum, well placed in the neighbouring country, well built, and well regulated by a medical superintendent, is an urgent need, indifference to which will bring down discredit and reproach upon them, among the best informed physicians and philanthropists of their own as well as of foreign countries.

ASYLUM OF ST. JEAN-DE-DIEU, NEAR LYONS.

Some three miles from Lyons, on the road to Marseilles, is a

large establishment for the insane of the male sex, belonging to the *frères* of "St. Jean de Dieu," which presents a favourable contrast to the town asylum of Lyons, just described. The building appropriated to this institution was originally constructed for the residence of a private gentleman, but has been much enlarged and fitted by means of various alterations to the purposes of an asylum by its present possessors, who have held it above thirty years. It is one of five similar establishments in France belonging to this benevolent and useful fraternity. The space of ground upon which the asylum stands is in the valley of the Rhone, and has a gentle slope towards the river, but is separated from it by a strip of flat land, formerly very swampy, aguish, and unwholesome, but now well drained. About ten acres of land belong to the asylum; they are enclosed by a high wall, and laid out in airing-courts and gardens cultivated by the inmates. The building is placed nearly in the centre of this space. The ground plan of the building is that of an elongated hollow square, having two wings extended from it on each side; one in a line with the principal front, the other from about the centre of the side, and parallel to the preceding. The chapel, surmounted by a fine tower, occupies the centre of the front elevation, and is placed somewhat in advance of it. The whole main edifice is of two stories, exclusive of an attic story not occupied by patients, and is in the Italian style of architecture. The walls on the inner front surrounding the enclosed court, are supported on arches resting on strong stone pillars, and in this way a continuous covered corridor or arcade is formed around the four sides. The general disposition of the apartments is such that all the sitting or day-rooms are on the ground floor, and all the sleeping rooms, with few exceptions, on the first floor. Next to the small room occupied by the doorkeeper, at the common entrance into the building, to one side of the chapel, is a large room where patients and visitors are received. On entering the corridor from the entrance hall, we come to the dispensary, consisting of three rooms, and next to it the kitchen; beyond are other offices. There is a dining-room to each division. The refractory are located in the posterior wing, of only one story, projecting at right angles from the main structure. The sleeping accommodation consists almost entirely of dormitories; but there is one section composed of some twelve single rooms, arranged on each side a corridor about 8 feet wide, having a window at the extremity opposite to the entrance door. Each of these single rooms was about 10 feet by 16-18 ft., and, like the corridor, some 14 feet in height; comfortably furnished and in nice order. The iron bedstead was fitted with curtains, the bed consisted of flock, and had a palliasse beneath. As at the Antiquaille, the bed was much

elevated above the floor. The bedding consisted of upper and under sheets, a blanket, and coverlet. Besides the bed each room had a chair, a small table and mirror, and a strip of carpet by the bedside; a crucifix, and often the picture of a saint, were placed on the wall. The floor, as everywhere else throughout the building, was paved with small red, square or hexagonal tiles, kept well dusted and polished, and set firmly in cement. The window was of the usual French casement fashion, opening inwardly, and defended externally by iron bars. These comfortable and well-kept rooms are only made use of as bedrooms, their occupants passing the day in the common sitting-rooms set apart for patients of the first class; for this asylum is of a mixed character, receiving a first and a second class of paying patients, and a third class wholly indigent, paid for out of the departmental resources, or, in a few instances, supported gratuitously by the brethren. The rate of pension varies from two to five francs per day. The second-class boarders, with few exceptions, sleep in dormitories, and have the same sort of beds and bedding, save curtains, as the first class. These dormitories are of very large size, being as much as 80 feet in length (probably more) by 18 or 20 feet in width. The bedsteads were arranged along each side, about 3 feet apart, and left a central avenue quite 8 feet wide, extending the entire length of the room. The area of these spacious apartments was interrupted about the middle by an abutment from the wall on either side, making a partial division into two rooms. The windows were large and sufficiently numerous, but ranged only along one side, excepting indeed at the upper and lower end. In some of the dormitories the external bars did not appear. The religious sentiment of the proprietors exhibited itself in the presence of a crucifix in every room; also usually of a painting of some saint above the door, or of a small statue, and in the case of the bed coverings, of an embroidered cross, with or without the cyphers J.H.S. upon the woollen or linen coverlets. During the night a lantern suspended from the ceiling struggled by its tiny light with the surrounding darkness. The third-class dormitories were similar in size, but partially subdivided by incomplete partitions. The bedsteads and bedding were much the same, only that the latter was coarser. All the bedsteads appeared fixed to the floor. The Infirmary was merely a large dormitory, partially subdivided into three compartments. One of these was devoted to paralytic and dirty cases, and was shut off from the next by a glazed screen, whilst the partition between the second and third room was an open screen. A small altar, where mass was daily said for the sick, was placed at a central point so as to be visible from each division. The beds were wider apart than in the common sleeping rooms, and

the bedsteads made of wood, stained and polished. Attached to one compartment of the infirmary were two or three single rooms, adapted for particular cases of sickness. Where the habits of the patients were dirty in bed, it was the plan to use a trough wooden bedstead, filled with straw, with a sheet below as well as above the patient. In feeble and paralytic cases, a folded sheet, in addition, was placed under the hips. The urine escaped into the straw, and through that, by a hole in the bottom of the bedstead, into a vessel beneath. The bath-house contained two bathing-rooms, one for the pensioners, the other for the indigent. The baths were deep, but short and narrow, of copper tinned inside, and not cased in wood, and severally furnished with a lid or cover. The baths for the third class had no separation between them, but those for the boarders had one curtain extended between them, and another across the foot; they also had convex metal covers in place of the flat wooden ones supplied in the other bath room. A douche pipe was suspended over the head of each bath, but was not sufficiently long or high above it to furnish a jet of much force; consequently, when it was wished to administer a douche, the patient was transferred to a section of the bath-room partitioned off from the rest, and supplied with a douche pipe of considerable force, together with an ordinary bath in which the patient could as usual be fixed by the aid of the cover fastened over it.

The usual classification of patients into quiet and convalescent, refractory, epileptic, paralytic, and dirty demented cases, was carried out, and to each class was appropriated its special quarter and its airing court. Although some of the patients had access to the central enclosed court, it was only exceptionally intended for their use, and was rather the office court, being in part surrounded by the general offices of the establishment. Of the other courts set apart for the patients, all, with the exception of the one on each side situated between the two parallel lateral wings, afforded some view of the neighbouring country. Unfortunately, their surrounding walls restricted the view very much, and it is to be regretted that in the case of some of the courts at least, sunk fences had not been adopted.

The chapel is of considerable size, and well built and decorated. The ground floor was set apart for the use of the brethren, whilst the patients occupied the gallery of a transept on each side, large enough to hold about one hundred seated on benches placed one above the other. Their view is very much restricted by a screen along the edge of the gallery, which at the same time acts as a guard against accidents by falling or leaping down into the chapel below. This screen is ingeniously constructed of stout deal boards, about twelve feet high and seven inches wide, placed at such an angle

that all may see the altar, but not the congregation in the opposite transept or in the body of the church. To make doubly sure against accident, and to prevent any attempt to clamber over this screen, a stout polished cylinder of wood is extended across the transept above the screen, and so fitted as to revolve on being laid hold of, and to elude the grasp of the aspirant climber.

The whole land, as before remarked, was under careful cultivation. Although none of the best, being very sandy and loose, the portion occupied as garden ground was in good order. Besides the purely ornamental portions, there was one section set apart as a botanical garden. The airing courts were not satisfactory, being left bare except of a few trees. The vegetable garden was extensive, and a small portion of the land was cultivated as a farm. The cow-house, dairy, barn, &c., formed a detached building. All the work was done by the patients under the supervision of the brethren, who take them out daily in parties, the several classes being kept separate. Although gardening and husbandry supply the largest measure of employment, yet other occupations are not neglected. For instance, all the bread is made in the establishment, and shoemakers, tailors, and other workmen are enlisted for service in the workshops under the superintendence of mechanics hired from without. Carpenters are not much patronised because of the sharp tools necessary in their work. A certain number of patients are also employed in aiding the brethren in household duties, for everything affecting the management and order of the house devolves upon them, excepting always the supervision of the mechanical trades.

One great and sad want of this asylum is that of good water. They have to depend chiefly upon rain-water collected in a tank; for the Rhone water, obtained by sinking shallow wells, is not fit for use: an artesian well would probably remove this evil. The diet is very good, a portion of meat being allowed twice a day; the third meal is of soup without meat. There is also a liberal allowance of bread and vegetables: the physician considered the fare too liberal. Knives and forks were allowed to many; to the rest only spoons and forks. Amusements are provided,—at least for the pensioners, who have two billiard-tables, are allowed a few papers and books, and are permitted to gratify their taste for music and drawing. It is to be regretted, however, that the amusement of the indigent is not likewise attended to.

No general system of warming and ventilation was in operation. Every sitting-room had a central stove, surrounded by a guard, but, excepting the infirmary, no sleeping-room had any such provision.

All the brethren wear a similar monastic robe of coarse black cloth, with a hood, which serves as a covering for the otherwise unprotected head in bad weather. The patients have no uniform clothing.

The medical staff consists of a chief physician and an "ad-joint;" one visits daily at eight in the morning, the other at four in the afternoon. Accommodation is provided in a small house at one corner of the asylum grounds, alongside the public road, for the physician; he, however, preferred to live in Lyons. The medical officers are paid servants of the *frères*, who exercise general control over the whole establishment, restricting the physicians pretty closely to the purely medical supervision. For although the classification and the employment of the patients and the imposition of restraint are assigned to the physicians as peculiarly their duty, yet the brethren take these matters pretty frequently in their own hands, chiefly, it must be admitted, during the absence of the medical men.

The *frères* appear to make very efficient and kind attendants on the insane. It is to this office, indeed, they specially devote their lives; they are a voluntary order of hospital attendants, and the performance of their duties is the subject of vows and of religious feeling. Nothing apparently could be more desirable than the enlisting of men as attendants on the insane, whose duties in the office would be their only coveted employment; whose end and aim would be their rigid and honest performance under an abiding sense of religious responsibility, coupled with a covenanted obedience to the supervision and control of one of their own number. But as there is no perfection in other human institutions, so this has its errors and evils. The community of nursing brethren at once opens the door to sundry failings and imperfections when it constitutes itself a body in authority, the ruler of an institution, and the master of others, and when questions of profit and loss have to enter into its calculations. The double part of attendant and master cannot be played successfully; and those who naturally should hold the reins of office, supervise the medical and moral treatment of the sick, dispose and arrange the institution in all its details for the furtherance of its objects as a medical and curative engine, are deposed from their proper position to be the dependants and paid *employés* of the corps of attendants.

The hindrances to the thoroughly efficient working of an asylum where the medical man is a sort of excrescence, and deprived of his independence of opinion and action by his subordinate position, need not be insisted upon at large. Suffice it to suggest the difficulties he must have to contend against when confronted by imperfect knowledge of asylum management, and of asylum wants, by the ignorance of medicine, and by unavoidable prejudices on the part of his employers. Or, again, how can a physician in such a position safely propose improvements or reforms which involve expense, even where profit is professed as only a secondary matter subservient to the extension of benevolent objects?

But to let these objections pass, others arise from other considerations. Religious motives and religious vows are in themselves fallible, and ever prone to degenerate into religious prejudice, pride, and bigotry; and thereby to counteract the best matured schemes and resolves. Members of religious orders, like soldiers, acquire an *esprit de corps*: they become partisans for the accepted predilections and motives of their fraternity, and devoted to its success. In this way erroneous opinions and prejudices gain firm possession of every member, and resist the attacks of any reformer, particularly when he is one bound by relation and position to obey. Again, if on this point in question we further take into consideration the connexion of these religious orders with the Roman Catholic Church, our argument against them in the capacity of administrators will be much strengthened. The interests of that Church must always be promoted, its jealousies always respected. Again, the usefulness of nursing fraternities is much diminished by the character of some of their members, and by the circumstances under which they have entered on their vows. Experience has shown that many persons unfitted in a moral and mental—and we may add in a physical—capacity, join themselves to these societies from various motives: some because they find themselves inapt for any ordinary remunerative occupation; others from a craving for seclusion and asceticism; others for a living, and to escape hard work as far as possible; others under religious excitement; and others from disappointment in business, in love, or other matters. Moreover, these religious societies require no previous education or mental enlightenment on the part of their novitiates; and hence the presence of a number of inefficient, perverse, ill-tempered, and obstinate folk in their community, and of not a few from the lower classes, who can neither read nor write, though sufficiently proficient in bigotry, prejudice, and superstition.

Lastly, to enumerate a few more evils of the system in question, the religious devotions, meditations, and fasts imposed by the Church and the religious order necessarily interfere with the management of an asylum; whilst the subjection of each member to the will of the superior in the house, and sometimes to one at a distant establishment, who can remove at will, and transfer him to another sphere of duty, takes away entirely that essential control the medical man should have over his attendants, and may at any time derange the efficient management of an asylum by the removal of a useful servant; or, on the other hand, by the substitution or retention of an inefficient or bad one.

To return from this long digression, two or three notes on this Asylum of St. Jean de Dieu remain for notice. Mechanical restraint is resorted to as a necessity in not a few cases. It is con-

sidered useful and necessary in maniacal excitement and in suicidal subjects. The latter sleep at night in the infirmary, where one or two attendants are constantly on the watch. When the propensity is very strong, they are often kept in the same apartment during the day. The utility of temporary seclusion to calm excitement is little recognised or practised, and the expedient of a padded room to defend the maniacal patient from self-inflicted injury has not been resorted to. The douche was employed as a measure of repression and punishment for refractory cases, and baths generally were in little request as means of treatment. I could discover no facts in respect of the medical treatment pursued deserving notice. The physician, however, ventured on a medical hypothesis in explanation of the prevalence of general paralysis in France. It was that, although intemperance was very operative, yet the abuse of mercury, chiefly in the treatment of syphilis, was very much more productive of this sad malady. To substantiate this opinion, he remarked that large numbers of persons affected with syphilis, unwilling to place themselves in the hands of physicians, resorted to the pharmaciens and other unqualified practitioners, who knew no other practice than that of giving mercury freely to produce salivation. Although there can be no doubt of the evil effects of mercury, so rashly administered, yet we fear it would be difficult to substantiate the opinion that it is causative of general paralysis; for the analysis of cases in this country would show that mercurial salivation was a rare feature in their history.

The number of inmates in this asylum at the date of my visit was stated to be 500, of whom some 70 were paralytic or epileptic. This population was more than double of that in 1838, when it stood at 208; and, to meet the increase, the building had been progressively augmented, and was, in 1854, still in course of enlargement. It admits the insane from any part of France, or indeed from abroad; but it especially serves as the asylum for the indigent of the departments of the Loire, de la Drôme, and du Gard.

A little *brochure* I picked up in Paris upon the statistics of this asylum, in the years 1838, 1839, and 1840, by the physician, M. Carrier, furnishes the following details:—On the first of January, 1838, the total number of inmates was 208, 87 of whom were pensioners, and 121 paupers. Of the 208, 59 were classed under mania—acute, chronic, intermittent, or complicated with epilepsy; 6 under monomania; 17 under melancholia; 4 as having hallucinations with delirium; 98 under dementia, including 8 epileptics and 2 paralytics; 4 under imbecility; and 25 as idiots. The admissions were, in 1838, 66; in 1839, 106; and in 1840, 89. They were most numerous in the spring

quarter, in April, May, and June; next so in the summer months of July, August, and September; and least so in the last three months of the year; the difference, however, between the last-named period and the first quarter of the year in this particular being slight: with respect to the age on admission; 11 of the 261 cases were under 20; 67 between 20 and 30; 91 between 30 and 40; 17 between 50 and 60; 8 between 60 and 70; and one of each of the two next decennial periods. As to civil condition, 170 were unmarried, 86 married, and 5 widowed. The table of occupations shows that agricultural labourers were the most numerous—viz., 80; next to these, artisans, 61; then those without profession, 35; next, professional men, 22; and shopkeepers, 20; servants, 14. Hereditary tendency is noted in only 16 instances: moral causes are assigned in 74; excess in 45; organic changes in 50; external causes in 11; unknown, 64. The cures appear much influenced by the season: thus, in April, May, and June, 45 were discharged cured; 33 in the following 3 months; 30 in the last 3 months; and only 7 in the first quarter of the year. Looking to their civil condition, the married appear the most curable in proportion to the admissions. Among the deaths were 18 suffering from mania in its several forms; 2 from monomania; 5 from melancholia; 17 from simple dementia; 6 from dementia with epilepsy; 9 from dementia with paralysis; and 3 from senile dementia; also 1 imbecile and 2 idiots died. Death was attributed to cerebral disease in 21 instances; to chest diseases in 11; to abdominal in 23; and to various causes in 8. Reckoning that, in the course of three years, 469 cases were under treatment, and that 68 of them died, the death-rate is 1 in 15·22 for the year 1838; 1 in 17·83 for 1839; and 1 in 11·93 for 1840. Considered with reference to the number of admissions in each year, the proportion of deaths is as 1 in 26·5 for 1838; 1 in 26·5 for 1839; and 1 in 17·37 for 1840.

M. Carrier calculates the ratio of cures not on the whole population, but after the exclusion of justly-considered incurable cases—viz., demented patients in general; paralytics, epileptics, idiots, and imbeciles. Comparing the number remaining after this exclusion with that of the cures in the three years, he finds the proportion to amount to 1 in 4·57; or, taken year by year, 1 in 4·38 in 1838; 1 in 4·80 in 1839; and 1 in 4·71 in 1840.

Little general comment upon this retreat of the Brethren of St. Jean de Dieu is required. Great credit must be given them for its generally satisfactory condition, and it stands in highly favourable contrast with the asylum in Lyons, which it excels especially in its site and structure. One striking feature in the building is the vastness of the dormitories, which are the largest I met with among the many asylums I visited. They were well

ventilated, very clean, and very neatly kept. Their elevation, not less than fifteen feet from floor to ceiling, greatly favoured their healthy ventilation, and afforded to the rooms a near approach to the standard cubic capacity laid down. Besides the two or more attendant brethren sleeping in each room, two others perambulated all the apartments, to watch and to attend to patients requiring their aid. Here, then, we see the dormitory system carried out on a very large scale; and if the physicians in medical charge of the asylum, and the brethren engaged in its actual working are to be believed, the results of this system are extremely satisfactory. The desire for privacy, in all probability, does not prevail so widely in France as in England; but, leaving this out of the question, the other objections brought forward against dormitories were distinctly stated not to be felt in practice, while, on the other hand, the easy and complete supervision, the influence of example, the withdrawal of patients from the solitude of single rooms, which to many give scope and occasion to delusions, fear, and frights, and the security against suicide, were urged as some of many advantages attending their use.

Although the promotion of employment, particularly of that out of doors, necessarily calls for commendation; yet the leaven of ancient prejudice is seen to remain in the objection of the brethren to the prosecution of trades requiring the use of edge-tools. Here is one instance in which the rule of such a brotherhood is, and is likely to continue for some time at least, an obstacle to the reception of those ideas of asylum management which are accepted by all medical men whose profession and position give them the benefit of observation and experience. The same comment applies also in the matter of mechanical coercion, here still extensively employed, and in almost all the forms which we have had to reprobate at the Antiquaille. The difficulty of persuading the monks to its abandonment will be so much the greater from their non-professional and general character, from their want of knowledge and experience, and from their interest in the *matériel* of the establishment, and in its preservation from damage by any means which may seem the most direct and efficacious.

We were pleased to find the recognition of so many excellent principles of moral treatment and management in M. Carrier's pamphlet. He insists on the advantages of regulated hours of employment, and of punctuality in the arrangements of the house, remarking that such constitute powerful means of regulating, and even of re-establishing, the healthy influence of the will, which, in all those bereft of reason, is always perverted or lost. "In every section (he adds) the meals, the walks, and the recreations are taken in common."

On the matter of treatment, M. Carrier very correctly remarks

"that to pretend to any exclusive method would be a fatal error. Experience, disengaged from all spirit of system, proves that the relief of the insane will invariably follow from a rational combination of moral and physical agencies, and that those cases are very exceptional where any one method of treatment can claim an absolute superiority. It is, moreover, the fact that phenomena which seem essentially of a moral nature are mostly complicated with evident derangement of some of the functions of organic life; so that, for instance, we have in one case agitation, sleeplessness, a large appetite, and constipation; in another, great physical apathy, drowsiness, the want of appetite, diarrhoea, &c. That this might naturally be expected, the enormous influence of the mind upon the health is sufficient to show To direct the senses of the insane to agreeable, and even, at times, to disturbing impressions—to adroitly and continuously divert their attention from the disordered conceptions which absorb their intellectual and moral powers—such, in a few words, is the system of the moral changes which, together, generally constitute the moral treatment of the insane."

There is, however, one method of treatment referred to by M. Carrier as occasionally practised in the asylum under notice—viz., that of *intimidation*, which it is enough to mention to secure its condemnation. There is yet another proceeding spoken of which we flattered ourselves had long since taken its place among the extinct barbarities of the past, but of which we are sorry to find a supporter in M. Carrier—viz., the "bath of surprise." This physician says: "I could cite a good number of cures effected almost instantaneously by this powerful means of treatment in cases of mania and of monomania." Notwithstanding this flattering report in its favour, no one, we feel assured, will now-a-days have the hardihood to revive this most reprehensible proceeding with the belief that he is to benefit his patients by it. Where fright cures one case of brain disorder, we may safely aver that it causes a hundred.

Examinations after death, M. Carrier tells us, "have almost constantly revealed the existence of lesions of the brain, or of its membranes. Yet there is little constancy of relation discoverable between the form of the delirium assumed and the seat and nature of the pathological changes. One fact I would point out as well deserving notice—viz., that insanity, the consequence of the exhibition of mercury, has, in all instances where death has followed, always been marked by a chronic form of hydrocephalus, without appreciable alteration either of the brain or of its membranes Pulmonary consumption has frequently been associated with melancholia, and a sort of adynamic dysentery has hastened the termination of numerous cases of dementia."

One word more with reference to M. Carrier's opinions. He is an advocate for the complete separation of the two sexes, by placing them in distinct asylums; for he is particularly apprehensive of unruly passions,—so often operative in the causation of insanity, being excited by the vicinity of the opposite sex. Some allowance must be made for this decisive opinion, seeing that the writer is, to a certain extent, the advocate of a particular asylum where females are rigorously excluded—a circumstance, by the way, we imagine due rather to the rules of the religious order who govern it than to medical or psychological considerations. Be this as it may, an *amour propre* for the institution he serves, and the want of experience in any asylum where not only are the males and females located under the same roof, but, under proper supervision, and at certain periods, brought together in the common enjoyment of recreations and amusements, will afford some apology for his adoption of the principle of complete isolation of the sexes.

At some little distance from this Asylum of St. Jean de Dieu, on the same road, but nearer to Lyons, is a small community of "Religieuses," of the order of St. Vincent de Paul, who devote themselves to the care of the insane, and had, in 1854, about thirty female patients in their house. The building, which was close to the high road, was, in the year named, in course of extensive enlargement, to receive an increased number of patients. Being so small an institution, and knowing that all such institutions belonging to religious orders can only be exceptionally visited, particularly when under female control, I made no attempt to inspect it. As it may, however, have by this time, according to the apparent law of asylum growth, have increased to the dimensions of a large establishment, it will be worth inquiring after by any psychological physician who may be staying for a few days in Lyons.

ART. VI.—LAW AND LUNACY: NOTES OF RECENT CASES.

DURING the quarter which has just expired, three cases came before the Courts arising out of matters relating to Lunacy, all of which, from the amount of public attention drawn to them, deserve to be noted down in the list of "Causes célèbres" in this department of legal inquiry. Each case has one or more points of considerable interest and importance. In the case of *Fletcher v. Fletcher*, a plea of admirable ingenuity elicited a very im-

portant legal decision, and the subsequent trial at *Nisi Prius* illustrated the sometimes nice distinction between positive delusion and mere obstinate wrongheadedness. The case of *Ruck v. Stilwell* (which we give at length in a subsequent portion of the Journal), after occupying the Court for three days, resolved itself into a question as to the meaning of a most ambiguous phrase in an Act of Parliament, the result (at present) being that it has received a construction at the hands of a jury, totally different from that put upon it by men who have taken the Act as their daily guide for fifteen years. The case of Miss Phœbe Ewings shows what an awkward position a medical man may place himself in by humouring a patient; and may also well serve as a caution to medical men as to the mode of conducting the examination of a supposed lunatic.

FLETCHER v. FLETCHER.

The plaintiff in this action, Edward Philip Fletcher, sued the defendant Edward Charles Fletcher, his uncle, for giving him into custody and causing him to be imprisoned in a lunatic asylum. The defendant pleaded, 1st, the general issue; 2nd, that the plaintiff was a person of unsound mind and incompetent to take care of himself, and a proper person to be taken charge of and detained under care and treatment as a person of unsound mind, and it was unfit, unsafe, improper, and dangerous that he should be at large, and so justified his being placed in an asylum by the defendant; 3rd, that the plaintiff had conducted himself as a person of unsound mind and incapable of taking care of himself, and as a proper person to be detained under due care and treatment, and that a medical certificate of two practitioners had been obtained as required by the 8 & 9 Vict., c. 100, s. 45, and that the defendant had reasonable and probable ground for believing that such certificate was true, and that the plaintiff was of unsound mind. The last plea was demurred to; that is to say, the plaintiff replied that even assuming it to be true, it was no answer to the action, thus raising a question of law for the decision of the Judges. The question having been argued before the full Court in January last, Lord Campbell gave judgment in the following words:—

“I think the plea is clearly bad. At common law only persons who are actually of unsound mind and whom it would be dangerous to leave at large can be restrained of their liberty. Mr. Bovill has gravely argued that persons who *sham* madness may be shut up in lunatic asylums. It would be most dangerous to the liberty of the subject if that were so. There are many *eccentric* persons, as we know from cases of contested wills, who are not by any means to be treated as lunatics. The 8 and 9 Vict. c. 100, s. 99, affords an argument that

there is no authority at common law for the proposition that if two men say A. B. is a lunatic, C. D. may take him up and treat him as such."

The practical lesson to be deduced from this decision, is that section 99 of 8 and 9 Vict., c. 100, protects proprietors and officers of asylums acting under proper orders and certificates, but leaves the person *originating* such proceedings to show, as required by the common law, that the person put under restraint is in fact a lunatic.

The questions of fact raised by the first and second pleas came on for trial in July last at the Guildhall, before Lord Chief-Justice Cockburn and a special jury. It was proved that the plaintiff was taken to Kensington House, a lunatic asylum kept by Dr. Wood, on the 16th March, 1858, and there detained until the 30th July, when he made his escape while out walking with a keeper. The following is a copy of the order for his detention given by the defendant.

"I, the undersigned, hereby request you to receive Mr. Edward Philip Fletcher, a person of unsound mind, as a patient into your house. Subjoined is a statement respecting the said E. P. Fletcher.

"EDWARD CHARLES FLETCHER,

"Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army and Justice of the Peace,
"Kenward Yolding, Kent."

The order was dated the 12th of March, and was directed to Dr. Wood, Kensington House. The statement accompanying the order represented that the plaintiff was twenty-eight years of age, single, of various previous occupations, of the Church of England, late of 4, Brooksby-street, Islington; that the present was not his first attack, but that he had one when he was twenty-six; that he had not previously been under care and treatment; that the duration of the existing attack was uncertain and cause not known; and that he was subject to epilepsy. In answer to the question, "Whether suicidal?" the answer was, "Doubtful; has threatened it;" and to the question, "Whether dangerous to others?" the answer was, "No."

The certificates of insanity were signed by Dr. Gill and Mr. Squire. Dr. Gill stated in his certificate that the plaintiff was a person of unsound mind, &c., upon the following grounds:—

"1. *Facts indicating insanity observed by myself.* General incoherence of manner; peculiar expression of face, the consequence of epileptic fits, the frequency of which satisfied myself of his delusion with regard to money being due to him by the firm to which his late father belonged, and which I ascertained to be delusions by applying to the solicitor of the executor of the estate.

"2. *Other facts (if any) indicating insanity communicated to me by others.* Frequent fits of violence and excitement, accompanied by

incoherent expressions, swearing, &c., and his general strangeness of manner, so that the servants absolutely refused to wait upon him; his capricious feelings towards his disreputable associates, begging his landlord one hour to turn them out like a dog, and the next being gentle and familiar with them.

"Dated 14th of March, 1858."

Mr. Squire stated in his certificate that the plaintiff was of unsound mind upon the following grounds:—

"1. *Facts indicating insanity observed by myself.* First: Three several attacks of maniacal excitement, in one of which he made some attempt at self-strangulation, and in two of them was dangerously violent; on one occasion offering to strike me while endeavouring to guard his head from blows upon the table and floor of the room, and being on the other occasion in danger of injuring himself unconsciously against the iron bedstead. Secondly: Delusion that he was engaged to be married to a lady whose property would allow him to prosecute his claims to money that he fancied himself entitled to. On both of these points I satisfied myself of the delusion by seeing the lady and inquiring about the money claims.

"2. *Other facts (if any) indicating insanity communicated to me by others.* An attempt at strangling himself by grasping his throat, and great violence and maniacal excitement observed by Mr. Thomas Jones of the Middlesex Hospital. Secondly: An illusion of blood on the wall, and incoherent expressions.

"Dated 14th March, 1858."

As the action was settled without going into the defendant's case, neither Dr. Gill nor Mr. Squire were examined in support of their certificates.

Plaintiff stated in his evidence that since 1855 he had been subject to severe convulsive fits, which, he said, were like hysteria, and lasted from four to six hours; that in February, 1857, and subsequent to that date, he had made applications to his late father's partners to settle accounts with him. There seems to be no doubt that his father really died largely indebted to the firm of which he was a member, and plaintiff admitted he had been so told by his father's executors, and by a person employed by them to investigate the accounts; but he said that he was not satisfied, and it appeared that his father, by his will, made a few months before he died, had purported to leave 5000*l.* to his executors, in trust for the plaintiff, on his attaining twenty-four years of age, besides two other legacies of the like amount to other members of the family. Being examined in reference to Dr. Gill's certificate, the plaintiff said:—

"I had an attack about a fortnight before the 14th of March. It lasted about three hours, and I then perfectly recovered. I have a per-

fect recollection of what occurred between me and Mr. Gill on the 14th. There was no incoherence of manner. All I said about my claim was that I required an explanation about my father's property. The servants . . . never refused to wait upon me. I had no disreputable associates that I am aware of. Some of my father's servants were kind to me. Mr. and Mrs. Clark kept a public-house. I often got a meal there. They never called upon me. I never requested my landlord to turn anybody out. It is false. When I was unwell, I said I could not be sure."

In reference to Mr. Squire's certificate, he said :—

"It is not true I ever made any attempt at self-destruction that I am aware of. When I was attacked, I had a feeling of suffocation and a weight on my neck. I put my hand to my cravat. I was sometimes conscious of doing that. I had been engaged to be married to a lady, but I broke off the engagement. At the commencement of 1858, Mr. Squire one day found a book in my room with a lady's name in it. He asked me who the lady was, her age, and asked if it was the party I was engaged to. I said 'No.' He continued chaffing me on the subject. He asked me if I got money, would I make use of it in prosecuting my claim. I said 'Yes.' That was all that occurred that I recollect. I never attempted more than I have stated. On recovering from an attack, for a second or two, everything appeared blood-red. It did not last more than a second or two. I am not aware of any such illusion except when recovering from an attack."

On cross-examination, the plaintiff admitted that in consequence of the interference of a friend, the Commissioners visited him after he had been in the asylum a fortnight; that they examined him, and said his memory was good; that they had seen the accounts, and recommended the Court of Chancery. They refused to discharge him because of his attacks. About the 24th June, the same Commissioners came again to visit the house. He asked them for an interview before they left. They did not seem very willing to grant it, and asked of one of the attendants how he had been. The attendant said, "Not quite so well." After that he was sent for, and stated his case. They did not attend to him a bit.

Mr. Charles Reade, the author of *Never Too Late to Mend*, gave evidence that he had examined the plaintiff after his escape, and found no delusion in his mind.

Mr Morgan said :—

"I am a medical practitioner in Sussex-place, Hyde-park-gardens. I have known the plaintiff twelve years. I visited him in Kensington House in the early part of last July. I came to the conclusion that he was not a fit subject for restraint in a lunatic asylum. I thought it necessary for the plaintiff to have medical supervision. I thought it might

be much better carried on under a medical man in the country than in the confinement of a lunatic asylum."

Several non-professional witnesses gave evidence as to their belief in the plaintiff's sanity, and two medical gentlemen who had attended him during some of his attacks, viz., Mr. Bibby and Mr. Langmore, both agreed that they were not strictly epileptic fits. Dr. S. Dickson and Dr. Rutledge both gave it as their opinion that plaintiff was perfectly sane in August, 1858.

On the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, a conference took place between the counsel, which resulted in an agreement of compromise.

The Lord Chief Justice observed that the defendant had acted on the representations of medical men, and though that would not justify his putting the plaintiff into a lunatic asylum if he was not insane, it took away the imputation of acting from sinister motives. Plaintiff's counsel wished the jury to express their opinion, whether plaintiff was of sound mind.

The jury without hesitation said that he was, in which opinion the Lord Chief Justice concurred.

RUCK v. STILWELL AND ANOTHER.

The first count in this action was for assaulting and imprisoning the plaintiff in a house called Moorcroft-house, in the parish of Hillingdon, and detaining him there among lunatics and persons of unsound mind, for a period of ten months. The second count alleged that the defendants were keepers of a house licensed for the reception of lunatics, and received the plaintiff upon an order signed by one Mary Ann Ruck, as a private patient, and with two medical certificates; that while the defendants had charge of the plaintiff he recovered, which the defendants well knew, and it was thereupon their duty to transmit notice of such recovery to the said Mary Ann Ruck, but that they neglected to do so, and they also wilfully neglected to transmit notice of his recovery to the Commissioners of Lunacy, but under colour and pretence of the said order and certificates, kept the plaintiff in custody for ten months, &c. To these two counts the defendants pleaded several pleas denying all the material allegations.

The action was tried on the 21st June last, and two following days, at the Guildhall, before Mr. Justice Hill and a special jury.

In the course of the trial the plaintiff abandoned the second count, and the case went to the jury on the first count only.

It appeared that the plaintiff was received into the defendant's house on the 5th November, 1857, upon the certificates of Dr. Conolly and Mr. Richard Barnett, M.R.C.S. He was then suffering from delirium tremens, and had delusions respecting the

fidelity of his wife. Plaintiff admitted that he continued to hold these delusions until the 25th July, 1858, when they were dissipated by a report made to him by his attorney, Mr. Wainwright, immediately on receiving which he admitted there was no doubt he had been wrong. He was discharged on the 27th August, 1858, on the execution of a Commission of Lunacy, when he was declared to be of sound mind. The history of the cure as given in the evidence is well worthy of perusal, and it will be found in the full report of the trial which we give in a subsequent page; but as it has no bearing upon the point on which the case turned, we need not say more upon the subject here. On the extraordinary character of the medical evidence adduced in behalf of the plaintiff, we commented in our last number.*

The ground on which the plaintiff ultimately rested his case on the first count was, that the medical certificates were informal and insufficient, because—1stly, Dr. Conolly was alleged to be "partly the proprietor of, or a regular professional attendant in, Moorcroft House;" 2ndly, that Mr. Barnett was not a surgeon in actual practice; and 3rdly, that the medical men did not examine the plaintiff apart from each other. In summing up the evidence to the jury, his Lordship (Mr. Justice Hill) made the following observations:—

"A great change had been made in modern times in the mode in which lunatics were treated. Harshness and bodily restraint had given way to gentleness and soothing kindness, and the absence of bodily violence; and one gentleman, Dr. Conolly, had been proved to have taken a prominent part in bringing about this amelioration. But the question now was whether the plaintiff's detention was justified by law. The defendant was the licensed keeper of a licensed asylum, and he said the patient was brought to him with a written order for his reception, and accompanied by two certificates signed by two medical men in the form pointed out by the statute, and that he was justified and bound to take charge of him till he died or was discharged in due course of law. The plaintiff said that there was a provision in the statute which forbade a certificate to be signed by certain parties; that Dr. Conolly's certificate was in violation of the Act of Parliament, and that the certificate was illegal and no justification. It would be a question for the Court whether the certificate, though sufficient in point of form, was sufficient in point of law. The provision was, 'that no physician, surgeon, or apothecary, who or whose father, brother, son, partner, or assistant, is wholly or partly the proprietor of, or a regular professional attendant in, a licensed house or hospital, shall sign a certificate for the reception of a patient into such house or hospital,' &c. (16 and 17 Vict., c. 96, s. 12). The question which he (Mr. Justice Hill) should leave to the jury would be whether they were of opinion

* By typographical errors in the remarks upon this case in our last number, Mr. Canton's name was printed *Carter*, and Mr. Gay's *Gray*.

upon the evidence that Dr. Conolly was 'partly the proprietor of, or a regular professional attendant in, Moorcroft House;' and if so, he should direct them to find a verdict for the plaintiff for such damages as they might be advised. If on the other hand they should be of opinion that he was neither, he (Mr. Justice Hill) should direct them to find a verdict for the defendant. There would also be two other questions, whether Dr. Conolly examined the plaintiff separately and apart from Mr. Barnett, and also whether Mr. Barnett was in actual practice as a surgeon. His Lordship proceeded to observe that there could be no doubt the plaintiff had been suffering from *delirium tremens*, and he (the plaintiff) said that Dr. Conolly and Mr. Barnett were both present all the time he was being examined, but there was no other evidence on that point, and the question would be whether the jury could rely on the plaintiff's evidence in contradiction of the certificates, which stated that the parties had examined him separately from any other medical practitioner. The next question would be whether Dr. Stilwell kept the plaintiff *bonâ fide*, or whether he kept him there for his own gain, and those questions would be very important in considering the question of damages. His Lordship then read the plaintiff's evidence as to his treatment by the defendant, which showed that his delusions continued up to the 26th of July, 1858, and also the evidence of the keepers and Mr. Wainwright on the same point. His Lordship then referred to the book kept at the defendant's establishment, from which it appeared that in the first quarter of the year 1857, Dr. Conolly had received £152 10s. from the defendant. His Lordship thought that if Dr. Conolly had been partly the proprietor, he would have received something out of every patient; but the book showed that he only received payments in respect of a certain number. It looked more like the case of a man who was a regular professional attendant in the asylum. In the second quarter ending June, 1857, Dr. Conolly received his consulting fee (25 guineas) and payments in respect of 18 out of 40 patients. In the quarter ending at Michaelmas, 1857, Dr. Conolly received his consulting fee (25 guineas) and payments in respect of 18 patients, in varying sums amounting in all to £184 7s. 6d. In the quarter ending at Christmas, 1857, he received payments also in respect of 18 patients. So also in the quarter ending in March, 1858, he received his consultation fee (25 guineas) and payments in respect of 18 patients, and in that quarter Mr. Ruck's name appeared with £15 opposite it. In the quarter ending at Midsummer, 1858, Dr. Conolly received his consultation fee of 25 guineas and payments in respect of 18 patients, Mr. Ruck's name having £15 opposite to it. It would be for the jury to say upon that evidence whether Dr. Conolly was or was not a regular medical practitioner in the asylum. His Lordship told the jury that whether they thought Dr. Conolly was in part a proprietor or a regular professional attendant in the asylum, in either case they ought to find their verdict for the plaintiff, with such damages as they might think reasonable, but if they thought otherwise, they ought to find for the defendant."

The jury found (1) that if receiving the money, as shown in the

book, made Dr. Conolly a part proprietor—they found the fact of receiving the money; (2) that Dr. Conolly was a regular professional attendant at Moorcroft House, and they assessed 500*l.* damages.

As to Mr. Barnett's not being in practice, the jury found they had not sufficient evidence that he was not, nor had they sufficient evidence to satisfy them that the plaintiff had not been examined separately by Mr. Barnett and Dr. Conolly.

The summing up of the learned judge involves matter of great importance to the medical profession generally; but as the case is still *sub judice*, we refrain from making any comment upon it at present.

CASE OF MISS PHOEBE EWINGS.

The circumstances of this case came before the public upon the execution of a Commission to inquire into the state of mind of Miss Phoebe Ewings. The inquiry commenced at the Castle of Exeter on Friday the 12th of August, and was continued for five days, the Court generally sitting thirteen hours each day. Samuel Warren, Esq., was the Presiding Commissioner.

Miss Ewings, the subject of the inquiry, is nearly eighty years of age. She had an attack of paralysis in October, 1858, which was followed by mania, and it was generally admitted that she had been properly placed in the Haydock Lunatic Asylum in the month of December. There she remained until the 15th of February in the present year, when she was placed in lodgings in Exeter by a distant relative, and under the medical care of Dr. Shapter of that city. In the month of May, a petition in lunacy was presented by a relative, alleging Miss Ewings to be of unsound mind, and praying the appointment of a guardian of her estate. Thereupon Dr. Bucknill was directed by the Lords Justices to visit the lady, and to report to them upon the state of her mind. After examining her at eight interviews, he arrived at the opinion that she was insane. Pending these proceedings, Miss Ewings made two wills, one on the 30th of May, which she afterwards destroyed, and the other on the 2nd of July. In both of these wills Dr. Shapter was named as residuary legatee, and the latter will provided that in the event of his dying in Miss Ewing's lifetime, the property, amounting to nearly £18,000, should go to his eldest son, and in case of his death to other members of Dr. Shapter's family. The solicitor who prepared this will was introduced by Dr. Shapter, and he was present when it was prepared and signed; but within a few days after he wrote to Miss Ewings' solicitor, stating it to be his intention not to take any

benefit under the will. He was examined in support of the sanity of the lady, and as might be expected was subjected to severe cross-examination and remarks upon the course he had adopted. It was with great reason contended that his evidence was inconsistent with his treatment.

A chief feature of interest in the case to the readers of this Journal, was contained in the evidence of Drs. Bucknill and Tuke on the part of the petitioner. Although the conclusion at which they had arrived, was also that adopted by the jury, it must be admitted they were very fairly bantered in cross-examination respecting the nature of some of the questions put to the old lady, with the view of testing her mental powers.

Dr. Bucknill stated in his evidence-in-chief, that although Miss Ewings was able to calculate that if she paid 100*l.* a-year for her board, that would be equivalent to 50*l.* for a half-year, and 25*l.* for a quarter of a year, yet she could not tell how much it would be per week. On cross-examination by Mr. Collier, he said that, when he asked her how much she would have to pay per week for her lodgings at 100*l.* per year, she could not answer the question.

Mr. Collier.—Will you be kind enough, Dr. Bucknill, to say how much that is per week?

Witness (hesitating).—I cannot tell in a moment (laughter).

Mr. Collier.—Come, 100*l.* a-year. How much is that per week? Don't be nervous: take time (laughter).

Witness.—I decline to tell you.

Mr. Collier.—Can you tell without taking out your pencil and going through the figures?

Witness.—No (laughter).

The Commissioner.—I don't think the learned counsel can (laughter).

Mr. Collier (reading from his brief).—It's just 38 shillings and five-twelfths of a penny (laughter). Would not a question of that sort puzzle her?

Witness.—It was not done to puzzle her.

Mr. Collier.—Did it have the effect of puzzling her?

Witness.—No doubt it did.

Dr. Tuke, in his evidence-in-chief, stated, that the general answers of Miss Ewings evinced a want of power to comprehend a subject. He asked, "Who is the present reigning sovereign?" She did not seem to understand it. She did not answer. He said, "Don't hurry yourself; who is the head of the constitution? who administers the law?" He put it many ways, but she seemed not able to understand. The young lady (present) interposed the question, "Who is the present Queen?" Miss Ewings said immediately, "Queen Victoria."

The Commissioner.—She beat you in the question, Doctor ; yours was rather philosophical (laughter).

On cross-examination by Mr. Collier, Dr. Tuke said :—

I asked her who was the head of the Constitution, who administered the law ? I wanted to give her a question that should make her think, but not to puzzle her.

The Commissioner.—If you were to ask Mr. Roebuck who was head of the Constitution, he would say the House of Commons (a laugh).

Mr. Collier.—So it was to make her think that you asked her who administered the laws. Now, Dr. Tuke, who does administer the laws ? (laughter.)

Dr. Tuke.—I decline to answer.

Mr. Collier.—Why, it is your own question.

Dr. Tuke.—Yes. I put it to the lady gently and kindly (laughter).

Mr. Collier.—Oh ! very well. I will put it to you gently and kindly : Dr. Tuke, who administers the laws of this country ? (laughter.)

Dr. Tuke.—If I were to answer at once—

Mr. Collier.—Oh ! take time : consider of it.

Dr. Tuke.—I should say the King or Queen. I see the dilemma ; but when I put the question to Miss Ewings, I was “ talking down ” to her.

Mr. Collier.—Now, on consideration, should you say the Queen or the Lord Chief Justice of England ?

Dr. Tuke.—On consideration, I think it might be the Lord Chief Justice.

The Commissioner.—Who is the Chief Magistrate ? Is it not the Sovereign ?

Dr. Tuke.—That is my impression. I wanted to ascertain if the lady understood a proposition. If I had asked who is the King or Queen reigning, I have no doubt she would have answered rightly. But my question may have puzzled her, although I put it in every possible way not to puzzle her. I think it possible that the failure in getting an answer may have been the fault of my question.

There can be little doubt as to the worthlessness of such a mode of examining a supposed lunatic for the object in question, and it is much to be regretted in the interest of medical testimony that this evidence should ever have been given in support of the conclusion sought to be established by it. Remembering the opinion current with the public, and nowhere less than in our Courts of Justice, as to the supposed readiness on the part of medical Psychologists to prove people insane, it is of the utmost importance to the credit of the profession that the reasons offered in support of such a conclusion should be such as will bear the strictest scrutiny.

Certain portions of the medical evidence given in support of the sanity of the lady are too curious to be passed unnoticed.

The Commissioner, addressing himself to Mr. Sharp, the ordinary medical attendant of Miss Ewings, previous to her residence at Exeter, and then under examination, said :—

Now the question is, and I have written it down for you, supposing Miss Ewings had yesterday taken the life of another person, and you are this morning asked—if she were being tried for her life—whether she was a rational being and accountable for her actions, would you answer that she was of sound mind, or that she was not ?

Witness.—I should say she was of sound mind when I saw her, but that having had an attack of mania it might suddenly return, and then of course she would be of unsound mind, but if she had done it while talking to me, then I will say “while in a sound state of mind,” but no medical man can say how suddenly an attack of mania may return after it has once appeared. If my memory serves me right, I might say that on the evening of the day when she ran out of the house in an excited state, she was calm in the morning.

The Commissioner.—But supposing no attack of acute mania had supervened—of which we have spoken—do you think that if she had killed any one that it would have been “murder?” Would you now sitting in that chair tell the jury—would you say that you believed that she was of sound mind ?

Witness.—Of sound mind.

The Commissioner.—Suppose, with your present knowledge—which you have given to the learned counsel and the jury—you were now to be suddenly informed by some one that she had ?

Witness.—The answer would be that a sudden attack of mania might have set in, but my impression is that she would not have done it while talking with me, but she might have done it in consequence of a sudden attack of mania having come on.

The Commissioner.—Are elderly people very liable to such attacks of acute mania ?

Witness.—I can't say peculiarly liable to sudden attacks, but I know they may have it.

The Commissioner.—Dr. Pritchard, you know, is an authority of some eminence. Listen to this which I read from his book :—“The disease of mental insanity often appears in a more marked and sudden manner in elderly persons who have sustained a slight attack of apoplexy or paralysis, which has perhaps been speedily recovered, and which might be expected to have left traces of the disease. The expectation is verified so far as the sensitive and motive powers are concerned, but the seat of the intellect is found to have been shaken to its very centre.” Do you agree with that ?

Witness.—I don't think that I have sufficient experience to say whether I agree with or differ from that.

Dr. John Andrew Paterson, a fellow of the College of Physic-

cians at Edinburgh, one of the witnesses, in his examination-in-chief, said :—

I am of opinion that Miss Ewings is quite competent to manage the ordinary affairs of life. I should say, subject to the enfeebling of old age, that she was of sound mind. Her memory and perceptive powers were good, and there is nothing about her to indicate lunacy of any kind.

On cross-examination by Mr. Karslake he stated as follows :—

Supposing that she was under a misapprehension as to a man being in the house at Warrington, that may be an exaggerated impression rather than a delusion. My opinion is, that at the time Miss Ewings was removed to the asylum she suffered from acute delirium, and not from mania—the former I believe to be a disturbance of the mind consequent upon physical disease, and the latter a disease of the brain. Often after an attack of mania delusions were discovered. I know that she had an attack of mania ; there was nothing unusual in her having the delusions.

Mr. Karslake.—Will you give us your definition of delirium and mania? *A.* Yes. *Q.* Do you say that mania is a disease of the brain, or would you not say that the effect on the mind is the result of disease of the brain? *A.* Yes ; but we are obliged to draw a line between bodily and mental disease ; of course, it is only in that sense we are obliged to draw a line. *Q.* Now, supposing you found a person six months ago had believed, without any foundation, that a person had clasped her around the neck, and had attempted to strangle her, and following upon that she has mania, and is conveyed to an asylum, and six months afterwards she still believes that people attempted to strangle her, for which there is no foundation in fact, would you call that a delusion? *A.* I am not sure I should. *Q.* Would you call it an exaggeration, assuming my premises? *A.* I will assume your premises, but it appears to me that a person would have so little recollection as to make her unable to distinguish between what was a false impression and an actual fact. *Q.* When do you suppose that the impression was caused? *A.* In her mania. *Q.* How are we to draw a distinction of what you call a delusion, or what you call an exaggeration? *A.* I should call it a delusion, but still it is not an existing delusion. *Q.* Then is it a delusion? *A.* It is an unfounded belief. *Q.* What is the difference between a delusion and an unfounded belief? *A.* (hesitating): It is very difficult to say. *Q.* There certainly must be words in the coinage of the English language to express it. What is the difference between an unfounded belief and an unfounded impression? *A.* Because many sensible people may labour under a delusion. *Q.* Supposing that a man was to tell you to-morrow that I am Oliver Cromwell, and nothing on the earth would prevent my belief in it, is that the effect of a delusion or not? *A.* Certainly. *Q.* Supposing that you had been with me an hour, and I told you that a man had come into

the room, and had attempted to strangle me, and that nothing of the sort had occurred, is that a delusion? *A.* Yes; I suppose it is. *Q.* It would not be an exaggerated belief? *A.* No; if there had been no foundation for it. *Q.* You would admit that it was, strictly speaking, a delusion? *A.* Yes. *Q.* Are you aware that by the law of the land a person believing in delusions is a madman? *A.* Of course it is entirely a matter of meaning of words. *Q.* No, no, it is not. Are you aware that a person having a persistent delusion, of a thing that does not exist, is insane and incapable of making a will? *A.* Yes; that is an insane delusion. *Q.* I am talking of a delusion as the persistent belief in a thing which does not exist, nor never did exist, would you call that an insane delusion? *A.* It is an insane delusion. *Q.* Then putting the adjective insane, is that the mere putting a vituperative expression to a delusion? *A.* I think almost all people may persuade themselves in the existence of something that does not exist, nor never did exist, and not be mad. *Q.* I grant you that, but is it not an insane delusion? *A.* Of course. *Q.* You recognise a distinction between a mistaken fact and a delusion? *A.* Yes; because a person may believe he is attacked by three persons when it is only one. *Q.* But supposing you had ascertained from Miss Ewings, or she had told you, that at Warrington, before she went to the asylum, a woman with one arm had thrown her down in her lap, and had clasped her round her neck, and you knew that it was not a fact, would not that be a delusion? *A.* I say that I do not believe that a mistaken belief as to what occurred in paroxysms of mania is a delusion. *Q.* Do you believe that delusions engendered during delirium or mania are not delusions? *A.* It is only the memory of a delusion. *Q.* Is it not a continuing delusion? *A.* Certainly not. *The Commissioner:* Supposing that you believed that a black man with three heads bit you, would you believe that to be a delusion? *A.* That is a different thing. *Q.* Supposing a person labouring under insanity had told you that a black man with three heads—*A.* (laughing): I should. *Q.* You will not, Dr. Paterson, attend to my questions. I will try again. Supposing a person labouring under insanity had told you that a black man with three heads bit you very much, and supposing you to have recovered, and that you persisted in the belief that the man had done so, do you mean to tell me that that would be a continuing delusion? *A.* Yes; because it is a very different kind of thing. The difference is just this; that the person is still believing that which is an impossibility, for we know that there is no person with three heads. *Mr. Karlake:* I do not know that.—The Commissioner here told Dr. Paterson that—inasmuch as the learned counsel was putting his questions with great care, he trusted he would answer him equally carefully. It was a very important matter.—*Mr. Karlake:* Will you explain the difference between the question the learned Commissioner has put, and the one I have put? *A.* Yes; because it is possible that a woman might have one arm. *Q.* Will you explain the difference between the memory of a delusion, and a delusion? *A.* One is an impression on the mind, and the other arises from a false conception. *Q.* Very well; but supposing

that a madman had a delusion that he was told by an angel to murder his father, would you believe that to be a past or existing delusion? *A.* I should say it would be both a past and existing delusion. *Q.* Will you draw the distinction between the two? *A.* It is impossible, because a man would not, in the nature of things, be told such a thing by an angel. *Q.* But suppose that he was told by a gipsy, would that be a delusion? *A.* No; an erroneous belief. *Q.* Define the difference between a delusion and erroneous belief, taking my premises? *A.* It is a belief arising from a false impression of the mind; a totally unfounded impression of the mind. *Q.* Is not that a delusion, as I said before? *A.* I draw a distinction in my own mind as to what in my own judgment is an erroneous belief, or an unfounded belief, or a delusion. I should think that which you mentioned about an angel is the memory of a delusion. *Q.* Give us the definition of a delusion. *A.* It is difficult to say. *Q.* Is the present belief in a non-existent thing a delusion? *A.* Certainly; if you prove to the mind of an individual who holds that belief that the thing never did exist, that is a delusion. *Q.* I assume that one evidence would be that the more you attempt to persuade him that it was a delusion, the more he would persist in believing it? *A.* Certainly. *Q.* Has it occurred to you in your practice to find that a common symptom of mania is the continuing to believe in an exaggerated thing, as distinguished from delusion? *A.* Certainly. *Q.* That is the result of mania? *A.* Very often; for all the mental faculties are exaggerated. *Q.* Now, among all those instances of unfounded belief, have you found that an unfounded aversion to people is a common symptom of insanity? *A.* Yes. *Q.* Have you found that attributing very serious consequences to acts of very minor importance is also a form of insanity? *A.* Yes, and the energies are impaired by paralysis, but I do not say that the cause is existing. *Q.* What is the physical evidence upon which you say that she entirely recovered from paralysis? *A.* Because she has been enabled to walk at a time two or three miles, and could lift dumb-bells. I could see no trace of paralysis. *Q.* Could you see it in her face? *A.* But very vague.

By the Commissioner.—Inability to protrude the tongue, as the effect of paralysis, afforded evidence of lesion of the brain.

Mr. Karslake.—Will you give me your definition of delirium, and how it differs from mania? *A.* It differs from mania because delirium is the result of bodily disease, whilst mania is the result of disease of the mind. *Q.* Does not mania frequently follow paralysis? *A.* Frequently, I cannot say. *Q.* Do you find that delirium often follows paralysis? *A.* Occasionally. *Q.* Do either of them, as a general rule, follow paralysis? *A.* There is a great suspension of the faculties. *Q.* I believe the forms of insanity are almost innumerable? *A.* Yes. *Q.* And the habits of insane people? *A.* Yes. *Q.* You find that when people are in lunatic asylums they are excessively particular about their religion? *A.* Yes. *Q.* Have you also found that people become excessively particular about religious services? *A.* I think there is occasionally a change of character. *Q.* Have you not found innumerable people who are labouring under delusions? *A.* Yes, I

have. *Q.* And that is an evidence of their insanity? *A.* Yes, in some instances a very strong evidence.

Re-examined by Mr. Coleridge.—A person may recover perfectly from an attack of apoplexy or paralysis, and her intellect be as sound as possible.

The Commissioner.—Have you ever seen such a case? *A.* I have not.

Mr. Karslake.—When you saw Miss Ewings were you told to look for insanity? *A.* Not particularly. *Q.* But when you are told, I suppose you do look for it? *A.* I do.

Mr. Coleridge.—Supposing that Miss Ewings stated that a woman with one arm entered her room, and laid her head in her lap, and that afterwards she exaggerated by stating that the woman attempted to strangle her, would you call that a delusion? *A.* I should call it an exaggerated belief.

The Commissioner.—Supposing that a person of seventy years of age had lost her sister, and had had an attack of paralysis, and that was followed by an attack of acute mania, so that steps were taken to put her into an asylum, and that you afterwards heard her maintaining certain impressions which had no foundation, would you say that the mind was sound—especially if she still maintained those erroneous impressions up to the period of her eightieth year? *A.*—(abruptly)—I do not think I can give you any other answer than I have given you over and over in this examination. *The Commissioner.*—(warmly)—Really you will not understand me, Dr. Patterson. Do give me an answer. If you found that she still believes to exist, what she believed at the time of the attack of acute mania, does that show unsoundness of mind? *A.* Doubts in the foundation of her belief. *The Commissioner* again repeated the question in several forms, but finding he could not get a proper reply to his question, he said to Dr. Patterson—“Very well, sir, I really cannot make myself understood. You had better go down.”

The conclusion of the case was that after a consultation of ten minutes the jury found a unanimous verdict that Phœbe Ewings was not of sound mind.

ART. VII.—THE ÆSTHETICS OF SUICIDE.

"THE SUICIDE DOES NOT UNDERGO DEATH BECAUSE IT IS HONOURABLE, BUT IS ORDER TO AVOID EVIL."—*Aristotle.*

"DO YOU KNOW, [SAID SOCRATES, THAT ALL EXCEPT PHILOSOPHERS] CONSIDER DEATH AMONG THE GREAT EVILS?"

"THEY DO INDEED," [SIMMIAS] ANSWERED.

"THEN DO THE BRAVE AMONGST THEM ENDURE DEATH, WHEN THEY DO ENDURE IT, THROUGH DREAD OF GREATER EVILS?"

"IT IS SO."

"ALL MEN, THEREFORE, EXCEPT PHILOSOPHERS, ARE BRAVE THROUGH BEING AFRAID AND FEAR; THOUGH IT IS ABSURD THAT ANY ONE SHOULD BE BRAVE THROUGH FEAR AND COWARDICE."—*Plato.*

IN the north room of the Royal Academy, at the last Exhibition, there was hung a painting, the subject of which was somewhat singular. It represented a garret, within which was depicted, sitting at the edge of a truckle bed, a young man whose countenance had a scared aspect. At his feet, upon the floor, sat a woman, her form huddled together, her head resting upon his knees, and her face hid by her arms. Nigh at hand, in front of an overturned stove, was a little heap of fiercely burning charcoal, and on a table, in the corner of the room, might be distinguished the butt-end of a pistol. Through a curtainless window could be seen the tops of green trees, and a patch of blue sky; while the pale light of early morning, or of the closing eventide, and the fiery glow of the burning charcoal, lit the scene.

We have described the picture from memory, and may perhaps have erred in some of the slighter details, but the chief characteristics were such as we have given.

The artist had done his work featly, and it did not need a second glance to see that he had fixed upon the canvas, with no contemptible skill, a too common phase of every-day-life suicide. But what recent or sometime past instance of double suicide so far appealed to our sympathies, or what description of such an event in literature stood so markedly prominent, from the excelling power of the writer, that the pencil should add a halo to the ghastly incident, or to the writer's pen? We turned to the catalogue, but appended to the number of the painting there was simply this sentence—

"The fumes of charcoal."

On the walls of the same Academy, a few years before, Wallis's wonderful painting of Chatterton's self-murder had hung. This suicide, however,—the wretched end of one of the most conspicuous examples of misdirected genius that the world ever saw, claims a place in history. Of the limner's representations of everyday suicide, we know M. Decamp's horrible but nervous

drawing. A young man, wasted by suffering and half naked, is extended upon a wretched bed, in an equally wretched attic. A blanket, the sole clothing, envelopes the body. The head has fallen backwards, and the long, trailing, entangled hair is dabbled with blood. One hand reposes on the breast, the other rests flaccidly upon the floor. Near the bed lies a still smoking pistol, while against the wall lean an easel and a palette, upon which the colours are still moist. On a rough-hewn plank above the easel are arranged a few books, and alongside them stand a plaster statuette, and a death's-head. This painting is simply termed *The Suicide*, and in nowise is the terrible story which it tells, or the terrible lesson which it conveys, mitigated or distorted. We know also Cruikshank's too truthful drawing, the last of the series named *The Drunkard's Children*, a sequel to *The Bottle*. Who has not shuddered when he has gazed upon the agonized figure, which, with the hands convulsively clasped upon the eyes, has sprung from the parapet of the bridge? How vividly the mind pictures to itself the sullen wash of the river against the piers; the dark glassy surface of the water in the huge black shadow of the masonry; the golden gleam of the moonshine on the distant ripples. How involuntarily we shiver at the thoughts of the chilly, damp air which hovers over the stream, and sicken at the awful sense of solitariness which is apt to steal over one when, standing on one of the bridges, he is hemmed in by the midnight sounds of the city. Alas! for the friendless who at such an hour and on such a spot may listen to them!* Then the sharp, painful recoil of the feelings, as the slight, scarcely heard splash strikes the ear from below, and the eager gaze with which we peer into the gulf, and mark the two or three pale, fleeting gleams of silvery light which crest the diminutive waves, tossed up by the cloven water. "God help the poor unfortunate!" we exclaim; rather should we cry, "*God help us*"—to read aright, and to act aright after having read, the legend written beneath the picture—"The maniac father and the convict brother are gone! The Poor Girl, homeless, friendless, deserted, destitute, and gin-mad, commits self-murder!"

"Alas! for the rarity
Of Christian charity
Under the sun!
Oh! it was pitiful!
Near a whole city full,
Home she had none."

* "When I first saw the river as I passed over King's College Bridge," said Robert Hall, speaking of the Cam, to Dr. Olinthus Gregory, "I could not help exclaiming, Why, the stream is standing still to see people drown themselves! and that, I am sorry to say, is a permanent feeling with me." How many, doubtless, are affected by a very similar feeling on looking at night upon the Thames, where

We know also that little sketch of Thackeray's, which illustrates "*A Gambler's Death*." It is but a roughly executed drawing, but it is *taken from nature*, and set in the tale to which it belongs, is of surpassing interest. (See the *Paris Sketch-Book*.)

Decamp's, Cruikshank's, and Thackeray's drawings tell the rigid, ghastly truth of everyday suicide; and the drawings of the two latter men convey a lesson not easily overlooked or forgotten, and free from a certain terrible fascination, which rivets the attention to the painting of the former man, even from its very truthfulness. But the "*Fumes of Charcoal*" is a picture which, judging from its title and execution, aims at depicting suicide from an æsthetical point of view. The horrible character of the act is partly overshadowed by a certain unhealthy sentiment, and the painting appeals to a morbid sympathy, rather than to a sound feeling of abhorrence tempered with an active and well-directed pity.

We may be wrong in our estimate of the artist's work, and we hope we are. It may, moreover, be simply an illustration of peculiar notions on his part of the functions of the painter's art; but we cannot help regarding this painting as one of several indications, which seem to point to a growing sympathy towards the act of suicide in this country.

Our coroners' juries have become so sensitive of the fame of suicides, that (so far as can be judged from newspaper reports*) the rule is to pronounce a verdict of temporary insanity in cases of self-murder. This legalized apology for suicide is not only too often an evasion both of the law and the gospel, but it tends to throw discredit upon the doctrine of temporary insanity, and what is even still more important, to convert the act of suicide into an object of legitimate pity.

We have no special literature of suicide in England at the present time; but our Gallic neighbours supply us in this respect superabundantly. With them suicide holds a very similar position in popular writings, and is invested with the same kind of sentiment as "broken-hearts" and consumption with us. We meet with self-murder at every turn in some of the most popular and widely-spread forms of French literature, and the act is clad with so many charms of a highly æsthetical character, and altogether takes so respectable a position among the legitimate causes of death, that one recoils in fear from the insidious doctrines (absurd though they may be) implied or taught. Witness the *Mémoires d'un Suicide recueillis et publiés par Maxime du Camp*, (Paris,

it winds within the metropolis,—a feeling often increased if not originally prompted by the sad associations connected with the bridges. It is to be feared that many who have been foiled at every turn in life's struggle, have become fascinated with the terrible idea and yielded to it.

* Cannot Mr. Samuel Redgrave help us to some more definite and satisfactory information upon this subject?

1855,) and the more recent work, *Les Suicides Illustres : biographie des personnages remarquables de tous les Pays qui ont péri volontairement depuis le commencement du Monde jusqu'à nos jours*, par F. Dabadie (Première Série. Paris, 1859.)

Charles Nodier had conceived the notion of writing the biography of noted suicides, and reading to us the "solemn philosophical lesson" which is to be derived from the string of renowned artists, poets, inventors, legislators, heroes, conquerors, kings, queens, emperors, priests, and lovers who have murdered themselves. "It is singular," remarks M. Sartorius, in a prefatory notice to M. Dabadie's work, "that for the last thirty years we have been swamped with celebrated brigands, celebrated kings, celebrated wives, celebrated children, celebrated animals, &c., but no one has recounted the tale of celebrated suicides. Thanks, however, to M. Dabadie, this much to be regretted hiatus in the French book-trade has been (by our advice) filled up."

We have the book, but the solemn philosophical lesson, and the biographical research, which would have legitimized its place in literature, are wanting. "*Les Suicides Illustres*" appeals to the *dilettanti* in suicide. In his Introduction to the work, M. Dabadie, after having touched in a slipshod fashion upon several opinions respecting suicide, writes :—

"Morality—we speak of social not of religious morality [happy distinction !] which has nothing to do here—morality, we say, which is elevated above the law by its origin, its function, its end, and which moves in a more extended sphere, justly disapproves of certain suicides. For example, every married man has contracted a sacred engagement; he owes help and protection to the woman he has espoused, as also to his children. This engagement having been freely entered into, one thing only can dissolve it—the radical and definitive impossibility of fulfilling it. Thus the father of a family who is or can be useful to it, is blameable if he disembarass himself of that life which does not belong to him.

"To recall this incontestible principle is to demonstrate that man has not *always* the right to kill himself. But universal opinion would be wounded—and we are tempted to add morality (!)—if it were sustained that he has *never* the right. In truth, in the eyes of opinion, there are suicides which are not only excusable but even praiseworthy. Such is the suicide of the commandant of a fortification or of a ship which he blows up rather than render it to an enemy. Orators, poets, and celebrated historians, as well as heroes, soldiers and sailors, who have had the bravery to accomplish this resolution, are admired by the people, and the Church dare not refuse to pray for the health of their souls. More than once it has happened that suicide has been the brevet of glory. Witness those Greeks and Romans who fell so nobly that *death was proud to take them*, according to the magnificent expression of the English poet; and without going so far back, the young

officer of our navy (Bisson), who immortalized himself in the waters of the Archipelago, under the Restoration.

"As to the vulgar suicides, it appears to us better to pity than to blame them. Rich or poor, old or young, ill or well, man is bound to existence by so many ties—without noticing the bond of habit—that he must have suffered cruelly before conceiving the idea of destroying himself, especially before realizing it." (pp. xxv—xxvii.)

Let it not be supposed that notions such as these are maintained by obscure writers solely. We may mark an approximation to them in a recent expression of opinion by one who has an enviable position among physicians, and whose scientific writings on suicide have a world-wide reputation—Brierre de Boismont. In the course of an inquiry into the suicidal or accidental nature of an injury which had occasioned the death of a gentleman in Paris in September, 1858, M. Pinard, the substitute of the procureur-impériale, said :—

"We are not of those too-austere legislators who without pity for the dead would gibbet the bodies of suicides, and drag them through the streets upon a hurdle.* We live, on the contrary, in the midst of an enfeebled society which beholds with indifference the multiplication of suicide, and which regards it more with pity than with anger. Does society look upon self-murder as a good or an evil? To listen to certain doctrines and to witness the ravages of this evil extending into all classes of society, we should say that it has doubts in this respect, and that it forgave all those who had recourse to it. Neither need we wonder at these doubts when we meet with poets who say to distempered souls, death is a sleep; 'rest ye and break the vase if the liquor is too bitter: when we encounter more hardy minds who proclaim to all that death is a right and the disinherited may quit a world which has abandoned them. Against this double cry of feebleness and pride it is necessary that we should maintain the old principles that have been taxed as common-place (as if common-places were not eternal truths), that suicide which arises from madness is a calamity, that when it is committed by a sane person it is a crime.

"Is not suicide a protest against the life to come, a protest against the immortal principle we carry in us, a protest against the social duties which we have given rise to and which we ought to fulfil to the end? Then ought every flourishing society to guard against this disease of eternal faiths. Then ought magistrates always to regard suicide as a disgrace, a crime to be engraved on a tomb, a dishonour bequeathed to a family."

Upon these opinions M. B. de Boismont remarks :—

"We are keenly affected by these noble and generous words, but do they not admit of any exception?"

* "1598, February 20.—The 20 day of Februar, Thomas Dobie drownit himself in the Quarrel holes, besyde the Abbey, and upon the morne he was harlit throw the towne backward, and thereafter hangit on the gallows."—*Robert Birrell's Diary—Notes and Queries*, vol. v., p. 272.

"Philip Strozzi had fallen into the hands of his most cruel enemy, Come de Medicis, whom he had wished to overturn. He was one of a body of conspirators, of whom he possessed the secrets. If he spoke, their heads would roll upon the scaffold, their property would be confiscated, their families proscribed and reduced to indigence, and his name and himself would be dishonoured. If he had but to meet an ordinary death his silence would not be shaken, but torture might triumph over his courage, as it had triumphed over that of the unfortunate Julian Gondi and many others, and cause him to forswear himself. He would not brave a like peril. Filled with the learning of the ancients, whose works had been recently disinterred, after many ages of darkness, and had electrified Italian imaginations, he descended to the tomb, invoking the name of Cato, and of those virtuous men who had likewise killed themselves. If Strozzi be criminal, truly his crime is of a nature every way peculiar, because his memory does not lack the sympathies of many men, and his memory will always be respected.

"In the midst of the agitations which disturb the world, perhaps there would be fewer villanies, and more great actions, if those who are called to play a part upon the political scene took the resolution to die rather than to abandon the triumph of their ideas, or preferred honour to life. There are epochs, says M. S. De Sacy, when to die with readiness is a noble science; and if Christianity, from a more elevated point of view, condemns absolutely suicide, after the courage of maintaining life in obedience to God, it must be admitted that there is no greater courage than that of quitting it voluntarily in order to avoid being sullied by a baseness."—*Recherches Médico-Légales sur le Suicide à l'occasion d'un cas douteux de mort accidentelle ou violente. Par A. B. de Boismont. Annales d'Hygiène Publique. July, 1859.*

M. B. de Boismont's reasoning would leave a tolerably wide path open and an ample verge, capable of unlimited enlargement, for suicide. For who is to lay down those rules which would enable us to determine with precision the circumstances when suicide becomes not merely justifiable but even praiseworthy? Honour and the world's-opinion are not synonyms of virtue as the world goes, and to take them as guides would leave us in precisely the same predicament that the world has been in with regard to suicide ever since it began to play a conspicuous part in history.

If M. Boismont's *in extremis* doctrine of political conduct were adopted, it is evident that it would not be the *ideas* contended for, but the success or not of those ideas which must govern the act of self-murder, for the doctrine is applicable to every shade, every variety of belief entertained by politicians. Think for a moment of Louis Napoleon struggling against the evils of penury, of expatriation, nay, of seemingly hopeless exile in a back street of London; his most cherished notions crushed; his greatest efforts not merely unsuccessful, but a mark of ridicule. Pic-

ture to yourself this man discovered one morning, amidst all the bustle and hurry of the huge city, stretched upon his bed, his head shattered, and the instrument of the foul deed within the grasp of the stiffened fingers; picture the stolid jury; the remarks of contemptible pity; the execrations of creditors; and the final interment in some obscure spot of one of the many desolate burial-grounds, or of the crowded cemeteries of London. Yet in what instance could M. Boismont's aspiration concerning self-murder have been more justified? But think of Louis Napoleon, Emperor of the French, and making for himself a colossal name in history, and reflect on the horrible absurdity of suicide as a last political resort. This is no question of Buonapartism or not; for the lesson belongs to every creed of political faith, but it is of the most value to those creeds which are for the nonce depressed, nay apparently hopeless.

Again, sympathy with the motives which may have led to self-murder is one thing; to hold them up as lights for our guidance is another and very different thing. Philip Strozzi dying on the rack, silent amidst his torments, or throwing a noble scorn at his executioners; Philip Strozzi emulating the courage of many Christian martyrs and warriors, and not the bastard courage of a Cato, would have as far excelled the Philip Strozzi dying by his own hand in a dungeon, as Lucifer the angel excelled Lucifer the fallen one. But, alas! for the ill-example to his supporters—alas! for any cause whose adherents are taught so ready a way to avoid difficulties; his physical courage failed, and Florence lost the example of a martyr and got the old-fashioned one of a mere conspicuous man. We pity Strozzi, but we should no more hold him up as an example to be followed, than the Red Indian would hold out to his son as an example the man who, to avoid torture when a captive, had destroyed himself, or who had suffered a groan to escape him under the torture.

It is recorded that when Charles V. was told of Strozzi's death, and the fashion of it, he remarked, *smiling*, "may all my enemies perish thus." It may be surmised that the Emperor shrewdly suspected that Strozzi dying by his own hand would have a less exciting effect upon the Florentines than Strozzi dying by the executioner. The Emperor's opinion of Strozzi and his co-workers, as expressed to Antonio Doria, is not to be overlooked when the question of the patriot's death is noted for admiration. "You little understand these men," said Charles V.; "they do not wish the liberty of their country, but their own greatness; for if we were to remove the duke, they themselves would become lords of Florence, in spite of the citizens, who really love the liberty of the city, but who could not resist the influence, and wealth, and power of these ambitious leaders."

The most transcendental of æsthetical views concerning suicide is that of Elias Regnault (*Nouvelles Réflexions sur le Suicide*), quoted by M. Dabadie. M. Regnault writes :—

“Suicide is the last term, the highest expression of man’s liberty. It is the most energetic protest of the superiority of his nature. Why have not animals ever conceived suicide? Because their nature is every-way passive. They have not the choice and the preference. Man, on the contrary, eminently active and free, has been able to push his activity even to the destruction of himself.”

The thought is borrowed from Pliny, but it is a pity that it should have been truncated by Regnault. Here is the missing fragment :—“Indeed,” says the pagan writer, “this constitutes the great comfort in this imperfect state of man, that even the Deity cannot do everything. For he cannot procure death for himself, even if he wished it, which, so numerous are the evils of life, has been granted to man as our chief good.”—(*Nat. Hist.* B. II. c. V.)

But Regnault and his co-thinkers have it that suicide is “la manifestation la plus éclatante de la personnalité humaine,” only when the act is essentially voluntary. Suicide under the influence of anger or mental alienation is exempted from the category. And really if, with these reservations, it were accepted that suicide is the highest expression of man’s liberty, it would simply lead to the conclusion that the act of self-murder involves the highest degree of his responsibility, social, moral, or religious.

A more recent apology for suicide than Regnault’s, and one much more novel and curious, is that of M. Bourdin. He holds that suicide is suicide only under certain circumstances. He writes :—

“Sacred and profane history furnish us with many examples of men who have exposed themselves seriously and voluntarily to death, without having nevertheless committed suicide. For example, Samson, become blind, buries himself beneath the ruins of a temple which he has overturned. Eleazar suffers himself to be crushed to death by the falling of an elephant which he has killed. Epaminondas, after having asked if his shield was safe, wishes the javelin to be torn from him, although its removal will cause death. Curtius devotes himself to the gods, and casts himself into a gulf to save his country. Regulus returns to Carthage, loving better to meet death than to violate his sworn faith. Christian history is filled with edifying examples of holy women who have preferred to expose their life than undergo a shame (*potius mori quam fœdari*). Saint Domnine and her two daughters, Saints Berenice and Prosdoce, drowned themselves in order to save their chastity; Saint Pelagie and her mother threw themselves from a roof to evade the violence of the governor of Antioch.—(Saint Ambrose, *De Virginibus*, lib. iii.) Saint Ignatius, bishop, wished that the faithful

at Rome should not sue for his pardon: *Voluntarius moriar, inquit, quia mihi utile est mori*. It would be easy to cite a great number of sacrifices as generous, inspired by faith, by political beliefs, or even by tender but exalted sentiments, such as love, friendship, &c. In these different acts are not found the characteristics of suicide; because to expose one's self to death, to place one's-self even in circumstances which render death inevitable, is not to wish to kill one's-self—is not to act with a formal and exclusive intention of killing one's-self.

This delectable piece of reasoning is somewhat akin to a casuistical opinion of Luther's. He was told of a young girl who, to avoid violence offered to her by a nobleman, had cast herself out of a window and was killed. The question was asked, was she responsible for her death? Luther said, "No: she felt that this step formed her only chance of safety, it being not her life she sought to save, but her chastity."—(Luther's *Table Talk*.)

"If," to continue M. Bourdin's remarks, "suicide does not exist in the conditions that I have named, all the more does it not exist in regard to those tender but passionate souls, who, feeling the emptiness and nothingness of all around them, ardently lay claim to another country. Still less does it exist in the instances of those members of the National Convention, who, as it is said, *have committed suicide to maintain their honour*. This last distinction is not as vain as it may appear to be at the first sight, because the confusion that it destroys has been made by able thinkers who have not sufficiently studied the matter.

"This preliminary explanation was necessary in order to destroy every species of equivocation and to define exactly the limits within which suicide exists; it was necessary also, in order to eliminate from the pathological classifications of suicide those facts which do not belong to them."—(*Du Suicide considéré comme Maladie*. Paris, 1849.—p. 9.)

When, therefore, as the result of his researches and of "simple inductive ratiocination," M. Bourdin writes, "I say that suicide is always a disease and always an act of mental alienation; I say, consequently, that it does not merit either praise or blame," (*Op. Cit.* p. 9), we know that he is not using the term suicide in its ordinary sense.

M. Bourdin's conclusion that suicide, in his restricted sense of the word, merits neither praise or blame, would, however, seem to be the right deduction to attach to a certain *quasi*-scientific theory of suicide, in the most extended sense of that term, which has been declared by Mr. Buckle in his *History of Civilization in England*. He asserts that all the evidence we possess points "to one great conclusion, and can leave no doubt on our minds

that suicide is merely the product of the general condition of society, and that the individual felon only carries into effect what is a necessary consequence of preceding circumstances."

The reasons adduced for so remarkable a conclusion deserve to be gravely considered. Mr. Buckle writes:—

"Among public and registered crimes, there is none which seems so completely dependent on the individual as suicide. Attempts to murder or to rob may be, and constantly are, successfully resisted; baffled sometimes by the party attacked, sometimes by the officers of justice. But an attempt to commit suicide is much less liable to interruption. The man who is determined to kill himself is not prevented at the last moment by the struggles of an enemy; and as he can easily guard against the interference of the civil power, his act becomes, as it were, isolated; it is cut off from foreign disturbances, and seems more clearly the product of his own volition than any other offence could possibly be. We may also add, that, unlike crimes in general, it is rarely caused by the instigation of confederates; so that men, not being goaded into it by their companions, are uninfluenced by one great class of external associations, which might hamper what is termed the freedom of their will. It may therefore very naturally be thought impracticable to refer suicide to general principles, or to detect anything like regularity in an offence which is so eccentric, so solitary, so impossible to control by legislation, and which the most vigilant police can do nothing to diminish. There is also another obstacle that impedes our view: this is, that even the best evidence respecting suicide must always be very imperfect. In cases of drowning, for example, deaths are liable to be returned as suicides which are accidental; while, on the other hand, some are called accidental which are voluntary. Thus it is that self-murder seems to be not only capricious and uncontrollable, but also very obscure in regard to proof; so that on all these grounds it might be reasonable to despair of ever tracing it to those general causes by which it is produced."

Are the circumstances and the motives which lead to or determine the act of suicide so exceptional as to present no aspect, even at a slight glance, of regularity of recurrence? Have the assumed remote and proximate causes of the deed been of so erratic a character, and so seemingly irregular in their manifestation, as to exhibit no indications of uniformity of action? Have the many physical and psychical troubles which have impelled man to destroy himself played so unimportant a part in the history of society and of races, manifested such marked characteristics of the incidental and not of the general, that any one of the results to which they have given rise should be expected to present a "capricious" stamp? Is self-murder "so rarely caused by the instigation of confederates:" is this the lesson taught by the

history of suicide among the Greeks and the Romans of old, the Japanese, the Hindoos, and the Parisians of our own days? Do experience and history show that the motives which affect the volition, which bring the mind into the state of pleasing to do a thing or not,* are so different in different people; do they show that the operations of the emotions and of the thoughts, as well as the action of the motives which influence them are so eccentric, that "what is termed the freedom of the will" is alike and manifestly eccentric? To each and all of these interrogatories all ordinary individuals, we have little doubt, would unhesitatingly answer, No! Why, it seems to us that all *à priori*-reasoning hitherto has led to the very reverse of Mr. Buckle's assertion that it might "very naturally be thought impracticable to refer suicide to general principles, or to detect anything like regularity in an offence which is so eccentric." That the recurrence of suicide was governed by definite laws is a belief as clearly implied in the writings of the ancients upon the act, as that the conviction in the existence of those laws has been a principal incentive to frequent research concerning suicide in all its aspects among the moderns.

As to the *impossibility* of controlling self-murder by legislation and a vigilant police, that is a question of fact which Mr. Buckle deals with as if it were a mere matter of opinion, for he contents himself with the bare assertion at some length, and a reference or two which may, perhaps, be quoted legitimately by those who hold the opinion of the *inutility* of the present system of legislation on suicide, but can afford only slight or very problematical grounds for the belief in the impossibility of controlling suicide by any legislation. We shall have to examine this subject at a greater or less length in a subsequent portion of this article, consequently, we shall simply make here the additional remark, that the fullest and most careful account that we are acquainted with of the history and legislation of suicide among different nations, that of Lisle's (*Du Suicide. Paris, 1856.*) shows not only that there is no sufficient foundation for the opinion that legislation, at all times and under all circumstances, is inoperative in checking suicide, or that the belief of lawgivers that by their enactments they can diminish suicide, is, as Mr. Buckle asserts, "folly," (*Note, p. 24.*) but also that there is good ground for hope that well-considered legislation would prove beneficial in checking or controlling the evil.

Mr. Buckle's preliminary propositions are in the main mere assumptions. But to continue his argument:—

* Bailey. *Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. 2nd Series.*—p. 173.

"These being the peculiarities of this singular crime, it is surely an astonishing fact, that all the evidence we possess respecting it points to one great conclusion, and can leave no doubt in our minds that suicide is merely the product of the general condition of society, and that the individual felon only carries into effect what is a necessary consequence of preceding circumstances. In a given state of society, a certain number of persons must put an end to their own life. This is the general law; and the special question as to who shall commit the crime, depends, of course, upon special laws, which, however, in their total action, must obey the large social law to which they are all subordinate. And the power of the larger law is so irresistible, that neither the love of life nor the fear of another world can avail anything towards even checking its operation."

Now, notwithstanding that Mr. Buckle states that "all the evidence we possess" points to this conclusion, he refers only to four sources of evidence, Dufau's *Traité de Statistique*, Winslow's *Anatomy of Suicide*, Quetelet's *Statistique Morale*, and certain tables in the *Assurance Magazine*. Certainly one cannot help admiring the hardihood of fixing so magnificent a conclusion on the confessedly and necessarily slender data contained in these works. Why we assume that Mr. Buckle's references constitute at least the head and front of his "all the evidence we possess" will be seen presently. As indicating the value of these references in relation to Mr. Buckle's conclusion, we may remark that Quetelet seems to constitute his chief statistical authority, and he is spoken of by him as "confessedly the first statistician in Europe," a sentiment which one might suppose would have at least induced Mr. Buckle to respect his opinions. Now Quetelet has expressly defended his researches from the conclusions which Mr. Buckle is desirous of attaching to them. Quetelet has written—

"That which precedes shows us that man, in general, proceeds with the greatest regularity in all his actions. Whether he marries, begets, kills himself, robs, or murders, he invariably seems to act under the influence of definite causes independent of his free-will.

"We must carefully guard ourselves here, nevertheless, from concluding that this constancy is the result of a desolating fatalism. FOR OURSELVES, WE SEE IN IT BUT THE PROOF OF THE PERMANENCE OF THE MORAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH GIVE RISE TO SUICIDES, DURING THE PERIOD WHICH OUR OBSERVATIONS EMBRACE."*

* "Tout ce qui précède nous montre que l'homme, en général, procède avec la plus grande régularité dans toutes ses actions. Qu'il se marie, qu'il se reproduise, ou qu'il se tue, qu'il attente à la propriété ou à la vie de son semblable, toujours il semble agir sous l'influence de causes déterminées et placées en dehors de son libre arbitre.

"Nous nous garderons bien cependant de conclure de là, que cette constance est le résultat d'un fatalisme désolant. Nous n'y voyons, pour nous, que la preuve de

Again, Mr. Buckle's assertion that "suicide is merely the product of the general condition of society, and that the individual felon only carries into effect what is a *necessary* consequence of preceding circumstances," is much the same kind of proposition as if it were said that the quotient determined the value of the different figures and the method of working of a sum. "In a given sum," to adopt Mr. Buckle's phraseology, "certain results must follow. This is the general law; and the special question as to what position each figure shall take in the sum depends, of course, upon special laws; which, however, in their total action, must obey the large arithmetical law to which they are all subordinate. And the power of the larger law is so irresistible, that neither the vexations of multiplication, nor the still greater troubles of division, nor the perplexities of rule of three, nor the maddening irritations of vulgar fractions,* can avail anything towards checking its operation." Thus the different psychical and physical elements, which are usually supposed to concur in forming the general result commonly spoken of as the state or condition of society, are to be regarded as having their value defined, or regulated, or governed by the results to which they have given rise; or the psychical elements are to be looked upon as not being concurrent causes with the physical in bringing about the state of the society, the former elements being products of the latter, which, in some unexplained manner, constitute or engender the general state spoken of; or the said state of society is a something *per se*—an active entity, or anything, or nothing, as the case may be. The first supposition strikes one as the meaning of Mr. Buckle's proposition at the first glance; the second is necessary to explain certain peculiarities of his explanation of that proposition; the third will be found generally useful in reading the introductory chapters of his work, and the continuation of his argument, which proceeds thus:—

"The causes of this remarkable regularity I shall hereafter examine; but the existence of the regularity is familiar to whoever is conversant with moral statistics. In the different countries from which we have returns we find year by year the same proportion of persons putting an end to their own existence; so that, after making an allowance for the impossibility of collecting complete evidence, we are able to predict,

la permanence des circonstances morales qui font naître les suicides, pendant la période qu'embrassait nos observations."—(Quetelet. *Du Système Social et des Lois qui le régissent*. Paris. 1848.—p. 327.)

* Multiplication is vexation,
Division's twice as bad,
Rule of Three it puzzles me,
And Fractions make me mad.—*School Song*.

within a very small limit of error, the number of voluntary deaths for each ensuing period; supposing, of course, that the social circumstances do not undergo any marked change."

In fact, suicide is subject to the ordinary laws of causation. Then what are the "social circumstances" spoken of which are liable to variation? They are not of a moral character, because Mr. Buckle teaches "that the moral actions of men are the product not of their volition but of their antecedents" (p. 29); and that "suicide is merely the product of the general condition of society," and of "preceding circumstances." It is evident, therefore, that the term "social circumstances" is not used here by Mr. Buckle in the sense in which it is ordinarily used, and that it is equivalent to the terms "general condition of" and "state of society," "antecedents," and "preceding circumstances," as used by him; and that the two former phrases as well as the two latter are used in some peculiar sense. This sense seems to be capable of no other explanation than a something *per se*—an active entity; and Mr. Buckle, in endeavouring to escape from a metaphysical Scylla has apparently plunged into a profounder Charybdis.

But how do Mr. Buckle's assertions, that "in the different countries from which we have returns, we find year by year the *same* proportion putting an end to their own existence," and "that we are able to predict, within a small limit of error, the number of voluntary deaths for each ensuing period; supposing, of course, that the social circumstances do not undergo any *marked* change," tally with the facts and his authorities? We have not, unfortunately, Quetelet's *Statistique Morale* by us, but there are certain remarks in his work on Man, freely referred to by Mr. Buckle, which have a direct bearing on this question. In that work, Quetelet bases his observations on the annual variations of suicides, on *five* years' records of suicides in France, *ten* years in the department of the Seine, and *seven* years in the Canton of Geneva; and he states, "we recognise in all the preceding figures a frightful concordance between the results of the different consecutive years. This regularity in an act which appears so intimately bound to the volition of man, is manifested more strikingly (as will be presently shown) in all that appertains to crime. Nevertheless, society may be modified in a country, and bring about changes in that which offers, at the first, a remarkable constancy for a *short period* (qui offrait d'abord une constance remarquable pour une période de temps peu étendue). According to Dr. Casper, 62 suicides were committed in Berlin from 1788 to 1797, 128 from 1797 to 1808, and 546 from 1813 to 1822." (*Sur L'Homme*, L. II., c. ii. s. ii.) Quetelet, indeed,

tells us in effect, that the regularity in the recurrence of suicide, although true for the "*période de temps peu étendue*," to which his data referred, cannot be assumed to be true of any other period, unless there be other and more extended observations, because such a conclusion would be inconsistent with Dr. Casper's researches, and unwarranted by the very brief character of his own researches. And such, if our memory serves us right, is the carefully guarded character of all M. Quetelet's researches concerning the annual recurrence of suicide, a care rendered necessary from the comparatively limited character of the statistics with which he had to deal.

Let us here glance for a moment at the French statistics of suicide, and see how they bear upon Mr. Buckle's assertion of the yearly recurrence of suicides in the same proportion, except when marked changes in society occur. In France the number of suicides in proportion to population, was in 1836, 1 in 14,207. From this year there was a progressive increase in the number of suicides year by year, with six exceptions (1841-44-45-46-48-49), until 1852, when the number had increased to 1 in 9340! (*Lisle, Du Suicide*, p. 22.) This is scarcely compatible with Mr. Buckle's assertion.

But again, Dufau's statistics of suicide refer to France, and are confined to the *ten* years 1827-37. In the former year the proportion of suicides to population was, according to him, 1 in 20,660; in the latter, 1 in 14,338 (13,683, *Lisle*), consequently the French statistics of suicide show a steady increase from 1827 to 1852, and this, with little variation, from year to year. But M. Dufau's returns, considered alone, from the limited period of time to which they refer, although very suggestive, afford but a slight foundation for any general conclusions, and so conscious is he of this truth, that he carefully avoids doing anything else than setting forth the facts told by his figures, and when he points out an interesting relationship which seemingly exists between the prevalence of suicide and the mean age of the population of a district, he immediately adds that "we state this simply as a conjecture. The *investigation relative to suicide has but commenced*," &c. (*Op. cit.* p. 302.)

If we now take Mr. Buckle's third authority. Dr. Winslow's work, we shall find in the chapter on the statistics of suicide, first, an account of the number of suicides committed in London for a century and a half, the bearing of which on Mr. Buckle's notions we shall have to refer to presently. Then Dr. Winslow quotes the interesting report of a committee of the Statistical Society, on suicides in Westminster, which is preceded by the very proper remark, that "The committee deems it right to premise that caution must be used in drawing too general in-

ferences from these statements, on account of the comparatively small number of cases to which they refer." Next follows an outline of M. Guerry's researches, the value of which will be best shown by his own words,—“These first attempts rarely lead then to an immediate application; they destroy error rather than establish truth, and their utility consists *less in giving rise to theories than in developing the spirit of criticism and research*” (et leur utilité consiste moins à élever des théories qu'à répandre l'esprit de doute et d'examen). (*Essai sur la Statistique Morale de la France*, p. 69.) Lastly follows an account of M. Prevost's researches on suicide in the Canton of Geneva, for the ten years 1825–34, which, as they show (putting aside the short period of observation) an annual mean of 13, a minimum of 0 (1825–1826), a maximum of 24, and a difference of 18, with a population increasing at the rate of about 500 a year, can hardly be supposed to aid Mr. Buckle's ideas much.* Of the value of the statistics of suicide for the metropolis, we shall take Mr. Buckle's own opinion. After referring (*note*, p. 27) to Mr. Jopling's paper on the subject, in the *Assurance Magazine*, Mr. Buckle adds, “These are the only complete consecutive returns of London suicides yet published [they extend over five years], those issued by the police being imperfect.”

Now the foregoing is the character of the references of Mr. Buckle concerning the statistics of suicide, yet he precedes his remarks on suicide and murder with the following sentence respecting the statistical evidence on crimes. “This evidence has gone on accumulating until it now forms of itself a large body of literature, containing, with the commentaries connected with it, an immense array of facts, so carefully compiled, and so well and clearly digested, that more may be learned from it respecting the moral nature of man, than can be gathered from all the accumulated

* The following is an approximative calculation of the proportion of suicides to population in the Canton of Geneva, from 1825–34, according to the data given by M. Prevost. Population, 1822, 51,113; 1834, 56,655:—

<i>Suicides in 10,000 Population.</i>	<i>Suicides in 10,000 Population.</i>
1825 1.1	1830 2.9
1826 1.1	1831 3.2
1827 1.6	1832 2.2
1828 2.0	1833 4.1
1829 2.0	1834 2.8

In the thirteen years 1838–47, 1853–55, the annual number of suicides in the Canton of Geneva ranged from 11 to 20, the average being 15.6. These figures exhibit a much less degree of variation than those for 1825–34, and show clearly the necessity for a long period of observations before any very absolute rules can be laid down respecting the annual recurrence of suicides in a country.—(See Dr. Marc d'Espina's *Essai Analytique et Critique de Statistique Mortuaire Comparée*.—(p. 93, *et seq.*)

experience of ages." (!) It is certain that the statistics here spoken of are not those made use of by Mr. Buckle in his examination of the question of suicide.

But to continue Mr. Buckle's argument, lest an iota of it should be lost:—

"Even in London, notwithstanding the vicissitudes incidental to the largest and most luxurious capital in the world, we find a regularity greater than could be expected by the most sanguine believer in social laws; since political excitement, and the misery produced by the dearth of food, are all causes of suicide, and are all constantly varying. Nevertheless, in this vast metropolis, about 240 persons every year make away with themselves; the annual suicides oscillating, from the pressure of temporary causes, between 266, the highest, and 213, the lowest. In 1846, which was the great year of excitement caused by the railway panic, the suicides in London were 266; in 1847 began a slight improvement, and they fell to 256; in 1848 they were 247; in 1849 they were 213; and in 1850 they were 229."—(*History of Civilization*,—pp. 24, 27.)

Truly five years constitute a somewhat narrow basis of observation or illustration for so important a conclusion in respect to the *annual* variations of suicide in the metropolis! But letting this pass, we would mention a remarkably interesting fact or two, connected with the moral statistics of the great city, and which have an immediate bearing upon Mr. Buckle's notions of suicide and crime, although not mentioned by him. From 1701 to 1829 the tendency to suicide in London remained nearly stationary, but the tendency to commit murder rapidly decreased during the same period. In the seventeenth century 4·6 murders occurred in every 10,000 deaths from all causes; in the nineteenth century only 0·5.* These results are obtained from the weekly Bills of Mortality; they are but approximative, but they are quoted and made use of on the authority of Dr. Farr. If then suicide, the product of a general state of society, is to be taken as an index of that state from 1701 to 1829, it would appear that during that period the said state underwent no very manifest change. But murder as well as suicide, indeed crime in general, is said by Mr. Buckle to be "the result, not so much of the vices of the individual offender, as of the state of society into which the individual is thrown."† Consequently the fixed character of the state of

* *London Bills of Mortality*.—Proportion of Deaths from Suicide and Murder in 10,000 Deaths from all causes.

	Suicide.	Murder.
1647 to 1700	8.5	6.5
1701 — 1749	16.2	3.4
1750 — 1799	15.0	2.1
1800 — 1829	18.6	1.7

† Mr. Buckle quotes (*note* p. 37) in support of this conclusion, Quetelet's statement that "Experience demonstrates conclusively this opinion, which might seem

society—"the irresistible larger law"—governing suicide, is entirely inconsistent with the progressive and constant change manifested in the state of society governing and necessitating murder in the same period. If then the "state of society" is to be regarded as an equivalent term, as used by Mr. Buckle in reference to both murder and suicide, we are reduced to the dilemma of believing that each crime either comports itself in a fashion of its own towards the general law, and modifies in a constant and regular fashion the action of that law, in which case, what becomes of Mr. Buckle's assertion of its irresistible character? Or that there is a general state of society peculiar to each crime, governed by very different laws, and of which the crime is the product, in which case the phrase may mean anything or nothing (as we have already had occasion to remark), as may be most convenient.

paradoxical at the first sight, that it is society which prepares crime, and that the criminal is but the instrument which executes it." (*Sur l'Homme*, L. iv. c. ii.) But the word "society" is not used by Quetelet and by Mr. Buckle in the same sense. In the sentence preceding that quoted, Quetelet says, that "since the crimes that are annually committed seem to be a necessary result of our social organization, and that the number can diminish only as the causes which lead to them are previously modified, it is for legislators to recognise these causes, and remove them as much as possible." Here social organization is used in the ordinary signification—the moral actions of man being conceived to play a primary part in it; and legislation would (as it does) refer as well to the moral as to the other causes which concur in bringing about a social organization or state of society. But with Mr. Buckle the moral acts of men become entirely subsidiary to the action of "what is called Nature," and they play an ambiguous disturbing effect, not a primary causative effect. Hence his notion of "society" is very different from Quetelet's, and the signification to be attached to that writer's remarks widely varies from that which Mr. Buckle would attach to them, and by the mode in which he quotes them, we regret to say, seems to wish to convey to others. "We must not conclude," writes Quetelet, "from what I have said, that all the actions of man, that all his tendencies, are submitted to fixed laws; and that consequently I suppose his free will to be absolutely annihilated. In order to remove any misconception in this respect, some explanations will be so much the more necessary, since they will throw light upon the question of free-will, one of the most difficult and most interesting questions that occur in the studies which occupy our attention. If, for example, we consider the tendency to crime in man, we mark first that this tendency depends upon his peculiar organization, his education, the circumstances in which he is placed, as well as his free-will, to which I accord willingly the greatest influence in modifying all his propensities As to the free-will, very far from causing perturbations in the series of phenomena which occur with this admirable regularity, it prevents them, on the contrary, in this sense, that it restrains the limits within which the variations of our different propensities are manifested Thus, then, free-will, very far from interposing an obstacle to the regular production of social phenomena, favours it on the contrary. A people formed only of sages would exhibit annually the most constant recurrence of the same facts. This will explain that which seems at first a paradox—that is to say, that social phenomena, influenced by the free-will of man, proceed from year to year with greater regularity than phenomena purely influenced by material and fortuitous causes." (*Dr. Système Social*, pp. 95—97.) Mr. Buckle regards free-will as a metaphysical figment; he conceives this belief to be conclusively supported by statistics; he is evidently not a statistician himself; yet the foregoing are the conclusions of his chief and most highly-lauded statistical authority!

The key to Mr Buckle's specious and inconsequent argument is to be found in the following propositions which precede it:—

"It is evident that, if it can be demonstrated that the bad actions of men vary in *obedience* to the changes in the surrounding society, we shall be obliged to infer that their good actions, which are, as it were, the residue of their bad ones, vary in the same manner; and we shall be forced to the other conclusion, that such variations are the result of large and general causes, which, working upon the aggregate of society [mark the phraseology—causes working upon society, therefore independent of] must produce certain consequences without regard to the volition of those particular men of whom the society is composed.

"Such is the regularity *we expect to find*, if the actions of men are governed by the state of the society in which they occur; *while on the other hand, if we can find no such regularity, we may believe that their actions depend on some capricious and personal principle peculiar to each man, as free will, or the like*" (p. 21):—

That is, Mr. Buckle assumes, *à priori*, that the actions of men, *per se*, are governed by no regular laws, and that they must, of necessity, be manifested in "some capricious" manner; but if it be discovered by observation that the said actions *are* governed by regular laws of recurrence, then it would follow that the *cause* of the said laws must be something apart from, and independent of the individual, consistently with the previous assumption of the eccentricity of his special action. And if, moreover, it be further discovered that there is a certain correspondence between changes in the state of society, and the recurrence of certain actions of men, those actions must be in *obedience* to (not simply concurrent with) the changes in society. Then, murder and suicide being taken, by Mr. Buckle, among other human acts, to illustrate his propositions, and he finding that murder and suicide are apparently governed by regular laws of recurrence under *given* circumstances of society, he at once concludes, in accordance with the propositions, that the regularity is due to the state of society, thus explaining the facts of correspondence by his previous assumption, and asserting the truth of his assumption by the facts which he seeks to explain by it! Mr. Buckle first begs the principle (the key of his entire method of reasoning) which it is necessary to prove, with this principle thus begged he explains the facts he considers, and then he assumes that the facts *thus explained* demonstrate the principle!

And yet it is upon reasoning of this kind that Mr. Buckle seeks to obtain assent to a conclusion which is equivalent to the assertion that suicide is a ghoul-like necessity, against which

neither the individual nor the collective efforts of man can avail anything ; and wherever Mr. Buckle's reasoning finds acceptance, it may be anticipated that it will lead to an unfortunate indifference to suicide in its social relations. Meriting neither praise nor blame, and uninfluenced by moral restraints, the act must be submitted to as a disagreeable necessity of every-day life, and we must accustom ourselves to it in the best way we can. And how will this be brought about ? Shall we rest content to have this revolting creation of a new Frankenstein hunting its victims day by day to death among us in commonplace ghastly guise ? Surely not. We shall strive to hide the most horrible features beneath a profusion of conceits ; we shall fence in the pathways of the demon with a wealth of fanciful sentiment, and, it may be, we shall end as many others have done (as we shall have in due time to tell), by enshrining an image of him, and worshipping it. In short, the pseudo-philosophy of Mr. Buckle tends towards the same end—the same unhealthy tone of sentiment concerning suicide, which is found to pervade the quotations which we have given from French writers on the subject, and the more intricate workings of which we have still to trace out.

Let us have a care. We have our present artists, who find a charm in suicide ; we have an apologist for the act in certainly one of the most facile and attractive historical writers of the day ; and the prescriptions of both the law and the gospel in reference to it are, in a great measure, unheeded. This is not a bad starting-point and groundwork in favour of a reactionary movement, sympathetic of suicide ; and if we do not take heed, we shall have our young men and maidens looking upon the deed as a matter of feeling, and not of morality. And so, in due time, we should come to hear the legitimacy of suicide babbled of at our fire-sides and in our workshops, while sympathy would find an outlet in song. Would you have an example of the song ? Read—

I.

Up, up, my page ! and saddle quick,
And mount my fleetest steed,
And over field, and over fell,
To Duncan's castle speed.
Lurk in the stable till thou spy
Some horse-boy of the train,
Then ask him, which the bride may be
Of Duncan's daughters twain ?
And should he say, " The olive maid,"
Ride back without delay ;
But should he say, " The fair-haired girl,"
Then linger by the way.

Then hie thee to the rope-yard, boy,
And purchase me a cord :
Ride slowly home, and give it me,
But do not speak a word.

II.

The suicide lies at the cross-roads,
Interr'd at the midnight hour ;
And there a blue floweret blossoms—
The poor sinner's flower.

I stood at the cross-roads sighing ;
'Twas hard on the midnight hour ;
There waved in the moonlight slowly
The poor sinner's flower.*

" Give me an ounce of civet, good apothecary, to sweeten my imagination."

We have not reached the core of our subject, and yet we are at the end of our space. We hope, however, at another time to pursue our theme.

* Heinrich Heine's Book of Songs. Translated by John L. Willis. London: 1856.

ART. VIII.—STATE OF LUNACY IN ENGLAND.

THE Thirteenth Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy, recently published, is of considerable interest, notwithstanding that it follows so rapidly upon, and has had several of its details anticipated by, evidence published in the report of the Select Committee on Lunatics which sat during the late Parliament. The contents of the Commissioners' Report do not well admit of being abstracted, but we shall endeavour to indicate some of the more important particulars given.

Since the 31st March, 1858, three of the public Asylums announced last year as in course of erection have been opened, to wit, those for Durham, Cambridge, and Northumberland. The United Asylum for the county and borough of Cambridge, and the Isle of Ely, is situated about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Cambridge, and it "is built upon a site moderately elevated, commanding extensive views. The land consists of about 57 acres; the surface is fine loam on a chalk subsoil. The building is designed to accommodate 250 patients." (p. 5.) The Asylum for the county of Durham is situated at Sedgfield, about 11 miles from Durham, and is estimated to accommodate 312 patients—157 males and 155 females.

"The cost of erection of the Asylum was 31,480*l.*; viz.—land, 52 acres, 4000*l.*, and buildings and fittings, 27,480*l.* The total average cost per patient being thus about 100*l.*

"The Asylum consists of a main building of three stories, and two separate blocks of two stories each, in connexion respectively with the workshops and laundry, and containing day-rooms on the ground, and associated dormitories on the upper floor.

"In the centre of the main building, the principal approach to which is from the north, are the superintendent's residence and the general dining-hall, over which is the Chapel. The male and female patients occupy respectively the western and eastern divisions of the Asylum.

"The second floor of the main building is occupied only at night.

"According to the original design there were on the second floor in each division three dormitories opening into a passage towards the north. Upon further consideration the partition walls were omitted, and the upper story on each side was converted into a large dormitory containing 50 beds, and warmed by open fires.

"The several wards are heated by open fires only. The dining-hall and Chapel are warmed by a hot-water apparatus."—(p. 12.)

The Commissioners report favourably of the condition of the patients already admitted into both asylums, and of the arrangements; and they also make several minor suggestions to promote the efficiency of the institutions.

With one or two exceptions the condition of the public asylums,

and the patients contained in them, throughout the kingdom, is very favourable; and the details given by the Commissioners in respect of each asylum, give a most satisfactory impression as to the persistent efforts of the different asylum authorities to keep up or improve the efficiency of the establishments. Moreover, the suggestions of the Commissioners show that not even the veriest minutiae of management and arrangement escape their eyes.

The Haverfordwest asylum, however, is still characterized by glaring unfitness and mismanagement. In our notice of the Twelfth Report of the Commissioners, we pointed out how this asylum had set the Commissioners at defiance since 1854, and how towards the end of 1857 the interference of the Secretary of State was requested, and the medical officer was superseded. Little benefit, it would now appear, has resulted from this change, and the asylum still retains its discreditable character. The West-Riding of York Asylum is exempted from a favourable notice by a high rate of mortality, and many defects in the internal arrangements and management. How needless this is, and we hope that it may now be said was, is made manifest by a note appended to the Commissioners' Report, which tells us, that since the comparatively recent appointment of Mr. Cleaton, as medical superintendent of the asylum, the general condition and management "have been reported as materially improved." (p. 41.)

Certain remarks of the Commissioners on the medical staff of the huge, overgrown, yet still increasing Colney Hatch Asylum, are well worthy of attention.

"The medical staff at this large asylum at present consists only of two medical superintendents, each of whom has an assistant, who acts as dispenser. These gentlemen have the entire medical and moral control and care of 1285 patients. It is manifest that anything like individual treatment must be limited to a very small proportion of the cases, and we fear that, with the mass of the patients, the superintendents must necessarily depend mainly upon the good conduct and trustworthiness of the attendants. Moreover, the chance of cure must, as we apprehend, be greatly reduced; such chance being still further diminished by the fact that, during the last six months, there has been no medical assistant on the male side."

Only one or two examples of restraint, and those of the slightest character, are reported from the different asylums.

The Commissioners again urge the necessity which exists for additional asylum accommodation, and on the most eligible modes of making such provision they have the following remarks.

"The mode by which additions have been made to county asylums varies in different counties. As a rule, we have suggested the erection of detached buildings of a simple and inexpensive character, rather than additions to the main structure, on the ground that additions must

generally partake of the character of the original building, and thus often entail the necessity of erecting new wards of too expensive a construction. Such wards are, as we think, quite unnecessary for many of the chronic and idiotic cases which accumulate in all large asylums, and are not required for those patients who can be regularly employed in active occupations. Above all, we have invariably found that patients removed from the long galleries of an asylum, to the more home-like apartments of a detached building, have not only presented a more cheerful and comfortable appearance, but have themselves expressed their satisfaction at the change."

These suggestions cannot be too highly commended.

A progressive improvement in the condition and management of the metropolitan licensed houses is reported, and it is stated that "the entries made by the Commissioners at the several provincial houses are for the most part favourable. Four houses have been closed in the provincial districts during the year, and one new license granted."

The Commissioners make known the circumstances which guide them in granting licenses, and they urge that it is important that they should have legal power to demand from the proprietors of licensed houses accounts of the payments made for, and amounts expended upon, patients. Thus, it is evident that the offensive and unjustifiable imputations respecting the probity of proprietors of licensed houses, which were made by the Earl of Shaftesbury in his evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, and upon which he based a similar proposition, are indulged also by the other Commissioners in Lunacy. We treated of this matter in our last number, but we may repeat here a remark we then made concerning the 26th clause of the proposed Bill to "Amend the Law concerning the Care and Treatment of Lunatics," which was submitted to the Select Committee, and which provided that the proprietors of licensed houses, and persons having charge of single patients, should furnish information to the Commissioners as to payment for patients:—

"This clause does not provide that due and sufficient cause being shown, warranting the suspicion of neglect of a patient, the Commissioners shall have the power of requiring an account to be submitted to them of the receipts from and expenditure for the patient, but gives them an unlimited power of requiring such accounts to be laid before them, when, how, and for whatever cause they might think fit! Such a proposition as this evidently emanates from the same suspicious spirit which infects the whole of Lord Shaftesbury's evidence respecting medical men practising in lunacy. It is not a *bonâ fide* provision, and would no doubt, if it were enacted, have the same fate as all vexatious legislative provisions; but in the meantime, it, and the rest of the clauses of the bill conceived in the same spirit, would have a diametrically opposite effect to that which they were intended to have."—p. 407.

The great importance of having competent attendants in an asylum, the value of night attendants, the signification to be attached to the word "seclusion" in the Lunacy Act, and the indispensableness of a good, nutritious diet among pauper lunatics, are discussed by the Commissioners. They have issued a useful circular concerning the qualification of attendants; and they hold that "any amount of compulsory isolation in the daytime, whereby a patient is confined in a room, and separated from all associates, should be considered as seclusion, and recorded accordingly."

Certain remarks concerning the property of lunatics deserve consideration:—

"We avail ourselves of this occasion urgently to press upon your Lordship's attention, with a view to early legislation, the great hardship and injustice entailed upon a large number of the insane and their families by the present dilatory and expensive provisions of the law for the administration of the property and income of insane persons of very limited means, more especially those whose mental malady is of a temporary, and probably curable character.

"One of the objects of the 'Lunacy Regulation Act, 1853,' was to provide a remedy for this great evil. The result of that enactment, in this respect, has entirely disappointed public expectation. The 120th section, which was specially designed to meet the cases referred to, has proved practically inoperative, by reason of the large and ruinous expense attending the necessary proceedings. We are informed by the Registrar in Lunacy that in no case can the requisite authority to represent the lunatic be obtained at a less cost than 75*l*. The provision is therefore illusory, and inapplicable as respects that large class, peculiarly objects of compassion, whose families are, as a first result of the disorder which has afflicted themselves, overwhelmed with misery, and frequently reduced to pauperism.

"These observations have especial reference to persons of limited life incomes, and to small tradesmen; and, as a striking illustration of our views, to the cases of poor governesses, whose anxious calling often induces temporary insanity, and who may have accumulated savings to a trifling amount, and prudently invested them in the funds.

"We would further observe, that legislation is required not only with reference to the interests of lunatics and their families, but for the protection of public companies, tenants, and others, owing dividends, rents, and other debts, and ready and desirous to pay them on receiving a legal discharge.

"We may mention, among many others which have been brought under our notice, the case of a Fire Insurance Company indebted to a lunatic upon a policy, and unable, without circuitous, inconvenient, and expensive proceedings, to relieve themselves from their liability.

"It is not within our province to indicate the mode by which the property and income of the class of the insane to whom we have ad-

verted could best be rendered available for their benefit and that of their families, but we deem it our duty strongly to express our opinion that, in all cases such as those under consideration, legal provision of an expeditious and inexpensive kind ought to be made for investing some person with authority to act for the Lunatic, as civilly dead. We venture further to submit that, unless and until a relative or friend be found, competent and willing to act in that capacity, the duty should devolve upon a public officer, in the nature of an official committee."

We commend to notice the formation of a fund by the Commissioners, for the relief of those pauper lunatics who, "as repeatedly happens," when entitled to a discharge from an asylum, have neither friend nor workhouse to receive them. A donation of 800*l.*, and subscriptions to the amount of 100*l.* by the Commissioners and their Secretary, form the nucleus of this fund, which is entirely a matter of voluntary contribution. The Colney Hatch and Hanwell Asylums have special funds for the purpose which have worked most beneficially.

The state of single patients is considered by the Commissioners, and, foiled in their efforts to carry out as rapidly as they could wish, improvements which they deem to be necessary in the management and control of such patients, as well as to perform a sufficiently extensive visitation by which unjust and improper treatment would be prevented, the Commissioners express the following opinion:—

"It is our conviction that the law will continue to be extensively violated or evaded, as respects this most helpless and neglected class of the insane, until medical practitioners are required, under a severe penalty, to give notice to this office of the names and residences of all persons who shall, for a given period, have been professionally attended to by them, as insane patients. We believe that such an enactment would produce numerous disclosures, which, in the absence of such a legal provision, medical practitioners are reluctant to volunteer."—(p. 78.)

We feel assured that the proposition implied in this opinion will prove most offensive to the medical profession, and that portion of the public next to them whom it most concerns. Nay, it is tolerably certain that, if the Commissioners' suggestion be acted on, a piece of vexatious and inutile legislation will be the result.

Can anything be more obnoxious to the feelings than the notion that the medical man should, in reference to lunacy, be transformed into a compulsory informer? That the bond of confidence which exists between the patient and his friends or relatives and the doctor in the earlier stages of lunacy is to be at once and abruptly broken? That the many reasons which, at the outset, may induce a family to wish that threatened, or manifest, and perhaps temporary lunacy in a member of the

family, may be kept private, and into which reasons we have no right to pry, should by an arbitrary legal enactment be made of no avail, and that families are to be made distressingly aware that no privacy can be maintained unless the *medical man be kept out of the house!* That the fact of lunacy may subject a household to legal inspection! Think of the neglect in early attendance, and of the quackery that such a state of things would induce.

But apart from these objections, which are not to be lightly unheeded, there are others, and if anything more formidable ones. Granting (for the sake of argument) that the condition of single patients is, in many instances, as unsatisfactory as the Commissioners state, we entirely disbelieve that the method in which they seek to overcome the evil is the right one; nay, more, we assert that it is manifestly erroneous. The law already makes it a misdemeanour for any person to receive a lunatic into his house for profit, without making known the same to the Commissioners, and without a certificate of lunacy; and it calls upon every medical man attending upon such a patient to report upon the condition of the said patient once annually to the Commissioners. We have here evidently the germ of the Commissioners' recent suggestion, and it is equally evident that the medical man has not hitherto considered himself warranted in so entirely ignoring the wishes of the patient or his friends as to fulfil the expectations of the statute. Is there any probability that the threat of fine would in anywise alter his conduct in this respect? The Commissioners have found that the police functions assigned to the doctor by the Act have not been carried out; who is to exercise police functions upon *him*, if the suggestion of the Commissioners should pass into law? Unless the Commissioners propose to give part of the penalty to the informer, we see no chance of the success of such an enactment, except as a source of irritation. Moreover, will the families who may have the misfortune to have insane members, or a tendency to insanity among them, consent to so arbitrary an interference with a question of private judgment? We fancy not.

Rest assured that the Sangrado principle applied to lunacy will never act. Law, and yet again law, and still more law, is an empirical method of procedure which can lead to no good. Lunatics are already sufficiently well larded with law. What, then, is wanted? First, a much better state of feeling respecting lunacy and lunatics among the people in general, than now exists. But how is this to be brought about if the Commissioners persist in speaking of and legislating respecting lunacy, as if medical men, in reference to it, were simply ogres? The confidence between the medical profession and the Commissioners is weakened on the one hand, and between the public and medical men on the other, and the unhappy patient—the incipient

lunatic, or single patient, as a necessary result, is victimized. Friends are frightened of calling in the medical man, in the first place—frightened of the asylum, in the second place—frightened of the certificate of lunacy, in the third place—and even the, to the public, mysterious Lunacy Commissioners, known only by trenchant Acts of Parliament, assume a dreadful and portentous character.

How unfitted the law is to deal with the intricate workings of lunacy matters, is well shown in an instance contained in the present Report of the Commissioners. They tell us of a licensed house existing in the kingdom, conducted on principles diametrically opposed to those now received as the right ones. Why do not the Commissioners close it, then ?

“ In this case we have reason to believe that no intentional harshness or neglect has occurred on the part of the proprietor, *who doubtless considers himself justified* in pursuing a course of treatment, and in providing a species of accommodation, which forms an exception to those of all similar establishments in the kingdom. *Had it not been for this belief on our part*, we should have thought it our duty some time ago to take steps to prevent the renewal of licence.”—(p. 52.)

And yet the Commissioners, who can thus admit the private opinion of an individual, *in his own interest*, to outweigh the written, specified law, would enact a law to compel men to entirely set aside their own private judgment and the judgment of others !

Let the Commissioners seek to obtain the confidence of the medical profession, and to spread a just knowledge of the requirements of the insane in the kingdom, and we have no doubt that they will much more readily and satisfactorily attain their aim, in respect to single patients, and the welfare of private lunatics generally, than by vexatious legal enactments. The great difficulty in the way of exercising a satisfactory control over single patients, is the feeling of the friends ; and this will only be overcome by kindly remonstrances and watchfulness, not by compulsion ; and we believe that the Commissioners under-rate their own powers in wishing to have additional legislation upon private patients. Indeed, from the instance we have quoted, and we could give other instances, it is evident the Commissioners have more law than they can well make use of. We know how steadily improvements are going on in the treatment of the insane, under the watchful care of the Board. Doubtless it may have been disheartened by difficulties, but we have infinitely more confidence in those difficulties being overcome by vigilant care than by legislation. We have spoken thus strongly of two measures suggested by the Commissioners, in their Report ; for in the present state of things we estimate the persistent, individual, and collective action of those gentlemen at a much higher rate than that of additional enactments.

The Report terminates by quoting a legal opinion that lunatics, declared so by inquisition, and placed in the position of single patients, are to be treated as such; with some remarks on the propriety of ensuring the visits of friends to lunatics in asylums, and an account of the difficulties which still impede the erection of an asylum for the city of London.

The appendix of the Report contains two series of statistical tables, the one referring to patients in asylums, the other to pauper lunatics and idiots.

The first tables are arranged upon a better and more comprehensive plan than in previous Reports, and we trust are to be taken as an indication that the Commissioners are about to place the statistics of insanity in good and proper order; but it is to be regretted that the tables are printed in a scrawling, ungainly fashion.

On the following page is the summary of the tables, and we have added the totals for the previous year.

These figures show a total increase of 601 patients admitted during the year 1858, and an increase of 350 pauper lunatics as compared with 915 during 1857.

The abstract of annual returns of pauper lunatics and idiots belonging to the several unions in England and Wales, on the 1st January, 1859, gives the following results:—

	Number of Patients.	In County or Borough Asylums.	In Registered Hospitals, or Licensed Houses.	In Work-houses.	In Lodgings, or Boarded Out.	Residing with Relatives
England.	28,104	14,194	1,922	7,410	767	3,811
Wales....	1,754	359	175	232	345	643
Total.....	29,858	14,553	2,097	7,642	1,112	4,454

Returns from the Poor-Law Commissioners, published in previous numbers of the Lunacy Commissioners' Reports, give as the number of pauper lunatics and idiots chargeable to parishes in 1847 and 1857, the following figures:—

1847—18,065

1857—27,693

1859—29,858

Much of the increase in the foregoing numbers is due to greater care in recording cases of pauper lunacy.

NUMMARY.

Number of Patients 1st Jan. 1858.				Discharges during the Year 1858.				Deaths during the Year 1858.			
Private.		Pauper.		Admissions during the Year 1858.		Total Number.		Number Recovered.		Total Number.	
M.	F.	Total.	M.	F.	Total.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.
County and Borough Asylums.		134	97	231	6777	8112	14,898	16,120	2413	2872	4685
Tough Asylum.		762	730	1492	98	78	174	1666	431	473	904
Hospital.		675	630	1305	491	827	1318	2823	601	665	1166
Metropolitan Asylum.		719	720	1439	650	499	1099	2473	658	454	1052
Provincial Asylum.		2300	2177	4467	7913	9640	17,450	21,867	4003	4104	8107
Royal Naval Hospital.		120	—	120	—	—	—	126	39	—	39
Total.		2410	8177	4658	7913	9640	17,450	22,013	4043	4104	8146
1st Jan. 1857.		Male.. 9992	Female.. 11875	21,237	3806	3909	7906	3279	2588	6187	1289

PATIENTS REMAINING 1st JANUARY, 1859.

	Private.			Pauper.			Total Lunatics.	Number deemed Curable.			Fossil Lunatic by Institution.			Criminals.			Chargeable to Coun- ties or Boroughs.		
	M.	F.	Total.	M.	F.	Total.		M.	F.	Total.	M.	F.	Total.	M.	F.	Total.			
County and Borough Asylums.....	128	106	234	7127	9469	16,615	15,948	879	794	1,673	3	11	242	84	336	644	710	1,354	
Hospitals.....	1640	796	2436	109	109	218	1,868	137	202	339	12	34	132	18	140	—	—	—	
Metropolitan Licensed Houses.....	683	624	1,307	464	800	1,264	2,451	140	191	331	69	68	137	31	96	35	94	119	
Provincial Licensed Houses.....	982	796	1,778	460	456	925	2,633	209	204	413	79	133	237	43	180	70	108	179	
Royal Naval Hospital.....	187	—	187	—	—	—	22,774	17	—	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	9469	9281	18,750	4990	6160	11,150	99,911	1383	1301	2773	178	123	300	653	150	683	749	803	
Included in Total Lunatics.																			
Patients remaining 1st January, 1858	2608	2230	4738	7985	9687	17,672	22,310	1265	1339	2783	171	124	295	401	143	653	694	796	

ART. IX.—HYSTERIA IN CONNEXION WITH THE BELFAST REVIVAL.*

THE revival of religion that is still progressing in the North of Ireland has been attended by many instances of the nervous disorders which appear to be almost inseparable from similar movements; and we find, in the pamphlet before us, a praiseworthy endeavour to explain, to the clergy and parents, the line of demarcation between the beneficial effects of awakened religious feeling and the rhapsodies of hysterical or cataleptic ecstasy.

Our readers will not require to be told that, in nearly all the "revivals" upon record, certain phenomena indicative of diseases of the nervous system have been manifested by many individuals. On such occasions the widely-spread rumours of miraculous conversions and beatific visions exercise a magnetic effect upon the weak and credulous, and attract to the camp meetings, the out-door preachings, or other centres of excitement, a large proportion of persons who are prepared to surrender themselves to any morbid impulse. As the business of such meetings proceeds, the vehement language from the pulpit, the exclamations or lamentations of some among the worshippers, and the notoriety accorded to conspicuous "cases," combine to produce all the most efficient excitants of hysteria; and are too frequently followed by some of its Protean forms, and some of its direful consequences. Most commonly, as, for instance, among the early Methodists, and in the revival which took place in America at the beginning of the present century, the instances of hysteria have been hailed as special manifestations of Divine grace; and the slaves of the most self-seeking of all diseases have been regarded as the elect saints of God. From the vantage ground of such a position they have been able to repel the scrutiny of scientific observers, to avoid any close inspection of the morbid phenomena really occurring, and to perfect any scheme of imposture that might tend to inflame the fervid ignorance, or to refresh the waning zeal, of the enthusiasts by whom they were surrounded. The medical records of these cases are therefore extremely meagre; and physicians, aware of the profligacy and insanity to which any large aggregate of hysteria must give rise, have probably placed themselves too much in a position of antagonism to great religious movements as a whole; so as to lose, in some measure, the confidence of the communities that such movements sway; and to forfeit the power of indicating and controlling mere physical disease, which it should be the province of their profession to exert.

Such was lately the state of affairs at Belfast. Catalepsy, and cataleptic ecstasy, were matters of frequent occurrence at certain places of worship, and were daily on the increase. Mill-girls were praying to

* The Work and the Counterwork, or the Religious Revival in Belfast, with an Explanation of the Physical Phenomena. By Edward A. Stopford, Archdeacon of Meath. Third Edition, 8vo; pp. 104. Dublin: Hodges, Smith, & Co., 104, Grafton Street.

be "struck." The best "cases" were obtaining a comfortable maintenance by relating their visions to daily levees of admiring auditors. The clergy, of all denominations, were wholly unprepared for the emergency, were ignorant, speaking generally, of what it was they witnessed, and do not appear to have imagined that medical men could have any special knowledge of the causes in operation, or any special duties with regard to the effects produced. Indeed, in the words of a correspondent, all the pious ladies of Belfast would have combined to destroy the practice of a doctor who had expressed a doubt of the Divine origin of the prevailing visitations.

At this conjuncture, Archdeacon Stopford had the discernment to perceive the nature of the physical effects produced by the popular excitement, and the courage to call these effects by their right name. His pamphlet is not less remarkable for its cordial recognition of the devotional movement, than for its indignant denunciation of the attendant hysteria; and is therefore calculated to eliminate the evil from the good, or, as the Archdeacon phrases it, the tares from the wheat, without alarming the prejudices, or alienating the sympathies, of the most ardent Presbyterian or Methodist. He traces some of the attacks of hysteria clearly enough to the abuse of certain pulpit arts, to the reiteration of hell, hell, hell—the accumulation of a depressing emotion, for which no outlet was provided in active thought or practical duty; and others to the kindred but more gradual operation of the mental atmosphere of the locality; and he describes the nature and tendencies of the disease with sufficient clearness to disabuse any candid mind of the supposition that it can ever, under any circumstances, be used as an instrument of good. What is still more important, he points out the manner in which the clergy may so control their congregations as to prevent such outbreaks for the future. Upon these and other parts of the subject, our space does not allow of quotations at sufficient length to do justice to the author; and we must be content most cordially to recommend the pamphlet itself to the attentive perusal of our readers. Among other benefits likely to result from its timely publication, we hope that facilities will be afforded for the medical examination of any cases of catalepsy that may still occur; and that the present revival may be so studied, in its physical aspects, as to throw fresh light upon the most obscure portion of nervous pathology.

It is only necessary to add, that Archdeacon Stopford's pamphlet has now gone through three editions; and that, in the last of these, some trifling inaccuracies on points of physiological detail have been either corrected or removed.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON LUNATICS.

IF the Parliamentary inquiry into the present state of the Law of Lunacy and condition of the insane in England prove abortive, it certainly will not arise from insufficiency of time for the digestion of the evidence laid before the Select Committee. Our readers will remember that, by the dissolution of the late Parliament, a Select Committee on Lunatics then sitting was brought to a sudden end, and the Committee simply reported the evidence laid before it, which evidence we noticed at length in our last number. So soon as the present Parliament got into working order, another Committee was appointed, consisting, with one exception, of the same members as the former one. The termination of the last session found, however, the labours of the Committee unfinished; and it has again had to content itself with reporting simply the evidence laid before it, and recommending the re-appointment of the Committee when Parliament again meets. This evidence has appeared too recently, and is too voluminous to be dealt with in the present number of our Journal, consequently we are obliged to postpone the consideration of it until a subsequent period.

We would, however, note one point in reference to pauper lunatics, which has an important bearing upon several of the remarks which we made in our article on "Pauper Lunacy," in the last number of the Journal. Mr. A. Doyle, one of the Inspectors under the Poor-Law Board, who gave evidence before the Select Committee, questions generally the truthfulness of the facts and conclusions respecting workhouses and the insane contained in them, recorded in the Supplement to the Twelfth Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy. It will be requisite, in examining the evidence reported by the Select Committee to enter pretty fully into Mr. Doyle's objections, but, in the meantime, we record his dissent, reserving, for the present, any expression of opinion upon it.

MEDICO-LEGAL TRIAL.—UNLAWFUL DETENTION IN A LUNATIC ASYLUM.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, WESTMINSTER, June 21st.

(Sitting at Nisi Prius, before Mr. Justice Hill and Special Juries.)

RUCK v. STILWELL AND ANOTHER.

Mr. Edwin James, Q.C., Mr. Serjeant Petersdorff, and Mr. Gordon Allen, appeared for the plaintiff; and Mr. M. Chambers, Q.C., Mr. Serjeant Ballantine, and Mr. Honyman for the defendants.

Mr. Gordon Allen opened the pleadings. The first count was for assaulting and imprisoning the plaintiff in a house called Moorcroft-house, in the parish of Hillingdon, and detaining him there among lunatics and persons of unsound mind for a period of ten months. The second count alleged that the defendants were the keepers of a house licensed for the reception of lunatics, and received the plaintiff upon an order signed by one Mary Ann Ruck, as a private patient and with two medical certificates; that while the defendants had such charge of this plaintiff he recovered, which the defendants well knew, and it was thereupon their duty to transmit notice of such recovery to the said Mary Ann Ruck, but that they neglected to do so; and they also wilfully neglected to transmit notice of his recovery to the Commissioners of Lunacy, but under colour and pretence of the said order and certificates, kept the plaintiff in custody for ten months, &c. To these two counts the defendants pleaded several pleas, denying all the material allegations.

Mr. Edwin James, in opening the case to the jury, said this was an action of trespass brought by the plaintiff, Mr. Lawrence Ruck, against Dr. Stilwell, the proprietor of a private asylum for the reception of lunatics, at Moorcroft-house, in this county, and the questions to be submitted to the jury would be found of the greatest public importance. The plaintiff had been confined in the defendant's house from the 5th of November, 1857, down to the 27th of August, 1858, when he was discharged: and the questions would be as to the legal right of the defendant to detain him, and the validity of the medical certificates, which he should show were in direct violation of the Act of Parliament. With regard to the moral right of the defendant to detain the plaintiff, the jury would be satisfied beyond all doubt that the parties were not justified in confining him, and that the plaintiff required no medical treatment at all, and but merely a preventive treatment. The jury would find that the plaintiff was of sound mind, and that there was no justification for confining him either in law or morality. The plaintiff was the owner of some property in Kent and Wales, and had been educated at Oxford, and he amused himself with agricultural pursuits and the sports of the field. In the month of August, 1857, he went down to Manchester with his wife to see the Exhibition, and there met a Mr. Barnett, who was one of the gentlemen who signed the medical certificate. After staying at Manchester some little time he went to Wales, and there attended a meeting of the Newtown and Machynlleth Railway Company, and continued in Wales till the month of October. In consequence of some domestic circumstances, the plaintiff then gave way to great intoxication, and his mind became affected, as always happened more or less in such cases. He then went to Welshpool, and met with Mr. Barnett, one of the gentlemen who signed the certificate, and though it was well known to everybody that the plaintiff was not in a state of insanity, Mr. Barnett took him to Reading where his wife was. There had been domestic differences, but he (Mr. James) made no charge against Mrs. Ruck, who had acted on the advice of Barnett and his attorney. There was no pretence whatever for charging the plaintiff with insanity, and yet, even after a jury had found that he was of sound mind, the

defendant went home and made an entry in his book to the effect that, in his, the defendant's judgment, the plaintiff was still "a dangerous lunatic," though it would be proved that he never once raised his hand against any one. His wife had slept with him at Reading the night previous to the day when Mr. Barnett and Dr. Conolly signed the medical certificates. The learned counsel referred to the enormous sums which were sometimes paid to the keepers of private lunatic asylums, 300*l.*, 400*l.*, 500*l.* a-year, and, in one instance, as much as 2000*l.* a-year. This was a great temptation, and therefore the legislature had interfered for the protection of the public, by passing several enactments, one of which was 16 and 17 Victoria, cap. 96. The 4th section of that statute enacted that no person should be received as a lunatic into any licensed house without an order signed as directed, nor without two certificates, signed by two persons, each of whom should be a physician, surgeon, or apothecary, who had respectively examined the person to whom the certificate related; and by the 36th section, the physician, surgeon, or apothecary must be one who was in actual practice. It would be shown that Barnett had not been in practice for years, and that both Dr. Conolly and the defendant (Dr. Stilwell) knew that fact. His certificate, therefore, had no legal weight at all, and the defendant (Dr. Stilwell), in receiving a patient on such a certificate, was guilty of a misdemeanour. The other certificate was signed by a gentleman, for whom he (Mr. James) personally had great respect, and in whom the public had great confidence, but he was astonished to find, that with the knowledge of the Act of Parliament, Dr. Conolly should have put his hand to a certificate which confined the plaintiff in a lunatic asylum for ten months. Very large sums were paid to private lunatic asylums for the board of lunatics, and therefore they required very great protection; for the interest of the keepers of those asylums was not to cure their patients but to keep them there. The defendant received as much as 400*l.* a-year for the plaintiff's board, and, as he had before stated, in one instance, as much as 2000*l.* a-year had been paid. The 12th section of the statute enacted that, "no physician, surgeon, or apothecary who, or whose father, brother, son, partner, or assistant, is wholly or partly the proprietor of, or a regular professional attendant in, a licensed house or hospital, shall sign a certificate for the reception of a patient into such house or hospital," &c. Notwithstanding that enactment, he (Mr. James) regretted to say Dr. Conolly, who had signed one of these certificates, was actually a partner in the defendant's establishment. When the plaintiff was sent to the defendant's asylum it was found that he did not require any medical attention whatever. This fact soon transpired, and also that Dr. Conolly was in the habit of giving certificates in direct violation of the Act of Parliament. Dr. Conolly received 15 per cent. of the profits of the establishment, and he had actually received his percentage of the profit of the detention of the plaintiff. The learned counsel here read an extract from the defendant's book, from which it appeared that in March, 1858, Dr. Conolly had received a sum of 15*l.* in respect of Mr. Ruck (the plaintiff). Dr. Conolly was to receive 60*l.* a-year out of Mr. Ruck's payments. He was the medical attendant at the asylum, and received as his salary 15 per cent. on the payments of all confined in the asylum. Dr. Stilwell had brought an action against the plaintiff to recover a sum of 250*l.* for his board, but as the plaintiff had been confined there against his will, he refused to pay. The certificates were not worth the paper on which they were written, and nobody knew that better than Dr. Stilwell, who had about forty-five patients in his house at the time, upon whose payments he was paying 15 per cent. to Dr. Conolly. A more scandalous violation of an Act of Parliament there could not be, and this was well known to both Dr. Stilwell and Dr. Conolly. If those facts had not been brought before the public eye, the plaintiff would have still been in confinement, and he (Mr. James) trusted the jury would express their opinion by vindicating the plaintiff for the imprisonment which he had suffered

during ten months without a shadow of justice or of law. The plaintiff ought to have been discharged within a few days of his admission, but in consequence of his detention he had been put to an expense of 1100*l.* in procuring his release.

Mr. Serjeant Petersdorff then called the plaintiff, Mr. Lawrence Ruck, whose examination lasted the rest of the day—about four hours. The plaintiff, who is a strong, healthy-looking man, gave his evidence in a very calm and deliberate manner. We give only a condensed account of the evidence.

The plaintiff said he was a gentleman of independent fortune, having estates in Kent and Wales, worth about 1500*l.* a-year. He was a member of Magdalen College, Oxford, and left in 1840. In 1841 he married the daughter of a Mrs. Matthews, and by her had six children. He resided in Merionethshire, where he had two residences, eight miles apart. From about two years after his marriage, he and his wife lived very unhappily together. In August, 1857, he went from Wales to Manchester, accompanied by his wife and two daughters, to see the Exhibition, and there met Mr. and Mrs. Barnett. Mr. Barnett was formerly a surgeon at Stourport. He was a friend of Mrs. Ruck's. While the parties were at Manchester, he and his wife were several evenings with Mr. and Mrs. Barnett. He (Mr. Ruck) then went with his wife and daughters into Kent to visit his brother-in-law, and remained there two days, and then left for Wales to attend a meeting of the Newtown and Machynlleth Railway Company, leaving his wife and daughters in Kent. After taking part in the railway meeting he returned to Kent in September, and remained about a month, going out shooting, and mixing in society. He then returned to Wales to attend another railway meeting, and was re-elected a director in October. He then went to his house at Pantllwdw, where he was waited upon by a Welshman and his wife, neither of whom could speak English, he being equally ignorant of Welsh. His home was uncomfortable, and a Miss Jones was sent for by Mrs. Matthews, his wife's mother. An intimacy had previously subsisted between him and Miss Jones which resulted in the birth of two children, a fact which he was anxious to keep secret from his wife. He was exceedingly annoyed at Miss Jones's conduct, who came in a half-drunken state, and afterwards made too free with the bottled ale, while he was out. He and Miss Jones occasionally had quarrels. As the weather was unfavourable to farming pursuits, he used to go out driving, and stopped here and there to refresh himself as well as his horse, and in this way he sometimes took more than was necessary. His trouble of mind affected him as much or more than the drink, and he became exceedingly irritable. He was at Pantllwdw for a fortnight. On one occasion he found that some one (whom he surmised to be Miss Jones) had entered his gunroom and disturbed some medical books with plates, and, as he thought they were not fit to be seen by women, he burned the books in the fire. He was intending to go to Kent, and in October drove towards Shrewsbury, to a place called Carno, and though he had had no intimation that his wife was coming to Wales, he was surprised to see her drive up there. He supposed she had been home and followed him. He said he could manage himself very well, and proceeded on to Welchpool, where he had a dispute with his wife about a gentleman going inside the coach. They stayed at Welchpool three days, and while there, he and his wife occupied separate rooms. To a moderate extent he indulged at Welchpool, and at night sent for a Dr. Harrison, who prescribed for him, and he gave up stimulants. Mr. Barnett was telegraphed for he believed by his wife, and came, and they all three took the mail for Shrewsbury, and went on to Birmingham that night. He (Mr. Ruck) there slept with his wife. He had told Mr. Barnett he was going to Kent, and Mr. Barnett said he had better call on him at Reading, as he had not seen his (Barnett's) new house. He accordingly went, and arrived there at two o'clock on the afternoon of Sunday, the 1st of November, 1857. On their arrival there, Mr. Barnett and witness's wife were for about an hour in conversation. Witness

settled the expenses of the journey with Mr. Barnett, and then went to dinner with his wife and Mr. and Mrs. Barnett. After dinner Barnett pushed the wine towards him, and invited him to take some, and he took a glass, and on his pressing him again, he took another half glass, but no more, as he fancied the wine was drugged. He determined to go to Kent, and started for that purpose, but was followed by Barnett, who seized him by the collar, and asked him what he meant by leaving his house in that manner. A scuffle ensued, people came up, and he (Mr. Ruck) explained to the police the nature of the assault, and that he believed Mr. Barnett had drugged his wine. As it was Sunday the policeman said there could be no charge made that day, and he would go back with him and taste the wine. This they did, and he (Ruck) drank a couple of glasses more. (Laughter.) During that and three successive nights he occupied the same room with his wife at Mr. Barnett's house. Dr. Conolly came down on the Wednesday, was introduced by Mr. Barnett as a particular friend, and talked with him (Mr. Ruck) on various subjects, and asked some questions about some quarries, and as to his wife. He (Dr. Conolly) was there about ten minutes, and Mr. Barnett was present the whole of the time. There was no plate on Mr. Barnett's door, and no signs of a practice. After Dr. Conolly had left, Mr. Barnett returned to the drawing-room, and said he thought he (Mr. Ruck) had better go and visit Dr. Stilwell. He (Mr. Ruck) at that time knew nothing of Dr. Stilwell, nor of his keeping an asylum, but he left Reading in company with one of Dr. Stilwell's servants, unconscious that he was going to an asylum. He went to Moorcroft House, near Uxbridge, and was introduced to Dr. Stilwell and his assistant, Mr. Weller. His keys were taken from him, his boxes searched, and the door locked, and he then knew in what sort of place he was. On inquiry he was informed by Dr. Stilwell that he was authorized to detain him by some medical certificates. He was never examined by any other medical gentleman besides Dr. Stilwell, but that gentleman was excessively curious about some reports he had heard respecting him. There was no examination as to his health, and he received no medicine and no medical treatment. A man named Randall attended upon him, and at first slept in his bedroom for about six months. He was never allowed to go out without a keeper. There were about forty patients in the asylum. When he had been there two or three days, Dr. Stilwell asked him to go out for a drive, which he did, and occasionally changed seats with him, while he (Mr. Ruck) sat on the box and drove the carriage. He was told that he was not allowed to post letters, and on one occasion was prevented by a keeper when he attempted to put a letter in the box. The Lunacy Commissioners attended occasionally at the asylum, but Dr. Stilwell was present all the time. The Commissioners put questions as to reports against his (witness's) wife. He was visited by his brother and sister, but they were seldom allowed to see him privately. He wished to see Mr. W. Ackworth, his attorney, and sent a letter to him surreptitiously by an attendant, for which he believed the servant was dismissed. Afterwards Mr. Ackworth came, but he was not allowed to see him except in the presence of Mr. Weller, so that he could do no more than answer the questions which he put. He (Ackworth) said he would call again in a few days, but for some unaccountable reason he saw no more of him. He wrote to his brother-in-law Mr. Fisher, the barrister, and instructed him to do everything in his power to get him out. Mr. Fisher informed him he had put the matter in Mr. Wainwright's hands, and Mr. Wainwright called upon him in April, and he (Mr. Ruck) gave him instructions to do what was necessary to procure his discharge. He (Mr. Ruck) requested Mr. Wainwright to go to Wales and make some inquiries, which he did, and communicated to him the result. Mr. Wainwright's report lulled his suspicions and dispelled all his (Mr. Ruck's) notions. He (Mr. Ruck) had to give Mr. Wainwright an order

for some money, but Dr. Stilwell interfered and prevented it. He (Mr. Ruck) was not attended by any medical man while there, but during Dr. Stilwell's illness an uncle of his attended for two or three months. Dr. Conolly used to visit the asylum once a week or once a fortnight. Mr. Ruck said he was present during the whole of the inquisition, and was examined by the Master in Lunacy, in presence of the jury, some of whom put questions. The result was that the jury found he was not insane. Since August last he had resided with his brother-in-law and at home. His income was about 1500*l.* a year, and he had some quarries, respecting which he had consulted some mining agents. Upon one quarry he had expended 500*l.* or 600*l.*, and some more money on another. At Moorcroft 3*l.* or 4*l.* were given to him at a time.

The plaintiff was then subjected to a very long and rigid cross-examination by Mr. Chambers. The subject of the cross-examination was as to the plaintiff's habits of intoxication and various delusions under which it was suggested he was labouring at the time he was sent to the asylum, particularly delusions as to his wife's infidelity. He admitted that at the time he entertained those delusions, but stated that his notions on that subject were entirely removed by the result of Mr. Wainwright's inquiries.

Mr. Ruck said—Mr. Wainwright's report dispelled all my suspicions and notions. That was a month or six weeks before the commission. At the commission I was examined by the Master in Lunacy. Previous to entering Moorcroft-house I had suspicions respecting my wife's infidelity. I communicated them to Dr. Stilwell. Mr. Wainwright's report entirely removed my suspicions. All my suspicions have now been removed. My wife has only had 40*l.* or 50*l.* from me, but I consider she has had enough from the sale of stock. She has six children to support. She sold the stock on my farm for 1500*l.* There was an agreement that my wife was to have 10*l.* a-week, and to sign a deed of separation. The deed was prepared, but she has hitherto refused to sign it. On one occasion she said she had not a farthing in her pocket, and Mr. Wainwright gave her a cheque for 20*l.* My first suspicions of my wife were at Carno. A gentleman got into the coach, and I thought my wife and he were too intimate, and I refused to go any further. At Welchpool I suspected her with regard to some of the people in the hotel, but no one in particular. I heard noises and footsteps at night outside my door, and thought my wife might be going about the house in a loose kind of way. Two men were watching. I was in a very agitated state. We had lived unhappily together after the first twelve months. I had a house at Pantllwdw, and another eight miles off, at Aberdover, where my children lived. I never fancied people were poisoning me. I did not fancy that at Lloyd's, the inn at Welchpool. I may have poured the wine into the chamber-pot. (Laughter.) It was execrable stuff. (Laughter.) I never said I had been poisoned. I had taken a fly at nine o'clock in the morning, and got into the carriage at the hotel door. I did not harness the horse myself. I took a traveller's coat for my own. It was exactly like my own. I returned it. I may have been drinking in the bar, but I was conscious when I went to bed, and when I left in the morning. The fly took me to Carno, and my wife came there. She was in an excited state. I was with my portmanteau, and going to Kent. My wife was at first unwilling to accompany me, but after a time she was willing. I did not on the journey say that I saw people rushing into one another's arms. I said that I overheard some one asking whether, when we met, we did not rush into one another's arms. I ordered a fly to take my wife back to her mother's, as I did not consider her in a fit state to travel. I suspected she was too intimate with the gentleman in the coach. When they brought the fly round my wife prevented them from going. I waited for some hours, and they said they would bring some horses; and for

about a quarter of an hour I took my seat in a fly. At night I found I could not sleep, and I sent for Mr. Harrison. It was two nights after that that the two men were set to watch me. I told Mr. Harrison my wife had been intimate with a gentleman—not with most of the people in the inn. I may have had an impression that Mary Jones lay by my side, and that she was talking to me, on the first night I was at Welchpool. My head was full of noises, and I thought I heard her whispering. That was one of the notions that Mr. Wainwright removed. He satisfied me that she (Mary Jones) was twelve miles off at the time, at Dolgelly. Mr. Harrison saw me again the next day, and I had some cooling draughts. I had my gun-case and pistol-case with me. I was going a-shooting, and my pistol required repairing. I am not sure whether the pistol was loaded. I always kept my gun and pistols loaded. The house at Pantllwdw was damp. I did not open the case. Mr. Barnett came down on Saturday after. I travelled that day. I told my wife to give me her money, and she gave me her purse with a 20*l.*-note in it. I did not know the 20*l.* was a present from her mother. We arrived at Birmingham at between twelve and one o'clock in the morning, and we started at ten o'clock the same morning. I have no recollection of saying to my wife, "You may well say your prayers." I did not go to my gun and pistols. I suppose that must be my wife's evidence. I may have said, "We must make haste and get away from here, for they know what you are." I suspected that my wife had been familiar with some people or other. I account for this by the fact that the noises in my head continued; and under certain conditions you may imagine almost anything. I did not say it had been telegraphed north, south, east, and west. No doubt I had the noises in my head on the way to Reading. They continued several days. I thought my wife had disgraced me with some men at Welchpool, and I said I would abandon the county. (The witness was here cross-examined at great length on these matters, and admitted the saying of many things against his wife which he was now satisfied were unfounded.)

The jury interposed, and asked whether it was necessary to go into these matters so fully, as they were admitted.

Mr. Justice Hill said he could not say that the evidence was irrelevant.

The plaintiff continued.—At the police-court, at Reading, I said my wife was nothing but a ——. That was a day or two before I went to Dr. Stilwell's. When Miss Jones came to me at Pantllwdw she refused to tell me what she had done with her children. I did not send for a policeman to give her in charge for murdering her children. I locked her up. She was in that drunken state that she was better locked up. (Laughter.) My wife never contradicted me, or appeared to feel injured, when I spoke of Mary Jones. At Reading I kept quiet, and ceased to have noises. I have not had noises in my head during the last six weeks; not at Sittingbourne, where I was living with a job-master. At Reading I dined with Mr. Barnett. I may have taken a glass or two of sherry at dinner. I had got half-a-mile when Mr. Barnett came after me. We struggled, and I got him on the ground. If I had been inclined, I could have given him such a settler as would have stopped all further inquiry. (Laughter.) He certainly had no right to follow me and insult me as he did. I told the policeman my wine had been drugged. He said that was a serious charge, for drugs were poisons. I said the wine was not poisoned, but drugged. We all went to the station, and there I told the inspector my wife was a ——. I said no doubt he (Barnett) wanted to lay me up by drugging me, because I said my wife was a ——. It was to prevent me from leaving my wife. I suspected that Barnett was one of her paramours. I did not mention that at the police-station. I told Dr. Stilwell so soon after my arrival at Moorcroft. Being detained in that house strengthened my suspicion that I was detained there to save my wife from exposure. I said to the doctors I had no reason to

disbelieve my suspicions, because I had no means of making inquiries. As soon as I received Mr. Wainwright's proof positive that all my suspicions were groundless I was satisfied. I have no doubt that my wife has been a pure and faithful wife all her life. I have no doubt of it. I have expressed great contrition to her. I thought all was condoned when I slept with her three nights at Reading. In May or June, 1858, I did not say that Mr. Barnett and my wife had had illicit intercourse. I may have said to Dr. Sutherland, in July, 1858, that all the servants on the railway took marked notice of my wife, but not that they said, "That is the woman that bilked her husband." I did not tell Dr. Winslow, in July, that no London prostitute could conduct herself as bad. I never said my wife attempted to poison me. I may have said she drugged my wine. I may have said that to Dr. Winslow at one of his visits. Mr. and Mrs. Goord did not come to see me at the asylum. Mr. Fisher and my sister came in November. I have no doubt I told him to do all he could to get me out. I did not see Mr. Wainwright till the spring, in April. The commissioners spoke to me from time to time, but in the presence of Dr. Stilwell. I never asked to see my children; I did not wish them to know I was in such a place. It was through Mr. Fisher Mr. Wainwright was employed. Mr. Wainwright got an order to see me, and he then saw me, without interruption, four or five times. Mr. Williams was introduced to me as a friend, but he betrayed all my confidence. I was allowed to go to London to see medical men, and I once dined with Mr. Fisher. Going home we had some brandy and soda-water and cigars, which had some effect on me; but when I got home I lighted my candle, and walked upstairs, and went to bed, and put my candle out. In about five minutes a man came into my room, and I called out, "You fancy you are going to catch a weasel asleep." (Laughter.)

JUNE 22nd.

Mr. Ruck, the plaintiff, was recalled, and his cross-examination resumed. He said:—Miss Jones is a cousin of my wife's, who often visited at my house; but my wife did not know that I had had two children by her. I did not say at the commission that she had murdered her children. She would not give me any information respecting the children, and I thought she might have made away with them. I now know from Miss Jones that they are well taken care of. She behaved most shamefully to me, and, as she has ample means of her own, I have almost disowned the children. She is dependent on her uncle and aunt. I once sent her a 10*l.*-note by a friend. A short time ago she asked me for 500*l.*, and I thought it so ridiculous that I took no notice of it. When I saw Mr. Wainwright, he told me I had better see no one without a letter of introduction from him. I was on my guard in talking to strangers. I am on my guard now. (Laughter.) The unhappiness which took place after my marriage was from my wife refusing to have any connexion with me. She did that for five years. We were very cool to one another. I always acted towards her in a proper manner. She treated me in the same style. At Reading, I and my wife condoned one another's conduct. I have mortgaged my property to a considerable amount to pay the law expenses.

Re-examined by Mr. Serjeant Petersdorff.—In respect to the quarries, I acted on advice. There never was any insanity in my family. This entry in the book produced was written the morning after I went to Welshpool. I was very unwell at the time. My portmanteau was taken from me at Reading, and all my books, including this one, were returned to my wife. I first became acquainted with Miss Jones some years ago. She used to visit in the house for months. It was Mrs. Matthews, my wife's mother, who sent for Miss Jones to my house. I can't say that Mrs. Matthews knew of the intimacy which had taken place, but I surmised —. I never saw Miss Jones's two

children. Miss Jones's father was a man of some property. He was a captain in the navy. I had a great quarrel with Miss Jones when I was in Wales. From the time I went to the asylum till the time I was discharged Dr. Stilwell never attempted to remove my delusions. I saw him almost daily. He ceased to talk about my delusions after five or six days. He never endeavoured to remove my delusions. I believe he inquired of my attendant, but not of me. I never had any noises in my head till October, when I went down to Wales. When I condoned the matter at Reading, I said I should think no more of it, and we had better go into Kent and live together. She agreed to it. That was on the Tuesday, before Dr. Conolly came. When I left the asylum I found that property had been sold for 1500*l.* which I valued at about 2000*l.* The house at Pantllwdw was let. I was at Aberdovey when I heard my wife say she had not executed the deed of separation, and that she wished to hear from her sister. About three or four years before the commission my wife had said we had better part. Sometimes we lived at different houses. She lived at Aberdovey and I at Pantllwdw for about two years; but I visited backwards and forwards. I did not want my wife to come with me from Wales in October, because she had no luggage.

George Randall, examined by Mr. Allan, said:—On the 5th of November, 1857, I was an attendant at Dr. Stilwell's asylum, and took charge of Mr. Ruck. My orders from Dr. Stilwell were never to allow him to post letters, and never to lose sight of him. About two days after Mr. Ruck came he went out for a drive with Dr. Stilwell. He was then as quiet as any gentleman need be in the world. He told me he drove. I had care of him for four months, and went out to walk with him. He went to church, and always conducted himself like the rest of the gentlemen there. I accompanied him to Windsor on several occasions. He had some money (3*l.*), and my orders from Dr. Stilwell were to let him spend it as fast as he could. He spent it very frugally. 3*l.* lasted about a month. He never had any medicine while I was there. When Mr. Ruck had been there three weeks, Dr. Stilwell told me it was very strange he could see nothing the matter with him. Dr. Stilwell told me to report to him about Mr. Ruck, and I used to report that I could see nothing the matter with him. When Mr. Ruck had been there about a month, Dr. Stilwell said to me he could see nothing the matter, and he would soon be discharged. He said that to me on several occasions; I might say half-a-dozen times. There were two physicians to the establishment, Dr. James Stilwell, of Uxbridge, and Dr. Conolly. They attended there once or twice a-week regularly during the whole time I was there. Dr. Conolly used to visit the patients. If Dr. Stilwell (the defendant) was not at home, Mr. Weller used to take Dr. Conolly round the rooms. I had been at Moorcroft about a week before the 5th of November, and I had seen Dr. Conolly there before that date.

Cross-examined by Mr. Chambers.—I saw Dr. Conolly enter at the street-door, and saw him go to the patients. He shook hands with the patients, and asked them how they were. The grounds were half-a-mile round. Dr. Conolly several times talked to Mr. Ruck. I should say seven or eight times. There was a ball there, and Dr. Conolly was at the ball. I left the establishment of my own accord, about a month after Christmas, I believe. I was there about four months. I recollect Mr. Weller being drunk one night. He bullyragged me. (Laughter.) When I was before the Master in Lunacy I said nothing about Dr. Stilwell's telling me to let Mr. Ruck spend the money as fast as he could. The question was never asked. But I say it now. (Laughter.) Mr. Ruck talked to me about his suspicions as to his wife up to the time I left. I told him they were delusions, I should say; he must be mistaken in his notions. I might have told him that once or twice. I was to report to Dr. Stilwell if Mr. Ruck misconducted himself out. Dr. Stilwell asked me if Mr. Ruck talked to me about his wife

and Mr. Barnett. I told him once or twice that he did, but I did not see anything the matter with him. I told Dr. Stilwell Mr. Ruck had said Mr. Barnett and his wife had been too intimate, too familiar. That was one of the delusions in which I told Mr. Ruck he must be mistaken. Another was that he said he had seen his wife nod and laugh with a traveller in a coach in Wales. He did not say his wife had had connexion with a traveller who got into the coach. He said Mrs. Ruck paid too much attention to him, and they were too familiar. Mrs. Ruck came to Moorcroft, and after that I told Mr. Ruck that he was mistaken. Mr. Ruck did not tell me he suspected his wife had had connexion with men in the inn at Welshpool. He might; I have no recollection. After I saw Mrs. Ruck I told Mr. Ruck his wife was a very ladylike person, and he must be mistaken about Mr. Barnett and the man in the coach. That was after Mrs. Ruck had had an interview with Mr. Ruck. When I reported to Dr. Stilwell, he used to say he could see nothing the matter with Mr. Ruck. I said at the commission that he said it on one occasion, but I am sure he said it more than once. My memory has got better now. I believe Mr. Ruck was as sane as anybody in court all the time he was at the asylum. He told me he had been drinking, and I explained to him that he might be mistaken. I posted a letter for Mr. Ruck. It was some time after I left. When I left I complained of Mr. Weller's language, and said I would "open the ball upon the asylum." I meant I should go and see Mr. Ruck's friends, and just tell them I could see nothing the matter with him. I saw Mr. Ackworth.

Re-examined by Mr. James.—I discharged myself. Mr. Weller had a party, a regular flare-up. We would not join him, and remained in the kitchen. The next morning I left. Mr. Weller was drunk on that occasion, and on several other occasions. Mr. Ruck was always very quiet. He was never a dangerous lunatic. He never raised his hand. He told me he used to take brandy about with him, and take too much, and he did not know what he was about. He said he courted inquiry, but he was shut up there.

By a Juror.—When I went out with Mr. Ruck we had half-and-half, but no spirits. Wine was allowed in the establishment.

Thomas Randall, examined by Mr. James, said—I am now in the police force. I am the brother of the last witness. I was a keeper in Moorcroft-house from three weeks after Mr. Ruck came till the 12th of May, 1858. I used to walk with the plaintiff, and never observed anything like insanity about him. He was not violent. I received orders from Dr. Stilwell not to post any letters. On the 9th of May, Dr. Stilwell said to me, "Have you been posting a letter for Mr. Ruck?" I said, "No." He turned round with a vicious look and said "You have." He said, "You have; the lawyers are at work, and no doubt will get him out." I was discharged for posting the letter. I had a month's money. My brother posted the letter, and I would not tell. I was discharged innocently. I have seen Dr. Conolly going round the rooms to the patients twice a-week. Dr. Conolly attended a patient of whom I had care.

Cross-examined by Mr. Chambers.—Dr. Stilwell had an uncle, Dr. James Stilwell, who lived at Uxbridge. He did not attend almost every day. I have seen him there once, twice, or three times a-week. I thought Mr. Ruck was sane. I did not speak to him about any delusions.

Theodore Prichard, examined by Mr. Serjeant Petersdorff, said—I am now in a regiment of Hussars. I was a keeper at Moorcroft for eight months, and left in August, 1858. I saw Mr. Ruck every day, and used to accompany him in his walks in the meadow about once in the week. I was in the habit of talking to him. I thought he was quite sane. I never observed anything insane in him. Dr. Stilwell gave me orders not to post any letters for Mr. Ruck. I have seen Dr. Conolly at the asylum. He has come into the room where I

was sitting with the patients, and asked how they were. There were five or six patients in the room at the time. I have seen him once a-week, once a-fortnight, or three times a-month. He felt the pulses of the patients. I have seen Dr. Conolly in different rooms with patients.

Cross-examined by Mr. Serjeant Ballantine.—I was there for eight months. Mr. Ruck was the same all the time. The rule was, that letters from the patients were to be put on the hall table. Dr. Conolly came occasionally. Dr. James Stilwell came two or three times a-week. Dr. Conolly went through the house with Dr. Stilwell, and on some occasions with Mr. Weller. I was not much with Mr. Ruck. I have talked with him about different things, but never about his wife or family.

R. D. Jones, examined by Mr. Allan, said :—I am a magistrate, and reside in Montgomery. I knew the plaintiff, Mr. Ruck, but we were not intimate. I was a director of the Newtown and Machynlleth Railway Company, and met Mr. Ruck, who was also a Director, in October, 1857. He attended several meetings in the autumn of that year, and took part in the proceedings. What he said was very sensible and to the purpose. There was nothing to show that he was a lunatic. No remark was made by any of the directors of any singularity. I have heard that Mr. Ruck had a slate quarry, and have talked to him about it.

Cross-examined by Mr. Serjeant Ballantine.—I never had any conversation with Mr. Ruck respecting his wife till after his release. I interfered to procure a reconciliation between Mr. Ruck and his wife, but failed.

The medical certificates and order for the admission of Mr. Ruck into Moorcroft Asylum were here put in and read.

Dr. Conolly's certificate, dated the 3rd of November, 1857, stated that he had examined the plaintiff, Lawrence Ruck, at Reading, on that day, "separately from any other medical practitioner," and that he was "a person of unsound mind," &c., and he formed that opinion on the following grounds :—

"1. Facts indicating insanity observed by myself.—A disposition to talk openly of his having had ocular proof of the infidelity of his wife, and speaking of it as if it would not interfere with their future comfort ; and an exaggerated manner of talking of the value of quarries on his estate.

"2. Other facts (if any) indicating insanity communicated to me by others.—An uncontrollable disposition at intervals to intemperance, acts of extravagance, and fits of depression, in which he has spoken of suicide. He has also the habit of carrying firearms with him. (Communicated by one of his friends, Mr. Barnett, of Reading, and by Mrs. Ruck.—J. CONOLLY, M.D., Hanwell."

Mr. Barnett's certificate, dated the 5th of November, 1857, stated that, "being in actual practice as a surgeon and general practitioner," he "separately from any other medical practitioner had examined Mr. Ruck, and that he was a person of unsound mind," &c., and that he formed that opinion on the following grounds :—

"1. Facts indicating insanity observed by myself.—Charges of cruelty against others, which are false ; restlessness, and a determination to wander forth, with complete infirmity of purpose, indulging in intemperance, and a profligate expenditure of money ; taxing his wife with infidelity ; inconsistent in alluding both to his agricultural operations and to the value of the land, from a supposition of immeasurable amounts of mines, lead, copper, and slate, contained therein.

"2. Other facts (if any) indicating insanity communicated to me by others.—Going about with loaded pistols ; threatening those who have always been in close bonds of friendship with him ; building walls one day, and altering them the next ; in all his actions presenting the converse of his former self ; excess of intemperance, or total abstinence ; embarking money injudiciously and recklessly in speculations. (Mrs. Ruck.)

RICHARD BARNETT, M.R.C.S."

"11, Victoria-square, Reading."

The order for the plaintiff's reception by Dr. Stilwell, at Moorcroft-house, signed by Mrs. Ruck, was also read. It was dated the 5th of November, and stated that the patient, Lawrence Ruck, was thirty-seven years of age, married, a landed proprietor and farmer; a Protestant of the Church of England, living at Pantil-lwdw, in Merionethshire, North Wales; that the present was his first attack, now extending over two or more years; that he had not been under any treatment previously; that the cause of his attack was probably partly hereditary and partly from intemperance, and that he was not subject to epilepsy. To the question, "Whether suicidal" the answer was, "No, I think not;" and to the question "Whether dangerous to others?" the answer was, "Has carried pistols loaded, and threatened others." It also stated that he had not been found lunatic by inquisition, and that there were no special circumstances preventing the patient being examined before admission, separately, by two medical practitioners.

Mr. James then called for extracts from one of Dr. Stilwell's books, headed "Dr. Conolly." They were produced, and read thus:—

"Mem. for Dr. Conolly, for	
Quarter ending the 30th of March, 1858.	
February 5, Ruck	£15 0 0
Mem. for Dr. Conolly, for	
Quarter ending June, 1858.	
May 5, 1858, Ruck	Qy. £15 0 0"

Mr. James submitted that the whole book was evidence, including the part which was sealed up. The question was, whether Dr. Conolly was wholly or partly a proprietor of the house.

Mr. Serjeant Ballantine objected that the book was not evidence, except as far as it was produced under the judge's order. The parts not ordered to be inspected had been sealed up.

Mr. Justice Hill said he had consulted with Mr. Justice Erle on this point, which was a novel one, and his opinion was that nothing was produced but the exposed part; but the plaintiff would be at liberty to call on the defendant to open the sealed part, and if the defendant refused, the plaintiff might give secondary evidence of the contents, and make observations on its not being opened to the jury.

Mr. Chambers upon that intimation consented that the book should be opened. This was done at a subsequent stage of the trial.

Mr. T. N. Walford, examined by Mr. Allan, said he was a surgeon, residing at Reading, and knew Mr. Barnett, of Victoria-crescent, Reading. In 1856, Mr. Barnett called upon him, and he returned the call, and had met him since in the town and at the Pathological Society, but never met him in practice.

Mr. G. W. C. Wainwright, examined by Mr. Serjeant Petersdorff, said:—I am the attorney for the plaintiff. I first went to Moorcroft-house on the 7th of November, 1857. I was applied to by some relatives. I saw Dr. Stilwell and Mr. Weller. Dr. Stilwell said Mr. Ruck had been suffering from *delirium tremens*, and he could not tell what effect seeing us might have; he would only allow us to see him from one of the windows. We went up to a window, and Mr. Ruck and Mr. Weller came round. That was all I saw. I saw the certificates. I went again on the 26th of April. Then I only saw Mr. Weller. I applied to see Mr. Ruck, and did see him. My impression is that on that occasion Mr. Weller was present. Mr. Fisher was present. We proposed to bring down some medical man. Mr. Weller said there was no objection, and on the 28th I took down Dr. Seymour. Mr. Ruck complained of being detained. On the 12th of May I saw Dr. Stilwell, and told him Dr. Seymour thought it was not a case for confinement in a lunatic asylum, and he considered that if Mr. Ruck were kept quiet he would soon recover. Dr. Seymour gave instructions for some con-

dential inquiries to be made, and he would see Mr. Ruck with the result. A conversation then took place between me and Dr. Stilwell whether Mr. Ruck was likely to be removed. Dr. Stilwell wished to know, and I said that was my view, that it would be better that he should be removed. Dr. Stilwell then pointed out that Moorcroft was a very beautiful place, that no asylum had larger grounds, and that as to attendance, he was always there, and Dr. Conolly, of Hanwell, attended. I arranged to come again on the 19th to see Mr. Ruck. Mr. Ruck then said he would have the whole matter sifted. Dr. Seymour and I had previously ascertained what those matters were, viz., the man in the coach, Miss Jones's being at Welshpool, the infidelity of his wife, and the *fracas* at Reading. I did not go again in consequence of a letter from Dr. Stilwell to Mr. Fisher. I next saw Mr. Ruck on the 25th of June. I had not then prosecuted the inquiries. On the 25th of June I was instructed to make inquiries. I was instructed on the 6th of July. I made my report on the 25th of July. On my doing so, he admitted that there was no doubt he had been wrong. On the 19th of May, I told Dr. Stilwell that I meant to get Mr. Ruck discharged, and I had no doubt of the result. Mrs. Ruck was present, and asked Dr. Stilwell if there could be any doubt of the result after what the doctors had said. Dr. Stilwell said, "Yes, there will be a great conflict of evidence, and the medical men on both sides will be to some extent biassed by the side they take." After I got the decision of the Lords Justices, I saw Dr. Stilwell, and arranged with him for Mr. Ruck to be brought up on the commission. After the commission terms were come to for a separation. The deed I believe has not been executed. The expenses of the commission were 1100*l*.

Cross-examined by Mr. Serjeant Ballantine.—Mrs. Ruck told me she never would live with Mr. Ruck again. I communicated that to Mr. Ruck. She afterwards met Mr. Ruck at my office, after the inquisition, and said there was no reason why they should not live together. Mr. Ruck declined, and referred to the former interviews, when some very unpleasant matters took place. It was proposed that a cottage should be taken for Mr. Ruck, and I suggested, in answer to Mrs. Ruck, that Dr. Seymour would be a proper person to put him under. After I had made the inquiries, I explained to Mr. Ruck the state of intoxication in which he was, and I told him what each person had said. From that time he was cured.

Re-examined by Mr. James.—I never observed any act or word of insanity in Mr. Ruck that would justify his confinement.

At this stage of the proceedings Mr. Justice Hill, who had opened and examined Dr. Stilwell's book, headed "Dr. Conolly," read the entry made in the quarter from January to March, 1857. There were the names of fifteen patients, with various sums put after each name, except two. There were five patients whose names had 6*l*. 5*s*. after them, two with 10*l*., and six with 12*l*. 10*s*., making a total of 126*l*. 5*s*., to this was added "consultation fee, twenty-five guineas," thus making a total of 152*l*. 10*s*. for that quarter. The next quarter, ending Midsummer, 1857, had similar entries, in respect of eighteen patients. The quarter ending the 30th of March, 1858, had similar entries, amounting to 156*l*. 5*s*., but no consulting fee. Opposite Mr. Ruck's name was 15*l*. The quarter ending Midsummer, 1858, had a consulting fee, 26*l*. 5*s*., and from fifteen to eighteen patients, with various sums opposite their names, Mr. Ruck's having 15*l*. after it.

Mr. James then put in the entry made by Dr. Stilwell in his book after the close of the inquisition, as follows:—

"August 27.—Mr. Ruck was discharged by the decision of the jury on his case, the full particulars of which are fully given in the morning papers. All that is necessary for me to state is, that I still adhere to my opinion that he is a most dangerous lunatic.—G. J. S."

Mr. Wainwright.—The charge made for Mr. Ruck's board was 400/.

Mr. James said he wished that fact to be proved, because it showed that Dr. Conolly had 15 per cent. on Mr. Ruck's payment.

Dr. Johnson, a physician at King's College hospital, examined by Mr. James, said :—I examined Mr. Ruck on the 9th and 12th of August, 1858, and have heard the evidence. The symptoms of his disease were those of *delirium tremens* arising from intemperance. I considered him sane. I do not consider that a person in such a state required detention. Such patients usually recover speedily and do not require detention.

Cross-examined by Mr. Chambers.—The safety of letting a man out of an asylum depends on the nature of his delusions. There are in our pauper asylums many who suffer from *delirium tremens*. That sometimes passes into insanity. The delusion as to the fidelity of one's wife is attended with risk.

Re-examined by Mr. James.—Repeated attacks of *delirium tremens* sometimes pass into insanity. I would not lock a man up because he was jealous of his wife. (Laughter.)

Mr. Skey, examined by Mr. James, said :—I am one of the senior surgeons at St. Bartholomew's. I examined Mr. Ruck on the 12th of August, and he appeared to be in a sound state of mind. The delusions which arise from *delirium tremens* generally pass off. Such cases are cases for detention, but not for detention in lunatic asylums. Some cases require watching, but I decidedly object to such cases being sent to a lunatic asylum, unless there is a part of the asylum devoted to such cases. I saw nothing in Mr. Ruck to show that he was insane or dangerous.

Cross-examined by Mr. Chambers.—Some patients are better under individual observation and kept alone, and some are better when placed in an establishment, such as a lunatic asylum. If a person had *delirium tremens*, I would place him under the eye or charge of a medical man, but also under a keeper. There is danger of violence in the early stages of *delirium tremens*. Delusions arising from *delirium tremens* soon vanish and pass away. It is a great object to obtain sleep. In thirty years' experience I cannot recollect any case of *delirium tremens* going out of the hospital to a lunatic asylum. Dr. Conolly has devoted himself for years, and successfully, to the study of insanity. The country owes a great deal to Dr. Conolly. I call in Dr. Conolly myself more than any other physician.

Re-examined by Mr. James :—In my judgment, from what I saw of Mr. Ruck and heard I do not think this was a case for confinement in a lunatic asylum.

Mr. J. Gay, examined by Mr. Serjeant Petersdorff, said he was senior surgeon of the Great Northern Hospital. He saw Mr. Ruck on the 5th of August last. He gave similar evidence to the previous witnesses.

On cross-examination by Mr. Serjeant Ballantine, he said that *delirium tremens* was a state of temporary insanity produced by intemperance, that it was attended with violence and delusions, and required restraint for a time.

In re-examination by Mr. James, he said the duration of delusions depended on the impression made on the mind.

Mr. E. Canton, examined by Mr. Allan, said :—I am surgeon to Charing-cross Hospital, and examined Mr. Ruck in August last, and believed him to be in a state of sound mental health. I attributed the delusions which he had when he entered the asylum to *delirium tremens*. It was not proper treatment to put such a person in a lunatic asylum.

Cross-examined by Mr. Chambers.—I am speaking of acute cases of *delirium tremens*.

Re-examined by Mr. James.—Cases of *delirium tremens* are first brought to the hospital.

Mr. James then put in the defendant's licence, and said that was the plaintiff's case.

Mr. Chambers submitted that the order and certificates which had been put in established a defence to the first count, under the 99th section of the 8th and 9th Victoria, cap. 106, which enacted that any keeper of a licensed house receiving a patient under a "proper order" should be authorized to detain him until he died, or was removed or discharged by due authority. The order was sufficient if it was good on the face of it, and accompanied with proper certificates. The second count was framed on the 19th section of the 16th and 17th of Victoria, cap. 96, which enacted that when the patient recovered, the keeper of the asylum was bound to give notice to the person who signed the order for the admission. That was disproved by the evidence, for it appeared the defendant was always of opinion that the plaintiff was a dangerous lunatic.

Mr. Justice Hill said the plaintiff's counsel rested his case on the fact that Dr. Conolly was either the regular medical attendant at the asylum or a partner, and that the defendant knew it.

His Lordship thought there was hardly any case on the second count, but he would not call on the plaintiff to elect at present.

The trial was then adjourned, and the Court rose.

JUNE 23RD.

When the trial of this cause was resumed,

Mr. Chambers said that he had considered last night the propriety of calling witnesses, and he had determined not to do so.

Mr. James said that, under those circumstances, he should rely on the first count only.

Mr. Justice Hill said that would narrow the issues to one single question—viz., whether Dr. Conolly was a part proprietor in the defendants' establishment. He should leave the question to the jury, telling them that, if they found that in the affirmative, the verdict must be for the plaintiff; but he should give the defendant leave to move.

Mr. James said he had also made two other points, that Mr. Barnett was not a surgeon in actual practice, and also that the medical men did not examine the plaintiff apart.

Mr. Justice Hill said there was no evidence that this was known to the defendants, but he would leave those questions to the jury.

Mr. Edwin James then summed up his evidence. He said the defendants' counsel in the exercise of his discretion had determined not to call witnesses to contradict the plaintiff's case. The reason why that case was unanswered was because it was unanswerable. Dr. Stilwell and Dr. Conolly had both been in court, and yet neither of them was called to contradict or explain the evidence which had been given. A whole array of medical names had been mentioned yesterday, but now not one of them was called to contradict the evidence of Mr. Skey and the other medical witnesses, no doubt because it was felt they might go further and fare worse. The learned counsel then stated that, by the common law, a person could not justify the confinement of another, unless he could show that he was a "dangerous lunatic;" but these asylums in modern times had been made to play the same part as the monasteries did in the Middle Ages, and persons had been confined in them for the most flagitious purposes. It was for that reason the law said no one should be confined in a lunatic asylum except on two medical certificates; but the law provided that those certificates were bad if either of them was signed by a gentleman who was either a part proprietor in the establishment or a regular medical attendant at it. And yet, in this case, it appeared that one of these certificates was signed by Dr. Conolly, who was in the receipt of nearly 800*l.* a-year from that establishment. Another fact in this case was that, in an important public investigation like this, which was interesting to every one, the Lunacy Commissioners had not come forward to justify their conduct; and

show, if they could, that this gentleman, who, according to the evidence, ought never to have been in a lunatic asylum at all, was properly confined. One point which he had to show the jury was, that Dr. Conolly was a part proprietor in the defendant's establishment. That would be proved by the book, which showed that he had received 15 per cent. on Mr. Ruck's payments. That showed that Dr. Conolly had the best of it, for he shared in the profit without sharing in the risk. What was the reason why Dr. Conolly was not called? Was it not because he would have been obliged to confess that he was receiving 15 per cent. on the payments of a number of those patients who were confined on his certificates? He (Mr. James) believed, from what had occurred elsewhere, that, if Dr. Conolly had been called, he would not have denied that he was a part proprietor and a regular medical attendant at the asylum. The learned counsel made some strong observations on the neglect of duty of the Lunacy Commissioners in not coming forward to justify their conduct.

Mr. Justice Hill interposed, and observed that on this inquiry the Commissioners were gagged, and had no power to be examined, unless called by one of the parties.

Mr. James said the defendant might have called them, and the very fact that he had not done so satisfied him (Mr. James) that the Commissioners had neglected their duty. The plaintiff never was insane, and ought never to have been looked up. He was suffering from *delirium tremens*, in which it was well known persons had delusions; but why should he have been looked up? He had given the greatest proof of sanity in the witness-box by narrating all the details of what had occurred while he was suffering from the delirium. The learned counsel then referred to Mr. Barnett's certificate, and asked why Mr. Barnett was not called. If he could have shown that his certificate was true, or that he had ever been told what he had stated, that would not have been an answer to the action, but it would have gone in mitigation of damages. But there was not a word of evidence to show that one word of the certificate was true, except the plaintiff's suspicions of his wife's fidelity, and his intemperance, which were admitted. The learned counsel went through the certificate, commenting on its various charges—"a profligate expenditure of money," "going about with loaded pistols," "threatening those who have always been in the bonds of friendship with him," charges which, he said, were entirely disproved. Then he was charged with "building walls one day and altering them the next" (*diruit, ædificat, mutat quadrata rotundis*), and "embarking money injudiciously and recklessly in speculations." If such charges could prove a man to be insane, the learned counsel thought a large portion of the world might be pronounced insane, and shut up. Such, however, were the grounds on which Mr. Barnett formed his opinion, though it now appeared that, with one or two exceptions, there was no foundation for them. The learned counsel then went through Dr. Conolly's certificate, and ridiculed the notion of locking up a man in a lunatic asylum upon such grounds as were there stated. He verily believed that, if one of the "Mad doctors" were locked up for half-an-hour with the greatest man in England, he would find out that he was insane. He would find that he had an exaggerated opinion of his abilities, or an inordinate self-conceit. If the party examined were a barrister, the doctor would probably find that, though poor and briefless, he expected to be Lord Chancellor. Dr. Stilwell, the defendant, had sat in Court, and heard all the witnesses had to say against him, and yet he would not come into the box to contradict one word of it. The only defence to the action at common law would be, that the plaintiff was a dangerous lunatic; but there was no defence on that ground, for there was not one entry in the defendant's books during the ten months he was at the asylum to show that the plaintiff had ever raised his hand, or spoken an unkind word to any one. The defendants must, therefore, rely on the certificates, which were both bad; Mr. Barnett's because he

was not a surgeon actually in practice, and Dr. Conolly's because he was a part proprietor of the establishment and a regular medical attendant at it. The learned counsel contended that the plaintiff's was not a case to be received into a lunatic asylum at all, and even if it was, he ought to have been received for the purpose of care, and not to be imprisoned. The learned counsel here read a letter written by Dr. Stilwell, on the 9th of June, 1858, refusing permission to the plaintiff's own brother-in-law, Mr. Fisher, to come and see him, and concluded a most effective address by calling upon the jury to mark their view of the defendants' conduct by such a verdict as would teach the keepers of such establishments that they must treat their inmates with justice and according to law. (The learned counsel's speech was followed by applause.)

Mr. M. Chambers then addressed the jury for the defendants. He said he was glad to hear those sounds of applause, for it convinced him that topics which had nothing to do with the case had made their due impression. Many of Mr. James's observations were most eloquent, but they were also most unjust towards the defendants. The law of England was strong to prevent a person from being improperly shut up in a lunatic asylum, for, if he had but humane relations to interfere in his behalf, it was as easy to procure his discharge as it would be to procure a prisoner's discharge from prison. He would undertake to show that Dr. Stilwell was not subject to the gross imputations which had been charged against him, and he would have as little difficulty in relieving Dr. Conolly from the aspersions cast upon his reputation. The law was, that no one could keep a lunatic asylum unless he was duly licensed so to do. He must apply to the Commissioners of Lunacy for a licence, which was granted only for thirteen months, and then required to be renewed. Before he could receive a patient he must have an order, accompanied with two medical certificates that the patient was of unsound mind, and those certificates must state on their face the facts on which the medical men grounded their opinion. When an order was presented, accompanied by such certificates, the keeper of an asylum was bound to take for granted all he found stated in the order and certificates. Another protection afforded was in the Lunacy Commissioners, who were bound to visit those establishments from time to time, in the discharge of their public duty, and no doubt they would faithfully discharge that duty, though Mr. James had assumed that they would not do it. A great deal had been said about "Mad doctors," which reminded him of the cry of "Mad dog!" He would ask, what dog would get justice when there was a cry of "Mad dog?" A great deal had been said about the orders given not to post letters, the regular rule of the house being that the letters were to be put on the hall table, and then sent to the post. The point had been discussed just as if all the people in lunatic asylums were sane; but he would ask, supposing the inmates of those establishments were real lunatics, whether the rule in question was not a proper one. There was no improper restraint put on the plaintiff. Two days after the plaintiff was admitted to the asylum, he was visited by his sister and her husband, Mr. Fisher, and Mr. Wainwright, the attorney. That was on the 7th of November, 1857, and after that the Commissioners attended from time to time. If he was detained there too long, whose fault was that? Was it owing to the apathy of his relations? or was it not because they were satisfied there were good reasons for keeping him there? In former times people had been improperly detained in lunatic asylums in this country, as they had been formerly imprisoned in the Bastille; but as the Bastille had been broken into and destroyed, so also in this country, he had no hesitation in saying that, if any man had friends, he could not be kept in an asylum one week, or one day, after his friends believed he had been restored and had become sane. The object, in this inquiry, had been to withdraw the attention of the jury from the real question at issue, and the learned counsel for the plaintiff appeared as if he had

rather been addressing a legislative assembly on some proposed plan for the amendment of the law on the subject of lunatic asylums. Much had been said against private lunatic asylums. But, would any man prefer Bedlam? Let him recollect the disclosures which were formerly made in connexion with that establishment. Would any man prefer being placed in a cottage, under a keeper, a low-classed man, with a medical man only occasionally in attendance? How much superior to either was a private lunatic asylum, conducted, as those institutions were, in accordance with modern improvements in treatment. Dr. Conolly, against whom so much had been said, was the great advocate of those reforms,—it was he who had struggled for years to take off restraint from lunatics, and who had enabled them to enjoy the pleasures of society and the benefit of country air. He had emancipated the wretched slaves who were formerly confined in dungeons. The learned counsel then proceeded to comment on the evidence, with a view to show that when the plaintiff was received into the asylum on the 5th of November, 1857, he was in a state of insanity, and required to be confined and taken care of. It was admitted by all that at that time he was labouring under delusions. The certificates also proved that, and he contended the certificates had not been proved to be false. The learned counsel commented at some length on those certificates to show that at that time the plaintiff was labouring under insane delusions. One point was, that he made “charges of cruelty against others, which are false.” That was proved by what the plaintiff himself admitted—viz., that he had charged Miss Jones with putting her two children out of the way. Then he charged Mr. Barnett and his wife with drugging his wine. He charged his wife with infidelity. Who could tell whether those things indicated insanity better than the medical men who saw and talked with him? They also were the proper persons to judge whether he talked about his quarries like a madman or like a commercial man. It was not for Dr. Stilwell, the defendant, to call witnesses to prove the truth of the certificates; but for the plaintiff, if he could, to disprove them. Had he done so? He had not dared to call one witness to prove that he had not indulged in habits of intemperance. The truth of the certificates was proved by Mr. Ruck himself, for he admitted that when he thought he had had ocular demonstration of his wife’s infidelity he asked her to go and live with him in Kent. It was proved that he kept loaded firearms, and that he took a loaded gun and pistols with him to Reading. All those statements contained in the certificates Dr. Stilwell was bound to take for granted, and to act upon, and even now they had not been proved to be untrue. The learned counsel also read Mrs. Ruck’s order for the admission of the plaintiff into the defendant’s asylum, and contended that, if her statement that his insanity was “probably partly hereditary” was unfounded, some member of his family beside the plaintiff ought to have been called to prove it so. If the plaintiff was not insane when he was sent to the asylum, why did not Mr. and Mrs. Fisher, and Mr. Wainwright, who saw him two days afterwards, do something towards his removal? Mr. Ackworth, his attorney, saw the plaintiff in March, but he did nothing. It was not till the 28th of April that Mr. Wainwright took any steps in the matter, and he then took down Dr. Seymour, who was not called as a witness. The learned counsel thought that a man who had delusions about his wife’s fidelity, and who believed that his wine had been drugged by her paramour, was a dangerous lunatic, and common prudence required that he should be put under restraint, lest he should do harm to himself or to others. It was a fortunate thing that when the plaintiff got Mr. Barnett down on the ground two policemen came up and separated him from the man who he believed had been too familiar with his wife, and drugged his wine. Those same delusions continued all the time he was at the asylum, down to the 26th of July, 1858, when they all vanished at the bidding of the attorney, Mr. Wainwright, and he became satisfied that he was mistaken. The inqui-

sition had lasted five days, and though a majority of the jury had found that he was not insane, there were grounds for believing that they might have been mistaken. The learned counsel contended that Dr. Stilwell had done everything in his power to cure his patient of his delusions. It was true he did not give him medicine more than once, for the medicine to be successful in such cases did not enter by the mouth; nor did he endeavour to persuade him that he was labouring under delusions, for that would have made him worse. But he administered the best of all medicines for an alienated and suffering mind, he gave him air and exercise, he allowed him commerce with the external world in excursions to Windsor and other places, and permitted him to attend the service at the village church on a Sunday. What physic could be better for a suffering mind than that? He was debarred from the use of spirits, but wine was allowed in the establishment. He had all necessary medical attendance, and was visited by the Lunacy Commissioners, who knew all about his treatment, and might have been called by the plaintiff as his witnesses. The plaintiff's case rested on the eloquent speech of his counsel, Mr. James, and his attack on Dr. Conolly. It was a very important question for the public to know, whether they were to be debarred from consulting that gentleman, in emergencies like these, merely because he happened to be the head of a lunatic establishment like that of Hanwell. The certificate which Dr. Conolly had signed had no reference to the defendant's establishment. It was a general certificate of the plaintiff's unsoundness of mind, and might have been produced at any establishment. It was said Dr. Conolly was a regular medical attendant at the defendant's house; but that was not the case. The book produced contained forty names, but Dr. Conolly only attended a portion of them.

Mr. Justice Hill.—The number varies from fifteen to eighteen.

Mr. Chambers said that the fact that the number varied showed that he was not a regular medical attendant, but only a consulting physician. Dr. Stilwell himself was the regular medical attendant, and his relative, Dr. James Stilwell, of Uxbridge. The payments made to Dr. Conolly did not make him a partner. It might as well be said that a barrister who received a retainer fee from the Bank of England or any commercial firm was a partner in the establishment, a proposition which was rather startling. Neither would his being paid by quarterly payments instead of by fees make Dr. Conolly a regular medical attendant. It was suggested that Dr. Conolly had acted from mercenary motives, and that because he received 700*l.* a-year from the establishment he would disgrace himself, and destroy his reputation by dishonourable acts. He (Mr. Chambers) treated that charge with the indignation it deserved; and he trusted the jury would not allow his honour to be attacked and his prospects blasted by such an imputation. It was not contrary to law for Dr. Conolly, as consulting physician, to sign such a certificate, so as to render himself guilty of a misdemeanour, which would subject him to three years' imprisonment, with hard labour. It was difficult when dealing with such a question to keep one's temper, though it was necessary for him (Mr. Chambers) to do so to the end. If Dr. Stilwell had made any misrepresentations respecting the plaintiff to Mrs. Ruck she might have been called as a witness. If any one was to blame in this matter, it was not the defendant, but Mr. and Mrs. Fisher, and Mr. Ackworth, and other members of the plaintiff's family, who ought to have interfered for his protection, and ought to have come forward now to disprove the charge of insanity. The learned counsel contended that the plaintiff had been taught to conceal the suspicions which he entertained of his wife. What had been his conduct since the commission? Mr. Jones tried to reconcile him to his wife, but he refused to be reconciled. Had he taken any notice of his six children? Had he seen or written to one of them? No. Yet he had not said one word against the kindness of Dr. Stilwell. The question, then, was,

whether the defendant (Dr. Stilwell) was to blame, either when he received the plaintiff or when he detained him? If there had been any fault in Dr. Stilwell's treatment of him, the plaintiff might have sued him in an action for that neglect; but there was no foundation for such a charge, and it would not have stood the slightest examination. The very existence of the defendant now rested on the result of the verdict. The friends of the plaintiff were of opinion that he had done his duty to him, and he (Mr. Chambers) prayed the jury not to ruin his reputation and destroy his prospects, for by doing that they would prevent men of respectability from undertaking the delicate charge of watching over gentlemen in the plaintiff's condition, and would throw those duties into the hands of men of an inferior class, and into more careless hands. He would leave the defendant's case in the hands of the jury, and feel that it was safe.

The learned counsel's address, which was delivered with great earnestness, was followed by some applause.

Mr. Justice Hill then summed up the evidence to the jury. His Lordship said the action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages from the defendant for imprisoning him among lunatics from the 5th of November, 1857, to the 27th of August, 1858. The defendant said he was justified in what he did; and the question for the jury to determine was, whether he was justified. It would be their duty to dismiss from their minds a vast deal of what they had heard discussed respecting the policy of the law. That was a question neither for the jury nor the judge, whose duty was to administer the law as they found it. One thing, however, was clear—viz., that most elaborate provisions had been made by the law for the protection of those who were placed in the unfortunate position of being confined in lunatic asylums. All human laws, however, were imperfect, but their defects must be remedied by the Legislature. A great change had been made in modern times in the mode in which lunatics were treated. Harshness and bodily restraint had given way to gentleness and soothing kindness, and the absence of bodily violence; and one gentleman, Dr. Conolly, had been proved to have taken a prominent part in bringing about this amelioration. But the question now was, whether the plaintiff's detention was justified by law. The defendant was the licensed keeper of a licensed asylum, and he said the patient was brought to him with a written order for his reception, and accompanied by two certificates, signed by two medical men, in the form pointed out by the statute, and that he was justified and bound to take charge of him till he died, or was discharged in due course of law. The plaintiff said there was a provision in the statute which forbade a certificate to be signed by certain parties; that Dr. Conolly's certificate was in violation of the Act of Parliament; and that the certificate was illegal, and no justification. It would be a question for the Court, whether the certificate, though sufficient in point of form, was sufficient in point of law. The provision was, "that no physician, surgeon, or apothecary who, or whose father, brother, son, partner, or assistant, is wholly or partly the proprietor of, or a regular professional attendant in, a licensed house, or hospital, shall sign a certificate for the reception of a patient into such house or hospital," &c. (16 and 17 Victoria, cap. 96, sec. 12.) The question which he (Mr. Justice Hill) should leave to the jury would be, whether they were of opinion, upon the evidence, that Dr. Conolly was "partly the proprietor of, or a regular professional attendant in, Moorcroft House; and, if so, he should direct them to find a verdict for the plaintiff for such damages as they might be advised. If, on the other hand, they should be of opinion that he was neither, he (Mr. Justice Hill) should direct them to find a verdict for the defendant. There would also be two other questions, whether Dr. Conolly examined the plaintiff separately and apart from Mr. Barnett, and also whether Mr. Barnett was in actual practice as a surgeon. His Lordship proceeded to observe, that there could be no doubt that the plaintiff had been suffering from *delirium tremens*, and he (the plaintiff) said that Dr.

Conolly and Mr. Barnett were both present all the time he was being examined, but there was no other evidence on that point, and the question would be, whether the jury could rely on the plaintiff's evidence in contradiction of the certificates, which stated that the parties had examined him "separately from any other medical practitioner." The next question would be, whether Dr. Stilwell kept the plaintiff *bonâ fide*, or whether he kept him there for his own gain, and those questions would be very important in considering the question of damages. His Lordship then read the plaintiff's evidence as to his treatment by the defendant, which showed that his delusions continued up to the 26th of July, 1858, and also the evidence of the keepers and Mr. Wainwright on the same point. His Lordship then referred to the book kept at the defendant's establishment, from which it appeared that in the first quarter of the year 1857 Dr. Conolly had received 15*l.* 10*s.* from the defendant. His Lordship thought that if Dr. Conolly had been partly the proprietor he would have received something out of every patient; but the book showed that he only received payments in respect of a certain number. It looked more like the case of a man who was "a regular professional attendant in" the asylum. In the second quarter, ending June, 1857, Dr. Conolly received his consulting fee (35 guineas) and payments in respect of eighteen out of forty patients. In the quarter ending at Michaelmas, 1857, Dr. Conolly received his consulting fee (35 guineas) and payments in respect of eighteen patients, in varying sums, amounting in all to 18*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.* In the quarter ending at Christmas, 1857, he received payments also in respect of eighteen patients. So, also, in the quarter ending in March, 1858, he received his consultation fee (25 guineas) and payments in respect of eighteen patients, and in that quarter Mr. Ruck's name appeared with 15*l.* opposite it. In the quarter ending at Midsummer, 1858, Dr. Conolly received his consultation fee of 25 guineas and payments in respect of eighteen patients, Mr. Ruck's name having 15*l.* opposite to it. It would be for the jury to say, upon that evidence, whether Dr. Conolly was or was not "a regular medical practitioner in" the asylum.

Mr. James called his Lordship's attention to the fact that while 15*l.* appeared twice after Mr. Ruck's name, Dr. Conolly had not attended him at all.

Mr. Justice Hill said that was certainly Mr. Ruck's evidence, but one of the witnesses said that Dr. Conolly spoke to him, and asked him how he did. His Lordship told the jury that, whether they thought Dr. Conolly was "in part a proprietor" or a "regular professional attendant" in the asylum, in either case they ought to find their verdict for the plaintiff, with such damages as they might think reasonable; but if they thought otherwise, they ought to find for the defendant.

The jury retired to consider their verdict, and on their return into court found that, if receiving the money as shown in the book made Dr. Conolly a part proprietor, they found the fact of receiving the money. They found that Dr. Conolly was the regular professional attendant, with 500*l.* damages.

As to Barnett's not being in practice, the jury found they had not sufficient evidence that he was not, nor had they sufficient evidence to satisfy them that the plaintiff had not been examined separately by Mr. Barnett and Dr. Conolly.

Mr. Justice Hill then directed the jury to find their verdict for the plaintiff, with 500*l.* damages, which was done accordingly.

Verdict for the plaintiff—Damages, 500*l.*

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